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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis presents analyses of (i) the public involvement in decision making processes in 
local government, and of (ii) the mobilisation of scientific expertise by the public engaged in 
these processes. The theoretical perspective of this research is at the intersection of Science 
Studies and Political Sciences. The Science Studies perspective is, however, clearly 
predominant.  
 This research, based on semi-open interviews, is empirical and the cases selected are 
decision-making processes with a strong technical-scientific dimension. More precisely, the 
cases selected are ten recent decision-making processes for the setting-up of incineration 
plants in France: the decision-making processes selected ended between 2003 and 2005. 
Beyond the empirical research, the research intends to improve existing theories and to 
provide novel concepts for the analysis of the public engagement and the mobilisation of 
scientific expertise by the public. 
 Part (i) shows that, in spite of the numerous legal possibilities that the local public 
authorities have, the level of public engagement was low. There was therefore very little 
political will to engage the public. The analysis suggests that an early participation sponsored 
by the public authority may diminish the degree of controversy of a decision-making process, 
whereas consultation is less likely to reach this goal. Finally, it seems that a high level of 
communication initiatives sponsored by the local NGOs is likely to lead to the abandonment 
of the incineration plant project.  
 Part (ii) shows that local NGOs may make positive contributions to public decision-
makings, widening the issue under discussion, and bringing alternative valid scientific and 
technical expertises. Therefore, the analysis support the position hold by many Science 
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Studies scholars who claim that public participation is likely to improve the quality of the 
overall expertise delivered to decision-makers. The analysis is also an agreement with a fairly 
positive view of NIMBY, which supports that the public may have a good grasp of and 
reasonable concern for health and welfare which are ignored by technical and administrative 
elites. Finally, the analysis supports the position hold by the ‘critical’ Public Understanding 
of Science scholars, that is, that the public is able to reflect on the source of their knowledge.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 This thesis presents analyses of (i) the public involvement in decision making processes in 
local government, and of (ii) the mobilisation of scientific expertise by the public engaged in 
those processes. The theoretical perspective of this research is at the intersection of Science 
Studies and Political Sciences. The Science Studies perspective is, however, clearly 
predominant.   
 This research is empirical and the cases selected are decision-making processes having a 
strong technical-scientific dimension. More precisely, the cases selected are ten recent 
decision-making processes for the setting-up of incineration plants in France: the decision-
making processes selected ended between 2003 and 2005 
 Because this research is twofold, the dissertation has been structured in nine chapters 
distributed in three parts. Part I is kind of ‘introductory’ part for the two other parts; it is made 
up of three chapters. In chapter 1, the (science study) literature on the use of scientific 
expertise in public decision-making processes is reviewed and the six research questions 
which stem from this literature review are presented. Concerning public engagement, these 
are: “1. to what extent is the public actually involved in decision-making processes?”; “2. how 
strong is the political will to involve the public?”; “3. what is the impact of the public 
engagement on the decision-making processes (i.e. on their degree of controversy, and on 
their outcome)?” Concerning the mobilisation of scientific knowledge by the public, the two 
first research questions tackle the sources of scientific knowledge mobilised by the public: “4. 
To what extent does local NGOs seek scientific expertise; what are their sources?”; and “5. 
what are the reasons invoked by the local NGOs for not mobilising scientific expertise?” The 
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third question deals with the use of scientific knowledge in the discourses of the public: “6. Is 
scientific knowledge a key argument in the discourses of the public; what are the other types 
of arguments that the public employs to gain credibility?” Chapter 2 deals with the selection 
of the cases and its social and academic justifications, and with the main lines of the 
methodology, which is mainly qualitative. Finally, chapter 3 gives an overview of 
chronological structure of the selected decision-making processes, and provides an analytical 
description of the actors involved, detailing the structuring of the mobilisation of the NGOs 
which engaged. 
 Part II deals with the public engagement in the selected decision-making processes. 
Chapter 4 sets up the theoretical framework, and details the methodology used to collect and 
treat the data. In chapter 5, the legal framework of the public engagement is set up. Chapter 6 
then attempts to answer the three research questions which deal with the public engagement.  
 In Part III, I analyse the mobilisation of scientific expertise by the public. To be more 
precise, in this part of the research I have limited my study of the public to the locally 
engaged NGOs. Chapter 7 outlines the theoretical framework and details the methodology 
used while chapter 8 deals with the sources of scientific expertise of the NGOs and chapter 9 
with the use of scientific expertise in the discourses of the NGOs. An introduction can be 
found at the beginning of each part; these introductions notably detail the structuring of the 
parts, respectively. 
 As the structure detailed above shows, part II and part III have their own theoretical 
framework in addition to the overarching framework presented in Part I. While the data 
collection methods, based mainly on semi-open interviews, are similar, the data treatment 
methods are very different. This is the reason why the methodology is explained in three 
steps: in part I the main lines are stated, then more details are given the respective theoretical 
chapters, and finally, possible necessary technical details are provided as the data analyses are 
made. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This part sets up the common framework of this twofold research. Chapter 1 is a kind of 
introductory chapter in which the (Science Study) literature is reviewed and the research 
questions about public engagement, on the one hand, and about public mobilisation of 
scientific expertise, on the other, are put forward. Chapter 2 introduces the main lines of the 
methodology used in this research. In this chapter, I also provide a discussion of the selection 
of the cases, that is, about the selection of the setting up of waste incineration plants as object 
of this research. The selection of ten decision-making processes for this multiple cases study 
is also discussed. Finally, in chapter 3 I provide a detailed but non-analytical description of 
the chronological structure of the studied decision-making processes. The actors engaged in 
the decision-making processes, notably the local public authorities and the public, are 
detailed, and an analytical description of the mobilisation of the (local) NGOs is provided.    
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Chapter 1  
Traditional Scientific Expertise is not Enough 
 
 Over the past forty years, western democracies have increasingly based their public 
decision-making on scientific expertise. However, relationships between power and scientific 
knowledge are now changing. Until the 1990’s the use of scientific expertise in technical-
scientific public decisions was not really questioned, at least not in the Science Studies field. 
Scientific expertise used to work as “speaking truth to power” (Price Don K., 1965). The 
process of the expert “speaking truth to power” can be roughly described as follows: when 
politicians were facing a problem involving technical-scientific aspects, they turned toward 
scientists to provide the answers; scientists analysed the problem and gave their “objective 
scientific advice”; then, politicians based their decision on this scientific-technical advice and 
thus, could claim that they objectively made the best possible decision. When those decisions 
did not turn out for the best, politics had the possibility to deflect their responsibility onto a 
technical failure. 
 By ‘technical-scientific public decision-making’ I mean “decision-making at those points 
where science and technology intersect with the political domain because the issues are of 
visible relevance to the public: should you eat British beef, prefer nuclear power to coal-fired 
power stations, want a quarry in your village, accept the safety of anti-misting kerosene as an 
airplane fuel, vote for politicians who believe in human cloning, support the Kyoto 
agreement, and so forth” (Collins H.M. and Evans R., 2002, p. 236). 
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However, the 1980’s and 1990’s have been a turning point for the relationship between 
power and scientific expertise. Many scandals arose around issues of risks and expertise, 
including: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, also called ‘mad cow disease’) in the 
U.K and then in Europe; the culture of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) crops in the 
U.S.A and in Europe; the contamination of cow’s milk by dioxins produced by waste 
incinerators in France; the contamination of transfusion blood by AIDS in France; or the 
radioactive pollution following the Chernobyl accident, and in particular the radioactive cloud 
which officially stopped at the French border. At the same time, many societal-technical 
controversies have also broken out concerning the global climate change, the water pollution 
by chemicals, or the territory management such as the sitting of nuclear power plants, nuclear 
waste disposals, railway lines, or waste incineration plants. Following these technical-
scientific and social controversies, the role of scientific expertise in public decision-making 
has been under discussion in the western democracies. And some top-down changes occurred; 
for example in France, a series of state agencies have been set up in order to provide 
independent public expertise. In 1998, three agencies were created: INVS to reinforce the 
general sanitary monitoring, AFSSA to monitor products intended to human use, such as 
foodstuffs, and AFSSAPS to monitor the health products. And in 2001 the French parliament 
voted in favour of the creation of AFFSSE, an agency put in charge of monitoring the 
environmental hazards to human health. 
 In this context, in the 1990’s-2000’s, many Science Studies scholars have analysed the use 
of traditional scientific expertise in technical-scientific public decision-makings. From here 
onward, the term ‘traditional’ has been linked to the technocratic way of making decisions: 
roughly speaking, experts produce their expertise within their scientific community, and then 
they communicate their final report to the decision-makers. ‘Traditional scientific expertise’ is 
thus distinct from the innovative experiences in which the public is involved, such as 
consensus conferences, or focus groups. Moreover the terms ‘scientific’ and ‘science’ refer to 
the natural sciences, such as physics, chemistry, biology; this research does not deal with 
other domains of expertise such as the economy.  Science Studies scholars have reached the 
conclusion that traditional scientific expertise actually encounters many problems. But they 
also propose some solutions for solving these problems. 
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I. The Problems of Traditional Scientific Expertise: The Science Studies 
Analysis 
 Science Studies scholars implicitly do not question the fact that scientific expertise is a 
foundation stone for the functioning of modern democracy. However, they have severely 
contested the way it is used, and the neat boundaries drawn between science, society and 
politic. They no longer consider that the conception of scientific expertise as “speaking truth 
to power” is valid. Traditional scientific expertise is not able to solve risk problems on its 
own: scientific expertise is not enough. The Science Studies scholars who claim that scientific 
expertise has failed invoke two main reasons: scientific expertise is not as positive as science 
is, and experts do not stand apart from values and personal interests. 
 
I.1. Traditional Scientific Expertise Is Not As Positive As Science Is 
Scientific expertise is not as positive as science is for three reasons. To begin with, 
according to H. Nowotny, experts are forced to transgress the limits of their competencies 
because scientists, when acting as experts, have to solve problems they have not chosen 
(Nowotny H., 2003).  In particular, in the case of crisis, scientists are nimbly asked to provide 
solutions or at least reliable information: they are consequently under pressure. Thus, if the 
available knowledge is not sufficient, they tend to transgress the boundaries of their discipline 
and the limits of their own knowledge. Even if uncertainties are omnipresent, decisions are to 
be taken and so scientists feel obliged to provide answers, at any cost. In other words, once a 
scientist has accepted the role of expert, he must give definite answers, frequently more 
definite than the state of the knowledge actually allows. In fact, as Helga Nowotny claims 
“the right of experts to say in public “we do not know has been won only recently, as the 
consequence of public scandals that have led to a break with ignoble silence or overt lying” 
(Nowotny H., 2003, p.152). 
Secondly, to be really valid, scientific expertise should understand the interactions 
between scientific knowledge, institutions, local context and the practices of the diverse actors 
(Nowotny H., 2003; Funtowicz S. and Ravetz J., 1992). Even in cases where there is no 
uncertainty about scientific knowledge, traditional expertise is transgressive because no risk 
issue is solely scientific or technical. Yet it is hardly possible for scientific expertise to act in 
an open field and thus to deal with the complexity of the real natural and social world, 
because science has historically drawn its strength from the isolation of the laboratories. Since 
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the 18th century, researchers have been substituting the great world of the common 
experience, the macrocosm where we live, with the microcosm of the well-equipped 
laboratories: laboratories are the tool which allow researchers to grasp and manipulate the 
macrocosm by simplifying and reducing it (Callon M., Lascoumes P. Barthe Y., 2001).1 
Thirdly, in order to reach a consensus among them, scientific experts frame the domain 
of relevance of the problem according to their own specialised discipline. Once this boundary-
work2 of relevance is realised, they consider as scientific what is inside the domain and as 
politic or values what lies out-side it. Consequently, scientists may exclude important aspects 
from their expertise; the gain in rigor is balanced by an imaginative narrowness. Thus 
scientific expertise is not neutral; it is an error to consider that scientists merely answer the 
questions asked by politics, using their special skills or superior knowledge. By this process 
of framing, they have the political power to decide the very terms of the deliberation. 
(Jasanoff S., 2003). Sheila Jasanoff insists on the importance of the activity of framing 
because “expertise often does not pre-exist the disputes the experts are summoned to settle, 
but is contingency produced within the very context of disputation. Expertise is not so much 
found as made in the process of litigation or other forms of technical decision-making” 
(Jasanoff S., 2003, p. 159, see also Jasanoff S., 1995a and Goodwin, 1994).  
 
I.2. Experts Do Not Stand Apart From Values and Personal Interests  
Not only is objective scientific knowledge alone unsuitable for grasping the complexity 
of the real world, experts do not stand apart from values and personal interests. To begin with, 
when traditional scientific expertise is value laden, that is, when acting as experts, what 
scientists “are doing is not ‘science’ in an ordinary sense, but a hybrid activity that combines 
elements of scientific evidence and reasoning with large doses of social and political 
judgment.” (Jasanoff, S, 1990, p. 229; see also Nowotny H., 2003; Jasanoff S. and Lynch M., 
1998; Funtowicz S. and Ravetz J., 1992). In other words, traditional scientific expertise is not 
                                                 
1 Michel Callon, Yannick Barthe and Pierre Lascoumes consider scientific research to act in three steps called 
“traduction.” “Traduction 1” is the reduction from the real world (macrocosm) to the little world of the 
laboratories (microcosm). “Traduction 2” is the work of the researchers who explore simplified objects using the 
huge concentration of instruments and competencies of the laboratories. The last step, “traduction 3,” is the 
always perilous return to the real world: will the knowledge and machines produced in the confined spaces of the 
laboratories survive in it? 
2 The concept of ‘boundary work’ was developed by Gieryn (Gieryn T. F., 1983; Gieryn T. F., 1999c; Gieryn 
T.F., 1995), and first applied by Sheila Jasanoff (Jasanoff S., 1987, and Jasanoff, S, 1990). See chapter 7, sub-
section  IV.2 for further details. 
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objective; it incorporates many popular conceptions and personal values. The conclusions of 
scientific expert evaluations often depend on the social positions and interests of the experts 
who produce them. This diversity of conclusions reflects the commitment of the diverse 
stake-holders and policy-makers. In other words, value judgments are notably acting during 
the experts’ work of boundary, when they decide what is relevant and what is not (Jasanoff, S, 
1990; Irwin A. and Wynne B., 1996). It is very difficult for an expert not to bias his 
conclusions by personal values because he is dealing with issues that involve the society in 
which he, his family, and his friends all live. When acting as experts, scientists leave their 
isolated laboratories to immerse themselves in the society. 
Traditional scientific expertise may also be affected by personal interests and financial 
dependence. Indeed, an expert is often firstly a researcher and the financing of his research, 
and thus his career, depends on public authorities and on important economic groups. Many 
researchers can feel (or are) obliged to provide a scientific expert evaluation which does not 
bother too much some current or potential future financiers; very few researchers can be 
totally independent when acting as experts (Jasanoff, 1990). 
 
According to Sheila Jasanoff, these criticisms of traditional scientific expertise seem to 
be shared by the scientists themselves in the U.S.A (See Jasanoff, S, 1990, p. 229). The 
situation appears to be similar in France, for example during the meeting “Environnement: 
expertise, science et société du 15 juin 2000,” the director of the French Centre National de la 
Recherche Scientifique declared: 
“Who could deny that from identical scientific conclusions, two researchers react 
in a different way according to their personal sensibility and consciousness?” 3 
 (Brechignac C., 2000) 
and the director of the Institute Pierre Simon Laplace des sciences de l'environnement global 
stated: 
“Neither witness, neither wise, he (a scientist who is acting as an expert) must be 
aware that science is not necessarily at the heart of the debate.” 4  
(Megie G., 2000) 
                                                 
3 Original version: “qui pourrait nier qu'à partir de conclusions scientifiques identiques, deux chercheurs 
réagissent différemment en fonction de leur sensibilité et de leur conscience personnelles?” 
4 Original version: “ni témoin, ni sage, il [le scientifique agissant comme expert] émet un avis et doit prendre 
conscience que la science n'est pas nécessairement l'élément essentiel du débat.” 
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 To sum up, the fact that experts do not act entirely free from values, and personal interests, 
and that traditional scientific expertise is not enough, has lead to the multiplicity of scientific 
expertises and counter expertises. Sheila Jasanoff suggests that decision-makers (in the United 
States) have exploited this multiplicity of scientific expertise to serve their own pre-defined 
goals through the selection of ad hoc experts or expertise:  
“an uncritical and theoretically uninformed discourse of expertise has fostered 
both an instrumental attitude toward experts on the part of government and 
relatively weak demands for accountability from citizens.” 
(Jasanoff S., 2003Jasanoff S., 2003, p.158) 
 
I.3. Discrepancy between expectations and the reality of traditional scientific 
expertise 
 To conclude, many Science Studies scholars agree that traditional scientific expertise is in 
crisis. They implicitly argue that the origin of the crisis is the discrepancy between what is 
expected from scientific experts and the reality of the traditional expertise. By ‘scientific 
expert’ I mean: a mediator between science and society who is summoned to rapidly solve 
problems that society is facing by using his special scientific skills. It is expected that 
scientific experts behave as if they would be “ideal” ‘scientific engineers’5 able to rapidly 
provide the ‘objective best solution’, whereas they are advisers, who have their restricted 
domain of competencies, who may make value judgements, who are fallible and who have 
personal interests. Moreover, at best experts are ‘scientific researchers’6 who deal with 
uncertainties and who need time to go further. This discrepancy between the expectations and 
the reality of traditional scientific expertise, and thus the arguments developed in the two 
previous sections have been summarized in the figure 1 below, which has been inspired by 
Jacques Theys (Theys J., 2000).  
                                                 
5 By ‘scientific engineer’, I mean a professional who uses certified and objective scientific knowledge in his 
daily activities. In Khunian terms, he works with (very well) established paradigms. Due to his special skills, a 
scientist is expected to be the most efficient person to close a controversy: he is supposed to be competent, 
impartial and rapid. In other words, scientists are considered according to Merton’s norms: universalism, 
communism, disinterestedness and organised scepticism. 
6 By ‘scientific researcher’ I mean a scientist who is at the frontiers of the well established knowledge, and who 
has to be imaginative in order to create new knowledge. A ‘scientific researcher’ has to deal with uncertainties, 
and he needs time to produce new knowledge. Finally, if necessary, a scientific researcher can discuss a 
paradigm and build a new one. 
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Figure 1: Discrepancy between the expectations from experts and the actual problems of traditional 
scientiific expertise  
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 This discrepancy, however, may appear as a caricature of the traditional scientific 
expertise. I do not claim, that all the experts are ‘non competent’, ‘partial’, or that they 
‘exceed their power’, that is, that the traditional scientific expertise does not work at all. I 
claim, rather, that in the light of the various scandals of the 1980’s and 1990’s and of the 
analysis made by  Science Studies scholars, there is a suspicion of ‘non-competency’, a 
suspicion of ‘partiality-unfairness’, and a suspicion of ‘excess of power’. 
II. Solutions to Solve the Problems of Traditional Scientific Expertise 
To solve the problem of traditional scientific expertise, Science Studies scholars 
propose two solutions: the precautionary principle for facing scientific uncertainties; and the 
involvement of the public to counter the possible non-competency, partiality, and excess of 
power of scientific experts. 
II.1. Facing Uncertainties: The Precautionary Principle 
The precautionary principle has become very popular, and is often invoked by diverse 
social actors to defend their interests and by journalists. Its meaning has consequently been 
transformed and manipulated and is thus not always clear. Apart these more or less fair uses 
of the precautionary principle, many ‘official’ and legal definitions can be found (see Morris 
J., 2002, p.1-21). The precautionary principle has been traced to the German principle of 
‘foresight-planning’ (Vorsorgeprinzip), a founding principle of German environmental 
policies during the 1970’s.  It later became a cornerstone of international environmental co-
operation, first used at the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea 
in 1987. The precautionary principle can be briefly formulated as follows: in case of doubt 
over the potential serious or irreversible consequences of a ‘technical-scientific object’ (for 
example the use of a new chemical, the introduction of a GMO in agriculture), protective 
measures must be taken (for example forbidding the use of the chemical, forbidding the use of 
the GMO  open fields) and at the same time experts must be asked to search for conclusive 
scientific evidence of the innocuousness of the object. Thus, the precautionary principle 
allows experts to deal with knowledge uncertainties; they are no longer summoned to give an 
immediate answer, they can say “We don’t know, we need time to go further in the research”. 
In other words the precautionary principle gives time to scientists to find conclusive evidence.  
The precautionary principle must not be confused with ‘prevention’. The former is used in 
case of uncertainties about the dangers and asks science for more information, whereas in the 
case of the latter dangers are identified. This confusion is linked to another one made between 
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uncertainties and risks. In the case of risk, the probability of an event’s occurrence and its 
negative consequences are established – the dangers are known, whereas in the case of 
uncertainties neither the probability nor the consequences of the danger are known – there is 
merely a suspicion about the existence of dangers. 
 
II.2. Public Involvement 
Numerous Science Studies scholars agree that the public should be involved in the 
technical-scientific public decisions, and should be considered as complementary to both 
scientific advice and systems of political representation. The positions of these scholars can 
be summarised by the position of Evans and Plows, who argue that “more heterogeneous 
participation and debate have the potential to improve the scrutiny and accountability of 
science within representative democracies” (Evans, Robert and Plows, Alexandra, 2007, p. 
827). The main goal of public involvement put forward by these scholars is that scientific 
expertise has to be widened in order to answer the complexities of the social and the political 
world, that is, that decision-making has to incorporate ‘non-standard’ knowledge in the 
governance of risk (Wynne B., 1992a; Fischer F., 1999; Weale A., 2001; Callon M., 
Lascoumes P. Barthe Y., 2001; Nowotny H., Scott P. Gibbons M., 2001; Nowotny H., 2003; 
Jasanoff S., 2003; Grundmann R. and Stehr N., 2003; Dietrich H., Schibeci R., 2003).  
Frank Fisher, for example, puts it this way when he argues for a ‘participatory 
expertise’: 
“There is not only a place for citizen input in socio-technical investigation, but a 
need for it. While citizens may not be capable of judging the complex technical 
calculations (and are seldom interested in trying to) they are able to offer valuable 
thoughts and judgments about the social assumptions and contextual 
interpretations that go into the mix.”  
(Fischer F., 1999, p. 301; see also Fischer F., 1990) 
 
For Brian Wynne (1992), the public’s expertise in relation to matters of ignorance resides 
in its ability to decide to whom to extend trust and confidence. In other words the public has 
the ability to broaden the frame of a given the problem. Furthermore, he argues that “science 
offers a framework that is unavoidably social as well as technical since in public domain 
scientific knowledge embodies implicit models or assumptions about the social world” (Irwin 
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A. and Wynne B., 1996, p. 1-17). In other words, insofar as expert assessments depend on 
assumptions about, for example, slaughterhouse practice or the use of protective clothing 
among farm labourers, it is likely that relevant public will be more expert in these matters 
than the technical experts.  
 Probably one of the most accomplished lines of argumentation on this issue has been 
developed by Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott and Michael who argue that it is necessary to move 
from a merely scientific reliable knowledge toward a ‘social robust knowledge’ (Nowotny H., 
Scott P. Gibbons M., 2001). The validity of scientific knowledge is not contested as such but 
its validation is too self-referential and thus self-sufficient. ‘Social robust knowledge’ has 
three interrelated aspects. Firstly, certified scientific expertise must be tested outside by 
confrontation with social, economic, cultural and political dimensions. Secondly, social 
robustness is more likely to be realised by involving a plurality of expertise, real or 
‘symbolic’ users and real or ‘imagined’ lay persons. The aim is to create a mix between 
scientific knowledge and other kinds of knowledge, expertise and experience. Thirdly, as 
society becomes an active partner in the making of expertise, robustness results from an 
iterative and repeated process. 
This widening is considered especially crucial in the cases of high scientific uncertainty 
(Weinberg A., 1972) and still more crucial in cases of political salience (Funtowicz S. and 
Ravetz J., 1992). More precisely, Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992) have sought to develop a 
framework for discussing the grounds and prospects for involving lay participation on 
scientific analysis and modelling. The core of their model is that there are two important 
dimensions to scientific approaches to policy questions. First, there is the amount of ‘system 
uncertainty’, and second, there is the ‘scale of the decision stakes’. When uncertainties and 
decision stakes are both low, one is the realm of applied science. When either the uncertainty 
or the decision stakes (or both) are higher, one enters in the realm of professional consultancy, 
which consists of personal judgments based on higher-skills. If either the decision-stakes or 
the uncertainty is very high, then Funtowicz and Ravetz claim the necessity of the 
involvement of citizens, the designation they suggest for such a situation is “post-normal 
science”. Funtowicz and Ravetz are not committed to the furthest extension of democracy; 
they claim that the involvement of a larger group of peers, with different kinds of knowledge, 
will favour the production of high-quality knowledge. 
 
To conclude, not only are science studies scholars convinced that there is a need to 
establish a role for non-experts in technical public decision-making, many stake-holders and 
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politicians share this view. The requirement for more participatory democracy, notably 
concerning environmental issues, has become a dominant narrative in Europe and France. 
French national institutions such as the public agency ADEME, which is, among other roles, 
an adviser to public authorities, recommends the involvement of all the actors, including the 
Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as environmental associations, or citizens 
associations, in the elaboration of local household waste management projects (ADEME, 
2005b). In 1998, France signed the European convention of Aarhus, which is in favour of 
major information and participation of the public at the outset of decision-making processes 
having an environmental impact, when all options are opened. This convention was enforced 
in the French law in 2002.7 Furthermore, the law 2002-276 du 27 février 2002 about the 
démocratie de proximité (proximity democracy) transformed the Commission Nationale du 
Débat Public (National Commission of Public Debate), created in 1995 by the so-called law 
“Barnier,”8 into an independent administrative authority and increased its domain of 
competence.9 Finally, at the European level, in its white paper on European governance the 
Commission of the European Communities is in favour of a major involvement of the civil 
society, which includes among others, NGOs, organisations which involves local and 
municipal life.10 So, the legal framework concerning the public involvement is changing, and 
the local elected decision-makers are likely, a priori, to be able to involve the public in order 
to avoid the development of controversial decision-making processes. 
 
III. A Twofold Research 
III.1. Research Questions 
 We have just seen that participatory democracy has become an important narrative in the 
Science Study literature, and in the European and French national legislation. In this academic 
and legislative context, this Science Studies research focuses onto two interrelated issues: the 
public engagement in public decision-making processes, and the mobilisation of scientific 
knowledge by the public. Public involvement has become a dominant narrative only recently 
and the legal framework has evolved recently as well. It is thus interesting to look at the 
                                                 
7 See chapter 5, sub-section IV.2, and the concluding chapter for further details about the Aarhus convention. 
8 Loi n 95-101 du 2 février 1995 relative au renforcement de la protection de l’environnement. 
9 See chapter 5, sub-section IV.1 for further detailes about the National Public Debate Commission. 
10 See Commission Of The European Communities, 2001,  p. 14-15 
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reality of the current public involvement practices on the ground, and thus to see to what 
extent the executive elected decision-makers actually involve the public. In technical-
scientific decision-making, the mobilisation of scientific knowledge by the public is central. 
Beyond the social knowledge it may bring, the public may also mobilise some scientific 
expertise, or more generally some scientific knowledge. Consequently, this study intends to 
answer two sets of questions, the first set concerns the public engagement, while the second 
one considers the mobilisation of scientific knowledge by the public.  
 Scientific knowledge is at the core of the present Science Studies research; it is the vital 
lead. In ‘technical-scientific’ decision-making processes, such as the setting up of incineration 
plants studied here, ‘scientific expertise’ is a type of information which is likely to play a 
significant role. As I show in sub-section I.1 of chapter 2, ‘scientific expertise’ uncertainties 
are at the origin of the social controversies which develop around the setting up of 
incineration plants. The ‘flow of information’ (which includes scientific knowledge) between 
the public and the public authority is a key concept in this research, and constitutes the link 
between part  II, which analyses the public engagement, and part III, which deals with the 
mobilisation of scientific expertise by the public. In part II, the typology of the public 
engagement mechanisms is precisely developed around the concept of ‘flow of information’. 
While in part III, I analyse the content of the flow of information emitted by the engaged 
NGOs, focusing on scientific expertise. In substance, in this research I analyse the 
mobilisation of scientific expertise by the public in decision-making processes in which this 
public is more or less involved 
Public Engagement 
 While rationales and mechanisms for participation in public decision-making processes 
have received the most Science Studies attention, less attention has been paid to the actual 
impact of participation on these decision-making processes and outcomes, and to the actual 
political will to involve the public. The existing public participation Science Studies literature 
can be classified into four types. 
 First, some authors have focused on the functioning of highly inclusive and rather 
innovative mechanisms. The objects of these studies are principally the most well-known 
mechanisms, that is, public hearings, initiatives, public surveys, negotiated rule making, and 
citizens review panels (Fiorino, Daniel J., 1990), and above all consensus conferences (Blok 
A., 2007; Seifert F., 2006; Einsiedel E., Jelsoe E. Breck T., 2001; Guston, David H., 1999). 
Some less well-known or more specific mechanisms have been, however, studied too, such as 
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the open ended consultation through a local daily newspaper (Levitt, Mairi, Weiner, Kate, and 
Goodacre, John, 2005), or the Swedish “Transparency Forum” and the UK public debate ‘GM 
nation?’ (Lezaun J., Soneryd L., 2007). 
 A second branch of the researches has attempted to classify the mechanisms (Rowe, Gene 
and Frewer, Lynn J., 2005; Renn O., Webler T. and Wiedemann P., 1995), and above all to 
identify criteria to evaluate their quality (Horlick-Jones T., Rowe G. Walls J., 2007; Rowe, 
Gene and Frewer, Lynn J., 2005/4/1; Rowe, Gene and Frewer, Lynn J., 2004; Rowe G. and 
Frewer L.J., 2000; Rowe G., Horlick-Jones T. Walls J. Pidgeon N., 2005; Goven, Joanna, 
2003; Laird, Frank N., 1993) 
 As we have already seen in sections I and II of this chapter, a third category of studies has 
paid attention to the rationales for more public involvement in technical public decision-
makings. 
 Finally, quite recently, a few studies have dealt with the impact of the public 
involvement on the decision-making processes or on the policies. To begin with, Henry 
Rothstein has considered “the impacts of participation by examining the UK Food Standards 
Agency's (FSA) Consumer Committee, which was created in 2002 to top-downsize consumer 
representation within policy making, but which was disbanded as a failure in 2005” 
(Rothstein, Henry, 2007, p. 582). Murdrock and al. have examined ten pilot projects that were 
part of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Project XL (excellence and leadership) to 
evaluate process goals (i.e. fairness and competence) and outcome goals (i.e. trust and 
incorporation of public values in decisions) (Murdock, Barbara Scott, Wiessner, Carol, and 
Sexton, Ken, 2005). Finally Robert Futrell has assessed the differential outcomes produced by 
two decision styles (technical adversarialism and participatory collaboration) in decision 
making on the U.S. Chemical Weapons Disposal Program (Futrell, Robert, 2003). 
 
 As a conclusion, there is little Science Studies research assessing the impact of public 
involvement on decision-making processes, that is, on their outcome and degree of 
controversy. Moreover, Science Studies has tended to avoid political science questions, and 
there is no knowledge about the public involvement mechanisms actually used by the local 
decision-makers, and about the actual political will to involve the public. Thus, through a 
multiple–case study comparing decision-making processes which would be similar but with 
various degrees of public involvement (and not only innovative participative mechanisms) 
and various degree of controversy (and not only controversial situations), this research intends 
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to answer the following first set of three research questions: first, “1. to what extent is the 
public actually engaged in local decision-making processes?”; second, “ 2. how strong is the 
political will to involve the public?”; and third, “3. what is the impact of the public 
engagement on the decision-making processes (i.e. on the degree of controversy, and on the 
completion/ giving up of the initial project)?”  
Mobilisation of Scientific Knowledge by the Public 
 As for the mobilisation of scientific knowledge by the public, the Public Understanding of 
Science (PUS) studies can be divided into three families corresponding to three approaches: 
the ‘traditional’, the ‘critical’, and a third one which address the traditional-critical divide.11 
While ‘traditional’ PUS studies are numerous, less attention has been paid to the ‘critical 
PUS’ approach. Since the beginning of the 1990’s, a great number of traditional PUS studies 
have been published in the most important Science Studies journals: Science Studies, Science 
Technology and Human Values, and above all in Public Understanding of Science.12 
Traditional PUS studies assess the ‘Scientific Literacy’ (SL) of the public, or its attitude 
toward science generally speaking or toward more specific domains, such as radioactivity, the 
genetic sciences, bio-technologies, or GMOs. Most of these studies are survey, resorting to 
questionnaires, but focus groups are also used.13  
 The ‘critical’ PUS approach is more recent, and has been built upon criticisms toward the 
‘traditional’ approach: it criticizes the ‘deficit model’ view, and the use of surveys which, 
according to it, support this view. Critical PUS aims at opening the black box of the ‘scientific 
ignorance’ of the public using qualitative methods, and carrying out studies in contexts. The 
critical approach literature is less numerous than the traditional, but it is however substantive 
and growing. The ‘critical’ approach literature consists of theoretical 
framework/programmatical discussions (Wynne B., 1991, Yearley S., 1994, Irwin A. and 
                                                 
11 The terms ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ PUS have been coined by Mike Michael (Michael M., 2002a), to 
distinguish the two main theoretical perspectives used in the Public Understanding of Science field. In the 
literature, ‘traditional’ PUS is also labelled ‘Questionnaire method’ or ‘Survey research’, and ‘critical PUS’, 
‘Ethnographic perspective’ or ‘Constructivist social and anthropological research’. See Chapter 7 for further 
details about these two approaches. 
12 In this enormous literature, more than 50 articles can be found. Among the most recents, see for example: Qin, 
Wei and Brown, J. Lynne, 2007; Lujan, Jose Luis and Todt, Oliver, 2007; Lowe, Thomas, Brown, Katrina, 
Dessai, Suraje, de Franca Doria, Miguel, Haynes, Kat, and Vincent, Katharine, 2006; Macoubrie, Jane, 2006; 
Gutteling, Jan, Hanssen, Lucien, van der Veer, Neil, and Seydel, Erwin, 2006; Priest, Susanna Hornig, 2006; 
Sanderson, Saskia C., Wardle, Jane, and Michie, Susan, 2005; Gaivoronskaia, Galina and Hvinden, Bjorn, 2006; 
Lassen, Jesper and Jamison, Andrew, 2006; Lee, Stuart and Roth, Wolff-Michael, 2003    
13 More details about this approach can be found in chapter 7. 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Chapter 1 
Traditional Scientific Expertise is not Enough 
 
 
- 19 - 
Wynne B., 1996, p. 1-17, Irwin A. and Michael M., 2003), and of a few case studies. The 
most widely known cases studies have been published in what can be considered the founding 
book of the critical approach:  “Misunderstanding science? The public reconstruction of 
science and technology” (Irwin A. and Wynne B., 1996). Other case studies have been 
published in Science Studies journals. Some papers analyse the interactions between expert 
and lay knowledge: radioactivity experts’ and sheep farmers’ knowledge in Cumbria 
following the Chernobyl accident (Wynne, B, 1992b); the outside scientists’ and the Saami 
pastoralists’ knowledge in Norway, also following the Chernobyl accident (Paine, R, 1992); 
the dynamics of expertise and their  implications for the lay--expert divide at a series of public 
events about the new genetics (Kerr, Anne, Cunningham-Burley, Sarah, and Amos, Amanda, 
1998). Then others papers study the views of public on science in specified contexts: analysis 
of teachers’ views on biotechnology and the teaching of it (Michael, Mike, Grinyer, Anne, 
and Turner, Jill, 1997); views on air quality information based on a case study in Teesside and 
Sunderland in northeast England (Bush J., Moffatt S. Dunn C. E., 2001); analysis of 
acceptance or rejection of the scientific knowledge according to the construction of the home 
culture ( Solomon, Joan, 1993).14 
 Recently, a few authors have addressed the existing divide between survey-based (i.e. 
traditional) and ethnographic (i.e. critical) studies (Nisbet, Matthew C. and Goidel, Robert K., 
2007Bauer, Martin W., Allum, Nick, and Miller, Steve, 2007; Sturgis, Patrick and Allum, 
Nick, 2004; Kallerud, Egil and Ramberg, Inge, 2002). The core of the position of these 
scholars is that there has been confusion between epistemological and methodological issues. 
They argue that PUS research has been hindered by a fallacious “essentialist” association 
between the survey research protocol and the public deficit model. And they challenge the de 
facto orthodoxy that has connected the deficit model with quantitative methodology, on the 
one hand, and the contextualist perspectives with qualitative research methodology on the 
other hand.  
  
 To conclude, in these three approaches, the public has been considered passive and not 
active toward scientific knowledge. Public Understanding of Science has precisely dealt with 
the understanding of scientific knowledge or with value of the public lay knowledge, but little 
attention has been paid to the mobilisation of scientific knowledge by the public. 
                                                 
14 More details about this approach can be found in chapter 7. 
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Consequently, there is little about the sources of scientific knowledge of the public in this 
literature; I have found only three papers. Two of them actually deal with the sources of 
scientific knowledge of journalists (Conrad, Peter, 1999; Wilson, Kris M., 2000). The third 
one analyses the impact of the source characteristics on public responses to information about 
genetic engineering (Frewer, Lynn J., Howard, Chaya, Hedderley, Duncan, and Shepherd, 
Richard, 1999). Finally, knowledge is also lacking as to the role of scientific arguments in 
public discourse, and I have found single study about this issue. So this research aims to 
answer the following three research questions. The two first questions tackle the sources of 
scientific knowledge mobilised by the public: “4. To what extent does local NGOs seek 
scientific expertise; what are their sources?”; “5. what are the reasons invoked by the local 
NGOs for not mobilising scientific expertise?” With this question, considering that the public 
selects sources that it trusts, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the sources the 
public trust. The third question deals with the use of scientific knowledge in the discourses of 
the public: “6. Is scientific expertise a key argument in the discourses of the NGOs; what are 
the other types of arguments NGOs employ in their discourses to convince the wider public 
and the public authorities?” 
 
III.2. Aims of the Research 
 This research aims to make a contribution, in general, to the Science Studies field, and to 
the Public Understanding of Science. It aims to make an empirical contribution, through a 
multiple-case study, but also a theoretical one, with the improvement of existing theories and 
the building-up of new ones.  
 With regard to the empirical contribution, this research aims to evaluate the actual impact 
of public engagement mechanisms – depending on their inclusivity – on two aspects of public 
decision-making processes: their outcome and their degree of controversy. Furthermore, it 
intends to provide an analytical description of not well known aspects, at least from a Science 
Studies perspective, of the public involvement (public engagement mechanisms actually 
used), and of the public mobilisation of scientific knowledge (causes of possible ignorance, 
sources of scientific knowledge, role of scientific knowledge in the public’s discourses).  
 Of course, to answer the research questions, meta-theories and theories and are necessary. 
The theoretical aims of this research vary according to the research questions. For the two 
first questions about the actual public engagement, an existing theory (a property space of the 
public engagement mechanisms developed by Rowe and Frewer [Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  
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2005]) will be first developed and then empirically tested. For the third question about the 
impact of the public engagement on the decision-making processes, an innovative theory for 
measuring the degree of controversy will be developed, and then empirically tested. This 
theory derives from the property space developed to answer the two first questions. For the 
fifth research question about the sources of scientific knowledge, an innovative property space 
and a typology will be developed and then refined in the light of the empirical research. 
Concerning the fourth question about the reasons for not mobilising scientific expertise, an 
existing typology developed by Mike Michael (Michael M., 1996b) will be confronted with 
the cases selected for this research in order to verify its pertinence and eventually to refine it. 
Finally, concerning the discourses of the public (question 6), a theory will be built through a 
variant of the Grounded Theory Methodology.  
  
 Another aim of this research is to enrich the Science Studies with a case study which the 
object is located in an occidental democracy, but which is not the U.S. or the U.K. Indeed, the 
Science Studies field is mainly Anglo Saxon, and consequently most of the cases studied are 
located in these two countries. As we will see in the following chapter, the cases selected in 
this research are located in France. 
 As a last point, this research intends to provide the science studies field with a research 
which has also a political science dimension, through the question of the political will to 
engage the public. 
 
IV. Summary-Conclusion 
 Many Science Studies Scholars agree that the use of traditional scientific expertise in 
technical decision-making processes is in crisis. To solve the problems of the traditional 
scientific expertise they claim the necessity to resort to the precautionary principle on one 
hand, and to a major public involvement on the other hand. The aim of the recourse to the 
precautionary principle is to reduce scientific uncertainties, while a major public involvement 
should solve the suspicions of non-competency, unfairness-partiality, and of excess of power 
of the traditional scientific expertise. Moreover, the French and European legislation tend 
toward a major public involvement in public decision-making processes.  
 In this context, this Science Studies research deals with two issues: public involvement on 
one hand, and the public mobilisation of scientific knowledge on the other hand. This research 
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is thus twofold, and intends to answer to six questions. The first three research questions 
concern the public involvement: “1. to what extent is the public actually involved in decision-
making processes?”; second, “2. how strong is the political will to involve the public?”; and 
third, “3. what is the impact of the public engagement on the decision-making processes (i.e. 
on their degree of controversy, and on their outcome)?” The three other research questions 
deal with the mobilisation of scientific knowledge by the public. The first two tackle the 
sources of scientific knowledge mobilised by the public: “4. To what extent does local NGOs 
seek scientific expertise; what are their sources?”; “5. what are the reasons invoked by the 
local NGOs for not mobilising scientific expertise?” The third question deals with the use of 
scientific knowledge in the discourses of the public: “6. Is scientific knowledge a key 
argument in the discourses of the public; what are the other types of arguments that the public 
employs to gain credibility?” 
 This research aims to make a contribution, in general, to the Science Studies field, and to 
the Public Understanding of Science. Through a multiple-case study, it aims to make an 
empirical contribution, bringing knowledge about the actual public involvement and the 
public mobilisation of scientific knowledge in France, but also a theoretical one, with the 
improvement of existing theories and the building-up of new ones. 
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Chapter 2  
A Multiple-Cases Study 
 This research project intends to answer its stated research questions through an empirical 
multiple-case study.  The cases selected are recent decision-making processes for the setting-
up of household waste incineration plants in France. Section II of this chapter justifies this 
choice from a societal and an academic point of view. In the same section, the list of the ten 
selected decision-making processes is presented, and then justified from a methodological 
point of view. Finally, in section III, the main features of the data collection and analysis 
methods used are introduced. 
 Since all researchers and research traditions bring a set of epistemological assumptions to 
their research process, even if they are sometimes unaware of it, and since epistemological 
assumptions influence the way researchers understand and interpret the data, let’s start with 
the clarification of the epistemological assumptions of this research project. 
I. Selecting the Cases 
 Sub-section II.1 justifies the choice of the setting-up of incineration plants generally 
speaking as an object of study, while sub-section II.2 makes and justifies the selection of ten 
specific decision-making processes. 
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I.1. Social Controversies and Scientific Uncertainties around Incineration Plants  
 In order to answer the six research questions stated in chapter 1, and this research being 
with Science Studies, the selected decision-making processes must be ‘technical-scientific’15, 
and the possible societal controversy must stem from actual scientific uncertainties. From a 
societal point of view, the setting up of new waste treatment facilities is interesting because it 
is a major topical issue today. The quantity of household waste produced is growing, and 
from a legal point of view, it is no longer possible to merely landfill them without treatment; 
the waste must be treated. Moreover, the decision-making processes for the setting up of new 
incineration plants are likely to be controversial because of the scientific uncertainties around 
dioxins.  
Waste Treatment and Incineration: A Major Topical Stake in France 
 As for most of the industrialised countries, the waste production of mixed municipal 
wastes16 in France is important (≈ 500 Kg/year/inhab.) and is continuously increasing. In 
France, for a long time, the local decision-makers have favoured two technologies for the 
waste treatment: incineration and landfills. As a matter of fact, in 1998, 35% of the mixed 
municipal waste (about 8 Mt) were incinerated in 248 incineration plants, and 50% were  
disposed in landfills (ADEME, 2005c). Today more than 130 incineration plants17 are still 
running throughout the entire country (See figure 2 below). Around 80% of the incinerated 
household wastes produced energy, mainly in the form of heat. 
 Moreover, numerous incinerator projects will be undertaken in the coming years. Indeed, 
the European directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste holds that not 
                                                 
15 As I have already stated in chapter 1, by ‘technical-scientific public decision-making’ I mean “decision-
making at those points where science and technology intersect with the political domain because the issues are of 
visible relevance to the public: should you eat British beef, prefer nuclear power to coal-fired power stations, 
want a quarry in your village, accept the safety of anti-misting kerosene as an airplane fuel, vote for politicians 
who believe in human cloning, support the Kyoto agreement, and so forth” (Collins H.M. and Evans R., 2002, p. 
236) 
16 In this research, I use the definition of ‘mixed municipal wastes’ established by the European Communities in 
the directive 2000/76/EC on the incineration of wastes: 
 “‘mixed municipal waste’ means waste from households as well as commercial, industrial and top-down waste, 
which because of its nature and composition is similar to waste from households, but excluding fractions […] 
that are collected separately at source.” (European Parliament And The Council Of Ministers, 2000, art. 3(3)). 
17 In this research, I use the definition of ‘mixed municipal wastes’ established by the European Communities in 
the directive 2000/76/EC on the incineration of wastes: 
“‘incineration plant’ means any stationary or mobile technical unit and equipment dedicated to the thermal 
treatment of wastes with or without recovery of the combustion heat generated. This includes the incineration by 
oxidation of waste as well as other thermal treatment processes such as pyrolysis, gasification or plasma 
processes in so far as the substances resulting from the treatment are subsequently incinerated.” (European 
Parliament And The Council Of Ministers, 28.12.2000, art 3(4)) 
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later than in 2009, “bio-degradable municipal waste going to landfills must be reduced to the 
75% of the total amount (by weight) of biodegradable municipal waste produced in 1995 
[…]” (The council of European Union, 1999, art. 4, par. 2a). And incineration is the most 
widespread technology for the treatment of the waste; far more than other technologies, such 
as methanisation or mechanical-biological sorting. So, local decision-makers will probably 
choose to set new incineration plants. The ‘Agence de l’Environnement et de la Maîtrise de 
l’Energie’ (ADEME) estimates that, between 2002 and 2012, six incineration plants will be 
planned each year (4 new and 2 renovations) in order to treat 700 000 000 Kg/year of waste, 
with an investment of € 320 million/year (ADEME, 2005a, p. 11). As a matter of fact, in 
2006, fourteen new incineration plants were planned (see figure 2 below). So the setting up of 
new household waste incineration plants is an important topical issue. 
Figure 2: Running Incineration Plants and Incineration Plants Projects In France in 2006 
 
 
 France has been selected for three reasons. To begin with, as I have noted above, 
incineration is a very topical issue in France: it is a technology widely spread across the 
country and the production of waste incineration is increasing. Second, in order to answer the 
research questions concerning public engagement, a relatively high number of highly similar 
cases (around 10) were necessary. Since régionale and départementale administration have no 
legislative power, France presents a national legal framework. This makes the studied 
decision-making processes highly similar and therefore easily comparable. Finally, as I have 
stated in chapter 1, My aim is to contribute to the Science Studies with an empirical study 
Running incineration plants Incineration plants projects 
Source: Greenpeace-CNIID (www.france-incineration.org; access date: 5 May 2006) 
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located in an occidental democracy different from an Anglo-Saxon or a Scandinavian 
country.18  Indeed, to date Science Studies are mainly Anglo-Saxon, and most of the studies 
concerning public engagement or mobilisation of scientific expertise by the public are based 
on cases mainly located in Anglo-Saxon countries, and to a minor extent in the Scandinavian 
countries and in the Netherlands; there are almost no French case studies.19 Obviously, it 
stems from this choice that the results of this research are above all relevant for French local 
decision-making processes.20 The results, however, contribute to the academic reflection on 
public engagement in technical-scientific decision-making processes. As for the conceptual 
tools developed in this research, they are likely to be useful to analyse similar decision-
making processes in other western European democraties or in North America.  
Development of the Societal Controversies around the Dioxins-Incineration Issue: 
Historical Perspective  
 The incineration plant projects are very likely to be controversial because of the dioxins 
emitted. By ‘controversial’, I mean that a significant part of the concerned residents strongly 
oppose these projects. And consequently, the local elected decision-makers often face a 
problem of legitimacy of their decision. Indeed, societal controversies around dioxins have 
been developing over the last ten years. As Nicolas Buclet states, the crisis around dioxins 
developed at the end of the 1990’s when dioxins, which used to be linked to Seveso,21 were 
linked with household incineration by the media. As a result, the image of household waste 
                                                 
18 In my initial research project, a comparison with Italy was foreseen. However, for reasons of time, it was 
finaly abandoned. Indeed, Italian regions have a great deal of legisltative power, above all in the northern part 
where there are highly autonom regions. The variations of the legal framework concerning public engagement 
are likely to be important, and therefore the cases are likely not to be similar. Moreover, the setting up of these 
various legal frameworks would have been time consuming. Moreover, in the southern part of Italy, the Mafia 
phenomenon should be dealt with in the analysis. 
19 Concerning public engagement see for example: Lezaun J., Soneryd L., 2007/7/1; Horlick-Jones T., Rowe G. 
Walls J., 2007/7/1; Schibeci R., Harwood J., 2007; Blok A., 2007/4/1; Rowe G., Horlick-Jones T. Walls J. 
Pidgeon N., 2005/10/1; Einsiedel E., Jelsoe E. Breck T., 2001/1/1; Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005; Renn O., 
Webler T. and Wiedemann P., 1995. 
Concerning (‘critical’) Public Understanding of Science see for example: Michael M., 1996; Wynne B., 1989; 
Dietrich H., Schibeci R., 2003/10/1; Bush J., Moffatt S. Dunn C. E., 2001/4/1; Shaw A., 2002. 
20 The public authorities in charge of the waste treatment (the grouping of communes) are also in charge of local 
planning (water supply, local public transport such as tramways, road traffic, etc). Therefore, it is likely that one 
would find the same attitude of the public authorities toward public involvement in the decision-making 
processes concerning the local planning as in the setting-up of incineration plants.   
21 The Seveso disaster was an industrial accident that occurred in July 1976, in a small chemical manufacturing 
plant approximately 15 km north of Milan in the north of Italy. It resulted in the highest known exposure to a 
certain type of dioxin, the TCDD, in residential populations. This accident gave rise to numerous scientific 
studies about the health impact of dioxins and standardized industrial safety regulations. The EU industrial safety 
regulations are known as the Seveso II Directive. 
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incineration plants started to deteriorate (Buclet N. (coordinateur), Bourg D. Gilotte L., 
2003).22 From a scientific point of view, dioxins have been known from the end of the 1960’s.  
The concept of toxicity equivalence was set in 1977,23 and this is in the same year that it has 
been acknowledge that household incineration plants emit dioxins. The Netherlands tried to 
manage the contamination of cow’s milk at the end of 1980’s and the beginning of the 1990’s. 
But in France, in spite of the repeated warning made by some scientists and NGOs, the public 
authorities did not take into consideration the dangers posed by the dioxins emitted by 
incineration plants until the media started to talk about the issue.  
 In 1996, the national consumer defence newspaper “60 millions de consommateur” 
(September 1996) published an article about the cow’s milk contamination by dioxins emitted 
by incineration plants, deploring that the issue was not taken seriously enough by the public 
authorities. In 1997, numerous important daily and weekly national newspapers (Le Monde, 
Libération, Le Canard Enchainé, Le Parisien, Le Nouvel Observateur, Les Echos, and La 
Croix) published article(s) about the emissions of dioxins and on the non conformation with 
the norms of emissions. 
 The year 1998 was a turning point on the road to crisis around the dioxins emitted by the 
incineration plants. A first controversy broke out in the media with the discovering of dioxins 
in the milk of cows next to the incineration plants of Halluin, Wasquehal and Sedequin, next 
to Lille, in the North of France. On the 26th of January 1998, in agreement with the Préfet 
Pierre Mauroy, senator mayor of Lille and president of the urban community of Lille, decided 
that these three incineration plants were to be closed as soon as an effective alternative will be 
available. Many major national newspapers widely related this spectacular decision: above all 
Le Monde, La Tribune, Le Figaro, Le Parisien, and in a less extent Les Echos, Libération, and 
l’Humanité. 
 Following this scandal, the newspapers were very keen on publishing information about 
the dioxin pollution due incineration plants. In March 1998, three newspapers published 
highly critical articles on the running incineration plants: France-Soir, “Incinérateurs: 
                                                 
22 A thorough story of the development of the dioxin-incineration crisis in the French media can be found in the 
report made by Nicolas Buclet for the Ministry Of Ecology: Buclet N. (coordinateur), Bourg D. Gilotte L., 2003, 
p. 74-103. This section is mainly based on this report; this is the reason why not all the references of the 
newspaper articles are quoted in detail. 
23 Different dioxin compounds have different toxicities and dioxins are most often found in mixtures rather than 
as single compounds in the environment. The most toxic forms of dioxin are 2,3,7,8-TCDD and 1,2,3,7,8-
PeCDD. Scientists use a shorthand method for comparing the toxicity of different types or mixtures of dioxins to 
the toxicity of 2,3,7,8- TCDD and 1,2,3,7,8-PeCDD. This method is called the "Toxicity Equivalence" or TEQ. 
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danger?”(Incinerators: danger?), 11 March 1998; Le Figaro, 13 March 1998; and above all 
Libération, “Alertes à la dioxine à Maubeuge et Nancy : cette substance toxique est rejetée 
par les incinérateurs d’ordures ménagères” (Dioxin alert at Maubeuge and Nancy: this toxic 
substance is discharged by household waste incinerators). The source of information of these 
newspapers was the national NGO CNIID (Centre National d’Information Indépendante sur 
les Déchets) which published some official analyses of the emissions of pollutants.    
 Following this scandal, on 19th of March, the ministry of environment asked for the 
measurements of dioxins in cow’s milk throughout France, around the incineration plants 
considered the most polluting. The result of these measurements was that fifteen incineration 
plants were polluting. But the ministry could not close these facilities without blocking the 
waste treatment systems in the concerned départements (≈county). Consequently, the ministry 
only enjoined the operators of incineration plants to conform to the standards. An aggravating 
factor of the crisis was that the French situation was illegal in the light of the European law. 
Indeed, according to the Council Directive 89/429/EEC of 21 June 1989 on the reduction of 
air pollution from existing municipal waste-incineration plants, these incineration plants 
should have conformed to the norms since the 1st December 1996. And at that date, less than 
half of the incineration plants with a capacity superior to 6T/hour did conform. Because of 
this non-conformity, France was censured by the European Court of Justice in 2002.24  
In April 1998, Le Monde (2, and 5-6 April) and Libération (4-5 April) published articles 
unfavourable to incineration: closure of further cow’s milk factory in the north of France, 
requested some public authorities to carry out of a sanitary study, and requested the shutting 
done of the polluting incineration plant of Maubeuge. Furthermore, both newspapers 
published a map based on the results of the study asked by the ministry of ecology. Notably, 
this map locates the fifteen incineration plants which emitted more than 10ng/m3. 
Then, in May and June 1998, two studies about the pollution by dioxins, respectively 
made by an NGO and a consumer association, successively broke out. Concerning the first 
study, the NGO CNIID asked to the German laboratory Ergo, sited in Hamburg, to measure 
out the dioxin contamination of the bovine meat sold in five Parisian supermarkets. The 
results of this study, described as “disquieting” by CNIID, were related by the newspapers in 
May 1998; some in an alarming way (Le Monde, Le Parisien, France-Soir, Libération), and 
                                                 
24 European Court of Justice, judgment of the court in Case C-60/01: Commission of the European Communities 
versus French Republic (Failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations ( Directives 89/369/EEC and 
89/429/EEC ( Air pollution ( Municipal waste incineration plants ( Incinerators in France), June 2002 
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some others in a more measured way (Le Figaro, Les Echos, L’Humanité). Some of these 
newspapers wrote other articles in which some personalities criticized the results of these 
analyses (Le Figaro, L’Humanité) or at least discussed their significance (France-Soir, Le 
Figaro). In June 1998, the consumer defence magazine Que Choisir published its study about 
the contamination of the maternal milk. This magazine denounced a contamination by dioxins 
but was reassuring concerning the development of the nursling. Le Figaro took again this 
information, and L’Evènement du Jeudi and Les Echos wrote more general articles about the 
food poisoning by dioxins. 
In the meantime the crisis intensified; other incineration plants were concerned: the 
successive closures of seven incineration plants because they did not respect the norms of 
pollution were announced in national newspapers (France-Soir, Les Echos). 
 
The media stopped talking about the dangers of household incineration for more than one 
year. The controversy started again in 2000 with the publication of reports and studies about 
the sanitary impact of dioxins and about the French situation. Above all, numerous local 
pollution affaires and cases of suspected poisoning became known. The Agence Française de 
Sécurité Sanitaire et Alimentaire (AFSSA), the Institut National de Veille Sanitaire (INVS) 
and the Agence De l’Environnement et de Maitrise de L’Energie (ADEME) published studies 
about the contamination of the French population. The conclusion is reassuring: the 
contamination of the French population is similar to that of other European Countries. The 
media seemed to be satisfied with this reassuring conclusion (AFP, Reuters, Libération, Les 
Echos, Nice-Matin, Le Figaro). However, CNIID criticised the reports, notably highlighting 
that some molecules were not taken into account. These criticisms were taken up by the 
Magazine Le Point, and two days after AFFSA corrected its web-site. 
Another series of local controversies were reported in the media. The incineration plant of 
Gilly-Sur-Isère got most of the attention. The incineration plant of Gilly-sur-Isère was 
definitively shut in October 2001 because of pollution by dioxins; around 7000 heads of cattle 
and 2000 tonnes of milk were destroyed. A judicial enquiry has been opened and eight 
persons were indicted in 2007. This important incident – the Préfet talked about a catastrophe 
– received intensive media coverage and had significant political impact. Some others local 
scandals broke out at Cluny, Angers, Besançon, Vaux-le-Pénil, or Le Havre but they did not 
have the same media coverage.  
It was only in 2003, three years after the dead line imposed by the European Commission, 
that the last incineration plant, which did not comply with the norms of pollution, was closed.  
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 To conclude, because of the scandals caused by dioxins, the public has become suspicious 
of household incineration plants, and of the decision-making processes which led to the 
setting up of new incineration plants.  As a matter of fact, the incineration plant decision-
making processes which took place in the 1990’s, such as Bellegarde (Ain), Lisses and Vert-
Le-Grand (Essone), and Lunel-Viel (Hérault) were controversial. And a significant part of the 
residents stood against the project for sanitary reasons, and were particularly worried about 
the health impact of dioxins (Dubien I. and Laurans Y., 2000). 
Scientific Uncertainties around Dioxins 
As we have just seen, the exceeding of the limits of emission of dioxins, and the pollution 
of the environment by the dioxins emitted by incineration plants, have been established. But 
the question of the actual impact of the dioxins emitted by incineration plants on human 
health is still opened.25 Indeed, the noxiousness of the molecules produced by incineration 
plants, dioxins, furans, and heavy metal, has been established. However this recognised 
noxiousness is for the molecules which are actually present in the human body; the question is 
still open about the link between the emission of dioxins and furans by an incineration plant in 
the atmosphere and their impact on the health of the residents. One of the questions is to 
assess the actual up-take of the molecules in the bodies of the residents, and to identify the 
factors, such as the consumption of local products, which may influence this up-take. Another 
question is the impact of incineration plants on the rate of diseases due to dioxins, such as 
certain types of cancer or congenital malformations. Epidemiological studies on the impact of 
incineration plants on human health are very few and rather recent. They date from the very 
end of the 90’s, beginning of 21st century. It was only in 2003 that the two French state 
agencies in charge of such studies, INVS (Institut National de Veille Sanitaire: National 
Institute of Public Health Surveillance) and AFSSA (Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire 
des Aliments: French Food Safety Agency) actually started to deal with the sanitary impact of 
incineration plants with a study which set up a protocol for an exposure assessment.26 And 
this is only at the end of 2006 that they published the first results about the contamination of 
                                                 
25 This paragraph has been written on the basis of two reports published by INVS-AFSSA (Institut National de 
Veille Sanitaire, Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, 2003, p.13-14; Institut National de Veille 
Sanitaire, Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, 2006b, p. 2-3), and of one study made by the 
Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale (Institut National de la Santé Et de la Recherche 
Médicale, 2002, p. 4-8). More details about sanitary studies and scientific uncertainties about dioxins can be 
found in the introduction to part III.  
26 See: Institut National de Veille Sanitaire, Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, 2003 
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populations living next to incineration plants,27 that is, after the conclusion of the decision-
making processes studied in the present project (1992-2005, see the following section I.2 for 
further details about the selected decision-making processes). Moreover, INVS and AFSSA 
declared that they started to lead this research because of a strong local demand for sanitary 
studies, and more particularly for epidemiological studies. Following a series of cow’s milk 
pollutions by incineration plants such as Gilly-sur-Isère and Cluny, and following an 
epidemiological study realised by professor Viel28, INVS and AFSSA were requested to carry-
out sanitary impact studies around specified incineration plants (Institut National de Veille 
Sanitaire, Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, 2003, p. 13). 
 
  To conclude this sub-section, the setting up of incineration plants is a topical issue 
because of the numerous facilities which are likely to be built in the coming years. The 
decision-making processes for the setting-up of incineration plants are ‘technical-scientific’ 
because the object of the decision, the incineration plant, is a complex technical object, and 
above all because the issue of the health hazards posed by the dioxins requires high level 
scientific knowledge. Because of the scandals caused by dioxins, the public has become 
suspicious of household incineration plants, and of the decision-making processes which led 
to the setting up of new incineration plants. Furthermore, there is a high degree of scientific 
uncertainty concerning the health hazards posed by the dioxins emitted by incineration plants. 
Thus, the settings up of incineration plants are likely to lead to societal controversies; the 
societal controversies steming from scientific uncertainties.  
 From a methodological point of view, in order to make possible the assessment of the 
impact of public involvement on the outcome and on the degree of controversy of a decision-
making process, the decision-making processes must be similar, but with probable various 
degrees of public involvement and various degree of controversy. The selection of only highly 
inclusive mechanisms would not allow such an assessment. The selection of a series of local 
decision-making processes for the setting up of household waste incineration plants taking 
place in a given country matches this requirement.  
 
                                                 
27 See: Institut National de Veille Sanitaire, Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, 2006b 
28 This is a study about “Soft–tissue sarcoma and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma clusters around a municipal solid 
waste incinerator with high dioxin emission levels” (Viel JF, Arveux P Baverel J Cahn JY, 2000).  
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I.2. Selection of Ten Decision-Making Processes 
The Ten Decision-making processes 
 The cases studied are the most recent decision-making processes of setting up of 
incineration plants in France. I have selected both the decision-making processes which ended 
with the opening of an incineration plant and with the abandonment of the project. This makes 
possible the assessment of the impact of public engagement on the outcome of the decision-
making processes. Since this empirical part of this research started in 2006, the most recent 
decision-making processes selected are the ones which ended in 2003, 2004 and 2005. For the 
purpose of this research, the end of a decision-making process is defined either by the official 
opening of an incineration plant, or by the abandonment of the incineration plant project.  
 Eleven decision making processes ended between 2003 and 2005.29 Eight ended by the 
opening of an incineration plant while three ended by the abandonment of the project. The 
cases, which are spread over the French metropolitan territory, are listed in the table 1 below 
(see also figure 3 below). Finally, ten out of the eleven cases have been studied: the case 
number 7 (Nîmes) has been removed from the study because of the impossibility of carrying 
out the interviews with the engaged NGOs. 
 The cases have been selected on the basis of two sources: the official list of the running 
incineration plants which is published by the Ministère de l'écologie, de l’Energie, du 
Développement durable et de l'Aménagement du territoire (i.e. Ministry of Ecology), and the 
list published by the national French NGOs Greenpeace and Centre National d’Information 
Indépendantes sur les Déchets (CNIID) on their web site www.france-incineration.org. The  
recourse to two types of sources, national public authority and national NGOs, allows for a 
cross-checking of the lists of the incineration plant projects. 
Methodological Justifications 
 The most recent decision-making processes have been selected for two reasons. First, they 
are the most topical, and the conclusions drawn from their study are more likely to be 
pertinent for the future decision-making processes. Second, from a methodological point of 
view, it is easier in such cases to trace the actors of recent decision-making processes to be  
                                                 
29 In the light of later empirical investigations, it has appeared that a twelfth case ended during this period: an 
incineration plant project at Grosbreuil, in the département of Vendée (85), which was finally abandoned in 
2005. 
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Figure 3: Map of the ten selected cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In each text box are indicated the number assigned to the case (from 1 to 11) and the name of the municipality 
hosting the incineration plant. The administrative division of the map corresponds to the départements. The 
number indicated inside each division is the number of the département. These numbers have been assigned by 
the French state on the base of the name of the département following the alphabetical order of the name of the 
départments (01 for Ain, 02 for Aine…, 24 for Dordogne, …, 71 for Saône-et-Loire, etc.).  
4. Arras6. Le Havre 
8. Villers-Saint-Paul
7. Nîmes 
5. Lasse 
2. Angers 
10. Guichainville 
1. Gueugnon 
9. Calce
3. Thiviers  
11. Vaux-le-Pénil
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Table 1. List of the eleven selected cases 
Case 
N° City 
Ending 
Year Opening 
Case 
N° City 
Ending 
Year Opening 
1 Gueugnon 2005 No 7 Nîmes 2004 Yes 
2 Angers 2005 No 8 
Villers-Saint-Paul  
(Compiègne) 
2004 Yes 
3 Thiviers 2005 No 9 Calce 2003 Yes 
4 Arras 2004 Yes 10 
Guichainville 
(Evreux) 
2003 Yes 
5 Lasse 2004 Yes 11 Vaux-le-Pénil 2003 Yes 
6 
Le Havre (St Jean 
de Folleville) 
2004 Yes 
 
 
interviewed and to gather the various documents they published. It may be difficult to find the 
actors of the cases which ended to long time ago. Furthermore, old cases may be problematic 
for the accuracy of the data collected since the actors may not remember well what happened 
a long time ago.  
 However, even if the decision-making processes selected are recent, they are all over.  Two 
reasons have led to the selection of ended decision-making processes. First, the incineration 
plant projects are often controversial, and it is difficult to carry out a sociological study in 
such strained contexts: the actors may refuse to be interviewed and the interviews could be 
biased because the parties involved defend their own interests. The stakes for the involved 
actors are too lively and too important. Second, it may be problematic to draw some 
conclusions from unfinished cases. And it is hardly possible to know when an ongoing case 
will end. The decision-making processes for the setting up of an incineration plant last more 
time than the time I have to carry out this research: the ten selected decision-making processes 
lasted eight years on average, and they started at the beginning-mid 90’s. 
 
 The ten selected decision-making processes were easy to localise. The boundaries of local 
decision-making processes, that is the actors involved and the concerned territory, were easily 
identifiable. Furthermore, these actors were more likely to have the time to be interviewed 
than actors who would be involved in national decision-making processes. At last, taking 
place in only one country, these local decision-making processes were subject to the same 
legislative framework. Moreover, as we have seen, incineration project are numerous. The 
selected decision-making processes are thus comparable. 
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 Finally, let me specify that the unit of analysis is not the same for the two parts of this 
research. While in the first part about the public engagement, the unit of analysis is the 
decision-making process, in the second part about the mobilisation of scientific expertise it is 
the NGO. 
 
II. Methodology 
In this research various methodologies have been used. This section introduces only 
the main lines of the data collections and of the data analyses. The details of each 
methodology can be found in the parts of the research where they are actually used. 
 In the literature about (qualitative) methodology, the definition of the main concepts, such 
as data collection method or research design, varies according to the authors. Furthermore, 
neither is the use of a given concept by certain authors always stable (see Travers M., 2001; 
Silverman D., 2000). Consequently, it is necessary to start this section specifying the 
definitions of five main terms: Methodology, data collection method, data, data analysis, and 
research design.   
 
II.1. Methodologies, Data Collection Methods, Data: A Few Definitions 
? Methodologies define how one will go about studying a phenomenon. The choice of a 
methodology should reflect an ‘overall research strategy’ as the methodology shapes 
which data collection method is used and how data are analysed. Methodologies may 
be define very broadly (e.g. quantitative and qualitative) or more narrowly (e.g. 
grounded theory, network analysis, discourse analysis or conversation analysis). The 
choice of a methodology is linked to the model chosen by the researcher in a given 
research. I use the definition of methodology made by Strauss and Corbin: “A way of 
thinking about studying social reality” (Strauss A. and Corbin J., 1998, p. 3). The 
choice of a methodology includes the choice of the data collection method(s) and of 
the data analysis method(s).  
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? Data collection methods30 are the techniques used to gather data. In qualitative 
research I list 4 sources of data: interviews (focus group, open or semi-structured, life 
history), field observations, documents of all kind (including diaries, letters, 
autobiographies, historical accounts, newspaper and other media materials, etc.), and 
audio and video materials. And there are two major way of sampling the data: the 
random sampling (usually used in quantitative research), and the non-random 
sampling, that is, the theoretical sampling (usually used in qualitative research; e.g. 
typical-case sampling).31 
 
? Data are the result of the data collection: For the observation, they are field notes; for 
interviews they are audio-video records and their transcripts, or specific searched 
information; for documents, they are the text and images gathered; and for audio-video 
materials, they are either the records themselves or their transcripts.  
 
? Data analysis methods are the techniques used to exploit and analyze the gathered 
data. In qualitative research, there are, for example: ‘discourse-analysis’,  
‘conversation analysis’, ‘content analysis’, ‘coding’. 
 
? Research design is the implementation of the methodology for a given research. It 
specifies how data are actually collected, and then analysed.  
 
                                                 
30 I prefer not to use the term ‘method’ alone because it lacks of precision and its use in the literature is often 
inconsistent. For example Max Travers and David Silverman use the terms ‘methods’, ‘methodology’, ‘data 
collection’ and ‘data analysis’ in a rather lazy way. (see Travers M., 2001, Silverman D., 2000). Indeed, there are 
some discrepancies between the definition they give and the use they make of the term. For example, Max 
Travers establishes the following definitions: “methods are the technique used in collecting data. Methodology, 
on the other hand, refers to the assumptions you have as a researcher, which can be epistemological or political 
in character, or mean that you support the view of the world promoted by a particular theoretical tradition.” And 
then indiscriminately uses the term method data collections methods on one hand and data analysis methods on 
the other hand (the later entailing specific epistemological assumptions!). 
31 Boundaries between data analysis and data collection are not always neat. When gathering data in the social 
world, a selection of the data, according to the theoretical perspective, is already made and the data may be also 
already ordered. For example, when building guidelines for interviews, a researcher pre-selects the data to be 
gathered through the questions he wants to ask; if that is more evident for the questionnaire, it is also true for 
semi-open and open questions: According to his research questions, the interviewer will pay attention and may 
ask for specifications about certain elements contained in the discourse of the interviewee. For example, in my 
research, my first question is an open one: could you tell me a chronological history of the decision-making 
process. However, I pay attention and ask for precision about certain features of the process which are: the dates-
duration of the phases; the presence of the other actors in each phase; the starting point of each phase; the topics 
of negotiation; the means of communication; the outcomes of each phase. So, when does my data collection 
finish and my data analysis start? The boundary is rather blurred. 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Chapter 2 
A Multiple Cases Study 
 
- 37 - 
A mixture of qualitative and quantitative methodologies has been used in this research. In 
other words, as Denzin and Lincoln put it, the methodology used in this research is  a kind of 
‘bricolage’, that is, “a professional do-it-yourself work which strategically combines different 
conceptual tools, data collection and data analysis methods in order to provide solutions to 
concrete problems” (Denzin N. K. and Lincoln Y. S., 2003, p. 3). 
  
II.2. Data Collection Methods 
Two Techniques 
The data have been collected through two techniques. These are face-to-face open and 
semi-structured interviews with the actors, and (electronic and paper) documents edited by the 
actors, that is, by the public authorities and the NGOs. The list of the interviewees and of the 
documents gathered can be found in the appendix entitled “Sources of Data”. More 
specifically, the collected documents are newsletters, web sites, minutes of public meetings, 
and some minutes of the elected decision-makers meetings. These documents have been 
gathered along the interviews and through researches on the internet. The strengths of 
documentation are: stability, it can be reviewed repeatedly; unobtrusiveness, it is not 
especially produced for the study); and exactness, it contains exact names, references, and 
details. However, one must be careful in selecting documentation due to the dangers of ‘bias 
selectivity’ if the collection is incomplete (see Yin R. K., 2003, p. 80 and Creswell J. W., 
2003, p. 186). Furthermore, the access to certain documents might be deliberately blocked by 
some involved actors because they want to defend their own interests; this is, by the way, one 
of the reasons why only completed decision-making processes have been selected. 
The interviewees are at least one member of each public authority in charge of the waste 
treatment (i.e. a grouping of communes), and at least one member of each mobilised NGO32. 
The interviews were mainly carried out through phone, but a few ones were face-to-face. The 
strength of the interviews is that they can produce insights. The human affairs can be reported 
and interpreted through the eyes of specific interviewees, and well-informed respondents can 
provide important insights into a situation. However they are subject to bias because they 
                                                 
32 The case of Calce is particular since the grouping of communes successively selected at least four sites in four 
municipalities. In front of the opposition of the town councils, the grouping of communes had to give up the 
sites. The mobilisation of the NGOs around these sites was unclear. So, the study focuses on the NGOs which 
mobilised around the last site, the one of Calce. 
See the appendix “The Ten Household Incineration plant Projects” for further details about this case. 
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always result from the interaction between interviewer and interviewee; moreover information 
are filtered through the views of interviewees (see Yin R. K., 2003, p. 80 and Creswell J. W., 
2003, p. 186). In other words, interviews are not a neutral collection of data. This is one of the 
reasons why two types of actors having divergent interests have been interviewed: the public 
authorities, and the NGOs. These ‘double’ interviews enable a cross-check of the information 
gathered. Finally, a drawback of the interviews is that they are time consuming.   
Finding the Interviewees 
The name and addresses of each of the ten public authorities were easily gathered through 
internet and public directories. But, it was a more difficult first to identify and then to find the 
addresses of the NGOs. Three sources of information have been used to overcome this 
difficulty: 
? the list of the NGOs which participate to the Local Commission for Information and 
Monitoring (in the cases in which the incineration plant has been built up);33 
? the (online) directory of the NGOs members of the national NGO Coordination du 
CNIID (Centre National d’Information Indépendante sur les Déchets, National Centre 
of Independent Information on Waste);34 
? the snowball sampling, asking to the interviewed NGOs and grouping of communes: 
“18. Which (other) NGOs mobilised around the incineration plant project?”35   
 
For the ten cases studied, a total of twenty-five NGOs were identified.36 Out of these 
twenty-five NGOs, twenty-two ‘full’ interviews with at least one member of each NGO were 
realised. For three NGOs, it was possible to realise only a ‘short’ interview, gathering little 
data. Finally, as I have already stated in section II of this chapter, the two mobilised NGOs of 
the case of Nîmes refused to answer or simply did not respond. Because of the impossibility to 
gather information about these two NGOs, the case of Nîmes has finally been removed from 
the study. 
                                                 
33 Information gathered through phone interviews with the grouping of communes, and with the NGOs. 
34 The directory is available at www.cniid.org/coordination/annuaire/annuaire.pdf , access date: 5 December 
2006. 
35 See appendix “Questionnaire for the NGOs”.    
36 See figure 4 in the section III of chapter 3  “Structuring of the NGOs’ Mobilisation” for further details about 
these NGOs. 
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 Carrying out the interviews:  two main steps 
The interviews were carried out in two steps. In a first step, in order to provide an insight 
into the structure of the decision-making processes, two cases (2. Angers and 5. Lasse) have 
been selected, and some open-interviews were carried out. These two cases were selected 
because one decision-making process (Case of Angers) ended with the abandonment of the 
incineration plant project, while the other one (Lasse) ended with the opening of the 
incineration plant. In both cases, one face-to-face open interview was conducted with one or 
two members of each public authority and of each mobilised NGO. A total of seven 
interviews were thus carried out. Open interviews were preferred to semi-structured because 
at the outset of the empirical research I had little clue about the actual structure of the 
decision-making processes, the actors involved, and about the kind of information I could 
actually gather from the interviewees. Moreover, personal face-to-face interviews were 
preferred to phone interviews because interviewees are more likely to spend from one to three 
hours in a meeting rather than on the phone. Furthermore, non physical meetings eliminate the 
non-verbal communication. So to get this first insight about the public engagement and the 
NGOs mobilisation of scientific knowledge, two open questions were asked to the public 
authorities:  
1. “Could you tell me a chronological story of the decision-making process from the 
very beginning until the decision to give up/the opening of the facility?”, and 
“During this story telling, could you specify the main dates and the actors 
involved?”; 
2. “How and when did you communicate with the public?”; 
and two others were asked to the NGOs: 
1. “Could you tell me a chronological story of your engagement from the moment 
when you engaged until the abandonment of the project/the opening of the 
facility?”, and “During this story telling, could you specify the main dates, the 
actors involved, and your modes of action?”.  
2. “Did you seek scientific knowledge?” ”What were your sources?” 
 
In a second step, knowing the overall structure of the decision-making processes and 
knowing what kind of information the interviewees were able to give, semi-structured 
interviews were carried out on the telephone. To be more precise, the interviewees were first 
contacted through an e-mail which introduced the project and me as the researcher. Then, the 
day after, they were contacted by phone. In order to have a top-down support for these 
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requests of interview, a web site on the personal web pages of the European University 
Institute (http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Researchers/christophevoineau/Index.html) was created. 
This web site also introduced the research and the researcher, but in a more detailed way than 
in the e-mail. Most of the people contacted answered positively at the first request. However, 
if almost all the NGOs contacted were fully available, the three public authorities of the three 
most controversial cases hesitated a great deal.  Finally they accepted but they provided little 
information. For each case, the public authority was interviewed first because it is the project 
manager, and thus it has the most comprehensive view of the decision-making process 
structure and of the actors involved. Then, in a second time, the NGOs were in their turn 
interviewed, and the information gathered completed and cross-checked. The details of the 
semi-structured questionnaires are presented in chapters 6 and 8. 
Legal Framework 
To finish, the legal framework concerning the distribution of power between the 
public authorities and concerning the public involvement have been drawn directly from the 
French Codes, Code de l’environnement, Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales, Code 
de l?urbanisme, and Code Civil. 
 
II.3. Data Analysis Methods   
 Three data analysis methods were used to answer the six research questions. As I have 
already stated, the data analyses are detailed in the respective chapters and sections; only the 
main lines of the analyses are introduced below. 
 The data analysis to answer a set of questions about public engagement is rather 
quantitative. It is made of three steps corresponding to the three questions. First, the actual 
public engagement was assessed with the drawing of charts representing the actual public 
engagement along the decision-making processes. More precisely, the decision-making 
processes were divided into three ‘key chronological stages,’ and a property-space of the 
public engagement mechanisms has been developed. Then, for each type of mechanism and 
for each stage, the number of public engagement initiative has been counted. Finally, charts 
visualising at each chronological stage the number of public engagement initiatives of 
different kinds have been drawn up. Second, in order to assess the political will to engage the 
public, these charts are confronted with the legislation framing the public engagement. At last, 
the impact of the public engagement on the decision-making processes is made confronting 
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for each case the actual public engagement with the outcome on one hand, and with the 
degree of controversy on the other hand. While the outcome (abandonment/completion) is 
easy to determined, the degree of controversy is defined through the development of a 
typology based on the mobilisation of the engaged NGOs: the more the NGOs were active, 
the more the decision-making process was controversial.   
  The data analysis methods employed to answer the questions about the causes of the 
possible scientific ignorance of the NGOs, and about their sources of scientific knowledge of 
the NGOs, are similar. The core of the analysis consists of the setting up of tables in order to 
classify the data collected during the semi-structured interviews. First, two property spaces 
have been built. Then, exploiting the semi-structured interviews made with the NGOs, these 
property spaces have been refined through the drawing of successive more elaborated tables. 
Finally, two typologies, one for the causes of ignorance, and another one of the sources of 
scientific knowledge of the NGOs, have been built.  
 The methodology employed in order to answer the last question about the role of scientific 
expertise in the discourses of the NGO is qualitative: this is methodology inspired by the 
grounded theory methodology. The analysis has been made with the software Atlas-ti. 
 
III. Summary-Conclusion 
 The cases selected for carrying out this multiple-case study are the ten most recent 
decision-making processes (at the time of the beginning of the empirical research) for the 
setting up of household waste incineration plants in France. These decision-making processes 
ended indiscriminately by the realisation or the abandonment of the incineration plant project; 
the cases selected are thus finalised/completed decision-making processes. Furthermore, the 
decision-making processes have not been selected according to their degree of controversy: 
the analysis will reveal if they were controversial or not. The aim of this non-discrimination 
concerning the outcome and the degree of controversy is to make possible the assessment of 
the impact of the public engagement on the outcome and on the degree of controversy. 
Household waste treatment, and more particularly, waste incineration are major topical 
concerns in France. A historical overview of the dioxin-incineration issue in the French media 
shows a development of controversies since the middle of the 1990’s. Moreover, at the time 
of the selected decision-making processes, there was a great deal of uncertainty about the 
hazard that dioxins emitted by incineration plants pose to health. Thus, the settings up of 
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household waste incineration plants are typical technical decision-making processes, and are 
possibly controversial, with the societal controversy stemming from scientific uncertainties.  
 
 The methodologies used in this research result from a ‘professional bricolage’, and vary 
according to the research questions, at least for the data analysis.  While the data collection 
method is eminently qualitative, data analysis methods are a mix between qualitative and 
quantitative methods. The data have been collected from semi-structured interviews made 
with the public authorities and the engaged NGOs. Documents (including web site) that these 
both actors published have also been collected. The interviews with two types of actor, public 
authority and engaged NGOs, has enabled a cross-checking of the data collected. The data 
analysis method for the first part of the research concerning the public engagement is rather 
quantitative, with the drawing of charts visualising at each chronological stage the number of 
public engagement initiatives of different kinds. As for the second part of the research 
concerning the public mobilisation of scientific knowledge, the data analysis method is rather 
qualitative. The possible scientific ignorance of the NGOs and their sources of scientific 
knowledge have been analysed with the setting up of successive tables, exploiting the data 
collected through the semi-structured interviews, while the analysis of the discourses of the 
NGOs have been realised using a variant of the Grounded Theory methodology. 
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Chapter 3  
Setting up of Incineration Plants in France: 
 Decision-Making Processes and Involved Actors  
 This chapter describes the overall structure of the ten selected decision-making processes 
and the actors involved. Even if the setting up of new incineration plants is within the 
competences of local elected decision-makers, the French law sets them in a national legal 
framework. Consequently, the decision-making processes of the ten cases have a similar 
structure, and the types of actors involved are the same. The two principal types of actors of 
the decision-making processes are the public authorities and the public, at least in the 
perspective of this research. This chapter is structured around three sections. The first section 
deals with the overall structure of the decision-making processes, while the second one 
introduces the actors engaged in the decision-making processes, detailing the distribution of 
power between the concerned public authorities. At last, in section III the engaged NGOs are 
detailed because they are present in the ten decision-making processes, and they play an 
important role; at least with regard to the public engagement. 
 Each of the ten decision-making processes is detailed in the appendix “the ten decision-
making processes”: A chronological story is presented, including the dates of the key events, 
and the characteristics of the public authorities in charge of the waste treatment and the public 
are detailed.  
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I. The Decision-Making Processes Structure: An Overview 
 The aim here is to give an overview of the ten decision-making processes as they took 
place in the ten studied cases and not to model them. The modelling is the subject of chapter 4 
“Public Engagement and Controversies: Two Property Spaces”, which establishes the 
theoretical framework for the analysis of the public involvement. 
I.1. The Main Lines of the Ten Decision-Making Processes 
 From the twelve semi-structured interviews conducted with the ten public authorities in 
charge of setting up a waste treatment facility, and from the study made by Isabelle Dubien 
and Yann Laurans about the role of the sanitary arguments in the processes of setting up of 
incineration plants (Dubien I. and Laurans Y., 2000), the decision-making processes can be 
roughly described in terms of a chronological  sequence of nine phases; some of the phases 
overlap in time while some others may be inverted. 
 The decision-making processes starts with a group of communes which makes a joint 
decision to set up a waste treatment facility. They set up a legal body called “grouping of 
communes”, which is composed of representatives of the communes; the grouping of 
communes becomes the manager/coordinator of the project. Then, the above body solicits 
technical advice from scientific and technical experts in the communes’ own waste treatment 
departments (where they exist) as well as from various public bodies/authorities and from 
private companies. Following these studies, it selects a technical solution for the waste 
treatment; in the cases studied, this is incineration. The third step consists of the location of 
the facility. The choice is made according to ‘technical criteria’: accessibility for lorries and 
trains, location at the ‘barycentre of the population,’37 and so on. However, the grouping of 
communes can not impose the choice of the site to the hosting municipality because this later 
is in charge of the planning permission on its territory: the hosting municipality can prevent 
the setting up of the incineration plant by not granting the planning permission. During the 
fourth phase, the grouping of commune specifies the characteristics of the incineration plant, 
such as the capacity, or the technology of the furnaces. On the bases of these specifications, it 
                                                 
37 ‘Barycentre of the population’ is a technical term used by the interviewees. It means that the location is chosen 
according to the distance between the site and the urban centers considering the population of these urban 
centers. For example, let’s consider two towns A and B separated by 10 km. If both towns had the same 
population, for example 10.000 inhabitants each, the barycentre would be in the middle, 5 km away from A and 
B. If A had 10.000 inhabitants and B ten times more, that is 100.000, the barycentre would be at 9 km from A 
and 1 from B. The aim is to minimize the kilometres that the total amount of wastes will have to make to reach 
the waste treatment facility. This technical term was used by the interviewees. 
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selects the builder and the development company which is going operate the facility. In the 
ten studied decision-making processes, these are private companies. During the following 
phase, an independent enquiry commission, set up by the Préfet,38 carries-out a public 
enquiry. This commission gathers the observations and remarks of the development company, 
of the local-decision makers, and above all of the residents and local NGOs opinions and 
proposals. During the sixth phase, the development company and the grouping of communes 
request together from the Préfet an authorisation to operate the incineration plant. The 
penultimate phase is the evaluation of this request by the Préfet. That is, the Préfet reads the 
conclusions of the public enquiry and asks the local branch of the technical services of the 
concerned ministries (sanitary, agricultural, transport, etc.) for their opinion about the 
incineration plant project. Then he/she grants, or not, the authorisation to operate. Obviously, 
such an authorisation is required for the pursuit of the project. Once the authorisation is 
granted, the building starts and the decision-making process ends by the official opening of 
the incineration plant. 
 The setting-up of an incineration plant is a very long process. The selected decision-
making processes lasted 8 years in average: they began at the beginning of the 90’s and ended 
between 2003 and 3005. More precisely, they lasted between six and eleven years, except in 
the case of Angers, where the process lasted only 2 years.39 
 
I.2. Guidelines for decisions: département or inter-département plan for the disposal 
of household and similar waste 
The choice of the waste treatment solution made by the grouping of communes is 
conditioned by a framework plan. Under the terms of article L. 541-1540 of the Code de 
l’Environnement, the decisions made by legal entities under public law and their 
concessionaries in the waste disposal sector have to be compatible with the département or 
                                                 
38 The Préfet is the local representative of the French State. See below sub-section II.1 “Distribution of Power 
among the Public Authorities” for further details. 
39 See the appendix “the ten decicion-making processes” for further details about each of the ten decision-
making processes. 
40 Décret n° 96-1008 du 18 novembre 1996 relatif aux plans d'élimination des déchets ménagers et assimilés 
(Journal Officiel du 24 novembre 1996) amended by décret n° 2005-1472 du 29 novembre 2005 (Journal 
Officiel du 30 novembre 2005). The last modification of 2005 is about the authority responsible for the setting-up 
of the plan. 
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inter-département plan for the disposal of household and similar waste41. Such a plan aims to 
organise the collection, sorting and treatment of waste at the level of the département:  
“II. […] [the plan] 3) Lists the priorities to be chosen, bearing in mind, in particular, 
foreseeable demographic and economic evolutions: 
a) For the set-up of new facilities, and may indicate the geographical areas that seem best 
suited for this purpose; 
b) For the collection, sorting and treatment of waste in order to guarantee a high level of 
environmental protection bearing in mind the economic and financial means required to 
implement them. 
III. - The plan takes account of the needs and capacities of the neighbouring zones outside its 
scope of application and the inter-commune cooperation proposals. 
IV. - Among the priorities chosen, it must provide for centres for the storage of ultimate waste 
originating from the treatment of household and similar waste.” 
Thus, the choice of a technical solution (i.e. incineration or another technique such as 
methanisation or composting) for the waste treatment by a grouping of communes can be 
constrained. However, the département plan has to take into account the inter-commune 
cooperation proposals, and the communes, grouping of communes, and existing waste 
treatment mixed syndicates participate in the drawing up of these plans. In other words, to a 
certain extent, the grouping of communes can choose incineration at the time of the drawing 
up of the département plan. 
 In most of the decision-making processes, the groupings of communes were totally free to 
select the technical solution they preferred.  However, in three cases, the incineration plant 
was already foreseen by the département plan.42   
II. The Actors Involved In the Ten Decision-Making Processes 
The actors who participate to the decision-making processes can be divided into three 
categories: public authorities, the public, and other actors. 
II.1. Distribution of Power among the Public Authorities 
 This section has two aims: firstly, to draw the legal provisions which assign the 
competencies to the various involved public authorities; and secondly to state the ‘effective’ 
distribution of power between the public authorities in the ten cases studied. The sources of 
information of this sub-section are (i) the interviews made with the public authorities in 
                                                 
41 Original label in French: Plan départemental d'élimination des déchets ménagers et assimilés. 
42 See appendix “The Ten Decision-Making Processes” for further details about the decision-making processes. 
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charge of the waste treatment on one hand, and (ii) the Code Général des Collectivités 
Territoriales and the Code de l’Environnement which determine the distribution of power 
between the involved public authorities on the other hand. 
 Four public authorities are engaged in the setting-up of an incineration plant. These are the 
authority in charge of the collecting, sorting, and treatment of the mixed municipal wastes, the 
Préfet, the Conseil Général (≈county council), and the Conseil municipal (town council).  
The Authority In Charge Of the Collecting, Sorting, and Treatment, Of the Mixed 
Municipal Wastes 
The authority in charge of the collecting, sorting, and treatment of the mixed municipal 
wastes is obviously the most important in the decision-making process, since it is the public 
authority which contracts the project. Indeed, under the terms of article L. 2224-1343 of the 
Code Général des Collectivité Territoriales, the household wastes collecting and treatment 
has to be managed by communes (“communes” means municipalities). However, a commune 
can transfer this competency to a public establishment for inter-commune cooperation 
(établissement public de cooperation intercommuncale), or to a mixed syndicate (syndicat 
mixte). A public establishment for inter-commune cooperation is basically a grouping of 
communes which want to elaborate common projects of development; it is a long term and 
multipurpose cooperation public establishment.44 Mixed syndicates are public establishments 
which can be composed of communes, groupings of communes, and other legal entities under 
public law. They are medium-term and single purpose public establishments.45 At last, on the 
demand of the communes or of the public establishments for inter-commune cooperation, the 
                                                 
43 This article has been introduced in the Code by Loi nº 99-586 du 12 juillet 1999, art. 71, Journal Officiel du 
13 juillet 1999. 
44 Under the terms of article L. 5210-1 of the Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales (Loi nº 92-125 du 6 
février 1992, art. 66, Journal Officiel du 8 février 1992) “the progress of the inter-commune cooperation is based 
on the free willingness of communes to elaborate common projects of development, inside solidarity perimeters”.  
In the terms of articles L. 5212-1, L. 5214-1 (Loi nº 99-586 du 12 juillet 1999, art. 14, Journal Officiel du 13 
juillet 1999) and article L. 5215-144 (Loi nº 99-586 du 12 juillet 1999, art. 5, Journal Officiel du 13 juillet 1999), 
three kinds of public establishment for inter-commune cooperation exist: syndicate of communes (which is a 
grouping of communes), community of communes (which is a grouping of communes all in one piece and 
without any enclave), and urban community (which is a grouping of communes all in one piece, without any 
enclave, and with more than 500 000 residents at the moment of its creation). 
45 Under the terms of article L. 5711-1 of the Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales, a mixed syndicate is 
composed exclusively of communes (Loi nº 99-586 du 12 juillet 1999 art. 24 Journal Officiel du 13 juillet 1999) 
and of public establishments for inter-commune cooperation (inserted by Loi nº 2004-809 du 13 août 2004, art. 
176, Journal Officiel du 17 août 2004), or of exclusively public establishments for inter-commune cooperation. 
A mixed syndicate can also associate territorial authorities (such as regions or départements), groupings of 
territorial authorities, and other legal entity under public law. (See Loi nº 99-586 du 12 juillet 1999, art. 24, 
Journal Officiel du 13 juillet 1999). 
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management of waste treatment and of the ultimate waste disposals can be assigned to the 
département, that is to the Conseil Général. 
As a matter of fact, in the ten decision-making processes, no commune provided alone for 
a waste treatment facility; the municipalities have preferred to cooperate with other 
neighbouring municipalities in order to share the cost of these expensive facilities. In the ten 
decision-making processes, the facility has to treat the wastes produced by tens or even 
hundreds thousands inhabitants. In nine out of ten cases, a mixed syndicate dedicated to the 
waste treatment has been created. These mixed syndicates are mainly composed of grouping 
of communes, and of smaller waste treatment mixed syndicates which are themselves a form 
of grouping of communes. Only in one case, that of Angers, was the public entity which set up 
an incineration plant project a public establishment for inter-commune cooperation. From now 
and onward, the public authority in charge of the collecting, sorting, and treatment, of the 
mixed municipal wastes will be designated by the term “grouping of communes”. 
The Conseil Général  
 The Conseil Général is the assembly of the elected local decision-makers at the level of the 
département. A département is an administrative division of the French national territory 
which corresponds more or less to a county.46 From July 1992 to November 2005, the 
drawing up of département or inter-département plan for the disposal of household and 
similar waste was within the competence of the French State, and since 1996 more 
specifically of the Préfet. However, on its demand the Conseil Général could take the 
initiative and the responsibility to draw up this plan. The situation has changed since 
November 2005: the drawing up of the département plan is exclusively within the competence 
of the Conseil Général, the préfets do not mage with these plans anymore.47 
 In the ten decision-making processes, the Conseil Généraux left to the Préfets the 
responsibility of the drawing up of the département plan. However, in two cases, in 2005, 
following local elections, the Conseil Généraux took the responsibility of the drawing up of 
                                                 
46 The French territory is divided in 22 regions, which are themselves composed of a series of département (from 
2 to 8). Each département is itself divided in cantons (from 15 to 79). The cantons are composed of 
municipalities called communes (from a few units to a few dozens). Because of their competencies, départements 
are the most important administrative division in France, more than the regions. See the map of France in section 
II.2 of chapter 2. 
47 Loi n°92-646 du 13 juillet 1992, art. 1 JORF 14 juillet 1992. 
Décret no 96-1008 du 18 novembre 1996 relatif aux plans d'élimination des déchets ménagers et assimilés, art. 3. 
Décret n° 2005-1472 du 29 novembre 2005 modifiant le décret n° 96-1008 du 18 novembre 1996 relatif aux 
plans d'élimination des déchets ménagers et assimilés, art. 4. 
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the département plan. These changes to who drew up of the département plans marked the 
abandonment of the concerned incineration plant projects in these two cases.  Thus, it could 
be the case that in a Conseil Général, which is a collective body, there existed many more 
veto points, and/or that a consensus may be harder to achieve on controversial issues. In other 
words under the presidency of the Conseil Général the drawing-up of a département plan may 
be more political in its mode of operation while with the Préfets it may be more technocratic. 
The Préfet 
 The Préfet is the representative of the French State at the local level of the département. 
He can play three roles in the decision-making process. First, as it has already been stated 
above, until 2005, he had by default the initiative and the responsibility for the setting-up of 
the département or inter-département plan for the disposal of household and similar waste. 
Consequently, he may influence the choice of the waste treatment technique, their numbers, 
and their locations.  
 Second, as for the public engagement, he has the power to set-up a Local Commission for 
Information and Monitoring (Commission Local d’Information et de Surveillance). This is a 
place where the NGOs can directly receive information from the project manager (i.e.the 
grouping of commune) and from the development company. 48 
  Last but not least, he is the authority which grants the authorisation to operate the 
incinerator. Indeed, under the terms of L. 511-149, L. 511-2 of the Code de l’Environnement 
and of Décret n° 53-578 du 20 mai 1953 (successively modified) which defines the facilities 
as being subject to authorisation or to declaration, incineration plants and others type of waste 
treatment facilities (composting, landfills, and crushing) are ‘classified’ for the protection of 
the environment50 and they are thus subject to authorisation by the Préfet. Three legal 
obligations condition the granting of this authorisation by the Préfet. Firstly, under the term of 
article L. 512-151 of the Code de l’Environnement, the applicant for the authorisation (i.e. the 
                                                 
48 See chapter 5 “Public Engagement: Legal Framework”, sub-section II.1, for more information about the Local 
Commission for Information and Monitoring. 
49 Loi nº 2001-44 du 17 janvier 2001, art. 11, IV Journal Officiel du 18 janvier 2001. 
50 Classified facilities for the protection of the environment are “facilities operated or owned by any public or 
private person or entity, which might present hazards or drawbacks for the convenience of the neighbourhood, or 
for public health and safety, or for agriculture, or for the protection of nature and the environment, or for the 
conservation of sites and monuments or elements of the archaeological heritage” (Environmental Code, 
Legifrance and Michael Faure, October 2006, article L. 511-1) 
51 Amended by Loi nº 2003-699 du 30 juillet 2003, art. 4, art. 25, Journal Officiel du 31 juillet 2003, and Loi 
nº 2006-11 du 5 janvier 2006, art. 77, Journal Officiel du 6 janvier 2006.  
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grouping of communes and the development company) has to supply a ‘risk study’ specifying 
the risks to which the facility may expose the interests referred in case of an accident, for 
whatever reason.52 Secondly, under the terms of article L. 122-153 of the Code de 
l’Environnement, an impact study enabling the assessment of the impacts of the facility must 
be included.54 These two points mean that that the applicants (i.e. the grouping of communes 
and the development company) have to provide some technical-scientific expertises. Thirdly, 
in the terms of article L. 512-2 of the Code de l’Environnement, the authorisation can be 
granted only after the realisation of a public enquiry, and after considering the possible 
hazards or drawbacks of the project listed in the previous paragraph. That means that some 
form of participation of the local NGOs and of the residents to the decision-making process is 
provided by the law.55 The authorisation takes place toward the end of the decision-making 
process and marks the end of the study of the project and the beginning of construction work. 
Only in two cases (Le Havre, and Guichainville) did the grouping of communes and the 
builder take the risk to start the building before the granting of this authorisation.56  
 The fact that waste treatment facilities are subject to authorisation entails that the very final 
decision for the setting-up of a waste treatment facility does not depend on the elected local 
decision-makers of the grouping of communes, but on the administrative representative of the 
French State in the département, i.e. the Préfet.  
                                                 
52 The authorisation may be granted only if these hazards or drawbacks can be prevented by measures which are 
specified in the ruling of the Préfecture. 
53 Loi nº 2002-276 du 27 février 2002, art. 147, I Journal Officiel du 28 février 2002, amended by Ordonnance 
nº 2004-489 du 3 juin 2004, art. 1, I, II, Journal Officiel du 5 juin 2004, and Loi nº 2005-1319 du 26 octobre 
2005, art. 1, Journal Officiel du 27 octobre 2005. 
54 Under the term of article L. 122-3, paragraph 2, of the Code de l’Environnement “ […] The content of the 
impact study, […] contains as a minimum an analysis of the initial state of the site and its environment, a study 
of the modifications that the project would bring about, a study of its effects on health, and the measures 
envisaged to eliminate, minimise and, if possible, compensate for harmful consequences on the environment and 
health; in addition, for transport infrastructures, the impact study contains an analysis of the costs at community 
level resulting from pollutions and nuisances and the advantages induced for the community, along with an 
evaluation of the energy consumption resulting from the operation, particularly from the traffic movements that 
it causes or prevents; […]”. This article initially set up by Loi nº 2002-276 du 27 février 2002, art. 147, II, 
Journal Officiel du 28 février 2002, has been subsequently modified by Ordonnance nº 2004-489 du 3 juin 2004, 
art. 1, I, II, Journal Officiel du 5 juin 2004, and Loi nº 2005-1319 du 26 octobre 2005, art. 1, Journal Officiel du 
27 octobre 2005. 
55 See Chapter 5 “Public Engagement: Legal Framework”, section I.2, for further details about the public 
enquiries 
56 See appendix “The Ten Decision-Making Processes” for further details about the ten decision-making 
processes. 
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The Conseil Municipal 
 The Conseil Municipal (town council) of the commune hosting the incineration plant is the 
(elected) public authority which delivers the planning permission. Consequently, it has the 
power to refuse the sitting of the incineration plant on its territory. No incineration plant can 
be constructed without its authorisation. Moreover, the town council of the hosting or a 
bordering municipality has the right to create a Local Commission for Information and 
Monitoring.57 
II.2. The Public 
The public is not an unproblematic concept. And thus it is necessary to specify who 
the public is in this study. In the ten cases studied here the public can be divided into three 
groups: the NGOs, the residents, and the formal or informal groups of economical interest. 
The residents are the natural persons living on the territory concerned by the facility, that is, 
on the territory of the grouping of communes. They may be engaged in the decision-making 
processes by the public authority through public meetings, or public enquiries. The informal 
or formal groups of economical interests are farmers (in the cases  1. Gueugnon, 3. Thiviers, 
5. Lasse, and 11. Vaux-le-Pénil,), and viticulturists (in the case 9. Calce).58 Among these three 
types of public, the NGOs played the most important role in the decision-making processes, 
both in terms of presence and in term of mobilisation. Indeed, in each of the ten cases, at least 
two local NGOs were engaged. Furthermore, the NGOs group together some residents, some 
members of the groups of economical interests, and some other local NGOs. In other words, 
most of the persons who stood against, or at least who were worried by, the incineration plant 
project joined, or had the possibility to join, a local NGO. To sum up, in the first part of the 
research about the public engagement, the three types of public are taken into account, while 
in the second part about the public mobilisation of scientific knowledge the study focuses on 
the NGOs. Due to the central role of the NGOs as mobilisation of the public, the structuring 
of the NGOs’ mobilisation is detailed in section III below. 
                                                 
57 See chapter 5 “Public Engagement: Legal Framework”, section II.1, for more information about the Local 
Commission for Information and Monitoring. 
58 The farmers mobilised through three ways: through local NGOs, through an informal way, or through the 
chambre d’agriculture (chamber of agriculture). 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Christophe Voineau  
Controversies, Public Engagement, and Scientific Expertise in Technical-Scientific Decision-Making Processes 
 
- 52 - 
II.3. Other Actors 
 The category “other actors” groups together the actors which participated to the decision-
making processes but who are not central for this research about public involvement. Two 
main “other actors” have been identified: the development company and the building 
company. The development company, which is private, is in charge of operating the 
incineration plant. Consequently, it actively participates in the formal written process of 
requesting authorisation to operate, together with the grouping of communes. Furthermore, the 
development company is member of the Local Commission for Information and Monitoring.  
In the studied cases the development companies are Novergie (SITA/Suez), CGEA-Onyx 
(Veolia Environnement), the two most important, and also Tiru (EDF/Vivendi/Suez), and 
THIDE (Groupe Gaz de France, Groupe Institut Français du Pétrole, Maguin). The second 
“other actor” is the company which builds the incineration plant. 
 The political parties were not significantly present with regard to the public engagement. In 
the open and semi-structured interviews, it has never appeared that the political parties tried to 
sponsor or merely favour any public debate or participatory mechanism; not even the green 
parties emerged from the interviews. From a structural point of view, political parties are 
unlikely to play a direct role in the decision-making processes. As I have stated above, the 
groupings of communes in charge of the waste treatment are composed of municipalities and 
of other groupings of communes, and only one representative of these later public entities 
participates to the meetings of the grouping of communes in charge of the waste treatments. 
Some elected decision-makers member of political parties, however, were member of some of 
the local mobilised NGOs (for example Coordination Environnmentale des Pyrénnées 
Orientales in the case of Calce, or Collectif Inciner’àtort in the case of Angers). Moreover, in 
two cases (1. Gueugnon, 3. Thiviers), the changing of majority at the Conseil Général has 
lead to the abandonment of the incineration plant project.    
III. The Structuring Of the NGOs’ Mobilisation 
 This section analyses the structuring of the NGOs’ mobilisation. In a first step, a typology 
of the NGOs is set up. Then the relationships among the NGOs are analysed. Finally, the 
positioning of the NGOs concerning incineration and their motivations for the mobilisation 
are explored. 
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III.1. Selection of the NGOs and Data Collection 
 The NGOs selected are all the NGOs that were involved in the ten selected decision-
making processes. The data have been gathered mainly through phone and personal face to 
face semi-structured interviews (questions 1 to 6 of the semi-structured questionnaire)59, and 
to a less extent through the web-sites of the NGOs.60 22 out of the 27 identified NGOS have 
been interviewed. As I have already stated in chapter 2, because of the impossibility to 
interview the two NGOs ICI-ROM and ADACIP, the case of Nîmes has finally been excluded 
from the selection of the cases. So there are finally 10 cases with twenty five identified 
NGOs. Among the three NGOs which have not been interviewed, two did not answer to my 
requests (Sauvegarde de l’Anjou, and Frenne66), and the third one (Nord Nature) answered 
very superficially. The identified NGOs are listed in the following section. 
III.2. The Types of NGOs 
 First of all, the NGOs which engaged in the decision-making process are all local; no 
national NGO was directly involved (the relationships between the local and the national 
NGOs are specified in the following sub-section). In other words, a local mobilisation faced a 
local project. The members of these local NGOs, mostly natural persons, come from the area 
surrounding the sites of the incineration plants, that is, principally from the neighbouring 
housing and from the town hosting the facility, but also from the neighbouring towns, and 
sometimes from the Département. A minor section of the members is made up of legal 
entities – these are to a very large extent existing local NGOs – while a few private companies 
are also present.  
Two types of NGOs can be identified: the ‘ad hoc’, and the ‘existing’ NGOs. The first 
category has been labelled as ‘ad hoc’ because they are NGOs especially created on the 
occasion of the setting up of an incineration plant (See figure 4 below), and their main scope 
has been to prevent the building of the incinerator. More over, they very often proposed 
alternative techniques for the waste treatment or alternative waste treatment policy. Therefore, 
they are mainly ‘waste oriented’. However in one case,  
 
 
                                                 
59 See the appendix “Questionnaire for the NGOs” for further details about the asked questions. 
60  See the appendix “Sources of Data” for further details about the list of the consulted web sites; and the list of 
the interviews carried-out. 
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Caption: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (continuous line) : ‘ad hoc’ NGO 
 (broken line)       : ‘existing’ NGO 
 (grey fill)             : Environmentally oriented NGO 
 (white fill)           : Waste oriented NGO 
 (hachure fill)        : Civic oriented NGO
                              : NGO for which no ‘full’ interview could be realised 
: NGO X is member of NGO Y Y X 
 In the first column, the eleven cases studied in this research are listed, while the boxes represent the 
NGOs which mobilised in these eleven cases. Then, there is one column for each net: Coordination du 
CNIID, Independent, and France Nature Environement (FNE). So the NGOs which are members of 
Coordination du CNIID are in the column ‘Coordination du CNIID’. The column ‘Independent’ contains 
the NGOs which are not linked at all to any national NGO. NGOs the national NGO France Nature 
Environnement (FNE) are listed in the last column. To finish, the NGOs which overlap the border line 
between two columns are not formally member of Coordination du CNIID or FNE but are nevertheless 
linked to one of these two national nets. 
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Figure 4. The 25 NGOs engaged in the ten decision-making processes 
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one NGO had a slightly different scope: in the case of Vaux-le-Pénil, the ad hoc NGO 
Association de défense des Victimes de l'Incinération des Déchets (AVIE) had above all the 
aim of obtaining an indemnity for the residents, claiming that they are victim of the pollution 
produced by a previous ‘old’ incinerator. Among the four forms of organisation of the social 
movements identified buy Donatella della Porta, the ‘ad hoc’ NGOs are organised in the same 
way as the ‘citizen committees’.61 Indeed, they have a strong local identity, a strategy of 
actions which favour protests, and the organisation is mostly participatory.62 
 
 The ‘existing’ NGOs are NGOs that were created before they knew about the incineration 
plant project. The label ‘existing’ has been chosen because these NGOs already existed when 
the incineration plant projects were set up; they were not created to fight against the 
incineration plant project. In fact, they were created to protect the environment in a broad 
way; they are ‘environmentally oriented’. Indeed, before the incineration plant project they 
were used to militate for the protection of the environment generally speaking: to them, the 
incineration plant was considered another source of pollution. Incineration is an issue to be 
dealt with, among others they consider also important. However, in two cases, the NGOs are 
not ‘environmentally oriented’. In the case of Vaux-le-Pénil, the existing NGO Un autre 
regard pour Maincy has a ‘civic’ scope: it aims to address criticisms to the policy of the 
municipality of Maincy. And in the case of Le Havre, the NGO Comité du quartier des 
Neiges has a more specific scope than the protection of the environment generally speaking: 
they fight against the neighbouring industrial pollution, including an old incineration plant 
which has been finally closed at the beginning of the 2000’s. The organisation of the 
‘existing’ NGOs is similar to the ‘groups of public interests’ with a strategy mainly made of 
                                                 
61 “Four forms of organisation of social movements: 
1. ‘Group of public interest’: characterised by a universal identity, a single issue, a strategy of lobbying and 
meeting and a bureaucratized organisation with formal membership; 
2. ‘Association of new volunteers’: characterised by a universal identity, strategy of offering of services, 
permanent organised structure, participative and reticular; 
3. ‘Auto-managed social centre’: characterised by a universal identity, strategy of counter cultural intervention, 
with moments of radical protests, participative structure of organisation;   
4. ‘Citizen committee’: characterised by a local identity, strategy of actions which favours protests; structure of 
organisation is participative, flexible, with a low level of coordination.”     
(della Porta Donatella, 2004, p. 13-14) 
62 See chapter 6 “Public Engagement in the Ten Decision-Making Processes”, section I.2, for further details 
about the initiatives undertaken by the NGOs in the decision-making processes. In fact, in the case of Vaux-le-
Pénil two NGOs did not protest. The NGO Association de défense des Victimes de l'Incinération des Déchets 
(AVIE) undertook some legal actions while the NGO Association des Médecins de Maincy lobbied the public 
authorities. 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Chapter 3 
Setting up of Incineration Plants in France: Decision-Making Processes and Involved Actors 
 
- 57 - 
lobbying and public meeting; and a formal membership. However, the identity is not 
universal but local. These NGOs claim the primacy of their municipal or département 
identity. 
 The distinction between ‘existing’ and ‘ad hoc’ NGOs stems from the first (prospecting) 
interviews. When I asked about the identity of the NGOs (date of creation, scope of the 
NGO), it clearly appeared that there were NGOs especially created to fight against the 
incineration plant on the one hand, and pre-existing environmentalist NGOs on the other 
hand. This distinction has been continuously reinforced as I carried out new interviews. This 
distinction is likely to be relevant in this research for two reasons. First, ‘ad hoc’ groups are 
likely to engage in the decision-making processes in a more active way than ‘existing’ NGOs; 
making the decision-making processes more controversial. Indeed ‘ad hoc’ NGOs are recent, 
the members are probably highly motivated, and likely full of energy to sponsor many 
initiatives. Moreover, the rationale being to fight against the local incineration plant project, it 
is likely that they are aware that their actions will be limited to a few months, one or two 
years maximum. On the contrary, ‘existing’ NGOs have to manage their human resources in a 
more accurate way in order to be able to act on the medium-long term. Second, ‘ad hoc’ 
NGOs concentrate only on their local incineration plant project whereas ‘existing’ 
environmentalist NGOs have to distribute their energy among various issues. Since they focus 
on only one issue, waste treatment and incineration, ‘ad hoc’ may mobilise more scientific 
expertise than ‘existing’ NGOs.  
III.3. Relationships among the NGOs 
Relationships among the Local NGOs 
 The relationships among the local NGOs mobilised around a given incineration plant 
project are quite tight. From the interviews, it appears that most of the NGOs worked together 
with the other(s) local NGO(s), that is, that they organised together initiatives such as 
petitions, protests, public meetings, and the preparation of the Local Commission for 
Information and Monitoring meetings, or at least that they were rather well informed about 
the initiatives organised by the others. In four cases, certain NGOs did not have tight 
relationships with the others. In the case of Vaux-le-Pénil, the numerous NGOs which 
mobilised (i.e. five) had only loose relationships among them. In the case of Lasse, the NGO 
Charles Flahaut did not have contact with the two other mobilised NGOs (La Hune and 
Coorrdination Environnementale des Pyrénnées orientales). The two latter groups consider 
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the former as an association of botanists that does not care about incineration. In fact, Charles 
Flahaut was not opposed to the incineration plant project. The NGO la Sauvegarde de 
l’Anjou was present in two decision-making processes (Angers, and Lasse). In the two cases, 
this NGO had almost no contact with the highly active NGOs AREN, Collectif Inciner’à tort, 
and CRITOM.  As a matter of act, La Sauvegarde de l’Anjou was not against the incineration 
plant project, and more generally was not opposed to waste incineration. 
 To conclude, almost all the NGOs were well informed about the actions of the others 
NGOs mobilised around the same incineration plant project, and consequently, they were 
likely to share scientific and technical knowledge they gathered. 
Relationship among the Local and the National NGOs 
 Even though all the mobilised NGOs are local, they are not isolated in their local context. 
Indeed, two thirds of the NGOs, and at least one NGO in each of the ten cases, are linked to a 
national net of NGOs: either to the Coordination du CNIID, or to France Nature 
Environnement (see figure 4 above). To be more precise, nine out of the 25 NGOs are linked 
to the Coordination du CNIID, seven to France nature Environnement (FNE). However eight 
NGOs are independent, that is, they are not linked to any national net. 
 CNIID (Centre National d’Information Indépendante sur les Déchets, National Center of 
Independent Information about Wastes) is a national NGO dedicated to the matter of waste 
treatment. CNIID introduces itself as an NGO that aims at: (i) informing about the toxicity of 
wastes in a general way, and also concerning specified types of wastes; and (ii) denouncing 
the sanitary and environmental damages linked to waste treatment, and proposing healthy 
alternatives. CNIID holds conferences on the whole French territory, sends documents to 
interested persons, and it proposes actions or events to be taken. However, the local NGOs are 
not members of CNIID, but of Coordination du CNIID. Coordination du CNIID, or more 
precisely, Coordination Nationale pour la Réduction des Déchets à la Source (National 
Committee for the Reduction of Wastes at the Source) groups together 290 local NGOs. 
CNIID provides Coordination with the secretariat. According to CNIID, the aim of the local 
NGOs members of Coordination is to fight against the existing or projected incineration 
plants or landfills, and to promote the reduction of wastes at the source as an alternative 
solution. Moreover, three times a year, Coordination du CNIID organises a national meeting 
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in order to facilitate the exchange of experience between the local NGOs. At the local level, 
CNIID is not present as such, only the members of Coordination are active. 63  
 France Nature Environnement (FNE) is a French national federation of local NGOs which 
aims to protect nature and the environment. Incineration of waste is only one of the various 
environmental themes FNE deals with. Around 3000 NGOs, spread across France, are 
member of FNE.  Concerning waste incineration, FNE is not in favour of the setting up of 
new incineration plant, but it is not completely opposed either. FNE thinks that incineration is 
not a good solution for the waste treatment because of the sanitary risk and the environmental 
pollution it entails. Nevertheless, it also states that incineration plants could exceptionally be a 
solution for big cities, because in these cases no landfill is available in a reasonable range. 
Furthermore, FNE rejects the idea of a moratorium on incineration plants, in the name of the 
reality of the situation of the big cities.64 FNE has three modes of actions: FNE and its 
member associations represent citizens in commissions of consultation at the local and 
national level; they lobby in order to change the French, European, and international 
legislations; and they educate and heighten public awARENess.65 
 The organisations of these two national nets are thus similar to the organisation of their 
respective members. Coordination du CNIID works the same way as a ‘citizen committee’: 
characterised by the sum of the local identities (i.e. by the sum of local NGOs); a strategy of 
actions which favours protests; and a structure of organisation which is participative, flexible, 
with a low level of coordination. Conversely FNE is a ‘group of public interest’: characterised 
by a universal identity; a strategy of lobbying and meeting; and a bureaucratized organisation 
with formal membership. 
 
 In the ten cases studied, Coordination du CNIID and FNE are two distinct networks: the 
NGOs which are not independent are either part of Coordination du CNIID or part of FNE. 
                                                 
63 Source: CNIID, www.cniid.org/lasso.html,  access date: 5 December 2006  
64 Sources : FNE, « Dossier : Incinération / Positionnement de France Nature Environnement sur la gestion des 
déchets et l'incinération », www.fne.asso.fr/PA/dechets/dos/dossiers_incineration.htm, access date: 18 June 2007  
65 As I have already stated, no national NGO is directly involved in the mobilisation at the local level. However, 
at the national level, on the dated 15 March 2007, 28 NGOs took position against incineration, signing the 
petition for a moratorium on waste incineration initiated by the grouping of NGOs Alliance. The petitioners are: 
ACIDD, Acroporis, Action Consommation, Adéquations, Adome, Agir pour l'Environnement, Amis de la Terre, 
APREIS, Biosphere, Blue Initiative, CNIID, Cheminements, CoLLecT-IF, CRII-GEN, Ecoforum, Ecologie sans 
frontière, Europe des consciences, Fac Verte, Good planet, Greenpeace, Fondation Nicolas Hulot, Intelligence 
Verte, L'Age de Faire, Le Festival du Vent, Marais du Vigueirat, MDRGF, Objectif Bio, and WWF. (Source : 
« L'Alliance pour la Planète réclame un moratoire sur l'incinération et une politique ambitieuse de réduction 
des déchets », www.lalliance.fr, access date : 15 June 2007) 
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Only the NGO Guichainville Environnement Haute Normandie belongs to both nets (see 
figure 4 above). The choice to be part of one of the two networks exclusively is not surprising 
since CNIID is strongly opposed to incineration whereas FNE is not in favour of a 
moratorium on incineration plants. Coordination du CNIID is present in most of the cases (8 
out of 10), whereas FNE is present in only three cases (see figure 4 above). Only in the two 
cases of Arras and Le Havre, is Coordination du CNIID absent whereas FNE is present.  
Therefore, considering the relationships among the local NGOs on the one hand, and 
between the local and the national NGOs on the other, it is possible to conclude that all the 
NGOs are directly or indirectly in touch with a national network. That means that in each 
case, the local NGOs may receive scientific or technical information from a national NGO. 
Moreover, in the light of the positioning of the national NGOs, it is likely that the NGOs 
members of Coordination du CNIID will be more opposed to the incineration plant projects 
than the NGOs members of FNE.  
 
III.4. Positioning Concerning Incineration and Motivations for the Mobilisation 
 Almost all of the interviewed NGOs (20 out of 22) declared that they stand against the 
local incineration plant project and more generally that they are against the principle of 
incineration. Only two NGOs are not against incineration: Comité du quartier des Neiges 
(case of Le Havre) and Charles Flahaut (case of Calce). The position of Comité du quartier 
des Neiges is that an incineration plant can be a solution if it is located in an appropriate place 
and if it respects the norms of pollution. As for Charles Flahaut, it felt that it was urgent to do 
something in order to close the landfill, and incineration was the ‘less bad’ solution. However, 
after the closure of the landfill and the building of an incineration plant, this NGO claims that 
it is necessary to monitor better incineration plants. A third NGO, La Hune (case of Calce), 
was not initially opposed to the project of an incineration plant. However, it changed its 
position because the sanitary risk appeared to them more important than they thought, and 
because incineration prevents the implementation of genuine selective sorting. 
 In response to the question “6.  Why do you oppose this project of incineration plant?”, the 
20 NGOs which opposed to the setting up of an incineration plant mainly invoked the sanitary 
risk and the environmental pollution. Dioxins are the molecules which are by far the most 
criticized, but furans and heavy metals are also mentioned. To be more precise, as principal 
reason, seventeen NGOs invoked the sanitary risk, two did not talk directly about sanitary risk 
but about the non respect of the pollutant emission norms of an existing old incinerator, and 
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one NGO talked only about the risk for agriculture. The other reasons invoked were the 
pollution of environment (6 NGOs), and a series of other various motivation: the location of 
the incineration plant (1), the non respect of the procedure concerning the impact study (1), 
the visual impact on architectural heritage (1), and the impact on the value of the residential 
patrimony. Thus, the reason why almost all the mobilised NGOs stand against an incineration 
plant is the sanitary risk. 
IV. Summary-Conclusion 
The ten decision-making processes have a similar structure and are thus actually 
comparable. In brief: a grouping of communes decides to set up a waste treatment facility, 
then it rapidly selects incineration as a solution; then it establishes the specifications of the 
incineration plants and selects a builder and a development company; in a third step, a public 
inquiry is carried out; finally, after the granting by the Préfet (the local representative of the 
state) of the authorisation to operate, the building starts and the facility opens. However, in 
three cases the incineration plant project was abandoned during the ‘specifications’ stage. 
Moreover, the decision of the elected decision-makers of the grouping of communes is more 
or less constrained by the département plan for the disposal of household and similar wastes. 
Among the actors involved in the decision-making processes, two have a major role with 
regard to public participation and public mobilisation of scientific knowledge: the groupings 
of communes and the local NGOs. The grouping of communes is the authority in charge of the 
setting up of a waste treatment facility, that is, is the project manager. However, three other 
public authorities condition the final decision: the mayor of the municipality which hosts the 
incineration plant since he personally delivers the planning permission through an order; the 
authority in charge of the département plan for the disposal of household and similar waste, 
that is the Préfet in the cases studied; and the Préfet again because he is the authority which 
grants the authorisation to operate and consequently he conditions the opening of the facility. 
Finally, the Préfet also has some prerogatives concerning the participation of the public: 
notably he is the authority which sets up the Local Commission for Information and 
Monitoring. 
Among the three types of public – individuals, NGOs, and groups of economic interests – 
the most important is the NGOs, because of their omnipresence and of their actual 
mobilisation. While in the first part of this research concerning public engagement these three 
types of public are studied, the second part about the mobilisation of scientific expertise by 
the public focuses on the NGOs. In the ten cases, the NGOs which mobilised are local. Thus, 
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local decision-making processes entailed local mobilisations. Two types of local NGOs can be 
differentiated: the ‘ad hoc’, especially created to stand against the incineration plant project, 
and the ‘existing’ which are mostly environmental NGOs. In the respective cases, the local 
NGOs worked together, or at least, each NGO was regularly informed about the actions 
undertaken by the others.  Even if these NGOs are local, they are not isolated: in each case, at 
least one NGO is linked to a national net. Two national networks have been identified: 
Coordination du CNIID, and France Nature Environnement. While CNIID deals exclusively 
with waste treatment and is strongly opposed to the principle of incineration, FNE is a 
generalist environmental NGO which thinks that incineration could be a solution in certain 
specific cases. The two types of local NGOs are respectively linked to the two national nets: 
the ‘ad hoc’ NGOs are linked to Coordination du CNIID, while the ‘existing’ NGOs are 
linked to France Nature Environnement. All but two out of the 25 local NGOs oppose the 
incineration plant project. The main reason for this opposition is the worry about the sanitary 
risk entailed by incineration plants, and more specifically by dioxins. Even if both types of 
local NGOs are opposed to incineration, in the light of the positions of the two national 
NGOs, it is likely that the ‘ad hoc’ NGOs will be more opposed to the incineration plant 
projects than the ‘existing’ NGOs. 
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PART II  
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT MECHANISMS 
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INTRODUCTION 
This second part intends to answer the three first research questions, which concern the public 
engagement in the ten selected decision-making processes: first, “to what extent is the public 
actually involved in decision-making processes?”; second, “what is the political will to 
involve the public?”; and third, “what is the impact of the public engagement on the decision-
making processes (i.e. on their degree of controversy, and on their outcome)?” 
This part consequently consists of three chapters. Chapter 4 provides the theoretical 
framework and the main lines of the methodology. Chapter 5 establishes the legal framework 
of the public involvement in France; the comparison of the actual public engagement with this 
legal framework enables the assessment of the political will of the local decision-makers to 
engage the public. Finally, chapter 6 provides the answers to the research questions.  
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Chapter 4  
Public Engagement and Degree of Controversy:  
Two Property Spaces 
 This chapter provides the theoretical framework that will be used to answer to the first 
three research questions. The theoretical framework shall enable the classification of the 
public involvement mechanisms sponsored by the public authorities and the public, and the 
measurement of the degree of controversy of the decision-making processes. From here 
onward the processes/techniques/instruments which enable the involvement of the public will 
be collectively termed ‘mechanisms’. Section II provides a property space of the public 
engagement mechanisms, while section III develops a property space of the decision-making 
process according to their degree of controversy.  
 
I. Public Engagement Mechanisms: The Typology Developed by Rowe and 
Frewer 
 In the first sub-section, the criteria for the development of a property space of the public 
engagement mechanisms are presented. Then, the second sub-section introduces the typology 
on which the property space is based.  
I.1. Criteria for the classification of public engagement mechanisms 
 As Rowe and Frewer state, throughout western democracies, a growing number of 
mechanisms have been set up in order to enable public involvement, and the very existence of 
this variety of mechanisms implies uncertainty and confusion about what involvement consist 
of, that is, ‘public involvement’ lacks of precise definitions (Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005). 
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This lack of precise definition hinders the development of a pertinent property space of the 
public involvement mechanisms. A general definition of ‘public participation’ usually 
accepted  is “the practice of involving members of the public in the agenda-setting, decision-
making, and policy-forming activities of organizations/institutions responsible for policy 
development” (Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005, p. 253). Such a definition enables the 
distinction of participation situations from non-participation situations where elected policy 
makers, with the help of nominated experts, take decisions with no further reference to the 
public. However, it does not enable the distinction between the various grades of involvement 
of the public. For example, the public may ‘participate’ by being passive recipients of 
information delivered by public authorities. In other words, the term ‘involvement’ covers 
different degrees of engagement of the public, from simple information given to the public to 
highly inclusive deliberative approaches, such as consensus conference or focus groups. 
Furthermore, in the literature, the labelling of highly similar mechanisms with different names 
and the use of a same name for very dissimilar mechanisms contributes to the confusion too. 
Confusion is such that some researchers might disagree with the scope of the mechanisms, 
which are thus, a priori and implicitly, excluded or included in research.66 Finally, the 
confusion is also due to the fact that public involvement is an object of study of different 
fields of research such as Political Science and Science Studies. Even the list of typical 
mechanisms varies according to the field of research. For example, in the Political Science 
literature, Bacqué and Syntomer list ten main engagement mechanisms: assembly, 
referendum, committee of quarter, quarters’ fund, participative budget, development 
community, citizen jury, consultative commission, participative strategic plan and community 
development plan, system of representation of the users of the public services (Bacqué M.-H. 
, Rey H. Sintomer Y., 2005). While, in a recent Science Studies article, Rowe and Frewer 
have identified “the eight most widespread engagement mechanisms”: referenda, public 
hearings/inquiries, public opinion surveys, negotiated rule making, consensus conference, 
citizens' jury panel, citizen public advisory committee, and focus groups (Rowe G. and 
Frewer L.J., 2000). 
 
 As Bacqué and Syntomer claim, various typologies of the mechanisms may be developed, 
depending on the main dimension retained to classify the mechanisms (Bacqué M.-H. , Rey 
                                                 
66 See Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005 for a thorough discussion about the lack of unambiguous definitions and 
its impact on the quality of studies about public involvement in technical decision-making processes. 
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H. Sintomer Y., 2005). These authors list four ways of classifying the mechanisms; the list is 
not exhaustive. The most obvious and easy typology, because it is the most concrete, consists 
of listing the mechanisms indicating the state of the variables which characterise them. A 
second way to develop a typology is to identify the type of participants. A third way to 
establish a typology according to the origin of the initiative of the participation: bottom-up, 
top-down, or bottom-up and top-down intertwined. At last, the temporality of the mechanisms 
(time limited, such as citizen juries or referendum or long term, such as participative budgets) 
can also be the main variable to develop a typology.  
 In order to specify what is meant by ‘public involvement’ in this research, through the 
development of a property space, it is necessary first to identify the intended scopes of the 
involvement of the public: is it to transform the public as a complementary/alternative source 
of information? Or is it to redistribute the power of the final decision between the public and 
the decision-makers? The present Science Study research is obviously interested in the 
former: as we have seen in chapter 1, this research focuses on the public involvement in order 
to overcome the problems of traditional scientific expertise. Of course, the involvement of the 
public as an alternative source for the elected decision-makers is also a form of empowerment 
of the public. In other words, this research focuses on the cognitive dimension of 
empowerment (i) agenda setting and (ii) framing of issues. Consequently, typologies such as 
the ladder of participation developed by Shery Arnstein (Arnstein S., 1969), in which the 
groups of mechanisms of public engagement differed along the single dimension of the re-
distribution of the power to the public, are of limited interest in this research.67 Consequently, 
the circulation of information between the public authorities and the public is a key element 
for the development of the property space of the public involvement mechanisms. Moreover, 
this property space must enable the classification of the various grades of involvement of the 
public: from mere communication to highly inclusive mechanisms. The typology developed 
                                                 
67 In this pioneering typology, the interest of Arnstein is the distribution of power between citizens and decision-
makers. She identified eight levels of participation. In order of increasing empowerment of the public these are: 
1. Manipulation, 2. Therapy, 3. Information, 4. Consultation, 5. Placation, 6. Partnership, 7. Delegated Power, 8. 
Citizen Control), themselves grouped into 3 families (Non Participation, Tokenism, Citizen Power). This ladder 
of participation has been a basis for the building of many other typologies in the political science literature. 
 Moreover, the empowerment of the public is a tricky issue. Indeed, the distribution of power to some non-
elected members of the public inevitably entails problems of input legitimacy (Scharpf F., 1999), that is 
problems of representativeness of the public participants (this not the case for the referenda). It seems that only 
election can guarantee representativeness of the people. Thus, in this perspective, it is better to engage the public 
as an alternative source of information (that is, opinions, but also knowledge) rather than as an alternative 
decision-maker. 
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by Rowe and Frewer (Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005) matches these two requirements. This 
typology has, however, a series of limitations. 
 
I.2. The typology developed by Rowe and Frewer: advantages and drawbacks 
  The typology of public involvement mechanisms developed by Rowe and Frewer stems 
from the need to differentiate and classify the various involvement situations. The authors 
have developed their typology based on the analysis of a broad range of existing mechanisms, 
mainly in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Since this typology is the basis for the development of 
my own property space, only the main features of this typology are set out in this sub-section; 
more details can be found in section III below. The typology of Rowe and Frewer is based on 
the key dimension of ‘flow of information’ (information means knowledge and/or opinions) 
between ‘public representatives’ (i.e. the public) and ‘sponsor’ of the engagement 
mechanisms (i.e. ≈ public authorities). According to the ‘flow of information’, three different 
descriptors differentiate initiatives which have been referred to as public participation in the 
past; these are: ‘public communication’, ‘public consultation’, and ‘public participation’ (see 
figure 5 below). 
Figure 5. Three classes of public engagement mechanism (Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005, p. 255) 
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For Rowe and Frewer, the aim of public engagement is to convey the maximum amount of 
relevant information (opinions and/or knowledge) from the maximum of relevant sources and 
to efficiently transfer them to the appropriate receivers. They implicitly suggest that 
optimising flow of information will increase the technical quality of the decision. In this 
perspective the three classes of public engagement mechanisms have the following 
competences/efficiency: 
 
“public communication: maximizing the relevant information flow from the 
sponsor and efficiently transferring it;  
 
public consultation: maximizing the relevant information flow from the maximum 
number of the relevant population and efficiently transferring it  (with minimal 
information loss) to the sponsor, with the efficient processing of that information 
by receivers (the sponsor); 
 
public participation: maximizing the relevant information flow from the 
maximum number of all relevant sources and efficiently transferring it  (with 
minimal information loss) to the other parties with the efficient processing of that 
information by the receivers (the sponsors and participants) and the combining of 
it into accurate composite.” 
(Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005, p. 263) 
 For a further differentiation between public engagement mechanisms, Rowe and Frewer 
have defined six ‘significant variables’68 – that is, ‘six significant charateristics’ – , still in the 
clear perspective of evaluating their appropriateness to transfer information between the 
parties involved. The public engagement mechanisms which have their significant variables 
(characteristics) in the same state, and thus having the same appropriateness to transfer 
information, are clustered in homogeneous categories. These six ‘significant charateristics’ 
are: the method of selection of the participants, the presence or absence of a facilitator to elicit 
information, the mode of response of the participants, the flexibility of the input information 
by the sponsor, the medium of information between the involved parties, and the existence of 
structured rules for the aggregation of the collected information.  
                                                 
68 Term coined by Rowe and Frewer. 
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 However, for the purpose of this research, this typology presents two limitations. First of 
all, as Bucchi and Neserini remarks (Bucchi M. and Neresini F., 2008), the most substantial 
shortcoming of the typology is that it is (implicitly) limited to the top-down mechanisms, that 
is, to the mechanisms actively promoted by a public institution. There is the need for an 
interpretative framework able to take into account also the bottom-up initiatives, which are 
the participatory forms commissioned by members of the public. Initiatives such as public 
protests, patient associations shaping the research and care agenda, or community-based 
research are deliberately not initiatives of public institutions.69 
 Second, the typology of Rowe and Frewer is static, that is, it does not take into account the 
chronological dimension of the decision-making processes in which the public may be 
involved; that entails two limitations. In the first place, the time when a public involvement 
initiative is set up is of significance. The impact of a public involvement initiative is different 
if it is organized at the outset, in the middle, or toward the end of a decision-making process. 
The key decisions are often made at the beginning of the decision-making processes while 
toward the end, only minor issues are still under discussion. Taking up again the model of 
flow of information, what is a ‘relevant information’ depends on the issue at stake, and thus 
on the stage in the decision-making process. Concerning the setting up of incineration plant, 
the issue at stake is not the same before and after the selection of incineration as waste 
treatment technology. Before the selection, all the technological solutions to waste treatment, 
such as mechanical biological sorting, methanisation, or thermolysis, are open. After the 
selection, however, only secondary aspects are open to debate, such as the capacity of the 
incineration plant, its location, or the type of furnace. Secondly, as Bucchi and Neresini note, 
over time, public engagement with regard to a certain issues may evolve: for instance, a 
public protest can induces a public authority to organise a consensus conference or a citizen 
panel or an initiative originally designed to produce a consensus may bring to light and 
radicalise conflictual positions (Bucchi M. and Neresini F., 2008).70 
                                                 
69 For further information about patient associations and community based researches, see: Callon M. and 
Rabeharisoa V., 1999; Epstein, Steven G, 1995a; Epstein, Steven, 1995b. 
70 The typology of Rowe and Frewer has a third limitation. Indeed, not only do public mechanisms, such as 
hybrid forums, involve the exchange of information, they are also processes during which new identities are 
negotiated and produced. The relevant groups do not always exist before a thorough interaction between them 
and the experts became possible; the relevant public may become visible and relevant only through an interactive 
process (Callon M., 1999). However this limit is not that important for the purposes of this research. However, 
 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Chapter 4 
Public Engagement and Degree of Controversy: Two Property Spaces 
 
- 71 - 
II. Public Engagement Mechanisms: A Property Space 
 The property space of the public engagement mechanisms developed in this research 
attempts to overcome these shortcomings. The approach is to improve upon the typology of 
Rowe and Frewer, taking up again its key concepts: flow of information, public 
communication, public consultation, public participation, and also the six charateristics for the 
evaluation of the mechanisms.71 In sub-section III.1, the typology of Rowe and Frewer is 
supplemented in order to take into account the bottom-up public involvement mechanisms, 
while sub-section III.2 supplements the key charateristics for the evaluation of the 
mechanisms, and sub-section III.3 explains how to take into account the point in time in 
which a public involvement initiative occurs. 
II.1. Definition of Public Participation: Seven Concepts of “Engagement” 
As I have already stated, the property space I develop here is based on the typology 
developed by Rowe and Frewer. Consequently, I take up most of the definitions they stated in 
their paper (Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005). The first element to be taken into account is the 
party which commissions a public engagement initiative. Public engagement mechanisms can 
be divided into two families: the one sponsored by a public authority, the ‘top-down public 
engagement mechanisms’, and the one sponsored by the public, the ‘bottom-up public 
engagement mechanisms’. In this research, the term ‘sponsor’ refers to the party 
commissioning the engagement initiative. The term ‘public authority’ labels public 
institutions which carry out incineration plant projects or have monitoring competencies on 
the projects: municipalities, grouping of communes, préfectures, while the term ‘public’ refers 
to as the part of the concerned public which is actually engaged (individuals, NGOs, 
formal/informal groups of interest). The ‘organizer’ is taken as the party that conducts the 
engagement exercise, which may or may not be the same as the sponsor. 
                                                                                                                                                        
once could add a seventh “significant characteristic” which vcould be labelled ‘inclusion of new identities’, with 
two values: enable, not enable. 
71 Bucchi and Neserini (Bucchi M. and Neresini F., 2008) adopt another strategy for overcoming the limitations 
of the typology of Rowe and Frewer. They built up a typology based on two dimensions: spontaneity and 
intensity. Spontaneity refers to the initiates of the production of scientific knowledge; a top-down mechanism is 
initiated by the public authorities while a spontaneous mechanism is initiated by the public. Intensity refers to the 
degree of participation of the public to the production of knowledge. These two dimensions are intented as a 
continuum and are represented by a qualitative two axis diagram. But this typology is not usable as such in this 
research. First, the concepts of intensity and spontaneity should be operationalised. As they are defined, they are 
too qualitative, and it is not possible to place the engagement intiative on the diagram in an objective way. 
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 In each top-down and bottom-up family, the three descriptive terms of communication, 
consultation, participation, make possible the differentiation between public engagement 
mechanisms. The differentiation relies on the ‘flow of information’ between the ‘public 
authority’ and the ‘public’. Moreover, it is necessary to enable the classification of the 
situations in which there is no involvement of the public, that is, when there is no flow of 
information between the ‘public’ and the ‘public authority’. This situation is referred to as ‘no 
public engagement’. Thus what have been in the past called ‘public participation’ or ‘public 
involvement’ is composed of seven class: ‘top-down public communication’, ‘top-down 
public consultation’, ‘top-down public participation’, ‘no public engagement’, ‘bottom-up 
public consultation’, ‘bottom-up public communication’ and ‘bottom-up public participation’.  
These seven concepts are defined below and represented in figure 6 below.72 From here 
onward these seven concepts in combination are referred to as ‘public engagement’. The 
methods intended to enable this engagement are referred to as ‘engagement mechanisms’ 
generically, and ‘engagement initiatives or exercises’ specifically.73 For example, a public 
meeting carried out on a given date, let’s say on the 20 March 1999, is an exercise/initiative, 
while a public meeting, generally speaking, is a mechanism.  
In ‘top-down public communication’, information is conveyed from the public 
authorities to the public (participants). The sponsor of the initiative is the public authority. 
Information flow is one-way: there is no involvement of the public as such, in the sense that 
public feedback is not required or specifically sought. When the public attempts to provide 
information, there is no mechanism specified a priori to deal with this at any level. During an 
initiative, a public authority may be represented by a (elected or non-elected) decision-maker 
or by an executive of the public administration. 
In ‘top-down public consultation’, information is conveyed from the public (participants) 
to the public authorities, following a process initiated by the public authorities. Significantly, 
no formal dialogue exists between the public and the public authorities. The information 
elicited from the public is believed to represent currently held opinions on the topic in 
question. 
 
                                                 
72 The definitions of the three concepts ‘top-down public communication’, ‘top-down public consultation’, and 
‘top-down public participation’  are substantially identical to the definitions of ‘ public communication’, ‘public 
consultation’, and ‘public participation’ developed by Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005. 
73 Definitions adapted from Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005, p. 254 
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Figure 6. The seven types of public engagement74 
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 In ‘top-down public participation’, information is exchanged between the public 
(participants) and the public authorities. That is, there is some degree of dialogue in the 
process that takes place (usually in a group setting), which may involve representatives of 
both parties in different proportions (depending on the mechanism concerned) or indeed, only 
representatives of the public who receive information from the public authorities prior to 
responding. Rather than simple raw opinions being conveyed to the sponsors, the act of 
dialogue and negotiation serves to transform opinions in the members of both parties (public 
authorities and the public). This mechanism is sponsored by the public authority. 
 In ‘no public engagement’: there is no flow of information between the public and the 
public authorities. Policy makers, with the help of nominated experts, take decisions with no 
further reference to the public. The public but does not bring any kind of scientific-technical 
expertise or other kind of knowledge. Obviously, for this type, there is no engagement 
                                                 
74 The figure is partly based on Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005, p. 255 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Christophe Voineau  
Controversies, Public Engagement, and Scientific Expertise in Technical-Scientific Decision-Making Processes 
 
- 74 - 
initiative. Legal actions undertaken by the public or by the public authorities fall into the ‘no 
public engagement’ class. In this case there is no direct flow of information between the 
parties: possible information are exchanged with the judge and not with the other party. 
 In ‘bottom-up public communication’: information is conveyed from the public 
(representatives of the public) to the public authority and/or to a larger public (participants). It 
is a one way flow sponsored by the public. This act of informing has two scopes which do not 
exclude each other. When information is directly addressed to the public authority, the scope 
is to provide decision-makers with alternative information in order to influence their final 
decision. When information is addressed to a larger public, the scope is to provide this larger 
public with alternative information in order to gain its support, and thus to pressure the 
elected policy makers through public protests. In this second situation, alternative information 
may also reach some decision-makers. 
 In ‘bottom-up public consultation’, information is conveyed from public authorities 
(participants) to the public (representatives of the public); the representatives of the public 
search for more information. The information elicited from the public authorities represent 
currently held positions on the topic in question. Such engagement is similar to the top-down 
communication with regard to the flow of information and the way it is conveyed. However, 
‘Bottom-up public consultation’ must not be confused with the mechanisms initiated by the 
public authority who wish to answer to what they perceive as a public need (may be 
following public protests); these are top-down public communication. To be classified as a 
bottom-up public consultation mechanism, the delivering of information by the public 
authority information must be the consequence of a specific request made by some members 
of the public. 
 In ‘bottom-up public participation’, information is exchanged between the public 
(representatives of the public) and the public authorities (participants). These mechanisms 
may be very similar to the top-down public participation ones; the difference relies in the 
sponsor, which is the public here. There is some degree of dialogue in the process that takes 
place (usually in a group setting), which may involve representatives of both parties in 
different proportions (depending on the mechanism concerned) or indeed, only representatives 
of the public who receive information from the public authorities prior to responding. Rather 
than simple, raw opinions being conveyed to the sponsors, the act of dialogue and negotiation 
serves to transform the opinions of the members of both parties (public authority and public 
participants). 
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 For reasons of clarity of the presentation of the seven concepts of engagement, I have 
employed the terms ‘public’ and ‘public authority’. I remind the reader that the public is 
composed of the natural persons or legal entities concerned by the decision-making process 
(In this research, the public is the residents, the local NGOs, and the formal and informal 
groups of economic interest, and the public authority is the elected decision-makers of the 
grouping of communes in charge of the waste treatment, or the Préfet). However, in bottom-
up engagement, not all of the public sponsor mechanisms, only some members of the public 
do. The members of the public who sponsor mechanisms are labelled by the term 
‘representatives of the public’. This label, however, does not mean that these members of the 
public have a legitimate representativity of the overall public; there are some representatives, 
not the representatives’. Likewise, in top-down engagement, it is very unlikely that all the 
public participates to the mechanisms; the members of the public who takes part to the 
mechanisms are designated by the term ‘participants’. In fact, by ‘participants’, I mean the 
members of the public (in top-down mechanisms) or of the public authority (in bottom-up 
mechanisms) who take part in the mechanisms. This definition of ‘participant’ is necessary 
for the following discussion concerning the eight significant characteristics of the 
mechanisms. 
II.2. Eight Significant Characteristics of the Mechanisms 
As we have just seen, the mains dimensions for the classification of public engagement 
mechanisms are a combination of the ‘flow of information’ and of the sponsor of the 
mechanisms (public authorities or the public). As I have already stated in sub-section II.2. of 
this chapter, in order to assess the efficiency of public engagement mechanisms and to further 
differentiate the mechanisms, Rowe and Frewer have employed what they label “six 
significant mechanism variables” (Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005), that is, six specific 
characteristics of the mechanisms.75 These six specific characteristics are: participant 
selection method, facilitation of information elicitation, response mode, information input, 
medium of information, facilitation of aggregation. I take for this property the definition of 
the efficiency of public engagement mechanisms which consist in “maximizing the relevant 
information (knowledge and/or opinions) from the maximum number of relevant sources and 
[in] transferring this efficiently to the appropriate receivers” (Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  
                                                 
75 Since the labelling set up by Rowe and Frewer does not always speak for itself, I have changed some of the 
terms they coined. However, I specify when I have made this kind of changes. 
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2005, p. 263). In other words, efficiency refers to appropriate ways of eliciting, transferring, 
and combining the public and the public authorities’ views, that is, the aim is to maximize the 
flow of information. However, in order to assess the efficiency of the bottom-up engagement 
mechanisms, two charateristics must be added to the six developed by Rowe and Frewer; 
these are ‘addressee of information’, and ‘argumentation’. The eight significant 
characteristics (the six set up by Rowe and Frewer and the two I have added) are discussed 
below with regard to the potential impact they have on the different components of the 
efficiency of the mechanisms in the flow of information model perspective. These 
components are maximizing the following: participants, information elicitation, information 
transfer, information processing, and information aggregation. The discussion is synthesised 
in table 2 below.  
The mechanisms which have the ‘same structural variability’76, that is which have their 
significant characteristics in the same state will be grouped together, and thus they will form a 
type of mechanisms. From here onward, the term ‘class’ is referred to as the seven main 
categories of mechanisms defined in the previous sub-section, while the term ‘type’ is referred 
to as the mechanisms which have their significant characteristics in the same state. 
 
                                                 
76 Term coined by Rowe and Frewer (2005) 
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Table 2. Summary of the eight key characteristics of the mechanisms (adapted from Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005, p. 265) 
Mechanism Charateristic1 Values of the 
Charateristic2 
Aspect of effectiveness Potentially 
Influenced 
Relevant Type of Engagement 
Participant selection method* Controlled Uncontrolled Maximize relevant participants 
Top-down/Bottom-up Communication 
Top-down/Bottom-up Consultation 
Top-down/Bottom-up Participation 
Facilitation of information 
elicitation* 
Yes 
No 
Maximize relevant information from 
participants 
Top-down/Bottom-up Consultation 
Top-down/Bottom-up Participation 
Response mode* Unlimited/open Limited/closed 
Maximize relevant information from 
participants (members of the public ror the 
top-down engagements and public authority 
for the bottom-up ones ) 
Top-down/Bottom-up Consultation 
Top-down/Bottom-up Participation 
Information input* Set information Flexible information 
Maximize relevant information from sponsor 
(public authority for the top-down 
engagements and members of the public for 
the bottom-up ones) 
Top-down/Bottom-up Communication 
Top-down/Bottom-up Participation 
Medium of information* Face-to-face Non Face-to-face 
Maximize transfer and processing of 
relevant information 
Top-down/Bottom-up Communication 
Top-down/Bottom-up Consultation 
Top-down/Bottom-up Participation 
Facilitation of aggregation* Structured combination Unstructured combination Aggregation of participant information 
Top-down/Bottom-up Consultation 
Top-down/Bottom-up Participation 
Argumentation** Yes No Maximize relevant information from public 
Bottom-up Communication 
Bottom-up Participation 
Addressee of information 
input** 
Public authority 
Larger public Maximize relevant participants 
Bottom-up Communication 
Bottom-up Participation 
The six charateristics marked “*” have been developed by Rowe and Frewer while I have added the two charateristics marked with “**”. 
1 labelled “mechanism variable” by Rowe and Frewer.;  labelled “levels of variable” by Rowe and Frewer 
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Charateristics Associated With Maximizing Relevant Participants 
 The issue of maximizing relevant participants arises with respect to six types of 
mechanisms: top-down/bottom-up communication, consultation, and participation. A 
charateristic of significance for maximizing relevant participants is the ‘participant selection 
method’.77 Mechanisms can be roughly divided into those that involve some degree of control 
of participant selection and those that have no control, relinquishing choice of involvement to 
the public participants themselves. In a controlled selection, the number and relevance of 
those engaged may be determined (by targeting communications or attempting to elicit 
information from a certain sample of population), whereas in an uncontrolled selection, this is 
not the case (the actively engaged individuals are likely to be the most numerous). Controlled 
selection may be more likely to maximize the relevant population involved than uncontrolled 
selection. Examples of controlled selection mechanisms are newsletters distributed in 
letterboxes, (top-down/bottom-up communication), opinion surveys (top-down consultation), 
or consensus conferences (top-down communication).  
 A particularity of bottom-up engagements, by comparison with those top-down, is that the 
public (representatives of the public) may convey information not only to public authority but 
also to a larger public. A relevant charateristic to enable the differentiation of the addresses of 
the information is the ‘addressee of the input information’ who is either the public authority 
or the larger public.78 With regard to the information flow model, information directly 
addressed to public authority (e.g. via a newsletter sent directly to decision-makers) is more 
likely to be efficient than information addressed to a larger public. In the latter forms, 
information may reach public authority largely distorted, or simply may not reach at all the 
public authority. However, in the approach of members of the public who sponsor these 
engagement mechanisms the scope is also (and often) to convince the public and thus to gain 
its support, in order to pressure public authority. In this perspective, it is more efficient to 
address information to a larger public.   
  
 
 
                                                 
77 Key charateristic developed by Rowe and Frewer.  
78 Key charateristic created by the author. 
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Charateristics Associated With Maximizing Relevant Information from Participants 
Each active participant can be considered to possess a quantity of relevant information 
(knowledge or opinions) regarding the problem in hand as well as other information of no 
relevance. To be effective, an exercise must elicit all relevant information from each 
participant while not eliciting irrelevant or spurious information. Two charateristics are likely 
to affect the possibility of maximizing relevant information from participants; these are the 
presence of absence of adaptive ‘facilitation of information elicitation’, and the ‘mode 
response’ available. These two charateristics are valid for top-down and bottom-up 
consultation, and top-down and bottom-up participation. There are valid for the 
communication mechanisms. These two charateristics have been developed by Rowe and 
Frewer. 
 
The ‘facilitation of information elicitation’ consists of the presence of a facilitator, named 
at the outset of the initiative, and who manages the elicitation process and search for gaining 
input from all participants. Active facilitation increases the elicitation of information through 
the stimulation of each participant to give her/his opinion. Furthermore in meetings 
(consultation or participation) the facilitator is more likely to gather all relevant information 
because he concentrates on this only task only and is not involved, as such, in the discussions. 
(In a sense, not only does a facilitator maximize relevant information from participants, but 
also plays a role in maximizing participants numbers through ensuring that all participants are 
active). An example is the commissaire enquêteurs who act in the framework of the enquêtes 
publiques (public enquiries). They are in charge of gathering opinions, suggestions, and 
counter proposals from the public through individual interviews and registers, and then of 
aggregating them. If the presence of a facilitator is a key charateristic, the quality of the 
elicitation may also significantly influence the gathering of relevant information. 
   
The ‘mode of response’ is either “open” or “closed”. Mechanisms that only allow 
respondents to choose among one or more options (opinion survey requiring ratings on a 
scale) are “closed”, whereas those that allow free responses (e.g. enquiry registers) are 
“open”. The open responses are more liable to affect the likelihood of maximizing relevant 
information than the closed ones; although, they are likely to elicit also more irrelevant 
information. Concerning the loss of information in the closed responses, the yes-no answer of 
a referendum is the most striking example. 
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In summary, active participants only represent potential information sources: they need to 
be engaged in such a way that comprehensive and appropriate information is elicited from 
them. 
 
Charateristics Associated With Maximizing Relevant Information from Sponsor 
 Information sources may include the public authority and its experts, as well as members 
of the public (and eventually their experts). Indeed in the information flow model, it is just as 
important that information from the public and from the public authority is full and relevant. 
 Top-down/bottom-up communication and participation engagements can be differentiated 
with regard to the ‘information input’ (i.e. information delivered by the sponsor): there are 
the mechanisms with set information input, and those with flexible input.79 Examples of 
information set prior to the initiative are newsletters, non-interactive web sites, exhibitions 
(top-down/bottom-up communication) or enquêtes publiques for which information 
documents are available in town halls (this an top-down participation. Members of the public 
have the possibility to write down their opinions, suggestions or counter-proposals on a 
register or to orally convey them through an individual meeting with a facilitator). Examples 
of the flexible type include meetings during which the sponsor can adjust the information 
delivered according to the questions asked by the participants (communication). Most of top-
down and bottom-up participation mechanisms allow flexible information input in order to 
facilitate dialogue between the parties involved. It is reasonable to hypothesise that flexible 
input is more liable to maximize relevant sponsor information than set input, all other 
charateristics being equal.  
 In top-down and bottom-up mechanisms, the roles of public authority and of the public 
with regard to the emission and reception of information are inverted: while in top-down 
mechanisms, information input are provided by public authority (the sponsor) and responses 
by the public (in fact the participants), in those bottom-up information input are provided by 
the public (the members of the public who sponsor public engagement initiatives) and 
responses by public authority (the participants).  
 
                                                 
79  key charateristic developed by Rowe and Frewer. 
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The public does not always provide a large amount of information. Bottom-up 
communication and participation engagements can be classified with regard to the presence of 
‘argumentation’ in the input information.80 Two cases are possible, either substantial 
argumentation is conveyed, or not. In the mechanisms where there is no substantial argument, 
information mainly consists in showing support or opposition to the positions held by public 
authority. This is the case of the traditional protests exercises (e.g. demonstration, petition). 
On the contrary, in bottom-up communication initiatives, such as newsletters or association 
public meetings, the members of the public who sponsor these mechanisms develop 
arguments supporting their position. Through protest mechanisms, the members of the public 
who sponsor the mechanism do not rely that much on the transformation of the position of 
public authority due to alternative information, as on the demonstration of an extended public 
opposition. The aim of public protests is thus to pressure public authority. In the meantime, 
the sponsor(s) of a protest may gain in credibility with regard to their representative ness of 
the position held by the larger public. The more the public participate to a protest, the more its 
sponsor gains representative ness in the eyes of the public authority. Consequently, in case of 
success of public protests, their sponsors can claim more easily a privileged role as participant 
in the possible following top-down public participation or consultation mechanisms. 
 
Charateristic Associated with Maximizing the Effective Transfer of Information to, 
and its Processing by, Recipients. 
 In the perspective of the information flow model, one aim of engagements is to maximize 
the transfer of information between the parties involved, and to ensure that the recipients (be 
these the sponsors or the participants) fully understand these information. In this respect, a 
significant charateristic is the ‘medium of transfer of information’.81 Information can be 
conveyed either face-to-face, through initiatives such as public meetings (communication) or 
individual meetings with a commissaire enquêteur (public enquiries), or non face-to-face 
using phones or computer technology (teleconferencing, comments of web site information 
through e-mail). Because of the loss of visual and non-verbal cue when there is no physical 
contact, non face-to-face mechanisms are less likely to diminish loss or misunderstanding of 
information.  
                                                 
80 Key characteristic added by the author. 
81 Key characteristic developed by Rowe and Frewer. 
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 Furthermore, non face-to-face mechanisms using certain ‘technologies’ may condition the 
number of respondents in top-down consultation or participation. For example, some forms of 
media, in particular the internet, may disenfranchise those who do not posses, or are not very 
familiar with, them. 
 
Charateristics Associated With Maximising the Aggregation of Relevant Information 
from Participants 
 In top-down/bottom-up participation exercises and top-down consultation exercises, the 
problem arises as to how merge the various knowledge and opinions of the various 
participants into a response which accurately combines all relevant information from 
participants. An inefficient aggregation can severely harm the effectiveness of an exercise, 
even if all relevant information from all participants has been correctly elicited and 
transferred. A significant charateristic aimed at taking into account this aspect is the 
‘facilitation of the aggregation process’ which consists in the presence or absence of prior 
established structured rules for the aggregation of information.82 Structured processes are 
more liable to affect the likelihood of aggregating information in such a manner to produce a 
faithful image of the various individual information. The aggregation is a synthesis that must 
allow retrieval of the various opinions and point of views. The aim is not to provide a 
coherent whole; the final report must take into account possible dissensions within the public 
or contradictory points of view. Unstructured processes without the observance of clear outset 
rules, equity and input from all participants is not guaranteed. This charateristic bears some 
similarities with the facilitation of information elicitation, in the sense that it maximizes the 
effective transfer of information from all participants. However, it is possible to have a 
structured process of information treatment without a designated facilitator. Opinion surveys 
or referenda are the typical examples of a structured aggregation of information which 
accurately takes into account the opinion of each single participant. 
 
II.3. Along The Decision-Making Processes: Three Key Chronological Stages 
 In order to enable a chronological analysis of the evolution of the use of public 
engagement mechanisms, it is necessary to provide a chronological model common to the 
                                                 
82 Key characteristic developed by Rowe and Frewer. 
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selected decision-making processes. Since the key dimension of the mechanisms typology is 
the ‘flow of information’, it is reasonable to base the definition of the stages on ‘what the 
information is about’, or in other words, “what are the importance the issues at stake?” 
Indeed, the issues at stakes are not the same at the outset and at the end of the decision-
making process. At the outset, all the options are open, or the range of options may be 
broadened, whereas towards the end, only minor characteristics of an already defined project 
may be under discussion. In other words, along the decision-making processes, the ‘freedom 
of manoeuvre’ (i.e. the importance of the issues at stake which are under discussion) 
continuously diminishes. This point is important concerning public engagement, and more 
particularly public participation: a given mechanism has not the same impact on the outcome 
of a decision-making process whether it is organise at the beginning, when all options are 
open, or toward the end of a decision-making process.    
Consequently, following this concept of importance of the issues at stakes, I divide the 
decision-making processes into four sequential stages. These are ‘framing’, ‘specifications’, 
‘realisation’, and ‘running’ (see figure 7 below).  As its labelling indicates, during the 
‘framing’ stage, the ‘problem’ is framed. That is, either it is decided what the problem is 
about, or a key issue is decided. Because virtually all options are open, this stage can be 
qualified as a ‘divergent phase’. Concerning, for example, GM crops, the framing consists of 
deciding what the problem is about: long-term health effects for anyone eating them, 
environmental safety, labelling and consumer choice, intellectual property rights, ethics, food 
security, poverty reduction, environmental conservation, and potential disruption or even 
possible destruction of the food chain. In this research the ‘framing’ stage consists of deciding 
a key issue: the selection of a waste treatment technique among incineration, and other 
techniques such as methanisation, or technical-biological sorting.  
The second stage is the ‘specifications’ stage: after the problem has been framed, this 
stage consists of defining the solutions to the problem. For example, concerning the 
environmental safety of GM crops, a part of the solution could be the experimental cultivation 
of a few plots of land to study the impact on the environment. During the ‘specifications’ 
stage, issues such as the number of plots, their location, or the type of GM crops to be 
cultivated would be decided. In this research, the issues at stake are the specifications of the 
selected technique (i.e. incineration in this research). The decision-makers have to decide 
about the technical specifications of the incineration plant, (such as its capacity, the 
technology for the furnaces, or the type of filters), its location, and the specificities of the 
terms and conditions of its running by a private operator.  
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Figure 7: Stages of Decision-Making Processes 
 
 
The ‘realisation’ stage consists of the implementation of the solutions decided during the 
second stage. When this stage arrives, there is little to be debated. Continuing with the GM 
crops example, during this stage, a few plots of land are cultivated. In this research, the 
realisation consists of the building of the incineration plant, and only minor changes to the 
technical specifications can be made. Typically, the residents ask for extra monitoring 
systems of the emission of pollutants (e.g. setting up of continuous or semi-continuous 
measurements of dioxins at the mouth of the chimney). 
Once the facility is ‘running’, the solutions have been fully implemented and virtually no 
modification can be realised. Concerning incineration plants, only information about the 
functioning of the incineration plant may be provided to the residents. In the framework of the 
Local Commission for Information and Monitoring, the operator and the grouping of 
communes are legally obliged to communicate information about the emissions of pollutants 
to the local environmental NGOs.  
In brief, the more the decision-making process is advanced, the less numerous and 
important the issues are likely to be under discussion While the first stage is ‘divergent’, the 
three following stages constitute the ‘convergent phase’. The more the process is ahead, the 
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less there are issues to be decided. In principle, at any stage the decision-makers can decide to 
restart the decision-making process, for example because of a strong public opposition. As I 
have already stated in chapter 2, in this research the end of a decision-making process is 
defined by the opening of the incineration plant or by the abandonment of the incineration 
plant project. Consequently, I focus either on the three first stages, or until the stage during 
which the incineration plant project is abandoned. I do not study the ‘new’ decision-making 
processes which starts after the abandonment of the initial incineration plant project.  
 This four-stage model fits particularly well decision-making processes in which the aim is 
to build infrastructures, such as incineration plants, nuclear waste site, railway lines, etc. 
Concerning decisions for which there is no building of infrastructure the stages may be 
different. However, it is still possible to define stages according to the number and/or 
importance of the issues at stake. 
 
III. Degrees of Controversy: A Property Space 
 In this section, I develop a property space which makes possible the classification of the 
decision-making processes according to their degree of controversy. This property space 
derives from the property space developed in the previous section. 
III.1. Four key variables 
 In this research, I define the degree of controversy through the activity of the NGOs. The 
activity of the NGOs makes possible the drawing of a good picture of the discontent of the 
residents. In substance, the more the NGOs are active, the more a decision-making process is 
controversial. Let’s note that dissensions within public authorities have not been taken into 
account to assess the degree of controversy. The degree of controversy of a decision-making 
process can thus be measured through the quantity (i.e. the number) and quality (i.e.the  types) 
of bottom-up public initiatives, and through the type of NGOs (‘ad-hoc’/’existing’) engaged. 
In concrete terms, the degree of controversy of the decision-making processes can be 
measured through the combination of a series of variables. These variables must reflect the 
determination of the NGOs on one hand, and the support of a substantial number of residents 
on the other hand. The combination of the four following variables matches these 
requirements: the ‘ad hoc NGO’ (presence/absence), the ‘legal actions’ (presence absence), 
the ‘bottom-up communication initiatives’ (number), and the ‘public protest initiatives’ 
(number). 
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 As I have stated in chapter 3, the NGOs which engaged the issue can be divided into two 
types, the ‘existing’, which are environmentally oriented, and the ‘ad hoc’, which are waste 
oriented; the ‘ad hoc’ NGOs were especially created on the occasion of the incineration plant 
project. The presence of an ‘ad hoc’ NGO shows a priori the determination of a group of 
residents to fight against the incineration plant project, and consequently the decision-making 
process is likely to be controversial.83 However, it is necessary to control whether this 
determination is transformed into facts by the NGOs. Moreover, it is possible to have a high 
level of contestation organised by the ‘existing’ and not by the ‘ad hoc’ NGOs.  Thus, in order 
to measure the degree of controversy it is necessary to count the initiatives sponsored by the 
engaged NGOs (so here we count the actions of both existing and ad hoc NGOs). 
 A type of initiative which shows the determination of the NGOs is the ‘legal action’. 
‘Legal actions’ are a good indicator of a high degree of controversy: dialogue between the 
NGOs and the public authority is broken off; there is no flow of information between the 
public authorities and the NGOs (see sub-section III.1 of this chapter for more details 
concerning ‘legal actions’). However, legal actions do not give evidence that a substantial 
number of residents stand against the incineration plant project since a legal action can be 
undertaken by a single resolute individual. Furthermore, the absence of legal action does not 
indicate, by itself, that the decision-making process is not controversial at all. So, the ‘legal 
actions’ variable alone is not sufficient to evaluate the degree of controversy, and it is 
necessary to combine it with other variables. More precisely, it is necessary to look at 
initiatives which the realisation needs the support of a group of persons: the ‘bottom-up 
communication initiatives’ fulfil this criterion. 
 The ‘number of bottom-up communication initiatives’ reflects the quantity of the actions 
undertaken by the NGOs.84 The higher this number, the more the associations are active, so 
the more the decision-making process is controversial. The organisation of numerous 
                                                 
83 The number of the engaged ‘ad hoc’ NGOs is not important since diverse strategies can be enacted: the fusion 
of existing NGOs and of individuals in one association (such as Collectif Incinerà’tort in the case of Angers), or 
the actions in parallel of specialised NGOs (such as in the case of Vaux-le-Pénil with a record number of 5 
NGOs engaged). In both cases, a lot of residents were engaged; the only difference was the type of organisation. 
By the way, the absence of any NGO (‘ad hoc’ and ‘existing’) would indicate, for sure, a non-controversial 
decision-making process. 
84 Among the three types of bottom-up public engagement mechanisms (communication, consultation, 
participation), the number of communication initiatives is the best indicator of the public activities. Indeed, the 
mechanisms of this class are, by far, the most used. Bottom-up consultation is not used that much, and bottom-up 
participation is not used at all. 
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initiatives such as public meetings or newsletters requires a great amount of work which can 
be produced only by a substantial group of coordinated and determined persons. This variable 
is an indicator of the number of people who are engaged. In other words, the number of 
‘bottom-up communication initiatives’ is an indicator of the number people who support the 
opposition to the incineration plant.85 The ‘number of bottom-up communication initiatives’ 
is, however, a quantitative indicator. From a qualitative point of view, one may argue that 
these initiatives may not be to stand against the incineration plant project. In order to 
overcome this criticism, I resort to a type of mechanisms which are definitely used to show 
discontent: public protests. 
 ‘Public protests’ are a type of ‘bottom-up communication mechanism’ that demonstrate the 
discontent of the NGOs. The more NGOs organise public protest initiatives, the more the 
NGOs are opposed to the incineration plant project, and the more the decision-making process 
is controversial. However, a high number of public protests reflects only punctual strong 
actions; that is why I combine it with the bottom-up communication initiatives. This is 
another reason why it is necessary to resort to a combination of variables, and that a variable 
alone can not measure the degree of controversy of a decision-making process.86 
 
 In order to actually enable the classifications of the decision-making processes according 
to their degree of controversy, the state of each of the four variables has been qualified as 
‘high’ or ‘low’: the ‘high’ state gives evidence in favour of a controversial situation, whereas 
‘low’ is in favour of a non controversial situation. These variables are summarised in table 3 
below.  For the first variable ‘presence/absence of an ad hoc NGO’, the state high is for the 
presence of ‘ad hoc’ waste oriented’ NGOs while low is for the absence of such NGO.  
                                                 
85 I remind that in chapter 3 I have discussed the fact that in this research I have assimilated the public to the 
NGOs. In substance, I have claimed that it is unlikely that individuals organise initiatives to oppose the 
incineration plant projects; and in the facts the engaged residents created or joined formal or informal groups. I 
designate both formal and informal groups with the same term ‘NGO’. I recognise that a more reliable indicator 
the number of individuals who actively supported the opposition to the incineration plant would be the number 
of the members of the NGOs, or the number of persons who wrote some comments during the public enquiry 
(however this last indicator would be available only in the decision-making processes which reach the stage of 
the public enquiry, which takes place toward the end of decision-making processes). But, put simply, although I 
have not gathered this type of data, I have adapted the theoretical framework to the data in my possession.  
86 It is not necessary to look at the other types of bottom communication initiatives. They would not provide 
further information about the degree of controversy because the number of bottom-up communication initiatves 
is equal to the sum of the public protests and of the other types of communication initiatives. 
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 The presence of ‘legal actions’ undertaken by the NGOs indicates a controversial situation. 
So this presence corresponds to the state high of the variable, whereas the low state is for the 
absence of legal action.  
 
Table 3. Summary of the four variables influencing the degree of controversy  
  Variables Levels Correlation with the Degree of Controversy 
Type of NGO Low: Absence of ‘ad hoc’ 
NGO  (0) 
 
High: presence of an ‘ad 
hoc’ NGO (X)  
 
 
The presence of especially created NGOs 
indicates a higher level of controversy than the 
presence of existing NGOs. The total absence of 
NGO indicates a non controversial situation. To 
then facilitate the categorisation of the decision-
making processes, the presence of especially 
created NGOs is considered as the state ‘high’ of 
the variable whereas the absence is the state 
‘low’. 
Bottom-up 
Communication  
Low: 0≤Ni<A  
High: A≤Ni 
 
Ni: Number of initiatives 
A: Average of initiatives in 
the ten cases 
The higher is the number of bottom-up 
communication initiatives, the higher is the 
degree of controversy 
Public Protests Low (0≤Ni’<A’) 
High (A’≥Ni’) 
 
Ni’: Number of initiatives 
A’: Average of initiatives in 
the ten cases 
The higher is the number of public protests, the 
higher is the degree of controversy 
Legal Actions Low: Absent (0)  
High: Present (X)  
 
The presence of legal actions indicates a higher 
degree of controversy. And thus this corresponds 
to the state ‘high’ of the variable, whereas the 
absence is the state ‘low’.  
 
 A reasonable definition of the high/low state of the ‘bottom-up communication initiatives’ 
variable is to compare the number of bottom-up communication initiatives (Ni) with its mean 
in the cases studied (A). Thus, two states are possible: below the mean, ‘Low’ (0≤Ni<A); and 
above the average, ‘High’ (A≤Ni). 
 Concerning ‘public protests’, here also, it is reasonable to define two states of the variable 
depending whether the number of initiatives for a determined case (Ni’) is below or above the 
mean of the initiatives of all the studied cases (A’): below the mean, ‘Low’ (0≤Ni’<A’); 
above the mean, ‘High’ (A’≥Ni’). 
 The definition of the states high/low based on a reference to the arithmetic mean can work 
only if the standard deviation is high, that is, if the dispersion of the collection of numbers is 
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important.87  
III.2. The Property Space 
 Table 3 may now be used to define the classes of controversy. To be systematic, the 
typology must take into account all the combination of the states of the four variables. In 
substance, the more numerous are the variables in a ‘high’ state, the more the decision-
making process is controversial. However, I have not assigned the same weight to the four 
variables. The variable ‘legal action’ has more weight than the three others because its 
presence surely indicates the presence of determined individuals. That does not mean that the 
absence of ‘legal actions’ is synonymous of non-controversial decision-making process: the 
state of the three other variables (presence of ad hoc waste oriented NGOs, level of bottom-up 
communication, level of public protests) must be also taken into account to accurately 
evaluate the degree of controversy. The same weight has been attributed to the three other 
variables. Thus, two groups of combinations can be identified: with legal action, and without 
legal action. Then, in each groups four combinations are possible: from zero to three of the 
other variables are in a ‘high’ state (implicitly from three to zero variables in a low state). So, 
the eight combinations are: 
 
Legal action, 3 variables high (0 low) 
Legal action, 2 variables high (1 low) 
Legal action, 1 variable high (2 low) 
Legal action, 0 variable high (3 low) 
No legal action, 3 variables high (0 low) 
No legal action, 2 variables high (1 low) 
No legal action, 1 variable high (2 low) 
No legal action, 0 variable high (3 low) 
 
A ninth combination, which shows a non controversial decision-making process, must be 
added; this is: no legal action, 0 variable high with the particularity that the number of 
bottom-up communication initiatives and the number of public protest are equal to zero. 
 
 However, for the purpose of this research, there is no need for nine degrees; five are 
sufficient to describe the various levels of controversy. Table 4 below identifies these five 
                                                 
87 The standard deviation is a measure of the dispersion of a collection of numbers. The standard deviation 
remains the most common measure of statistical dispersion, measuring how widely spread the values in a data 
set are. If many data points are close to the mean, then the standard deviation is small; if many data points are far 
from the mean, then the standard deviation is large. If all data values are equal, then the standard deviation is 
zero. 
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degrees; from the less to the more controversial, these are: ‘Non Controversial’, ‘Slightly 
Controversial’, ‘Moderately Controversial’, and ‘Highly Controversial’. This reduction from 
nine combinations to five degrees is possible considering that two different combinations can 
describe a same degree of controversy. This is due to the fact that the variable ‘legal action’ 
has more weight than the others. 
 A decision-making process can be of a ‘Highly Controversial’ type whether one or more 
legal actions were undertaken, and at least two of the three other variables (type of NGO, 
bottom-up communication, public protest) are in the ‘high’ state, or whether no legal action 
was undertaken but the three other variables are in their ‘high’ state. The other classes of 
controversy are defined decreasing the number of the variables in a ‘high’ state by one for 
each lower degree.  
 The ‘moderately controversial’ type groups together two combinations. The first one is the 
presence of a legal action and only one of the three other variables in the state ‘high’.  
 
Table 4. Property spaces of the decision-making processes according to their degree of controversy 
Classes of Controversy States of the Significant Variables 
Highly 
Controversial 
 
- Legal Action  
- Two or three out of the three other 
variables ( ad hoc NGO, Bottom-up 
Communication, Public Protests) are in 
a ‘high’ state 
Or 
- No Legal Action 
- All the three other variables ( ad hoc 
NGO, Bottom-up Communication, and 
Public Protests) are in a ‘high’ state 
 Mainly 
Controversial 
Moderately 
Controversial 
 
- Legal Action 
- One out of the three other variables (ad 
hoc NGO, Bottom-up Communication, 
and Public Protests) is in a ‘high’ state 
 
Or 
- No Legal Action 
- Two out of the three other variables ( ad 
hoc NGO, Bottom-up Communication, 
or Public Protests) are in a ‘high’ state 
 
Slightly 
Controversial 
  
- Legal Action 
- None of  the three other variables is in a 
‘high’ state 
Or 
- No Legal Action 
- One of the three other variables (ad hoc 
NGO, Bottom-up Communication, or 
Public Protests) is in a ‘high’ state. 
Almost not 
controversial 
- No Legal Action 
- The three other variables are in a ‘low’ state, but  the number of bottom-up 
communication initiatives and the number of public protests are not both be equal to 
zero, (See the non controversial type) 
Mainly 
Non Controversial 
Non controversial 
- No legal action  
- No ad hoc NGO 
- No bottom-up communication at all 
- No public protest at all 
  
The ‘slightly controversial’ decision-making processes are characterised either by the 
presence of a legal action and none of the three other variables in a ‘high’ state, or by the 
absence of a legal action and one of the three other variables in a high state, no legal action 
was undertaken and one or two of the other three variables are in a ‘high’ state.  
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 As for the ‘almost controversial’ decision-making processes, they are defined only by one 
combination which is the absence of legal action and the ‘low’ state of all the other variables. 
However, the three variables (ad hoc NGO, bottom-up communication, and public protests) 
are not equal to ‘zero’ in the same time. Indeed, this combination (i.e. absence of ad hoc 
NGO, low bottom-up communication, low public protest, and absence of legal action) defines 
the ‘non-controversial’ decision-making processes.  
 At last, to simplify, these five categories can summarized into twp main classes: the ‘quite 
controversial’ decision-making processes, which groups together the highly and moderately 
controversial decision-making processes, and the ‘quite non-controversial’, which groups 
together the slightly, almost not, and non controversial decision-making processes. 
  To finish, the qualifications ‘moderately’, ‘slightly’, or ‘almost not’ does not mean that 
certain individuals were not strongly determined but that they were not that numerous. 
IV. Methodology 
IV.1. Data collection methods: Two semi-structured questionnaires 
 The data used to answer the first three research questions have been collected through 
semi-structured interviews. I have set up two different ‘interview tools’ to carry out these 
interviews: one for the public authorities, and the other for the NGOs. To begin with, the 
public authorities have been interviewed with the help of a ‘chronological table of the 
decision-making processes’ (see the appendix “Chronological Table” to find the template). 
For each decision-making process, three categories of data have been gathered. The first 
category, the dates of the key events, makes possible a precise timing of each decision-
making process structure. The second category consists of the (top-down) initiatives that the 
public authority sponsored to inform or involve the public; the number of initiatives and the 
point in time they took place have been gathered too. In the third category the initiatives that 
the public and more precisely the NGOs sponsored, including the number of initiatives and 
the point in time they took place, are listed. The two last categories of the data collected 
enable the measurement of the top-down and bottom-up public engagement in the decision-
making processes. For each category of data, a series of possible answers based on the initial 
explorative open interviews88 was proposed. Concerning the key events, possible answers are, 
for example, the creation of grouping of communes put in charge of the waste treatment, or 
                                                 
88 See chapter 2, sub-section III.2  
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the carrying out of the public enquiry. Concerning top-down public engagement, possible 
answers are the most usual mechanisms such as newsletters, or public meetings. At last, with 
regard to bottom-up engagement, possible answers are also the most usual mechanisms such 
as petitions, protests, or newsletters (the list of the possible answers I proposed can be found 
in the appendix “Chronological Table”).The temporal resolution of the chronological tables is 
the month; however not all the interviewees were able to be so precise, above all concerning 
the oldest events which took place almost ten years ago, and sometimes the actual precision is 
the quarter or the semester. But finally, this lack of precision has not impacted the data 
analysis since I have divided the decision-making processes into three key chronological 
stages, each stage lasting from a few months (8 months) to a few years (6 years), according to 
the stage and to the decision-making process.89 
 As to the interviews with the NGOs, they were realised with the help of a semi open 
questionnaire made of two questions. The semi-structured questionnaire can be found in the 
appendix entitled “questionnaire for the NGOs”, the questions relevant for this part of the 
research are the questions number 5 and 8. Question number 8 was about the initiatives they 
undertook, including their number, and the point in time they took place. The aim of question 
number 5 was to cross-check the declaration made by the public authority concerning the top-
down public mechanisms: I asked the NGOs the mechanisms through which the public 
authority engaged them.  
 
 Finally, as far as possible the information delivered by the public authorities and the NGOs 
have been cross-checked through the documentation these actors published: minutes of 
meetings, newsletters, and web sites (see the appendix “Sources of data” to find the 
exhaustive list of the interviewed carried out, and of the documents gathered). 
IV.2. Data analysis methods 
 To answer the first research question “to what extent is the public actually involved in 
decision-making processes?”, I draw graphs which make possible the analysis of the evolution 
of the public engagement along the decision-making processes: the three key chronological 
stages are in abscissa and the number of initiatives for each class of mechanisms are in 
ordinate. Two series of charts have been drawn: a series ‘by decision-making process’, and a 
                                                 
89 The exact duration of each stage, including the dates, can be found in the tables in the appendix “Actual Public 
Engagement: Charts by Decision-Making Process”.  
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series ‘by class of mechanisms’. In the series by decision-making processes, there are ten 
charts, one per decision-making process. On each chart, there are seven graphs: one for each 
class of public engagement mechanisms (see the charts in the appendix “Charts by Decision-
Making Process”). This series enables me to assess the extent to which the ten grouping of 
communes on one hand, and the NGOs on the other hand, resorted to each class of 
mechanisms, and at which point in time. In the series by class of mechanisms, there are seven 
charts, one per class of mechanisms (see the charts in the appendix “Charts by Class of 
Mechanisms”). On each chart, there are ten graphs, one per decision-making process. This 
series makes possible the comparison between the decision-making processes for a given 
class of mechanisms. 
 To answer the second research question “how strong is the political will to involve the 
public?”, the actual public engagement is compared with the legal provisions which frames 
the public involvement in France. If the local decision-makers go beyond the compulsory 
norms, there is a strong political will to involve the public. On the contrary, if they limit the 
public involvement to the minimum imposed by the law (this minimum being very low), there 
is little political will to involve the public. 
 To answer to the third research question “what is the impact of the public engagement on 
the decision-making processes (i.e. on their degree of controversy, and on their outcome)?”, in 
each decision-making process the actual public engagement is confronted with the outcome of 
the decision-making process (abandonment/opening of the incineration plant) on one hand, 
and with the degree of controversy of each decision-making process on the other hand. The 
outcome of the decision-making processes is confronted with the actual top-down on one 
hand, and actual bottom-up engagement on the other hand. 
 More details about the data analysis method can be found in chapter 6, in the sections in 
which I attempt to answer to the three research questions, respectively. 
 
V. Summary-Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have provided two property spaces. The first property space enables a 
classification and an evaluation of all the types of ‘public engagement mechanisms’ according 
to their appropriateness to convey information between the public and the public authorities. 
This property space is based on, but overcomes the shortcomings of, the typology developed 
by Rowe and Frewer (Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005). That is, the property space takes into 
account bottom-up mechanisms, and not only top-down ones, and it also enables the 
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classification of the legal actions undertaken either by the public or by the public authorities. 
Public engagement mechanisms are classified according to the sponsor of the mechanisms 
(the public authority: top-down, or the public: bottom-up), and above all according to the 
‘flow of information’ between the public and the public authority (communication, 
consultation, participation, and no flow). Seven classes of mechanisms have thus been 
developed: ‘top-down communication’, ‘top-down consultation’, ‘top-down participation’; 
‘no public engagement’ (no mechanisms and/or legal actions); ‘bottom-up communication’, 
‘bottom-up consultation’, and ‘bottom-up participation’. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
typology of Rowe and Frewer, the property space takes into account the chronological 
dimension of the public engagement through the definition of three key chronological stages. 
These chronological stages have been defined according to the importance of the issues under 
discussion. These stages are: ‘framing’, ‘specifications’, and ‘realisation’. Finally, to evaluate 
the efficiency of the bottom-up mechanisms (i.e. maximizing the flow of relevant information 
between the maximum members of the public and the public authority), I have added two 
charateristics to the six defined by Rowe and Frewer: ‘Participant selection method’*, 
‘Facilitation of information elicitation’*, ‘Response mode’*, ‘Information input’*, ‘Medium 
of information’*, ‘Facilitation of aggregation’*, ‘Argumentation’**, ‘Addressee of 
information input’**.90 These eight charateristics enable the clustering of similar 
mechanisms: the mechanisms which have the same significant charateristics are grouped 
together, and thus make a type. I show that the evaluation of the efficiency of the mechanisms 
is not central in this research: in fact, I do not use it in the analysis of the data (see chapter 7). 
I have kept this part of the theoretical framework in order to make a more complex discourse 
concerning public engagement mechanisms and their role in the decision-making processes. 
 In this definition, using seven concepts of public engagements, the final decision remains 
in the hands of the decision-makers (excepted for referenda); it is not the hands of the public. 
There is thus no empowerment of the public in the sense of Arnstein (see sub-section II.1 of 
this chapter for further details). 
 Let us note here that this property space make no assumption concerning the motivations 
of the local decision-makers for sponsoring public engagement mechanisms. The elected 
decision-makers may resort to public engagement just to get rid of social movements, giving 
                                                 
90 *  key charateristics developed by Rowe and Frewer 
**  key charateristics developed by the author 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Chapter 4 
Public Engagement and Degree of Controversy: Two Property Spaces 
 
- 95 - 
the illusion of an engagement of the public. This research does not aim at assessing the 
sincerity of the top-down engagement mechanisms.  
 
 The second property space I have developed in this chapter enables the classification of 
decision-making processes according to their degree of controversy. This property space is 
innovative. The key point concerning this property space is that it is based on the activity of 
the NGOs: the more the local NGOs sponsor initiatives to stand against the incineration plant 
project, the more the decision-making process is controversial. The variables which enable the 
differentiation between the degrees of controversy must reflect the determination of the 
NGOs, and the support of a significant part of the residents. These variables are: ‘type of 
NGO’ (presence/absence of an ad hoc NGO), ‘legal actions’ (presence/absence), ‘bottom-up 
mechanisms’ (number), and ‘public protests’ (number).  
 The combinations of these four variables define five degrees of controversy: ‘highly 
controversial’, ‘moderately’, ‘slightly’, ‘almost not’, and ‘non controversial’. Then, in order 
to facilitate the analysis of the empirical data, I have also defined two main categories: the 
‘mainly controversial’ decision-making processes, which groups together ‘highly’ and 
‘moderately’ controversial decision-making process; and the ‘rather non-controversial’, 
which groups together ‘slightly’, ‘almost not’, and ‘non-controversial’ decision-making 
processes. 
  This property space is an attempt to make a grounded and objective measurement of the 
degree of controversy of the decision-making processes. It has been designed especially for 
the decision-making processes studied in this research. One may use this property space as 
such for future researches, however, it can be used as a basis for the development of new 
property spaces, more adapted to new situations. The presence of public protest and legal 
actions are an indisputable sign of a controversial decision-making process. The counting of 
the number of bottom-up communication initiatives and public protests provide, on the other 
hand, a relative measurement of the degree of controversy.  
 
 Finally, the data are collected through two semi-structured questionnaires: one for the 
public authorities, and another one for the NGOs. The data analysis method is a mix between 
qualitative and quantitative methods. The details of the data analysis method can be found in 
chapter 6, in the sections in which I attempt to answer to the three research questions, 
respectively. 
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Chapter 5  
Public Engagement: Legal Framework 
 This chapter describes the provisions for public engagement in the decision-making 
processes surrounding the setting up of incineration plants in France. All the public 
engagement mechanisms provided by the law are identified, differentiating those which are 
peremptory (i.e. compulsory) from those discretionary (i.e. non compulsory). By ‘peremptory’ 
I make reference to the mechanisms that the public authority has to sponsor to engage the 
public. By ‘discretionary’, I designate the mechanisms which are provided by the law, but that 
the local public authorities have the liberty to implement or not.   
 The decision-making processes for the setting-up of an incineration plant are ruled by a 
series of environmental, urban, and administrative acts which are respectively gathered 
together in the Code de l’Environnement, Code de l’Urbanisme, and Code Général des 
Collectivités Territoriales. The Commision Nationale de Débat Public (National Public 
Debate Commision) does not apply to this research.91 
 The legal framework that is drawn up here is valid for the years 1992-2005, which 
corresponds to the period of the ten decision-making processes.92 During this period, the 
legislation has evolved. Changes in the norms which are subsequent to the cases studied in 
this research must not be taken into account because under the terms of article 2 of the Code 
Civil “Legislation provides only for the future; it has no retrospective operation”. Moreover, 
                                                 
91 See section IV of this chapter for further explanations about the National Public Debate Commission  
92 See appendix “the ten decicision-making processes” for further details about the ten decision-making 
processes 
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under the terms of article 1 of the Code Civil “Statutes and, when they are published in the 
Journal Officiel de la République Française, administrative acts shall come into force on the 
date specified in them or, in the absence thereof, on the day after their publication”. The 
changes which occurred between 1992 and 2005 are notified, and the dates when these norms 
came into force are specified. 93  
 
 This chapter is structured around the four types of provisions which order the public 
engagement in the decision-making process. The first section deals with the ‘peremptory 
provisions’ which order public engagement in the decision making process itself, and which 
establish the obligations of the local decision-makers. The second section lists the 
‘discretionary provisions’, that is, the provisions which provide the grouping of communes 
with extra public engagement mechanisms; the grouping of communes having the freedom to 
implement or not these mechanisms. The third section brings together the ‘provisions in case 
of existing facilities or services:’ these are provisions that are not directly linked to a decision-
making process, but which provide the local public life with places where local decision-
makers and the public can meet. The last section is dedicated to the National Commission of 
Public Debate and to the Aarhus convention. Even if these norms actually have no impact on 
the legal framework of the cases studied in this research, it is important to know what they 
consist of since they are indicative of the current legislative trend toward more public 
participation. 
I. Peremptory Provisions 
With regard to the provisions ruling the public engagement in the decision-making 
processes for the setting up of incineration plants, the decision-making process can be divided 
into three periods: before the public inquiry (enquête publique), during the public inquiry, and 
after the opening of the incineration plant. In our model of the decision-making processes 
                                                 
93 In France, the normative texts concerning a given subject are gathered together into Codes. Among others, 
there are the environmental Code, the civil Code, or the penal Code. However, the Codes regularly evolved in 
order to take into consideration the new laws. Concerning the quotation of the norms, I indicate the reference to 
the French Codes. References to the original texts of the law (which are designated by a number, a title and a 
date) are also specified, in foot notes. Moreover, the modifications Articles of the Codes had undergone either 
during the period 1992-2005, or after this period, are also indicated in foot notes. 
 The Codes and all the French legislation are available on the official French State website: 
www.legifrance.gouv.fr. English versions of some of Codes are also available on this governmental web site. As 
far as possible, in the quotation, I resort to the English versions provided by www.legifrance.gouv.fr; the laws 
available only in French have been translated by the author. 
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structure made of three key chronological stages, the public inquiry takes place toward the 
end of the second stage. 
I.1. Before the Public Inquiry 
 The public engagement is organised under the provisions of Article L 300-2 of the Code de 
l'Urbanisme.94 This article gives a great freedom of manoeuvre to communes and public 
establishments for inter-commune cooperation regarding the organisation of public 
engagement mechanisms since they decide on the mode of involvement of the public:  
 
“I. town council or deliberative organ of public establishment for inter-commune cooperation 
deliberates on the modes of involvement of the public and on the pursued purposes, associating during 
the entire duration of the elaboration of the project, the residents, local NGOs, and other concerned 
persons among whom the representatives of agricultural profession before: 
a) any elaboration or review of the land development plan or of the local plan of urbanism;  
b) any creation, on its initiative, of a plan for territorial consistency; 
c) any development operation realised by a commune, or on its behalf where, due to its 
importance or nature, this operation modifies in a substantial way the living environment or 
the economical activity of the commune, if it is not realised in an area which has already been 
defined in the framework of the above points a) or b). […] ” 95 
(Code de l'Urbanisme, Legifrance, 2009, Emphasis added96) 
                                                 
94 According to article L 121-2 of Code de l’environnement, before the public enquiry, public engagement is 
organised either under the conditions of the National Public Debate Commission, or under the conditions of 
Article L. 300-2 of the Code de l’Urbanisme.  As explained in section IV of this chapter, the National Public 
Debate Commission does not apply in the case of the setting up of incineration plants. 
95 Transalted by the author with the help of the website edited by Centre de Documentation de l’Urbanisme, 
Ministère de l’Equipement (Urbanism Documentation Center, Minister for Infrastructure), www.urbamet.com; 
original version : 
”I- Le conseil municipal ou l'organe délibérant de l'établissement public de coopération intercommunale délibère 
sur les objectifs poursuivis et sur les modalités d'une concertation associant, pendant toute la durée de 
l'élaboration du projet, les habitants, les associations locales et les autres personnes concernées dont les 
représentants de la profession agricole, avant : 
a) Toute élaboration ou révision du schéma de cohérence territoriale ou du plan local d'urbanisme ; 
b) Toute création, à son initiative, d'une zone d'aménagement concerté ; 
c) Toute opération d'aménagement réalisée par la commune ou pour son compte lorsque, par son 
importance ou sa nature, cette opération modifie de façon substantielle le cadre de vie ou l'activité 
économique de la commune et qu'elle n'est pas située dans un secteur qui a déjà fait l'objet de cette 
délibération au titre du a) ou du b) ci-dessus.” 
96 Loi nº 85-729 du 18 juillet 1985 art. 1 Journal Officiel du 19 juillet 1985 ; 
Loi nº 88-1202 du 30 décembre 1988 art. 57 Journal Officiel du 31 décembre 1988 ; 
Loi nº 2000-1208 du 13 décembre 2000 art. 25 Journal Officiel du 14 décembre 2000 ; 
modified by loi nº 2003-590 du 2 juillet 2003 art. 42, art. 43 Journal Officiel du 3 juillet 2003, but these changes 
do not affect the freedom of manoeuvre for the organisation of theengagement of the public. 
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Moreover, the common provisions of Code de l’Environnement do not much more specify the 
modes of involvement of the public since the point II.4 of article L 110-1 only indicates that  
“the principle of participation, according to which everybody has access to information relating to 
the environment, including information relating to hazardous substances and activities, and 
whereby the public is involved in the process regarding the development of projects that have a 
major impact on the environment or on town and country planning.”  
(article L 110-1, Environmental Code, Legifrance and Michael Faure, 200697) 
I.2. Public Inquiry 
 Public inquiries (enquêtes publiques) are ruled by articles L123-1 to L123-16, and R123-1 
to R 123-46 of the Code de l’Environnement.98 During the decision-making process, the 
public inquiry is actually the first mechanism which obliges the elected local decision-makers 
to involve the public. The purpose of a public inquiry “ […]is to inform the public and to 
collect its opinions, suggestions and counter-proposals […] in order to give the competent 
authority all the information it requires.[…]” (article L 123-3, Environmental Code, 
Legifrance and Michael Faure, October 2006). However, the public inquiry is initiated only 
after the decision-making process has been under way for a considerable amount of time. 
Groupings of communes have to sponsor the public enquiry after it has selected a waste 
treatment technology (here incineration), and a developing company (which is planned to run 
the facility). Indeed, the same article 123-3 specifies that the public inquiries “follow[s] the 
impact study when this study is required”, and in the case of the waste treatment facility 
projects, such a study is required. And, as a matter of fact, the impact study of a facility such 
as an incineration plant can be made only after the facility has been designed. So, the public 
inquiry can be realised only once the project is defined, when almost everything has been 
decided. The results of the public inquiry have to be communicated to the préfet together with 
the request for the authorisation to operate. I remind that this request to the préfet is made 
together by the grouping of communes and the developing company (see section II of chapter 
3 for further details about the involved actors). The delivering of the authorisation to operate 
is the very last step before the beginning of the building. 
                                                 
97 Loi nº 2002-276 du 27 février 2002 art. 132 Journal Officiel du 28 février 2002 
98 Loi n° 83-630 du 12 juillet 1983 about public enquiries, called Loi Bouchardeau,; 
Loi 95-101 du 2 février 1995 about the enforcement of environmental protection, called Loi Barnier; 
Loi 2003-699 du 30 juillet 2003 concerning the prevention of major technological risks ;  
Loi nº 2002-276 du 27 février 2002  Journal Officiel du 28 février 2002 about democracy of ‘proximity’. 
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 The procedure and course of the public inquiry are governed by articles L123-4 to 123-16, 
and R123-1 to R123-23 of the Code de l’Environnement. The inquiry is conducted, according 
to the nature and scale of the operations, by a commissaire enquêteur or by an inquiry 
commission, both of them appointed by the President of the relevant administrative tribunal or 
by  a member of this tribunal, delegated by the President for this purpose. Under the terms of 
article 123-7 of the Code de l’environnement:  
“At least fifteen days before the inquiry is opened and throughout its duration, the competent 
authority [in this research: a grouping of communes] informs the public by all appropriate means, 
notably in the places concerned by the inquiry and, according to the scale and nature of the project, 
via the written press or by audiovisual communication, of the purpose of the inquiry, the names and 
capacities of the commissaire enquêteur or the members of the inquiry commission, the date on 
which the inquiry is opened, the place of the inquiry and its duration. The duration of the inquiry 
must not be less than one month. By a reasoned decision, the commissaire enquêteur or the 
President of the inquiry commission may prolong the enquiry for a maximum period of fifteen 
days.” 
 The residents who have access to the impact study can write down their observations on 
registers and have the possibility to individually meet the commissaire enquêteur or the 
inquiry commission (See article R123-17 of the Code de l’Environnement). The developer 
must bear the costs of the inquiry (Code de l’Environnement, article L123-1499) 
 Under the terms of article L123-9 of the Code de l’Environnement, the commissaire 
enquêteur or the inquiry commission may organise a meeting in order to provide and 
exchange information with the public in the presence of the developer.100 Since August 2003, 
in the case of waste treatment facilities, the organisation of such meetings is compulsory if it 
is requested by the mayor of the commune which hosts the facility, or by the President of the 
concerned public establishment for inter-commune cooperation. 101  
 
                                                 
99 Loi n° 2002-276 du 27 Février 2002  Article 142 JournalOfficiel du 28 Février 2002 
100 Furthermore, he/she receives the developer of the operation concerned by the public inquiry (inserted by Loi 
nº 2002-276 du 27 février 2002 art. 141 Journal Officiel du 28 février 2002; may receive all documents, visit the 
site concerned, convene the developer as well as the interested administrative authority. 
101 Inserted by Loi nº 2003-699 du 30 juillet 2003 art. 1 Journal Officiel du 31 juillet 2003 
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I.3. After the opening of an incineration plant: Local Commission for Information 
and Monitoring 
“1° Each individual has the right to be informed about the harmful effects on human health and the 
environment of the collection, transport, treatment, storage and deposit of waste as well as about 
the measures taken to prevent or compensate for these effects […]” 
 (article 125-1, point I, Environmental Code, Legifrance and Michael Faure, October 2006). 
After the opening of an incineration plant, this right implies the creation of a Local 
Commission for Information and Monitoring (Comité Local d’Information et de Surveillance, 
usually called CLIS). More generally, under the terms of article 125-1102 , a Local 
Commission for Information and Monitoring is created on any waste disposal or storage site, 
on the initiative of either the Préfet, or of the town council of the commune hosting the facility 
or of a neighbouring commune. This commission is composed in equal parts of: 
representatives of the public administrations concerned, the operator of the facility, the local 
authorities (i.e. the public grouping of communes), and the environmental protection 
associations concerned. On the request of the commission the Préfet, who chairs the 
commission, orders the inspection operations that the commission deems necessary for its 
works. With regard to the content of the information available for the members of the 
commission, “the documents drawn up by the operator of a waste disposal establishment to 
measure the effects of its activity on public health and the environment are sent to the 
commission” (article 125-1, point II.2°, Environmental Code, Legifrance and Michael Faure, 
October 2006). As for the cost of setting up and running of the commission, they are borne 
equally by the State, the local authorities and the operator. 
II. Discretionary Provisions  
In addition to these legal obligations, local decision-makers have at their disposal three 
other legal tools to involve the public during the decision-making process: Local 
Commissions for Information and Monitoring (Commission Locale d’Information et de 
Surveillance, CLIS), local referendums (referendums locaux), district councils (conseils de 
quartier), and consultative committees (commissions consultatives). 
                                                 
102 LOI no 92-646 du 13 juillet 1992 relative à l'élimination des déchets ainsi qu'aux installations classées pour la 
protection de l'environnement  
Inserted by Ordonnance nº 2001-321 du 11 avril 2001 art. 9 I, II Journal Officiel du 14 avril 2001 
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II.1. Local Commission for Information and Monitoring 
 From 1993, The Préfet has the possibility to set up a Local Commission for Information 
and Monitoring (Commission Locale d’Information et de Surveillance, CLIS) for the waste 
treatment facilities project, that is, during the decision-making process. This commission is 
exactly the same as the one described above in the compulsory provisions, the only difference 
is that before the opening of the incineration the setting up of such a commission is not an 
obligation. On the request of a commune situated inside the ‘radius of posting’ (i.e. 2 Km for 
incineration plants), the creation of a Local Commission for Information and Monitoring is 
compulsory (article R125-5, Code de l’environnement103, and Décret n°53-578 du 20 mai 
1953 concerning the Nomenclature of classified facilities). 
 
II.2. Local Referendum 
 Before 2003, the consultation of the voters through a local referendum (referendum local) 
already existed (Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales article L2142-1 and 
following.)104 However, the terms of these articles presented two limitations: first, only the 
communes could organise local referendums; and above all, referendums were merely 
consultative, the results of a referendum are not binding on the decision-makers. But, law 
n°2003-705 of the 1st August 2003105 overcomes these limitations. Firstly, public 
establishments for inter-commune cooperation (among which the grouping of communes in 
charge of the waste treatment) also have the possibility to organise referendums. Furthermore, 
the consulted voters actually decide since the local elected decision-makers have to 
implement the result of the referendum. Groupings of communes (and more generally public 
establishments for inter-commune cooperation and municipalities) have the possibility to 
organise local referendums to solve whatever kind of problem which is in its area of 
competence.106 However under the terms of article 5211-49107 of the Code Général des 
Collectivités Territoriales the public establishments for inter-communes cooperation can also 
organise a local referendum in which only an opinion is asked to the voters without any 
                                                 
103 Décret en Conseil d'Etat  93-1410  du 29 décembre 1993 Journal Officiel "Lois et Décrets"  du 31 décembre 
1993 
104 Loi nº 92-125 du  6  février 1992 Journal Officiel du 8  février 1992 
105 Articles from LO 1112-1 to LO 1112-14 of the Code Général des collectivités territoriales 
106 In fact,  
107 Loi nº 99-586 du 12 juillet 1999 art. 43 Journal Officiel du 13 juillet 1999, modified by 
Loi nº 2004-809 du 13 août 2004 art. 122 II Journal Officiel du 17 août 2004 en vigueur le 1er janvier 2005 
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constraint on the final decision made by the elected decision-makers. In any case, the 
organisation of a local referendum by the public establishments for inter-communes 
cooperation is not an obligation at all, only a possibility. 
 
II.3. District councils 
 Under the terms of article L2143-1 of the Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales108, 
in the communes with more than 80 000 residents, the town council defines the limits of the 
districts. Each district has to be provided with a council, which is called the district council 
(conseil de quartier). The composition and mode of functioning of these district councils are 
set-up by the town council. A district council can be consulted by the mayor about any issue 
concerning the area or the town. Mayors have the possibility to associate district councils to 
the projects concerning their district, respectively. Mayors are not obliged, however, to resort 
to district councils. In the communes from 20 000 to 79 999, the setting up of such councils is 
a possibility, but not an obligation. 
 
II.4. Consultative Committees 
 A commune or a public establishment for inter-communes cooperation can set-up some 
consultative committees (commissions consultatives) concerning matters in its area of 
competences, including waste treatments (see articles 2143-2109 and 5211-49-1110 of the Code 
Général des Collectivités Territoriales). The members are appointed by a commune or public 
establishment for inter-communes cooperation on the proposal of the mayor or of the 
president, so there is little constrain about the members who compose these committees, even 
if, for the public establishment for inter-communes cooperation, the members must be 
appointed according to their representativeness or competencies, and representatives from 
local NGOs can be also appointed. A shortcoming of such committees is that their 
composition, once determined, cannot be changed. Indeed, they are set-up on a medium term 
                                                 
108 Loi nº 2002-276 du 27 février 2002 art. 1 I Journal Officiel du 28 février 2002 ; 
inserted by Loi nº 2002-276 du 27 février 2002 art. 1 II Journal Officiel du 28 février 2002 
109 Loi nº 96-987 du 14 novembre 1996 art. 39 Journal Officiel du 15 novembre 1996 ; 
Loi nº 2002-276 du 27 février 2002 art. 1 I, 2 Journal Officiel du 28 février 2002 
110 Loi nº 99-586 du 12 juillet 1999 art. 43 Journal Officiel du 13 juillet 1999 ; 
Loi nº 2002-276 du 27 février 2002 art. 5 V Journal Officiel du 28 février 2002 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Chapter 5 
Public Engagement: Legal Framework 
 
- 105 - 
basis, so they are unable to take into account emergent actors such as the NGOs which are 
especially created to oppose a project. 
 
III. Other Provisions  
 In case of existing waste treatment facilities or existing ‘waste services’, two provisions 
makes compulsory the creation of two commissions where local elected decision-makers and 
local NGOs meet: the Local Public Services Consultative Commissions (Commissions 
Consultatives des Services Publics Locaux), and the Local Commissions for Information and 
Monitoring (Commissions Locales d’Information et de Surveillance, CLIS). These 
commissions are not directly linked to the decision-making process, but they are places where 
residents and local decision-makers can meet in case of existing facilities or services. 
 
III.1. Local Public Services Consultative Commissions 
 From February 2003, the communes with more than 10000 residents, public establishments 
of inter-communes cooperation with more than 50000 residents, and mixed syndicates 
including at least one commune with more than 10.000 residents have to set up a local public 
services consultative commission (see article L1413-1 of the Code Général des Collectivités 
Territoriales111). This commission deals with the local services which are provided either by  
a private company through an outsourcing of public services, or by companies under local 
government control and which have a financial autonomy. This commission is composed of 
local decision-makers and of representatives of local NGOs. This commission has two main 
duties: first to produce an annual report on the quality of the service; second, it has to be 
consulted about projects concerning local government companies having a financial 
autonomy. This second attribution is quite important for this research since waste treatment 
facilities are operated by private companies through an outsourcing of public services, or by 
companies under local government control and which have a financial autonomy. So from 
February 2003, big communes or grouping of communes are obliged to involve local NGOs in 
the decision-making processes concerning the setting-up of waste treatment facilities.  
                                                 
111 Loi nº 2002-276 du 27 février 2002 art. 5 I, 23 II Journal Officiel du 28 février 2002 en vigueur le 28 février 
2003; 
Ordonnance nº 2004-559 du 17 juin 2004 art. 15 Journal Officiel du 19 juin 2004 
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III.2. Local Commission for Information and Monitoring 
 A waste disposal or a storage site may already exist when the decision to set up a new 
waste treatment facility is taken, and thus a Local Commission for Information and 
Monitoring might already exist for these facilities. Even if these Local Commissions for 
Information and Monitoring are not part of the decision-making process, they are places 
where local decision-makers and local environmental protection NGOs are used to meet. And 
these meetings could be the occasion to talk about the new waste treatment facility project. 
IV. The National Public Debate Commission and the Aarhus Convention  
 As I have already stated in the introduction to this chapter, the Commission Nationale de 
Débat Public (National Public debate Commission) is not in charge of the setting up of 
incineration plants, and the Aarhus convention does not apply to the selected decision-making 
processes. However, in order to grasp the trend of the French and European legislation with 
regard to the participation of the public, it is interesting to introduce them. 
IV.1. The National Public Debate Commission 
 The National Public Debate Commission (Commission Nationale de Débat Public), 
created in 2002, is in charge of the public participation in environmental decision-making 
processes: 
 “the National Public Debate Commission, an independent administrative authority, is responsible 
for ensuring the respect of the principle of public participation in the development of town and 
country planning or infrastructure projects of national interest of the State […] as soon as these 
projects are socio-economically significant or have significant impacts on the environment or on 
town and country planning. […]”. 
(articles L 121-1, Environmental Code, Legifrance and Michael Faure, October 2006)112 
 The aim of the National Public Debate Commission is to ensure a strong participation of 
the public from the very outset of the decision-making process: under the term of the same 
article L121-1, “[…] Public participation may take the form of a public debate. This debate 
covers the suitability, the objectives and the principal characteristics of the project. Public 
participation is ensured throughout the entire development phase of a project, from the 
undertaking of preliminary studies through to the end of the public enquiry. […]” 
                                                 
112 Loi nº 2002-276 du 27 février 2002 art. 134 Journal Officiel du 28 février 2002 
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 The National Public Debate Commission does not apply to the decision-making processes 
selected for this research because household waste incineration plants are not considered as 
infrastructure projects of national interest of the State. 113  
IV.2.  The Aarhus Convention 
The convention of Aarhus has substantially modified the French legal framework 
concerning the participation and information of the public. The convention of Aarhus is a 
European convention the objective of which is to “[…]guarantee the rights of access to 
information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental 
matters[…]. (article 1).114 It was signed in 1998 by States members of the Economic 
Commission for Europe as well as States having consultative status with the Economic 
Commission for Europe. France signed the convention on the 25th June 1998 and ratified it on 
the 8th July 2002. France has enforced this convention in the French legislation on two 
occasions. Firstly, the convention has been enforced as such on the 6th October 2002 through 
the Décret n° 2002-1187 du 12 septembre 2002 Journal Officiel du 21 septembre 2002. In a 
second time, four years later, the Code de l’environnement has been updated through the 
Décret no 2006-578 du 22 mai 2006 concerning the information and participation of the 
public with regard to environmental matters.115 Let’s note that this convention could not be 
applied to the decision-making processes studied in this research since they started at the 
beginning of the 1990’s and ended between 2003 and 2005. However, it shows a legislative 
trend toward more public participation. 
  
The convention deals with environmental matters, in a wide sense, from the building-
up of regulations to decisions on specific activities. Since this research is about the setting-up 
                                                 
113 The categories of infrastructure projects that the National Public Debate Commission deals with are listed by 
a Conseil d'Etat (the highest administrative court in France) decree, and incineration plants are not part of this 
list (see article R 121-1 of the Code de l’Environnement). Furthermore, on the 1st December 2004, the  National 
Public Debate Commission declared non admissible the submission by the public establishment for inter-
commune cooperation Marseille Provence Métropole of their incineration plant planning (Commission Nationale 
du Débat Public, 2006). 
See below, “about the National Public Debate Commission” for more details. 
114 See the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe webpages dedicated to the Aarhus  convention:  
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/welcome.html 
115 Décret no 2006-578 du 22 mai 2006 relatif à l’information et à la participation du public en 
matière d’environnement, Journal officiel du 23 mai 2006 
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of waste treatment facilities, I focus on article 6 which deals with “public participation in 
decisions on specific activities”116: 
“[…] 2.The public concerned shall be informed, either by public notice or 
individually as appropriate, early in an environmental decision-making procedure, and 
in an adequate, timely and effective manner [...] 
3. The public participation procedures shall include reasonable time-frames 
for the different phases, allowing sufficient time for informing the public in 
accordance with paragraph 2 above and for the public to prepare and 
participate effectively during the environmental decision-making. 
4. Each Party shall provide for early public participation, when all 
options are open and effective public participation can take place. 
5. Each Party should, where appropriate, encourage prospective applicants 
to identify the public concerned, to enter into discussions, and to provide 
information regarding the objectives of their application before applying for 
a permit. 
6. Each Party shall require the competent public authorities to give the 
public concerned access for examination, upon request where so required under 
national law, free of charge and as soon as it becomes available […] 
7. Procedures for public participation shall allow the public to submit, in 
writing or, as appropriate, at a public hearing or inquiry with the applicant, 
any comments, information, analyses or opinions that it considers relevant to 
the proposed activity. 
8. Each Party shall ensure that in the decision due account is taken of the 
outcome of the public participation. 
9. Each Party shall ensure that, when the decision has been taken by the 
public authority, the public is promptly informed of the decision in 
accordance with the appropriate procedures. Each Party shall make accessible 
to the public the text of the decision along with the reasons and 
considerations on which the decision is based. 
10. Each Party shall ensure that, when a public authority reconsiders or 
updates the operating conditions for an activity referred to in 
                                                 
116 In the Aarhus convention, “party” means a contracting party to the convention. 
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paragraph 1, the provisions of paragraphs 2 to 9 of this article are applied 
mutatis mutandis, and where appropriate. […]” (Emphasis added) 
 
The convention does not set-up any specified procedures, however it indicates very specific 
guidelines about the participation of the public. Not only does this convention oblige the 
local-decisions makers to make easy the participation of the concerned public but also oblige 
them to look for this concerned public. The participation of the public is really guaranteed 
since the public must be involved at the outset of the decision-making process, “when all 
options are open”, and time must be given to the public, so that he can prepare itself for an 
efficient participation. Furthermore, decision-makers must take into account the outcome of 
the public participation, and then motivate their final decisions, specifying the reasons and 
consideration on which the decision is based. 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
 The convention of Aarhus and the Commission Nationale de Débat Public, which provide 
for an important public participation from the outset of decision-making processes, do not 
apply to the setting up of incineration plants. In fact, during the decision-making processes for 
the setting up of incineration plants, there are little legal constrains concerning public 
engagement: the groupings of communes have the liberty to decide themselves “the modes of 
involvement of the public” (article L 110-1, Environmental Code, Legifrance and Michael 
Faure, October 2006). In other words, at the outset of the decision-making processes, the 
groupings of communes in charge of the setting up of incineration plants have no obligation to 
engage the public: there is no obligation to inform, to consult, or to sponsor a participation of, 
the public. The only compulsory engagement mechanism, a public inquiry, comes late in the 
decision-making process: it takes place only once the incineration plant project has been 
completely defined, just before the beginning of the construction. In other words, it comes 
when the ‘degree of manoeuvre’ is very low; almost everything has already been decided. 
Furthermore, with this public inquiry there is no direct flow of information between the public 
and the grouping of communes, but between the public and the Préfet. Moreover, this flow of 
information is indirect: there is no meeting between the public and the Préfet: information 
reaches the Préfet through a commissaire-enquêteur who gathers and synthethises the opinion 
of the residents and of the local NGOs through meetings and (mainly) registers. This is only 
after the opening of an incineration plant that there is an obligation to set up a place where the 
operator, the local decision-makers, and the public regularly meet. This place is the Local 
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Commission for Information and Monitoring. However, only local environmental NGOs are 
authorised to participate, the law makes no provisions for the participation of residents as 
natural persons.  
  Beyond the compulsory mechanisms, the groupings of communes can organise 
consultations of the voters, either in the form of a local referendum which constrains the final 
decision made by the elected decision-makers, or in the form of a simple consultation which 
merely aims to gather the opinion of the residents. In other words, when they decide to 
organise a referendum, the local elected decision-makers have to choose whether they want it 
to be binding or not. Furthermore, in cities with more than 80 000 residents, mayors can 
consult the district councils and associate them with the project. 
In case of already existing facilities, some places where local NGOs and decision-makers 
meet, the local public services consultative commission and the Local Commission for 
Information and Monitoring are provided by the law. In that case, concerned local NGOs and 
decision-makers have opportunities to meet each other and to talk about the project. 
 To conclude, the groupings of communes in charge of the setting up of an incineration 
plant project have a lot of possibilities and freedom to engage the public and very little 
constraints. 
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Chapter 6  
Public Engagement  
in the  
Ten Decision-Making Processes 
 This chapter intends to provide answers to the three first research questions: “1. to what 
extent is the public actually engaged along the local decision-making processes?”; “ 2. what is 
the political will to involve the public?”; and “ 3. what is the impact of the public engagement 
on the decision-making processes (i.e. on the degree of controversy, and on the completion/ 
abandonment of the initial project)?”. The chapter is thus made up of four sections. In section 
I, the public engagement mechanisms used in the ten decision-making processes are listed and 
a typology of the mechanisms is developed. Section II defines the three key chronological 
stages for the ten-decision-making processes. Section III assesses the extent to which the 
types of engagement mechanisms defined in section I have been actually used by the public 
authority and by the NGOs along the decision-making processes. This section is concluded by 
the assessment of the political will of the local decision-makers to engage the public. At last, 
in section IV, I evaluate the impact of the public engagement on the decision-making 
processes. 
I. Public Engagement Mechanisms: A Typology 
 This section develops a typology of the public engagement mechanisms actually used in 
the ten decision-making processes. The data analysis method is made of three main steps. 
Firstly, all the mechanisms quoted in the interviews by the NGOs and the public authorities 
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have been listed, without considering the frequency of their use: even if a mechanism has 
been used only one time in one decision-making process, it has been listed (the frequency of 
use of the respective mechanisms is actually discussed in the section III of this chapter). 
Secondly, for each mechanism, the class has been established (i.e. top-down communication, 
top-down consultation, etc), and the structural variability (i.e. the state of the eight significant 
characteristics of the mechanisms) has been determined. The list of the mechanisms actually 
used, with the values of their eight significant characteristics, can be found in the appendix 
“Public Engagement Mechanisms Classified according to their Key Characteristics”. Thirdly, 
the mechanisms having their eight significant charateristics in the same state have been 
clustered and form a type of mechanisms; each type has been labelled by a number. 
 This section has been divided in seven sub-sections, one for each class of mechanism: top-
down public communication, consultation, and participation; no engagement; bottom-up 
public communication, consultation, and participation.  
All the types of mechanisms have been summarised in a table. In this table, for each 
mechanism, the class, type, and the state of the significant charateristics are stated. A short 
description which includes complementary information is also provided (see table 5, below). 
The seven sub-sections and the table 5 are complementary. The table takes again the 
greatest part of the information which is developed in the seven sub-sections, but while 
advantages and disadvantages of the mechanisms are more extensively described in the text 
than in the table, the structural variability is exhaustively described only in the table. 
 Let me remind the reader that in this research the public authorities are the grouping of 
commune in charge of the waste treatment or the Préfet. As for the public, for the top-down 
mechanisms, it consists of the NGOs, groups of (notably economical) interest, other 
organisations, or natural persons. For the bottom-up mechanisms, the public considered is 
different: is the engaged NGOs (the reasons of these choices concerning ‘public authority’ 
and ‘public’ can be found in chapter 3, section X). Finally, the term ‘association’ is referred 
to as inclusive of NGOs, groups of (notably economical) interest, or other organisations. 
 
 In the ten decision-making processes, 19 top-down public engagement mechanisms and 15 
bottom-up mechanisms have been listed. More precisely, I have identified 13 types of public 
top-down and 8 types of bottom-up engagement mechanisms. The types are labelled with a 
number: type 1, type 2, etc. The types already developed by Rowe and Frewer are marked 
with one asterisk (“*”), while the ones I have developed in this research are marked with two 
asterisks (“**”). Some ‘type number’ are not present in this typology since the number 
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corresponds to a type identified by Rowe and Frewer, but which is not present in this 
research. At last,  in table 5, in each class, the types of mechanisms are listed in the increasing 
order of efficiency.117 
I.1. Top-down Mechanisms 
Top-down Communication 
 Five types of top-down communication mechanisms have been identified. These are type 
1* (traditional publicity through the broadcasting of information), type 2* (public meeting, 
district councils), type 3* (exhibition, web site), type 5** (meetings with Associations), and 
type 6** (Phone communication with associations).  
 ‘Top-down communication type 1*’ mechanisms are the traditional communication tools, 
typically used as part of public information programs, through which a particular population 
is targeted (in that sense, the selection of the public is controlled) with set information, via a 
variety of (non face-to-face) media. The mechanisms actually used are newsletters, press 
releases, radio broadcasts, and letters to associations. Newsletters allow lengthy and quite 
complete presentations of the project, and a high control of the selection of the public, but the 
cost of distribution, entirely covered by the public authority, is quite high. Press releases are 
far less expensive for the public authority but the control on the selection is less important:  
the public is only partially targeted through the selection of a certain type of newspaper. For 
both mechanisms, an advantage is that the readers have the possibility to go back to stable and 
first hand information. The disadvantage is that information is set and no interactivity is 
possible. 
 The mechanisms of the top-down communication type 2* are either public meetings 
especially organised on the occasion of the incineration plant project (Eventually with 
question-and-answer session), or district councils which are meetings regularly organised by 
the municipal authority in the quarters. These mechanisms rely on the public to come to the 
information rather than vice versa. As such, the involved public is largely self-selected and 
biased in terms of those most proactive and interested. Information, which is communicated 
face-to-face by public authorities to those involved, is flexible, depending to some degree on 
what participants ask. This flexibility enables the delivery of information corresponding more 
                                                 
117 I remind that in this research, efficiency means “maximizing the relevant information (knowledge and/or 
opinions) from the maximum number of relevant sources and [in] transferring this efficiently to the appropriate 
receivers” (Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005, p. 263). See chapter 4 for further details. 
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to the expectation of the public. However, this information is no longer available once the 
meeting is over. 
 The top-down communication mechanisms type 3* are web sites and exhibitions. These 
mechanisms rely on the public to come to the information. The information is set and is 
delivered through non face-to-face media. Whereas this definition is  unproblematical for 
(non-interactive) websites, further details must be given concerning exhibitions. The 
information is set in that the public can only acquire what the sponsor makes available, 
although it is variable depending on what information is sought and when. Although there 
may be face to face contact with exhibition staff, these tend to be representatives of decision-
makers directing the public to appropriate information. The exhibition staff tend not to be 
themselves significant information sources. These considerations about the flexibility and the 
face-to-face aspect depend on the way the exhibitions are actually organised. Websites allow 
for very lengthy description of the project and first hand information is available twenty four 
hours a day. Even if information is set, a certain flexibility is possible, or rather, a certain 
interactivity. An advantage is that the cost is rather low. A disadvantage is that not only does 
it rely on the public to come, but only the public having access to internet can come. 
Exhibitions create an event and make the project lively. However, information is available 
only over a short period of time. On another note, a long tem exhibition is costly.  
 The top-down communication mechanisms of type 5** are meetings with the members 
of associations or with their representatives, and visits of existing waste treatment facilities 
with associations.  As for top-down information type 2*, information is provided face-to-face 
and is flexible, response to individual query is supplied. The difference is that in the present 
type, the public is highly selected. Three mechanisms were used by the public authorities, 
formal and informal meetings with associations, visits of existing facilities with associations, 
and (compulsory) Local Commissions for Information and Monitoring. The meetings with 
associations can be either meetings with all the members of the association(s), in that case 
they are similar to the public meetings, or they can me more limited, including only the 
representatives of the association(s). Flexibility of the information delivered is enhanced 
thanks to the (usually) low number of participants which allow a greater interactivity.  
Concerning the visits of existing waste treatment facilities, invitations are sent to 
representatives of the association(s). Usually, these visits also involved elected decision-
makers, some administration staff and sometimes journalists. As for Local Committees for 
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Table 5. Typology of the engagement mechanisms used in the ten studied decision-
making processes (inspired from rowe and frewer, 2005) 
Mechanism 
Class 
Mechanism 
Type 
Mechanisms actually 
used 
 State of the significant 
characteristics 
Top-down 
Communication 
Top-down 
communication type 
1* 
(traditional publicity)  
Information broadcasts 
(‘Publicity’ via newsletters/ Journal, 
press releases, radio broadcasts, 
letters to associations) 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Information input: set information 
- Medium of information: Non face-to-
face 
 Top-down 
communication type 
2* 
 
Public Meeting (Eventually with 
question-and-answer session) 
 
District councils 
- Participation selection method: 
Uncontrolled 
- Information input: Flexible information 
- Medium of information: face-to-face 
 Top-down 
communication type 
3* 
Public authority (non interactive) 
web site 
 
Exhibition 
- Participation selection method: 
Uncontrolled 
- Information input: set information 
- Medium of information: Non face-to-
face 
 Top-down 
communication type 
5** 
Formal / Informal Meetings with 
Associations 
 
Visits of existing facilities with  
Associations 
 
(compulsory) Local Commission for 
Information And Monitoring 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Information input: Flexible information 
- Medium of information: face-to-face 
 Top-down 
communication type 
6** 
Phone Communication  with 
Associations 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Information input: Flexible information 
- Medium of information: Non face-to-
face 
Top-down 
consultation type 1* 
Opinion Survey 
Local referenda 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Facilitation of information elicitation: 
No  
- Response mode: Closed 
- Medium of information: Non face-to-
face 
- Facilitation of agregation: Structured 
combination 
Top-down 
consultation type 2* 
Consultative Committee - Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Facilitation of information elicitation: 
No  
- Response mode: Open 
- Medium of information: Non face-to-
face 
- Facilitation of agregation: Unstructured 
combination 
Top-down 
consultation type 4* 
Consultation meeting with  
representatives of associations 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Facilitation of information elicitation: 
Yes  
- Response mode: Open 
- Medium of information: face-to-face 
- Facilitation of agregation: Unstructured 
combination 
Top-down 
Consultation 
Top-down 
consultation type 5* 
Consultation public meeting - Participation selection method: 
Uncontrolled 
-  Facilitation of information elicitation: 
No  
- Response mode: Open 
- Medium of information: face-to-face  
- Facilitation of agregation: Unstructured 
combination 
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Top-down 
participation type 1*  
Action Planning Workshop 
( Départemental commission for the 
disposal of household and similar 
waste plan ; commission 
départementale pour le plan 
d’élimination des déchets des 
ordures ménagères) 
 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Facilitation of information elicitation: 
Yes  
- Response mode: Open 
- Information input: Flexible information 
- Medium of information: face-to-face  
- Facilitation of agregation: Unstructured 
combination 
 
Top-down 
participation type 
3** 
Non compulsory and Compulsory 
Local Commission for Information 
and Monitoring 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Facilitation of information elicitation: 
No  
- Response mode: Open 
- Information input: Flexible information 
- Medium of information: face-to-face  
- Facilitation of agregation: Unstructured 
combination 
 
Top-down 
participation type 
4** 
Registre d’enquete (Enquiry 
Register) (Compulsory Public 
Enquiry) 
- Participation selection method: 
Uncontrolled 
- Facilitation of information elicitation: 
Yes  
- Response mode: Open 
- Information set 
- Medium of information: Non face-to-
face 
- Facilitation of agregation: Unstructured 
combination 
Top-down 
Participation 
Top-down 
participation type 
5** 
Interview with commissaires 
enquêteurs (compulsory public 
enquiry) 
- Participation selection method: 
Uncontrolled 
- Facilitation of information elicitation: 
Yes  
- Response mode: Open 
- Information input: set information 
- Medium of information: face-to-face  
- Facilitation of agregation: Unstructured 
combination 
No Engagement 
type 1.**  
No Mechanism 
No Initiative - No characteristic No Engagement 
No Engagement 
type 2. ** 
Legal Action 
Administrative Action 
 
Criminal Action 
- Take place in court 
Bottom-up 
consultation type 
1** 
Association meeting with the 
participation of the public authority 
 
- Addressee of information: Public 
authority 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Response mode: Open 
- Medium of information: face-to-face  
- Facilitation of agregation: Unstructured 
combination 
Bottom-up 
Consultation 
Bottom-up 
consultation  type  
2** 
Request of Documents - Addressee of information: Public 
authority 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Response mode: Open 
- Medium of information: Non face-to-
face 
- Facilitation of agregation: Unstructured 
combination 
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Bottom-up 
communication type 
1** 
(traditional public 
protest) 
Demonstration 
 
Petition  
 
Protest letter sent  to policy-makers 
- Addressee of information: Public 
authority 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Information input: set information 
- Medium of information: Non face-to-
face 
- Argumentation: No 
Bottom-up 
communication type 
2** 
Opposition association press 
release  
 
Opposition Open Letters 
 
- Addressee of information: Larger 
public 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Information Set 
- Medium of information: Non face-to-
face 
- Argumentation: No 
Bottom-up 
communication type 
3** 
Association Information broadcast 
(‘Publicity’ via newsletters/ Journal, 
newspaper, open Letters, press 
release, radio broadcast) 
 
- Addressee of information: Larger 
public 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Information input: set information 
- Medium of information: Non face-to-
face 
- Argumentation: Yes 
Bottom-up 
communication type 
4** 
Association exhibition 
 
Association web site 
- Addressee of information: Larger 
public 
-  Participation selection method: 
Uncontrolled 
- Information input: set information 
- Medium of information: Non face-to-
face 
- Argumentation: Yes 
Bottom-up 
communication type 
5** 
Association conferences 
 
Association public meeting 
 
- Addressee of information: Larger 
public 
- Participation selection method: 
Uncontrolled 
- Flexible  information  
- Medium of information: face-to-face  
- Argumentation: Yes 
Bottom-up 
Communication 
 
 
Bottom-up 
communication type 
6** 
Association newsletter, reports,  or 
expertises, sent to policy-makers 
 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Addressee of information: Public 
authority 
- Information input: set information 
- Medium of information: Non face-to-
face 
- Argumentation: Yes 
Bottom-up  
Participation 
Bottom-up 
participation type 
1** 
Not present in this research. For 
illustration, existing mechanisms 
that can be found in the Science 
Study literature:: 
 
Community based research 
 
Patient association 
- Participation selection method: 
Controlled 
- Addressee of information: Public 
authority 
- Information input: Flexible information 
- Response mode: Open 
- Medium of information: face-to-face  
- Argumentation: Yes 
*: type identified by Rowe and Frewer (2005) 
**: type developed by the author 
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Information and Monitoring, it is sometimes difficult to decide whether to categorise them as 
top-down communication exercises or as top-down participation exercises; it depends on the 
way public authority considers and thus organises it. However, a distinction can be made 
between the compulsory and the non-compulsory commissions. Compulsory commissions are 
more likely to be a communication exercise. Indeed, by law, these committees are compulsory 
only after the opening of an incineration plant, once there is basically nothing to decide; the 
aim of such commissions is that local decision-makers and the operator distribute information 
concerning the emission of pollutants to selected NGOs and other organisations. However, in 
some cases, requests provided by representatives of the public, such as the installation of extra 
measurements of pollutant emissions, have been taken into account. In these cases, the Local 
Commission for Information and Monitoring is another class of mechanisms (top-down 
participation type 3*). The non-Compulsory Local Commissions for Information and 
Monitoring are more likely to be top-down participation type 3* initiatives, but it depends 
upon the way it actually works. 
 Top-down communication type 6** mechanisms are phone communication with 
associations. Representatives are regularly contacted by public authority to be informed about 
the evolution of the project. Thus the public is highly selected. Even if information is not 
communicated face to face, phone communications allow flexibility. Another advantage is the 
low cost of such a mechanism. 
Top-down Consultation 
 Four types of top-down consultation (type 1*, type 2*, type 4*, and type 5*) have been 
identified. Opinion survey, and referenda, are top-down consultation type 1* mechanisms. 
These mechanisms are essentially highly controlled ways of acquiring answers to specific 
questions from large samples. Quantity of data is more important than quality. There is no 
facilitation of the elicitation of information, and possible answers are pre-selected. 
Theoretically, opinion surveys can be semi-structured questionnaires, what allows more 
flexibility for the answers, but makes difficult and above all costly the treatment of the 
answers collected. As for the aggregation of data, it is structured.  
 Only one mechanism, the consultative committee, makes up the type 2*. This type aims to 
attain open responses on a significant issue from a selected part of the public. A consultative 
committee is basically composed of representatives of the civil society of a commune or a 
grouping of communes. This is a non face-to-face mechanism: elected decision-makers ask for 
a written report to the consultative committee about the topic in question. The consultative 
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committee is not set up especially for the setting up of an incinerator, and the committee can 
be consulted about many kinds of projects. The limit of such committees is that they have not 
a flexible composition. Indeed, they are set-up on a medium term basis, so they cannot take 
into account emergent actors such as the NGOs which are especially created to get opposed to 
a project.118 
 The type 4** of consultation mechanisms consists of meetings with the associations in 
order to know their views concerning the issue at stake. Through the high selection of the 
participants, this type of mechanisms aims at gathering the views of a definite kind of public. 
The lack of elicitation of information of these face-to-face meetings is compensated by the 
fact that the meetings have a limited number of participants, one representative of the public 
authority, and a few representatives of the NGOs. In the cases studied, the meetings are rather 
informal and usually take place in the office of a member of the administrative staff. Because 
there is no significant information delivered by the public authority, this type of mechanisms 
may be seen as consultation rather than participation mechanisms. 
 None of the public authorities resorted to the focus groups, which is a type 4 mechanism 
which has been studied and promoted by many science studies scholars: (See for example 
Condit C. M., Parrott R. Harris T. M., 2002; Rowe G. and Frewer L.J.  2005). Focus groups 
have been used in a wide range of activities – e.g. testing the efficacy of propaganda films, 
marketing, and information campaigns-  before being used in technical-scientific decision-
making. Small groups are composed in order to reflect different categories of the public. 
These groups meet on a few occasions, in which a compere asks very general questions in 
order to get a free discussion going. More precisely, people (for each group) are randomly 
selected, often by telephone. The duration of each session is about 2 hours and each group 
meets weekly in a neutral place. Audio-visual presentations are often used because they likely 
to make easier the discussion by provoking an emotional state. The products of these 
discussions are some records, answers to questionnaires or reports. The role of the compere, 
who must not be an expert, is to facilitate the discussion. This procedure does not really allow 
an interactive confrontation between scientific expertise and the public. However, it has the 
advantage of allowing new positions to appear – something which is not possible with the 
pre-determined questions of the polls. It might indicate new tracks which should be 
                                                 
118 See chapter 5 ‘Public Engagement: Legal Framework’ for furter details about consultative committees 
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investigated or at can at least modify the hierarchy of themes which are already the subjects of 
research. 
 
 Large-scale consultation of the residents through meetings is a top-down consultation 
mechanism of type 5**. This class of mechanisms aims to attain open responses from a 
rather large percentage of the population on a significant issue. However, the selection of the 
public is not controlled and there is no facilitator. Thus, such mechanisms rely on the public 
to come and participate to the consultation. Such consultation meetings may be trusted by 
NGOs, and may be not representative of the actual resident views. In the public meeting, 
decision-makers present the issue at stakes (i.e. the incineration plant project) and then gather 
the reactions of the participants. Even if the public authority may take into account the result 
of the consultation in its final decision, the aim is not that the public authority and the public 
mutually change their views. Thus these meetings are consultation and not participation 
mechanisms.  
Top-down Participation 
 Three mechanisms were actually used; these are (non-compulsory) Local Commission for 
Information and Monitoring, registres d’enquête (inquiry registers), and interviews with 
commissaires enquêteurs (commissioners); they can be respectively differentiated in three 
types of top-down participation: type 3**, type 4**, and type 5**. Registres d’enquêtes and 
interviews with commissaires enquêteurs are both carried out in the framework of the 
compulsory enquête publique (public inquiry). The registres d’enquête are a top-down 
participation mechanism of type 4**. These mechanisms rely on the public to come and 
consult information documents, and then to give its opinions in an open written form. The 
‘organizers’ and ‘facilitators’ of these participation mechanisms are the commissaires 
enquêteurs (commisioners), who are appointed by the president of the local administrative 
tribunal. In the concerned town-halls, the ‘organizers’ make available some documentation 
about the project, and they collect the opinions, suggestions, and counter-proposals of the 
public through the registers (public opinions are also gathered through individual meetings, 
see type 5 below). Finally, the commissioners aggregate the gathered information, and they 
write down a motivated favourable or unfavourable advice intended to the préfet. By law, the 
duration of a public inquiry must not be less than one month.  
 Individual interviews with commissaires enquêteurs belong to the type 5** of top-down 
participation. This class of mechanisms is similar to the type 4**. However, the flexibility of 
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the responses is enhanced thanks to face-to-face meetings, which takes place in the concerned 
town-halls. 
 Finally, Non-compulsory Local Commissions for Information and Monitoring are type 3** 
top-down participation mechanisms. The selected participants, representatives of the 
associations, are provided with information, and they have the possibility to respond in an 
open way. Flexibility is also enhanced by the face-to-face exchange. However, there is no 
facilitated elicitation and no structured aggregation. The Local Commission for Information 
and Monitoring can be in this class when local decision-makers really want to take into 
account representatives of the public opinions. Before the opening of an incineration plant, the 
setting up of a Local Commission for Information and Monitoring is not compulsory.  
Compulsory and Non-Compulsory Local Committee for Information are organised in the 
same way. However, they are not the same type of mechanism. Indeed, compulsory 
committees are set-up after the opening of the incineration plant, when the decision-making 
process is over, and so when everything has been decided, whereas the non compulsory one 
can be set up during the decision-making process, when some issues are still under discussion. 
Thus, compulsory Local Commissions for Information and Monitoring are communication 
mechanisms, whereas the non compulsory ones are more likely to be participation 
mechanisms. However, it is not always easy to classify the Non Compulsory Local 
Commissions for Information and Monitoring because they can be used as communication, 
consultation, or participation mechanism depending on the public authority. The actual type 
of a non compulsory Local Commission for Information and Monitoring is linked to the stage 
in which it is organised. If such a committee is not set before the beginning of the second 
phase, it is likely to be a communication rather than a participation mechanism. 
 No top-down participation mechanisms type 1* have been used during the decision-
making processes. This type groups together two of the three mechanisms which are 
representative of the highly participatory mechanisms studied and promoted by Science 
Studies scholars: consensus conference and citizens’ jury.119 This type is characterized by the 
controlled selection of participants, facilitated group (FTF) discussions, unconstrained 
participant responses, and flexible information input from the public authorities, often in the 
                                                 
119 See among others: Renn O., Webler T. and Wiedemann P., 1995; Callon M., Lascoumes P. Barthe Y., 2001; 
Rowe, Gene and Frewer, Lynn J., 2005/4/1; Crosby N., 1995; Armour A., 1995; Joss S., 1998; Grundahl, J, 
1995; Hamstra A., 1995; Mayer I., de Vries J. and Geurts J., 1995; Joss S., 1995; Blok A., 2007/4/1; Seifert F., 
2006/1/1; Einsiedel E., Jelsoe E. Breck T., 2001/1/1. 
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form of “experts” who are available for questioning by the public participants throughout 
numerous session spread on a few months. 
   Consensus conferences directly include the public in the discussions – thus discussions 
are not limited to the circle of experts and decision-makers. The discussions are about topical 
subjects that have a national dimension. The model of the consensus conferences is the 
Danish experience which took place in 1987 and dealt with health care issues (Joss S., 1998, 
Grundahl, J, 1995). The consensus conferences which followed used the Danish experience as 
a template among others, these are: the Dutch consensus conference on transgenic animals 
which took place in 1993, and on human genetics research in 1995 (Hamstra A., 1995; Mayer 
I., de Vries J. and Geurts J., 1995), the British conference on biotechnology which took place 
in 1994 (see Joss S., 1995), in the U.S.A. on the issue of "Telecommunications and the Future 
of Democracy" in 1997 (see Guston, David H., 1999/10/1), and the French one on GMOs in 
1998 (see Boy D., Donnet-Kamel D. and Roqueplo P., 2000). The aim is to create a debate 
and to frame it in the broadest possible way in order to enlighten decision-makers on 
technical-scientific matters for which there are great uncertainties.  
A few variations apart, consensus conferences have been organised in this manner. They 
are composed on the one hand of scientific experts and stake-holders – that is all people more 
or less concerned by the subject such as industries, non governmental associations, trade 
unions, consumer associations, political parties, etc. -, on the other hand, a random selection 
of directly or indirectly affected citizens. The aim is to have the widest diversity of opinions. 
Participants meet regularly together over several months, each session lasting a few hours. 
During the first sessions, citizens receive scientific-technical training from the experts in order 
to be able to participate in the debates. At the end of the training, the citizens select the 
themes they wish to discuss. During the following sessions, a few experts make a brief 
presentation on each theme and then they answer the questions asked by the citizens. At the 
conclusion of each session, the citizens withdraw and write a short report which is sent to the 
decision-makers.  
 Previously conducted consensus conferences seem to show that the public participation in 
technical-scientific decision-making is quite viable (see Guston, David H., 1999/10/1). The 
framing of the problem seem to be effectively wider: diverse values and interests as well as 
the complexity of the problem are taken into account – there is therefore a gain in output 
legitimacy. Furthermore, they make visible the various lobbies and include persons previously 
excluded before – thus reinforcing the input legitimacy. However, there is still a problem of 
input legitimacy in terms of the selected sample of the public who ‘decide’ for those who 
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were not part of the process. Furthermore, the participants represent already constituted 
groups and this procedure does not allow the exploration and emergence of identities. 
 Citizens’ jury operate in a similar way to conference consensus. The major difference is 
that this procedure deals with local issues and not with the problems a nation is facing as does 
the conference consensus process (See Crosby N., 1995, Armour A., 1995) However, in the 
case of Gueugnon, after the abandonment of the initial incineration plant project (i.e. after the 
end of the studied decision-making process), the Conseil Général (assembly of the 
département) decided to start the decision-making process again, resorting to ‘action planning 
workshop’ in the framework of the setting-up of the Départemental commission for the 
disposal of household and similar waste plan (commission départementale pour le plan 
d’élimination des déchets des ordures ménagères). The NGOs participated to the elaboration 
of 12 scenarios of waste treatment. Indeed, they participated in all the meetings of the 
commission départementale together with the elected decision-makers and the administrative 
staff. They had the same possibilities to influence the decision-making as the elected decision-
makers: they could bring their own knowledge, they could ask for the selection of certain 
experts, and they could question the expert which participated in the meetings.  
I.2. No Public Engagement 
 When exchange of information between the public (at least the associations) and the public 
authority became difficult, associations undertook administrative or criminal actions in order 
to fight against the public authority project. This class of mechanism is considered as ‘non-
engagement’ since there is no ‘flow of information’ between public authority and the public. 
Information is exchanged between a judge and the legal representatives of both parties, public 
authority on one hand, and associations on the other hand. The administrative actions 
concerned the procedural aspects of the decision-making process, or the non conformity of a 
facility concerning certain norms. As for criminal actions, they were undertaken in the cases 
in which an old generation incineration plant used to run. In these cases, the NGOs claim that 
the incineration plants did not respect the norms concerning emission of pollutants, and 
consequently that they put in danger the residents’ health.  
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I.3. Bottom-up Mechanisms 
Most of the bottom-up public engagement mechanisms are similar to the top-down 
ones. The difference is that bottom-up mechanisms are sponsored by the public whereas top-
down ones are sponsored by the public authorities. 
Bottom-up Communication 
   Six types of bottom-up communication mechanisms can be differentiated. They have 
been labelled from ‘type 1’** to ‘type 6’**. Demonstration, Petition and Protest letters sent to 
policy makers are the bottom-up communication mechanisms of type 1**. They are the 
traditional communication mechanisms typically used as part of protestation plan which 
mainly target the public authorities. The information conveyed is very simple: opposition to 
the position of the public authorities. The aim of these mechanisms is to pressure the public 
authorities through non face-to-face actions. The representatives of the public aim to gain 
representativeness through an important number of participants. Because the arguments 
usually used during these protestations are of a slogan type, the discourse held may be 
considered without ‘argumentation’. 
 With the type 2** mechanisms, press release and opposition open letters published by the 
NGOs aim to publicise the opposition of the NGOs to the incineration plant project. The 
target is the larger public. In principle, it is possible that these mechanisms contain arguments, 
in this case, they are another type of mechanisms (see type 3**).  
 Type 3** mechanisms are ‘Association Information broadcast’, that is, ‘publicity’ via a 
variety of (non FTF) media: newsletters/ Journal, newspaper, open Letters, press release, 
radio broadcast. These are the traditional communication mechanisms, through which the 
NGOs target a particular population (among the larger public) with set information. The target 
is the larger public, and the information consists in arguments which support the opposition to 
the public authorities’ project. These mechanisms are similar to the top-down communication 
type 1.  
 Association exhibitions and association web sites are type 4** bottom-up 
communication mechanisms. These mechanisms are similar to the top-down communication 
mechanisms of type 3. The exhibitions used in the ten decision-making processes were 
sporadic actions in public places such as “dégage l’emballage” (no packaging anymore) and 
they took place in supermarkets. They were symbolic consciousness-raising actions. On a 
particular day, the organizers who were dressed in sandwich boards went to some 
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supermarkets: just behind the cashdesk, they left all the packaging of the goods they had 
purchased.  
 Conferences and public meeting, type 5** mechanisms, were used a large amount by the 
NGOs. This class of mechanisms is similar to the top-down communication type 2. These 
mechanisms rely on the larger public to come to the information rather than vice versa. 
Information is communicated face-to-face by associations to those involved, and is variable, 
depending to some degree on what participants ask. In these meetings, the NGOs provide the 
(larger) public with alternative information. Roughly, the discourse is centred around the 
sanitary and environmental risks of incineration and around the alternative techniques. The 
aim of the NGOs is to bring the attention of the (larger) public to their cause. In public 
meetings the speaker is a member of the NGO, while in conferences he is an external member 
especially invited. This external member is endowed with some expertise in the field either of 
waste treatment, or of the sanitary and environmental impact on health and environment. 
 Bottom-up communication type 6** brings together newsletters, reports, or expertises, sent 
directly to policy-makers. Through written documents, these mechanisms are essentially ways 
of providing the public authorities with set alternative information. The aim is to change the 
mind of the public authorities.  
Bottom-up Consultation 
 Bottom-up Consultation consists of requests for information made by the public to the 
public authority. This request shows the lack of top-down communication in the eyes of the 
NGOs. Two types of consultation mechanisms have been identified. Type 1** consists of the 
request of a meeting with the public authorities. Information is communicated face-to-face by 
public authorities to those involved and is variable, depending to some degree on what 
participants ask. The place of the meeting is generally provided by the NGOs or groups of 
interest. This class of mechanisms is similar to the top-down communication type 5**, the 
difference is the sponsor. The bottom-up consultation mechanisms type 2** consists of the 
request of documents:  NGOs asked for written information to the public authorities.  
Bottom-up Participation 
 The characteristics of the bottom-up participation mechanisms are identical to the top-
down ones, only the sponsor differs. In the eleven decision-making processes, no bottom-up 
participation has been found. Bottom-up participation entails the engagement of the public 
authority in a participation mechanism whose it is not the sponsor. The absence of bottom-up 
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mechanisms has two meanings: either the NGOs did not dare or think that it was possible to 
sponsor such mechanisms, or the public authority discouraged any thought to sponsor bottom-
up mechanism. In the light of the actual top-down engagement, it is very likely that the 
groupings of communes are not keen on abandoning the organisation of the decision-making 
processes. The examples of bottom-up participation mechanisms are not in the field of 
decision-making but in the field of the research, with for example patient associations shaping 
the research and care agenda, or community-based research (see Epstein, Steven G, 1995a; 
Callon M. and Rabeharisoa V., 1999; and Bourret P.). 
      
II. The Three key chronological stages 
 As I have stated in chapter 4, I have divided the decision-making processes in three key 
chronological stages according to the importance of the issues under discussion: ‘framing’, 
‘specifications’, and ‘realisation’. In the ten cases, ‘framing’ corresponds to the choice of the 
waste treatment technology, that is the choice of incineration, while ‘specifications’ comprises 
the technical specifications of the incineration plant (capacity, types of furnace, etc.) and its 
location. Moreover, in this stage are also included the selection of the building company and 
of the operator through invitations to tender. The third stage, ‘realisation’, consists of the 
construction of the incineration plant. 
 For each of the ten decision-making processes, the three key chronological stages are 
defined through the identification of four key events. These key events are four decisions 
made by the public authorities: the grouping of communes or the préfet. The actual 
delimitation of the key chronological stages, that is, the definition of the four key 
chronological events, is not unproblematic. In the mess of the social reality, the decision-
making processes are not all linear, that is the events do not always occurs in the same order. 
Moreover, the decision-making processes are riddled with slack periods during which nothing 
seems to happen, and which can last months and even years. So, concerning the ‘slack 
periods’ and the ‘non linearity’ a series of choices must be made in order to define the three 
chronological stages in the ten decision-making processes, making the decision-making 
processes comparable.  
 First, concerning the ‘slack periods’, the choice consists of their attribution either to the 
stage which ends or to the following stage which starts. Such choices must be made for the 
stage 1-stage 2, stage 2-stage 3, and stage3-stage 4 delimitations. The first stage, ‘framing’, 
starts with the decision of a grouping of communes to set up a waste treatment facility and 
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ends with the choice of incineration as waste treatment technology. Then, a few months can 
elapse before the first meeting in which the discussions about the specifications start; I 
consider this first slack period as part of the second stage since the ‘degree of manoeuvre’120 
diminishes when the choice of a waste treatment technology is made. In other words, the 
second stage starts with the decision to adopt incineration as waste treatment technology. The 
second stage ‘specifications’ ends with the granting by the préfet of the authorisation to 
operate. Indeed, in the request to operate addressed to the préfet, the grouping of communes 
and the operator have jointly proposed the final and complete specifications of the 
incineration plant. Subsequent substantial modifications of the incineration plant project 
would require a new authorisation to operate. Then, there is another slack period between the 
granting of the authorisation and the beginning of the construction. I consider this slack 
period as part of the third stage. Indeed, between the granting of the authorisation and 
beginning of the building, the public authorities do not modify substantially the project; the 
‘freedom of manoeuvre’ remains substantially the same. So the third stage ‘realisation’ starts 
with the granting by the préfet of the authorisation to operate, and not with the actual 
beginning of the construction. The third stage, and in the same time the decision-making 
process, ends with the official opening of the incineration plant. 
 
                                                 
120 I remind that ‘degree of manoeuvre’ means the number and importance of the issues to be decided (see 
chapter 4, sub-section III.3 for further details about the key chronological stages) 
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Figure 8. Definition of the three key chronological stages through four key events 
 
 Concerning the ‘linear problem’, in two cases the construction started before the granting 
of the authorisation by the préfet to operate.121 Since the definition of the key chronological 
stages is made according to the ‘freedom of manoeuvre’, I consider that the third stage 
‘realisation’ starts with the granting of the authorisation to operate by the préfet. Indeed, the 
decision of the préfet is more restrictive for the project than the beginning of the construction.
 Seven decision-making processes ended by the official opening of the incineration plant 
and are thus made of three stages, while three ended during the second stage with the 
abandonment of the incineration plant project. These three decision-making processes are the 
one which ended in 2005: 1. Gueugnon, 2. Angers, and  3. Thiviers. 
  
                                                 
121 See the appendix “The ten decision-making processes” for thick descriptions of each of the ten decision-
making processes 
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III. Actual Public Engagement and Political Will 
 The analysis of the actual public engagement and of the political will to engage the public 
is based on the charts of the number of public engagement initiatives in function of the three 
key chronological stages. Two series of charts have been drawn. The first series is made up of 
ten charts: there is one chart per decision-making process, and on each chart there are seven 
graphs, one for each of the seven classes of mechanisms. The second series is composed of 
seven charts: there is one chart per class of mechanisms, and on each charts there are ten 
graphs, one for each decision-making process. These charts and the details of their building 
can be found in the appendixes “Actual Public Engagement: Charts by Decision-Making 
processes”, and “Actual Public Engagement: Charts by Class of Mechanisms”. This section is 
composed of four sub-sections. The three first are respectively dedicated to the actual top-
down engagement, no public engagement, and bottom-up engagement, while the last sub-
section deals with the political will of the local decision-makers to engage the public.  
III.1. Actual top-down mechanisms 
Top-down communication 
 Communication mechanisms are the favourite public authorities’ tools for the engagement 
of the public. In each of the ten decision-making processes, the public authority (grouping of 
communes in charge of the waste treatment) resorted to them. Among the five types of top-
down communication mechanisms, the most used are the type 1* (above all newsletters and 
press releases) and the type 2* (public meetings); the others mechanisms were used in a 
marginal way. 
 According to the stage of the decision-making processes, the number of top-down 
communication initiatives varies a large amount (see the chart “Top-down Communication” 
in the appendix). In almost all but one cases, there is no top-down communication at all 
during the first stage, and in all the decision-making processes, the communication starts only 
once the choice of a waste treatment technology, that is incineration, is made. In the case of 
Le Havre, a little top-down communication was made during the first stage. But only three 
initiatives were organised: one letter to an NGO, one phone communication with an NGO, 
and one public meeting. Only the NGO ‘Comité du quartier des Neiges’, NGO of the 
residents of an old generation incinerator was informed.  
 Three types of decision-making processes can be differentiated according to the top-down 
communication. In the first type (three cases: 6. Le Havre, 8. Villers-St-Paul, and 10. 
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Guichainville), there is a peak of the number of communication initiatives during the second 
stage, the ‘specifications’ stage. Then the communication decreases, and almost disappears 
during the ‘realisation’ stage. In the second type (9. Calce, 10. Vaux-le-Pénil), the top-down 
communication constantly increases along the three stages. In the case of Calce, however, 
communication remains very low along the entire decision-making processes. The third type 
is composed of only of one case: 5. Lasse. In this case, there is no top-down communication 
during the decision-making process, but consultation and participation initiatives were 
sponsored by the public authority from the second stage onward. The last type brings together 
the three decision-making processes ended by the abandonment of the incineration plant 
project. In these three cases, top-down communication started during the ‘specifications’ 
stage. Obviously, for these cases, there is no ‘realisation’ stage. 
Top-down consultation 
 The public authorities almost did not resort to consultation mechanisms (see the chart “top-
down consultation” in the appendix). Indeed, even if four types of top-down consultation have 
been identified, they were actually used in only four out of the ten decision-making processes. 
In none of the decision-making process consultation was made during the first stage. The first 
consultation initiatives were sponsored during the second stage, after the waste treatment 
technique was already selected. Finally, in only one case (Calce) were consultation initiatives 
sponsored during the third stage. 
 Opinion surveys, and referendums, which are top-down consultation type 1* mechanisms, 
were each used once. A referendum was organised by one municipality (in the case of Calce) 
in order to decide about the hosting of the incineration plant. An initiative of type 2*, a 
consultative committee, was used only in the case of Angers. As for the type 4**, some top-
down consultations of NGOs took place in the cases of Angers and Lasse in order to know the 
views of the NGOs concerning the incineration of waste. While in the case of Lasse, the 
public authority contacted national NGOs in order to gather their views on waste incineration, 
generally speaking, in the case of Angers, Angers Loire Métropole met the local 
environmental NGOs in order to know their view about the specific project. At last, Angers 
Loire Métropole was the only public authority to organise a large scale consultation of the 
residents resorting to public consultation meetings. 
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Top-down participation 
 In the ten decision-making processes, the public authorities resorted little to top-down 
participation mechanisms (see the chart “Top-down Participation” in the appendix). In none 
of the decision-making process, a public participation initiative was sponsored during the first 
stage. Since it is compulsory, in all the decision-making processes the public authorities 
sponsored one public inquiry which is made of registres d’enquête (enquiry registers) on 
which the public can write down its opinions and suggestions, and individual meeting 
between the commissaires enquêteurs (enquiry commissioners) and the residents (on the 
demand of the residents). These two mechanisms are respectively type 4**, and 5** top-down 
participation mechanisms. By law, the public inquiry is realised very late in the decision-
making process, at the end of the ‘specifications’ stage, a few months before the beginning of 
the ‘realisation’ stage, when everything has been decided in the details.  
 In four cases, the public authority contented itself with the public enquiry; the cases are: 3. 
Thiviers, 4. Arras, 2. Le Havre, and 10. Guichainville. In the six other decision-making 
processes, the public authorities resorted to a few non compulsory mechanisms. More 
precisely, in four cases (5. Lasse, 9. Calce, 10. Villers-Saint-Paul, and 11. Vaux-le-Pénil), the 
grouping of communes sponsored a few non compulsory Local Commissions for Information 
and Monitoring (see chart “top-down participation” in the appendix). However, for three of 
these cases (Calce, Villers-Saint-Paul, and Vaux-le-Pénil), the first meeting took place when 
almost everything was already set, that is, toward the very end of the ‘specifications’ stage, or 
during the ‘realisation’ stage. Furthermore, in each of these cases, only three initiatives took 
place. Only in the case of Lasse a substantial series of seven commissions were organised 
from the beginning of the second stage onward and thus could have an impact on the outcome 
of the decision-making process.  
 In the case 1.Gueugnon, there was an attempt to set up such a commission. However, the 
local NGOs refused to participate arguing that it would only have meant that they supported 
the incineration plant project. 
 At last, in the case of Angers, the grouping of communes Angers Loire Métropole made 
available some non compulsory registres d’enquête in the town halls of the municipalities 
members of the grouping of communes. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether these registers 
were rather consultation or participation mechanisms, since I could not identify precisely the 
kind of information delivered by the public authority. In the case of Angers, the grouping of 
communes had also the possibility to be in touch with the local NGOs through a Compulsory 
Local Commission for Information and Monitoring regularly organised for the existing old 
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generation incineration plant. However, in the facts, this commission was not a place where 
the public authority and the NGOs debated about the new waste treatment facility. The 
situation was already very controversial; some administrative and criminal actions were 
undertaken about this existing incinerator.  
 
III.2. No Public Engagement 
 In none of the decision-making process is there a situation of total absence of public 
engagement, with no mechanism at all. But some legal actions were undertaken by some 
NGOs. Some civil actions were undertaken in almost half of the cases: 2. Angers, 3. Thiviers, 
5. Lasse, 10. Villers-Saint- Paul, and 11. Vaux-le-Pénil (see the chart “Legal actions” in the 
appendix). These actions were about the compliance with the law of the authorisation to build, 
the authorisation to run, or of the départemental plan for the elimination of waste. In the case 
of Angers, such a legal action did not concern the new incineration plant project, but the 
authorisation to build for the old existing incineration plant (which officially opened in 1978, 
and which is still running in 2009), and its non compliance with the anti-pollution equipment 
norms. Criminal actions were undertaken in the cases of Angers and Vaux-le-Pénil, but they 
were not about the new incineration plant project, but about old generation incinerators and 
the hazard to health posed by their emissions of pollutants.  
 The administrative actions were undertaken during the second stage of the decision-
making processes. That is, once the NGOs were informed about the incineration plant project; 
they tried to influence the outcome of the respective decision-making processes. As for the 
legal actions, since they are not linked to the new incineration plant project, but to an old 
generation existing incineration plant, it is difficult to identify a relationship between the time 
they were undertaken and the stage of the decision-making process. 
III.3. Actual bottom-up Engagement 
 I succeeded in interviewing all the concerned NGOs excepted in the case of Arras. In this 
case, the only engaged NGO, Nord-Nature, answered very briefly to the interview. From this 
interview, the engagement of the NGO can be summarised as the participation in the 
compulsory Local Commissions for Information and Monitoring, after the opening of the 
facility. Furthermore according to the grouping of communes SMAV, there was no bottom-up 
engagement, and the residents were not much interested in the thermolysis facility project. 
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Bottom-up communication 
 Among the six types of bottom-up communication mechanisms, the NGOs principally 
recoursed to the type 3** mechanisms, that is the traditional publicity (newsletters, press 
releases), and to the type 5** (Public meetings and public conferences), and to a lower extent 
to public protests (type 1**). Public meetings were used far more than conferences. Public 
meetings were held roughly on a monthly basis, while only a few conferences were organised. 
What is likely due to the fact that it is more complicated to organise public meetings with 
external speakers than with internal ones. About type 4**, the greatest part of the NGOs has 
set up a web site, whereas exhibitions were more rarely organised. 
 Newsletters, reports, or expertises directly sent policy-makers (type 6**) were very rarely 
used: these mechanisms were employed by the NGO Collectif incinerà’tort (Angers). The aim 
of the initiatives was clearly to change the mind of the decision-makers through alternative 
expertises. To a lower extent, the NGO CRITOM, in the case of Lasse, also resorted to this 
type of mechanisms. At last, the type 2* (opposition association press release and opposition 
open letters) were not used that much. 
 With regard to the evolution along the decision-making processes, all the cases have in 
common that there was no bottom-up communication during the ‘framing’ stage. This 
absence of communication is consistent with the fact that the incineration plant project were 
not publicised by the public authorities during the first stage. I have identified four types of 
decision-making processes according to the bottom-up communication (see chart “bottom-up 
communication”). The first type is composed of four cases (5. Lasse, 9. Calce, 11. Vaux-le-
Pénil, 10. Guichainville). In these cases, there is a (small) peak of bottom-up communication 
toward the end of the ‘specifications’ stage. This peak corresponds to the period of the public 
enquiry: through a more intensive communication directed at larger public, the NGOs tried to 
have an impact on the outcome of this enquiry. In the second group, bottom-up 
communication constantly increases along the decision-making process. But, there is only one 
case in this type, 8. Villers-St-Paul. Once the building has started, it is very unlikely that 
bottom-communication has an impact on the outcome of the incineration plant project. In the 
third group, the NGOs did not organise any bottom-up communication initiative, these are the 
decision-making processes ‘4. Arras’, and ‘6. Le Havre’. This lack of initiative shows that the 
NGOs were not that opposed to the incineration plant project. In the last group, the decision-
making processes ended with the abandonment of the incineration plant project. In the case of 
Gueugnon but above all of Angers, and Thiviers, the NGOs communicated much more than in 
the other cases.  
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Bottom-up consultation 
 Bottom-up consultation mechanisms can be found in half of the decision-making 
processes: Angers, Thiviers, Lasse, Villers-Saint-Paul, Guichainville, and Vaux-le-Pénil (see 
chart “Bottom-up Consultation”). In each of these cases, the number of requests (i.e. of 
bottom-up consultation initiatives) is quite low by comparison to the number of (bottom-up or 
top-down) communication initiatives: between one and five initiatives. In most, but not all, of 
the cases, the public authority answered to the request of the public. 
III.4. Conclusion 
Political will to engage the public 
As we have seen in chapter 5, the public authorities have a lot of possibilities to engage the 
public, and few legal obligations. The constraints consist of the carrying out of a public 
inquiry toward the end of the second stage ‘specifications’ and the creation of a Local 
Commission for Information and Monitoring once the incineration plant is running, that is, 
after the end of the decision-making process. Comparing the actual top-down public 
engagement with the legal framework, it appears that there was little political will to engage 
the public, and almost no will to make the public participate beyond what was legally 
mandatory. Since the legal obligations were very few, it can be argued that there was very 
little political will to make the public participate. Indeed, there was no top-down engagement 
(no communication, no consultation, and no participation) during the first stage (‘framing’ 
stage), when all options were open. Top-down public engagement started during the second 
stage, that is, after the key decision, the choice of incineration as waste treatment technology, 
was made. Furthermore, the top-down engagement predominantly consisted of 
communication with traditional mechanisms:  newsletters, press releases, and (to a minor 
extent) public meetings. Consultation was almost inexistent in all but one case: in the case of 
Angers a substantial consultation was carried out through consultation public meetings, and 
enquiry registers during the second stage. As for participation, it started very late, toward the 
end of the second stage, when the ‘degree of manoeuvre’ was almost equal to zero, that is, 
when almost everything was already decided. Top-down participation started with the 
carrying out of the compulsory public inquiry. Moreover, only in three cases did the public 
authority set up a Local Commission for Information and Monitoring toward the very end of 
the second-beginning of the third stage. Only in one case (5. Lasse) did the public authority 
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start to sponsor meetings of a Local Commission for Information and Monitoring, at the 
middle of the second stage. The public authorities almost did not resort to the other public 
engagement mechanisms provided by the law: public referendum, district councils, 
consultative committees, and participation of residents and users to the life of the local 
services. In substance, it appears that the public authorities did not go much further than the 
provisions of law. If communication was late but rather substantive, participation and 
consultation was very late and very little. The public engagement recommended by Science 
Studies scholars (Wynne B., 1992; Fischer F., 1999; Weale A., 2001; Callon M., Lascoumes 
P. Barthe Y., 2001; Nowotny H., Scott P. Gibbons M., 2001; Nowotny H., 2003; Jasanoff S., 
2003; Grundmann R. and Stehr N., 2003; Dietrich H., Schibeci R., 2003/10/1)122 is far from 
being implemented in the local technical-scientific decision-making processes in France.   
 Three intertwined reasons may explain this lack of political will on the part of the local 
public authorities. A first hypothesis is habit: the local decision-makers are simply used to 
make decisions without the participation or consultation of the concerned public. They make 
the decisions following mandatory procedures of public involvement. In brief, they may be 
simply not aware that they have the possibility to involve the public. A second hypothesis is 
that the habits of making decision following the representative democracy make them 
mistrustful toward participatory democracy. They may not want to abandon a part of the 
power they obtained winning elections. Another aspect of this reason is the responsibility of 
the elected decision-makers: the decision made at the end of a participation process may not 
be in accordance with the point of view of the elected decision-makers while this decision will 
be part of their track record for future elections. A third reason may be that the procedures for 
public participation are unknown, and consequently decision-making processes involving the 
public may be perceived as risky. Local decision-makers may have some doubt about the 
outcome of such decision-making processes, will they succeed in making a decision shared by 
most of the public, and they may think that they are going to loose time. Moreover, it is not 
easy to set up a new type of decision-making process; they may not know how to organise 
public participation and consultation; they likely not have the requested internal 
competencies.  Of course, these reasons can be combined. Moreover, I do not pretend to set 
up an exhaustive list of the reasons for this lack of political will. Further research would be 
                                                 
122 See chapter 1 
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necessary to fully explore and analyse the reasons of the local decision-makers of this lack of 
will to engage the public.  
  In order to increase top-down consultation and participation in environmental local 
decision-making processes two alternatives solution can be envisaged: promotion or legal 
obligation. In France, the state environmental agency ADEME is likely capable to make an 
efficient promotion thanks to its good knowledge of the local public environmental decision-
making processes: it knows the local public authorities and their competences, and it is 
informed about the new projects. Moreover, since it already provides some technical advice 
and financial help to the local public authorities, ADEME is very likely positively perceived 
by the local decision-makers. Therefore, the latter are likely to heed the advice about major 
public participation made by ADEME. As the French national experience shows, with the 
setting up of the Commission Nationale de Débat Public in 2002, the other solution is to 
impose public participation by law. As I have already stated in chapter 5, Commission 
Nationale de Débat Public deals only with the environmental decision-making processes 
concerning the projects which are of national importance. 
In both cases, the local public authorities need technical support to sponsor participation 
and consultation initiatives. This technical support could be provided by a public entity, as the 
Commission Nationale de Débat Public does, or by consulting firms, as is already the case 
concerning the technical studies of the projects. 
A typology different from the one of Rowe and Frewer 
 Concerning top-down engagement mechanisms, to date the typology of Rowe and Frewer 
(2005) is very likely the most complete, gathering together the mechanisms studied in the 
Science Studies litterature. None of the highly participatory mechanisms have been used 
during the ten studied decision-making processes. I have not found any of the participation 
mechanisms classified in the typology of Rowe and Frewer (2005): I have not found any of 
popular highly participatory mechanisms: consensus conferences, citizens’juries, and action 
planning workshop (type 1); deliberative opinion poll, planning cells (type 3). I have not 
found the less known mechanisms either: town-meeting with voting (type 4); and negotiating 
rule making, and task force (type 2). 
However, I have identified new top-down participation mechanisms and I have therefore 
supplemeted the typology of Rowe and Frewer. These mechanisms are also new types that 
Rowe and Frewer did not encounter: Local Commission for Information and Monitoring (type 
3); enquiry register (type 4); and interview with commissaires enquêteurs (type 5).  
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These mechanisms allow public participation, but they have a major drawback: in the cases 
studied they were sponsored too late in the decision-making processes. For effective 
participation, an initiative must be sponsored at the outset of the decision-making process, 
during the framing stage, not toward the end, when almost everything is already decided. 
Public inquiries are, in principle, a good participation mechanism: the dossiers, which 
precisely describe the project, allow the public to be fully informed and the registres 
d’enquêtes (enquiry registers) and individual interviews with commissaires enquêteurs 
(commissioners) enable the public to give its opinions, suggestions or counter-proposals. But 
public enquiries come too late in the decision-making processes; they take place when 
everything has already been decided. Another draw-back of the public enquiries, as they are 
actually organised, is that they took place in town halls, during the working hours. Thus the 
residents who are also workers had difficulties accessing the public inquiry. The other 
mechanism provided by law, the (Non Compulsory) Local Commission for Information and 
Monitoring could also be a good participation initiative. But they were organised very late in 
the decision-making processes, during the ‘realisation’ stage, when everything was decided. 
Furthermore, the local NGOs (usually from one to three) were in minority: they were facing a 
multitude of representatives of the public authority (grouping of communes, municipality, 
state), and of the operator.  
 
I have found only a few of the top-down consultation mechanisms listed by Rowe and 
Frewer (2005). I have encountered opinion poll, local referenda (type 1), and consultative 
comitte which are similar to the consultation document (type 2). But I have not found one of 
the most popular consultation mechanisms: the focus groups (type 4). I have not found some 
other mechanisms: survey and telepolling/voting (type 1); electronic consultation (interactive 
web-site), type 3; open space, study circle (type 5), and citizen’s panel (type 6).    
However, I have supplemented the typology mechanisms which are similar to type 4 and 
5, that is, which have the same ‘significant charateristics’. These are: Consultation meeting 
with representatives of associations (type 4); and Consultation Public meeting (type 5) 
 
To conclude, the top-down consultation and participation mechanisms encountered in this 
research are different from those listed in the typology of Rowe and Frewer. This research is 
based on French cases, while, as they indicate, the typology developed by Rowe and Frewer is 
mainly based on the mechanisms used in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The question which 
stems is why the French mechanisms are so different form the Anglo-Saxon ones? It is 
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unlikely that the Anglo-Saxon mechanisms were not adapted to the French democracy. There 
is no reason why the mechanisms listed by Rowe and Frewer could not be applied in France. 
As a matter of fact the Commission Nationale du Débat Public resorted to some of these 
mechanisms, such as the focus groups. Concerning the compulsory participation mechanisms, 
it is plausible that the French legislators simply did not look that much toward the Anglo-
Saxon experiences. As for the non-compulsory mechanisms, as we have seen the local public 
authorities studied in this research were obviously not at the leading edge of participation and 
consultation, and it was therefore unlikely that they sought innovative highly participary 
mechanisms used in the Anglo-Saxon countries.  
 
Public will to engage in the decision-making processes 
 Bottom-up public engagement is the reaction of a part of the residents to the incineration 
plant project and to the way public authorities engaged the public in the decision-making 
processes. As soon as the incineration plant was decided and publicised, that is, at the 
beginning of the ‘specifications’ stage, the mobilisation of the NGOs started. The NGOs 
principally resorted to communication mechanisms. This bottom-up communication consisted 
of protests (demonstration and petitions), and of information through public meetings, 
conferences and newsletters. Bottom-up consultation, which reflects the need for information 
of the NGOs, was used in half of the cases, but in each case the number of initiatives is low. 
In most of the cases, the public authorities followed up these requests. As for bottom-up 
participation, it was not used in any of the eleven cases. This absence of bottom-up 
participation is not easy to interpret: did the NGO think that there was no way to obtain the 
participation of the public authority in such mechanisms? Finally, legal actions, which are ‘no 
public engagement’ mechanisms, were mainly undertaken toward the end of the decision-
making process, just before the ‘realisation’ stage; they were the last attempts of the NGO to 
stop the incineration plant projects. 
 
 A question which has not been dealt by Science Studies scholars concern the public 
willingness to engage in the decision-making processes. This public willingness is 
fundamental for the organisation of participation or consultation mechanisms. By definition 
without public willingness to participate, it is not possible to sponsor consultation or 
participation initiatives. And the discourse of the science studies scholars about the public 
engagement to solve the problem of traditional scientific expertise (see chapter 1) losts its 
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significance. Consequently, the decision-makers can make their decisions as they used to do, 
limiting public engagement to information. In the ten cases studied, the bottom-up 
engagement shows that the public was willing to engage in the decision-making processes. As 
we will see in chapter 9, most of them searched for information about the alternative waste 
treatment technologies.  
 Therefore, the first thing to do before thinking about sponsoring public participation or 
consultation is to assess the impact of the project on the public opinion. Doing so, it is 
possible to evaluate the possible degree of controversy of the decision-making process. Such 
an assessment can be done for example comparing the project with previous similar ones. For 
example, in the light of this research, it appears that the setting up of a waste treatment 
facility, or at least of a waste incinerator, is very likely to be controversial. Specifities of the 
concerned territory and population should be taken into account. In the case of waste 
treatment facilities, for example, specificities are, among others: presence of an old generation 
incineration plant, existing NGOs, socio-economical level of the concerned residents, specific 
activities around the site (schools, hospital, agriculture, etc.). Another solution to assess the 
impact of a project on the public opinion is to carry out surveys. These two solutions do not 
exclude each other, and they could be combined.  
 
IV. Impact of the Public Engagement on the Decision-Making processes 
 In order to evaluate the impact of the public engagement on the decision-making processes, 
I confront the actual public engagement with the outcome on one hand, and with the degree of 
controversy on the other. The actual public engagement has been drawn in the section II of 
this chapter. The outcomes (realisation/abandonment) of the decision-making processes can 
be found in the table 16 in the appendix “The Ten Decision-Making Processes”. As for the 
degree of controversy, they are established in sub-section IV.1 below. 
 In this section, I provide thus a typology of the decision-making processes according to 
their degree of controversy. Then I assess the impact of the top-down and of the bottom-up 
public engagement on the degree of controversy, and on the outcome of the decision-making 
processes.  
IV.1. Degree of Controversy of the Ten Decision-Making Processes 
 As I have stated in chapter 4, section IV, I define the degree of controversy of the decision-
making processes through four variables: ‘legal action’, ‘ad hoc NGO’, ‘bottom-up 
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communication initiatives’, and ‘public protests’. But this definition can work only if the 
standard deviation of the variables ‘bottom-up communication initiatives’ and ‘public 
protests’ are both high. If not, it is difficult to differentiate the degree of controversy. For the 
10 studied, the mean of the number of bottom-up communication initiatives cases is A=17.1, 
and the mean of public protests is A’ = 3.6, while the respective standard deviation are high: 
respectively σ = 16.7, and σ’ = 2.9. In other words the data points are far from the mean. So it 
is possible to apply the definition of the degree of controversy through four variables to the 
ten decision-making processes. The states of the four variables of each decision-making 
process are listed in table 6 below. 
Table 6. Decision-making processes listed with the states of their variables 
Case 
Legal  
Action 
High 
(Present , 
X))/ Low 
(Absent , 
0) 
Type of  
NGO 
 
Ad hoc 
NGOs 
High 
(Present , 
X))/ Low 
(Absent , 
0) 
Level of bottom-up 
communication 
Initiatives 
(Number of 
initiatives Ni) 
High (Ni≥17) /Low 
(Ni<17) 
σ = 16,7 
Level of public 
protest 
Initiatives 
(Number of 
initiatives Ni’) 
High 
(Ni’≥3,5)/Low 
(Ni’<3,5) 
σ' = 
Degree of 
Controversy 
Degree of 
Controversy 
(simplified 
version) 
1. Gueugnon 0 (Low) X (High) High (17) Low (2) Moderate Mainly Controversial 
2. Angers X (High) X (High) High (40) High (6) High Mainly controversial 
3. Thiviers X(High) X (High) High (46) High (5) High Mainly controversial 
4. Arras 0 (Low) 0 (Low) Low (0) Low (0) Non Controversial 
Mainly 
Not Controversial 
5. Lasse X(High) X (High) Low (10) Low (1) Moderate Mainly controversial 
6. Saint Jean de 
Folleville  
(Le Havre) 
0 (Low) 0 (Low) Low (0) Low (0) Non Controversial 
Mainly 
Not Controversial 
7. Nîmes N.D.A. X (High) N.D.A.1 N.D.A. N.D.A. N.D.A. 
8. Villers-Saint-
Paul X(High) X (High) High (33) High (6) High 
Mainly 
controversial 
9. Calce 0 (Low) X (High) Low (5) Low (2) Slightly Mainly Not Controversial 
10. Guichainville 
(Evreux) 0 (Low) 0 (Low) Low (7) High (7) Slightly 
Mainly 
Not Controversial 
11. Vaux-le-Pénil X(High) X (High) Low (14) High (7) High Mainly Not Controversial 
 1 No Data Available 
 
 Four decision-making processes are highly controversial, two moderately, two slightly, and 
two are non-controversial, and there is no ‘almost controversial’ decision-making process. In 
other words, using the simplified categories, six decision-making processes are mainly 
controversial while four are mainly not controversial. The decision-making processes are 
clustered according to their degree of controversy in table 7 below. 
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Table 7. Degrees of controversy of the ten decision-making processes 
Classes of Controversy Characteristics Cases 
Highly 
Controversial 
 
- Legal Action  
- Two or three out of the 
three other variables ( 
especially created NGO, 
Bottom-up Communication, 
Public Protests) are in a 
‘high’ state 
Or 
- No Legal Action 
- All the three other variables 
( especially created NGO, 
Bottom-up Communication, 
and Public Protests) are in a 
‘high’ state 
 
2. Angers 
3. Thiviers 
8. Villers-Saint-Paul  
11. Vaux-le-Pénil 
 
Mainly 
controversial 
Moderately 
Controversial 
 
- Legal Action 
- One out of the three other 
variables (especially created 
NGO, Bottom-up 
Communication, and Public 
Protests) is in a ‘high’ state 
 
Or 
- No Legal Action 
- Two out of the three other 
variables ( especially 
created NGO, Bottom-up 
Communication, or Public 
Protests) are in a ‘high’ 
state 
 
1. Gueugnon 
5. Lasse 
 
Slightly 
Controversial 
  
- Legal Action 
- None of  the three other 
variables is in a ‘high’ state 
Or 
- No Legal Action 
- One of the three other 
variables (especially created 
NGO, Bottom-up 
Communication, or Public 
Protests) is in a ‘high’ state. 
9. Calce 
10. Guichainville 
Almost not 
controversial 
- No Legal Action 
- The three other variables are in a ‘low’ state, but  the number of 
bottom-up communication initiatives and the number of public 
protests are not both be equal to zero, (See the non controversial 
type) 
No case 
Mainly not 
controversial 
Non 
controversial 
- No legal action  
- No especially created NGO 
- No bottom-up communication at all 
- No public protest at all 
4. Arras 
6. Le Havre 
  
IV.2. Impact of the Top-Down Public Engagement on the Decision-Making Processes 
 As I have shown in the section I of this chapter, top-down public engagement consisted 
mainly of a late communication and of a very late and little participation. Only in two cases 
(Angers, and Lasse), the public authority sponsored substantial non compulsory consultation 
and participation initiatives from the second stage onwards. Because of this lack of variety in 
the top-down public engagement, it is not possible to assess the impact of the top-down 
engagement on the degree of controversy and on the outcome of the ten decision-making 
processes. However, it is possible to make some hypotheses based on the cases of Lasse and 
Angers. In the case of Lasse, it is possible that the top-down participation and consultation 
sponsored from the beginning of the second stage onwards limited the discontent of the 
residents. Indeed, at the beginning of the second stage, the decision-making process of Lasse 
had the characteristics to become ‘highly controversial’ (creation of an ‘ad hoc’ NGO, legal 
actions undertaken by this NGO), and finally the low level of bottom-up communication 
during the second and third stage made the decision-making process only ‘moderately 
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controversial’. In fact, a series of requests of the residents has been taken into account during 
the participation initiatives. In other words, the top-down participation has had an impact on 
the outcome of the decision-making process, not on the realisation-non realisation of the 
incineration plant project, but the initial project has been modified: the site has been moved in 
order not to make the lorries not going through the center of the village, and extra monitoring 
of the functioning of the incinerator have been set up to answer to the worries concerning the 
emission of pollutants and the health hazards posed by the dioxins. More precisely, the mixed 
syndicate decided to monitor the functioning of the incinerator, and not to leave the 
monitoring only to the operating company, as it is usually done in France. In facts, the mixed 
syndicate set up its offices within the structure of the incineration plant, it monitors all the 
wastes which enter the incineration plant (origin, type, weight), and it continuously monitors 
the emission of pollutants through its own monitoring center. Moreover again upon the 
request of certain residents, the mixed syndicate set up extra monitoring system of the 
emission of pollutant: a system of semi-continuous monitoring of the emission of dioxins and 
a continuous measurement of other molecules such as acids.123 
 Conversely, in the case of Angers, the sponsoring of numerous top-down consultation 
initiatives during the second stage did not diminish the degree of controversy. The NGO ‘ad 
hoc’ Collectif Inciner’àtort claimed that in spite of the top-down consultation, the 
mobilisation of the NGO should not diminish, that is, the members of the NGO should 
participate to the consultation and in the meantime continue to sponsor bottom-up 
engagement mechanisms (interview N°3). In fact, the NGO continued its mobilisation and 
sponsored numerous bottom-up communication initiatives, mainly public meetings and the 
publication of a newsletter. Finally, the public authority Angers Loire Métropole abandoned 
the incineration plant project, and selected the mechanical-biological sorting as waste 
treatment technology. So, in this case, the top-down consultation did not diminish the 
mobilisation of the NGO, and thus the degree of controversy. 
IV.3. Impact of the Bottom-Up Public Engagement on the Decision-Making Processes 
 As I have already stated, it is not possible to asses the impact of the bottom-up engagement 
on the degree of controversy, since the latter is defined by the former. But, it is in principle 
possible to evaluate the impact of the bottom-up engagement on the outcome of the decision-
                                                 
123 See the appendix “the ten decision-making processes” for more details about the decision-making process of 
Angers. 
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making processes and on the top-down engagement. Since bottom-up and top-down 
consultation and participation are both low, the analysis is based on the communication 
engagement (top-down and bottom-up). 
 At first sight, it seems that the bottom-up engagement had little impact on the realisation or 
abandonment of the incineration plant projects. Indeed, the decision-making processes with a 
high bottom-up engagement, ended indifferently by the abandonment (1. Gueugnon, 2. 
Angers, 3. Thiviers) or by the completion (5. Lasse, 8. Villers-Saint-Paul, 11. Vaux-le-Pénil) 
of the incineration plant projects. However, looking at the evolution of the engagement along 
the three stages, it is possible to propose some hypotheses (see the charts in the appendix). 
The three cases in which the incineration plant project was abandoned (1. Gueugnon, 2. 
Angers, 3. Thiviers) are the only cases in which there is a very high level of bottom-up 
communication during the second stage (see appendix chart “bottom-up communication”). 
Furthermore, in these cases the level of bottom-up communication is clearly higher than the 
level of top-down communication during the second stage (see the appendix “charts by 
case”). Conversely, the decision-making processes which ended with the opening of the 
incineration plants are characterised, during the second stage, by a rather low bottom-up 
communication and by a top-down communication superior to the bottom-up communication, 
excepted in the cases 5. Lasse, and 10. Guichainville. However, in the case of Lasse, a 
substantial top-down participation was sponsored during the second stage, and thus 
compensated the low level of communication. Moreover, in the case of Villers-Saint-Paul, the 
NGOs sponsored numerous bottom-up communication initiatives, but they came very late in 
the decision-making process, during the third stage, that is, during the building of the 
incineration plant. So, it is likely that a high level of bottom-up communication superior to the 
top-down communication, led to the abandonment of the incineration plant project, but this 
bottom-up engagement must take place before the third stage.  From the decision-making 
processes studied, it is not possible to know what makes the difference: the high level of 
bottom-up communication per se, or the fact that it has not been matched by a similar lever of 
top-down communication. 
 As for the decision-making processes that were slightly or not controversial, they all  
ended with the opening of the incineration plant (4. Arras, 6. Le Havre, 9. Calce, 10. 
Guichainville). Therefore, in case of low bottom-up engagement, it is likely that the decision-
making process ends with the opening of the incineration plant.  
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 To conclude, it is likely that an important bottom-up engagement may impact the outcome 
decision-making processes if there is a high level of bottom-up communication before the 
beginning of the third stage, that is, before the beginning of the realisation of the project. 
 
Impact of the bottom-up engagement on the top-down engagement 
 As we saw in section III of this chapter, in the ten decision-making processes the bottom-
up engagement started during the second stage. So the implementation of the evaluation of the 
impact of the bottom-up engagement on the top-down engagement consists of the evaluation 
of the impact of the bottom-up engagement during the second stage on the top-down 
engagement during the third stage. The public authorities could begin to respond to the 
NGOs’ initiatives actions already at the second stage. However, I cannot evaluate this due to 
the time resolution of my chronological description of the decision-making process, that is, 
due to the definition of three key chronological stages. From the data collected, it is not 
possible to know the chronological order of the top-down and bottom-up initiatives 
respectively within the period of the second stage; I can only state that the initiatives took 
place during the second stage. Consequently, it is necessary to select the decision-making 
processes for which there is a third stage, that is, the decision-making processes which ended 
with the opening of the incineration plant. Six cases match these criteria, these are: 4. Arras, 
6. Le Havre, 8. Villers-Saint-Paul, 9. Calce, 10. Guichainville, and 11. Vaux-le-Pénil. Even if 
it ended with the opening of the incineration plant, the case of Lasse is excluded from this 
selection because the public authority sponsored some participation initiatives during the 
second stage. In this case it is thus not possible to evaluate the impact of the bottom-up 
engagement on the top-down participation since the public authority was keen on organising 
top-down participation already during the second stage.  
 In four cases (8. Villers-Saint-Paul, 9. Calce, 10. Guichainville, and 11. Vaux-le-Pénil), 
there was some bottom-up communication during the second stage, whereas in two cases (4. 
Arras, 6. Le Havre), there was no bottom-up engagement during the second stage. As for the 
top-down participation during the third stage, in the four first decision-making processes, 
some top-down participation initiatives were sponsored, whereas in the two others it was not 
the case (see the charts “top-down participation” and “bottom-up participation” in the 
appendix). It is thus likely that the bottom-up communication during the second stage led to 
the sponsoring of top-down participation during the third stage.  
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IV.4. Conclusion 
 Concerning the degree of controversy in almost all the decision-making processes, at least 
one NGO stood against the incinerator plant project. More precisely, six were mainly 
controversial (four highly, two moderately) while four were mainly not controversial (two 
almost non-controversial, two non controversial). Because of the lack of consultation and 
participation initiatives sponsored by the public authorities, it has not been possible to assess 
the impact of the top-down engagement on the degree of controversy and on the outcome of 
the ten decision-making processes. I can only present two contrasting decision-making 
processes in which there was respectively participation and consultation. In one case, the 
substantial top-down participation possibly limited the discontent of the residents: the public 
authority modified the initial plant project according to some requests of the residents. On the 
contrary, in the other case the consultation did not diminish the mobilisation of the local NGO 
which continued to sponsor many communication initiatives, and the decision-making process 
was finally highly controversial. Since top-down participation is rather rare in the local 
decision-making processes, in future research it would be better to start with selecting highly 
participatory decision-making processes, and then search for comparable non participatory 
decision-making processes. 
 As for the impact of the bottom-up engagement, I cannot draw any strong conclusions 
because of the relatively small number of cases. However some grounded hypotheses can be 
made. First, it is likely that an important bottom-communication during the second stage, 
superior to the top-down communication, contributed to the abandonment of the incineration 
plant projects. Moreover, it is likely that the sponsoring of bottom-up communication 
initiatives during the second stage of the decision-making processes entailed the sponsoring of 
top-down participation initiatives during the third stage.   
 
 Until now, including this research, studies have focused on single mechanisms. On one 
hand, there are the studies which focus on a unique participation mechanism, such as 
consensus conferences (see for example: Lezaun J., Soneryd L., 2007/7/1Blok A., 
2007/4/1Seifert F., 2006/1/1Condit C. M., Parrott R. Harris T. M., 2002/10/1Einsiedel E., 
Jelsoe E. Breck T., 2001/1/1). On the other hand, as in the typology developed by Rowe and 
Frewer (2005), or the evaluation of mechanism made by Renn and al. (1995), various 
mechanisms are studied, but separately. In this research, I have first developed a typology; I 
have therefore dealt with the mechanisms separately. In a second step, I have attempted to 
deal with all the mechanisms used during the entire decision-making processes, but the 
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evaluation was mainly quantitative. From this research, it appears that the point in time when 
an initiative is sponsored is fundamental. But above all, it appears that a more global 
evaluation is necessary: rather than assessing the single mechanisms, it is necessary to study 
systems of public engagement mechanisms, that is, plans of public engagement which 
combine public engagement initiatives at the various stages of the decision-making processes. 
To make such an analysis, the ‘key chronological stages’ combined with the ‘significant 
characteristics’ are likely to be helpful.  
 It is likely that an efficient plan of public engagement should combine the three classes of 
mechanisms. Such a plan should start with a large publicity of the project, traditional 
information mechanisms such as newsletters and press releases are likely to work well. In the 
meantime, an evaluation should be made of the impact of the project on the public opinion in 
order to evaluate the public willingness to engage in the decision-making process. If there is 
no public willingness, information initiatives are likely to be sufficient; there would probably 
be few participants to consultation or participation initiatives.  
 In case of public willingness to engage, the sponsoring of participation or consultation 
initiatives should be considered. The framing stage is very likely to be the key stage. As we 
have seen in the cases studied, when they selected incineration, the grouping of communes 
underevaluated the importance for the public of the sanitary risks issue. Therefore, the first 
initiatives should enable the inclusion of the public concerns in the framing of the project. 
They can be consultation or participation initiatives; the main points are that the mode of 
response of the public should be open in order to allow the emergence of the various public 
concerns, and that the public selection must be as large as possible. Mechanisms such as 
enquiry registers, interactive web sites, consultation public meetings and individual meetings 
with commissaires enquêteurs have the required characterics. Moreover, these first initiatives, 
and above all the public meetings (which group together various people) are likely to allow 
the emergence of new identities, that is the emergence of new groups of residents which will 
likely engage in the decision-making processes (Callon M., Lascoumes P. Barthe Y., 2001). 
 Then, the various solutions or scenarios of the project could be studied with small groups 
of participants, resorting to highly participatory mechanisms such as action planning 
workshops which have as main characteristics a controlled participant selection method, a 
flexible input of information, an open mode of reponse, a facilitation of information 
elicitation, face-to-face, and an unstructured facilitation of aggregation. In the light of this 
research, it seems that local NGOs are likely to be very engaged participants. In order to gain 
further (input) legitimacy, the choice of the solution could be settled with a large scale 
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consultation mechanisms, that is,  type 1 consultation mechanisms: referendum, opinion poll, 
survey, or telepolling/voting. It is likely that the second stage, the ‘specification’ stage, would 
interest less the public because almost no important issues are under discussion. A few 
initiatives such as planning workshops or Local Commission for Information and Monitoring 
with the participation of some selected members, such as the local NGOs, are likely to be 
sufficient.  
 Finally, during the ‘building’ stage, there is almost nothing to be decided. Therefore, mere 
information is probably sufficient. All along the decision-making process, information given 
to the entire population and not only to the participants is necessary. The residents who do not 
participate are likely interested in being informed about the project, its evolution, and about 
the consultation and participation initiatives sponsored. The delivered information gives them 
the possibility to engage in the already begun decision-making process and ensure more 
transparency about the way the decision is actually made. 
 Of course, this plan is only a quick outline and is therefore schematic. It should be first 
developed and refined from a theoretical point of view, considering the possible impact of the 
successive mechanisms on the degree of controversy of decision-making processes. This 
evaluation should be based on the ‘six siginificant characteristics’ of the mechanisms and 
should take into account the three ‘key chronological stages’. A series of alternative plans 
could be set up, notably according to the nature of the project and of the population 
concerned. Moreover, it is likely that an engagement plan should be flexible in order to adapt 
to the evolution, which may be unexpected, of the decision-making process and more 
precisely of the reactions of the public. Such plans should be used as hypotheses to be tested 
through a new empirical research. In order to implement such plans, collaborations with 
consultancy firms dealing with participation or with grouping of communes should be 
considered. 
 By the way, since participation is likely to spread in the future, it would be interesting to 
set up a data base of the decision-making processes which resorts to top-down consultation or 
participation mechanisms. Such a database would notably facilitate the evaluation of the 
impact of these classes of mechanisms on the degree of controversy of the decision-making 
processes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 As I have stated in chapter 1, many Science Studies scholars agree that public engagement 
is a solution to the crisis of traditional scientific expertise. While in part II I have analysed the 
actual public engagement in ten decision-making processes for the setting up of incineration 
plants, in this third part, I deal with the mobilisation of scientific expertise by the local NGOs  
in these 10 decision-making processes. 
 The purpose of the 10 decision-making processes is to choose a technology for the 
treatment of waste. In the first part, I have developed an analysis of the public engagement 
around the concept of ‘flow of information’ between the public authorities and the public. The 
information put forward by the public authorities can be divided into three main categories: 
economic, administrative, and technical. Economic information mostly concerns the costs: 
such as the amount of the initial investment, the cost of the maintenance, the incomes coming 
from the sale of the energy produced by incineration, or the number of jobs created. A key 
economic element is the cost for the treatment of each tonne of waste. Administrative issues 
consist mainly of the legal status of the entity which will operate the facility: outsourcing, or 
public company under local government control. As we have seen in part II, the technical 
issues under discussion change during the decision-making processes. In the first stage, the 
issue at stake is the choice of the waste treatment technology: incineration, mechanical-
biological sorting, methanisation, etc. In the 10 decision-making processes, incineration has 
been selected. It is likely that the reliability of the technology has played a role in these 
choices. Indeed, while the novel alternative technologies such as pyrolisis or mechanical 
biological sorting has had had limited experience in treating municipal waste, incineration is a 
proven technology, both from a technological and economical point of view. During the 
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second stage, the choices concern the specification of the incineration plant, such as the type 
of and number of furnaces, the capacity of treatment, and the selection of a site (made 
according to technical criteria such as the accessibility for lorries or for trains). But during the 
second stage, the NGOs engaged in the decision-making processes, and they have brought 
new focuses: the environmental and sanitary hazards posed by incineration. As I have shown 
in chapter 3, the main motivation for the engagement of the NGOs is the dioxins: the local 
NGOS are worried by the environmental and health hazards posed by the dioxins emitted by 
incineration plants. Since uncertainties concerning the impact of dioxins on the environment 
and on health can only be cleared up by science it is likely that the local NGOs search for 
information through the mobilisation of scientific expertise. To sum up, even if the selected 
‘technical-scientific’ decision-making processes124 are about the choice of a technology 
(incineration), scientific expertise (about dioxins) is likely to be central for the NGOs.125  
 In this part, I intend to evaluate the extent to which the local NGOs resorted (or not) to 
scientific expertise, that is, I intend to answer the second set of three research questions I 
established in chapter 1.  
  This third part constitutes three chapters. Chapter 7 sets up the theoretical framework, 
while chapter 8 exposes the methodology and attempts to answer the research questions: “4. 
To what extent did the NGOs seek for scientific expertise? When they did not, what are the 
reasons they invoke?”, and “5. When they sought for scientific expertise, what are the sources 
they selected, and thus what are the sources the NGOs trust?” Finally, chapter 9 intends to 
answer the research question which deals with the use of scientific knowledge in the 
discourses of the public: “6. Is scientific knowledge a key argument in the discourses of the 
NGOs; what are the other types of arguments that the public employs to strengthen their 
position?”  
 Let us introduce first the molecules which are at the core of the controversies, dioxins: 
their chemical structure, the way they can be measured out, their effects on human health, the 
exposure of the population, the types of studies which can be set up to measure the sanitary 
                                                 
124 It is worthwhile remembering here that the decision-making processes for the setting up of incineration plants 
are ‘technical-scientific’, that is, they are “decision-making at those points where science and technology 
intersect with the political domain because the issues are of visible relevance to the public: should you eat British 
beef, prefer nuclear power to coal-fired power stations, want a quarry in your village, accept the safety of anti-
misting kerosene as an airplane fuel, vote for politicians who believe in human cloning, support the Kyoto 
agreement, and so forth” (Collins H.M. and Evans R., 2002, p. 236). 
125 According to the interviewed NGOs, excepted for one case, the public authorities did not consider the impact 
on health and on the environment of incineration. These issues were brought in the decision-making processes by 
the NGOs. 
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impact of a household waste incinerator, and finally what was the state of scientific 
knowledge concerning the link dioxins-municipal solid waste incinerators at the time of the 
ten decision-making processes.126 
What Are Dioxins? 
 The term “Dioxins” refers to a group of chemical compounds that share certain chemical 
structures (two benzo- groups fused onto a p-dioxin ring, see figure below) and biological 
characteristics. Several hundred of these compounds exist and are members of three closely 
related families: the chlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins (PCDDs, 75 different molecules), 
chlorinated dibenzofurans (PCDFs), also called Furans (125 different molecules), and certain 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Sometimes the term dioxin is also used to refer to the most 
studied and one of the most toxic dioxins, 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD). 
CDDs and CDFs are not created intentionally, but are produced inadvertently by a number of 
human activities. Natural processes also produce CDDs and CDFs. PCBs are manufactured 
products. Dioxins are formed as a result of combustion processes such as commercial or 
municipal waste incineration and from burning fuels (like wood, coal or oil).  
 
 
 
The skeletal formula and substitute numbering 
scheme of dibenzo-p-dioxin, the pARENt 
compound of PCCDs. The variety of PCCDs is 
due to the multiple possible positions of 
chlorine atoms on this skeletal. 
 
Health Effects 
 Dioxins bio accumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are 
known teratogens, mutagens, and suspected human carcinogens.127 Studies have shown that 
                                                 
126 Sources for the writing down of the introduction of dioxins:  
Institut National de Veille Sanitaire, Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, 2005 
Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire de l'Environnement et du Travail, 2007 
Interagency Working Group (Group of U.S. Federal Agencies), 2007 
127 A ‘teratogen’ is an agent that interferes with normal embryonic development: alcohol or thalidomide or X-
rays or rubella are examples. 
A ‘mutagen’ is an agent (physical or environmental) that can induce a genetic mutation or can increase the rate 
of mutation. 
A ‘carcinogen’ is a substance that produces cancer. 
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exposure to dioxins at high enough doses may cause a number of adverse health effects. 
Because dioxins from natural and anthropogenic sources have been widely distributed 
throughout the environment since the early 1900’s (and before), almost every living creature, 
including humans, has been exposed to dioxins. The health effects associated with dioxins 
depend on a variety of factors including: the level of exposure, and how long and how often. 
Because dioxins are so widespread, we all have some level of them in our bodies.  
 The most common health effect in people exposed to large doses of dioxins is chloracne. 
Chloracne cases have typically been the result of accidents or significant contamination 
events. Chloracne is a severe skin disease with acne-like lesions that occur mainly on the face 
and upper body. Other effects of significant exposure to dioxins include skin rashes, skin 
discoloration, excessive body hair, and possibly mild liver damage. Several studies suggest 
that the workers exposed to high levels of dioxins at their workplace over many years have an 
increased risk of cancer. Animal studies have also shown an increased risk of cancer from 
long-term exposure to dioxins. Finally, based on data from animal studies, there is some 
concern that the exposure to low levels of dioxins over long periods (or high level exposures 
at sensitive times) might result in reproductive or developmental effects. 
 Concerning incineration plants, the main concern over health effects of dioxins for the 
residents is the risk of cancer in adults, and in minor extent the reproductive and 
developmental effects. Usually, the residents are exposed to rather low levels of dioxins (by 
comparison to the accident of Seveso) over many years. However, as in the case of Gilly-sur-
Isère, some incinerators may run without respecting the norms of emission of dioxins, 
releasing huge quantities of dioxins.  
Diffusion in the Environment 
 After they are created, dioxins spread into all the mediums of the environment: water, air, 
soil, and sediments. Dioxins decompose very slowly in the environment. For example, the 
half-life128 in soils is estimated at around 10 years (7 years in the human body). When 
released into the air, dioxins can be deposited on soils and plants and taken up by animals and 
aquatic organisms. The lipophilic properties of dioxins129 explain that they may be 
concentrated in the food chain so that animals have higher concentrations than plants, water, 
                                                 
128 The half-life of a quantity whose value decreases with time is the interval required for the quantity to decay to 
half of its initial value. 
129 In other words, dioxins tend to accumulate into fat.  
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soil, or sediments. Dioxins accumulate in the food containing a lot of fat such as fish, 
shellfish, milk, or eggs. Dioxins are little soluble in water. When dioxins are released into 
water, they tend to settle into sediments where they can be further transported or ingested by 
fish and other aquatic organisms. Because of a low capacity of transfer towards vegetal 
tissues, vegetal fats are less contaminated.  
 In the ten decision-making processes, the main concern for the NGOs was the dioxins 
emitted by the chimneys: dioxins are also present in the clinkers, which are dumped in 
specific landfills, but the local NGOs were less interested by this issue. Dioxins are released 
in the atmosphere, they come down on the soils in a range of a few kilometres around the 
facility, and then through the food chain, animals and animal produces (meat, eggs and cow’s 
milk) are contaminated.  
Exposure of the Population 
 Although dioxins are an environmental contaminant, exposure is mainly a result of their 
accumulation in animal fats. More than 90 % of human dioxin exposure is due to foodstuffs. 
Foodstuffs of animal origin normally contribute to approximately 80 % of overall contact. 
The dioxin burden in animals derives mainly from their feeding stuffs. Therefore feeding 
stuffs and soils raise concerns as potential sources of dioxins for animals. Small amounts of 
exposure occur from breathing air containing trace amounts of dioxins on particles and in 
vapour form, from inadvertent ingestion of soil containing dioxins, and from absorption 
through the skin contacting air, soil, or water containing minute levels.  
 The residents surrounding incineration plants are thus mainly exposed through the 
consumption of local foodstuffs: above all eggs, cow’s milk, meat, and in a minor extent 
vegetables. The residents are much less likely to be contaminated through breathing air. 
Maximum Levels of Dioxins in Foodstuffs Reference Doses and Reference 
Concentrations 
 European provisions impose maximal contents of dioxins in certain categories of 
foodstuffs, in order to reduce the global exposure of the population, and to prevent from a 
high exposure in case of punctual pollution. The Council regulation (EC) No 2375/2001 of 29 
November 2001 sets maximum levels of PCDD and PCDF per gram of fat contained in 
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various products (meat, fish, milk, milk products, eggs, oils and fat). They are expressed in 
equivalent toxic equivalent quantity (TEQ).130 
Reference Doses and Reference Concentrations 
 Reference Dose (RfD) and Reference Concentration (RfC) are toxicological indicators 
which enables to qualify or quantify a risk for human health. They establish the relationship 
between a toxic substance and the occurrence of an undesirable sanitary effect. They are set 
up by international organisations such as the World Health Organisation or by national 
structures such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. For the dioxins which are 
composed of PCDDs, PCDFs and the PCBs dioxin-like, several organisations propose a 
Reference Dose for oral intake, (since oral intake is the main exposure to dioxins, no 
Reference Dose exists concerning breathing exposure). A Reference Dose is the maximum 
tolerable oral dose of a toxic substance. Under this dose, there is no observable sanitary effect. 
As for Reference Concentration, this is the maximum tolerable concentration of a toxic 
substance. 
 The World Health Organisation proposes a Reference Dose for an oral daily exposure to 
dioxins. It is called the Tolerable Daily Intake (TDI). This dose is from 1 to 4 pg/kg I-
TEQOMS/day. Concerning human blood, the W.H.O. proposes a Reference Concentration in 
serum; its value has evolved along time, according to the knowledge on dioxins toxicity. In 
2005, the value is 18.5 pg TEQ2005/g of fat material. 
Measuring Of Dioxins in the Environment and In Foodstuffs 
 Techniques of identification and of measuring out of dioxins are complex and depend on 
the nature of the sample to analyse. Dioxins must be extracted with appropriate solvents, 
purified, the diverse families of dioxins must be separated, each type of dioxins identified and 
finally measured out. Furthermore, the quantities to be measured are in the order of the 
pictogram (pg).131 These analyses require costly and quite rare materials; only a few 
laboratories can afford the required materials. The cost of identification and measuring out is 
thus very expensive: from 750€ up to 1500€ according to the medium.  
                                                 
130 Different dioxin compounds have different toxicities and dioxins are most often found in mixtures rather than 
as single compounds in the environment. The most toxic forms of dioxin are 2,3,7,8-TCDD and 1,2,3,7,8-
PeCDD. Scientists use a shorthand method for comparing the toxicity of different types or mixtures of dioxins to 
the toxicity of 2,3,7,8- TCDD and 1,2,3,7,8-PeCDD. This method is called the “Toxicity Equivalence” or TEQ. 
131 1 pg=10-12g=0,000000000001g 
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 In the framework of the 10 decision-making processes, it is possible for the public 
authorities and for the local NGOs to order to specialized laboratories the measuring of 
dioxins in samples which can contain dioxins: air, soils, vegetation, animal fat, cow’s milk, 
and eggs. To assess the contamination of humans, it is possible to measure dioxins in samples 
of blood or maternal milk. 
Studies to Measure the Sanitary Impact of Incineration Plants 
 Five types of studies can be envisaged to measure the sanitary impact of a household waste 
incinerator. The choice of the study depends on the question to which one wants to answer, 
but above all, it is limited by the data actually available. The studies likely to be set up to 
measure the sanitary impact of an incineration plant are: 
- ‘Literature studies’, which enable the grasping of the situation, to formulate a question 
concerning the incurred risks and their nature, and to find some elements of the answer.   
- ‘Environmental studies’, which enable the evaluation of the contamination of the 
environment detecting and quantifying the presence of determined molecules.   
- ‘Exposure studies’, which describe the exposure of individuals to a determined substance. 
The exposure is evaluated through environmental studies and/or the measurement of 
biological markers in organisms (for example, the measuring out of dioxins in blood). 
- ‘Sanitary risk evaluation studies’, which enable the definition of the effects on health of 
substances or dangerous situations. These studies notably combine environmental studies, 
exposure studies and the Reference Doses and/or Reference Concentrations. 
- ‘Epidemiological studies’, which compare diverse populations of individuals and make 
possible the description and explanation of the sanitary situation of the studied population. 
Descriptive and comparative epidemiological studies (unique or repeated through times) 
are the most adapted to study the sanitary impact around an incineration plant at the local 
level. These epidemiological studies consist of the research of correlation between the 
exposure to dioxins released by an incineration plant (for the residents living under the 
plum), and the development of determined diseases. If registers with sanitary data, such as 
the number and types of cancers, are not available, such epidemiological studies are 
impossible to conduct.  
 
In principle, during the decision-making processes, the local NGOs have the possibility to 
mobilise the five types of studies listed above, when available. They may simply seek existing 
studies, or they may order local studies concerning their incineration plant by third parties 
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such as private or public laboratories. The local NGOs might themselves carry out some 
studies, but it is unlikely that they have the internal human and technical resources to realise 
such studies.  
 In the case of the pollution by the dioxins emitted by incineration plants, some types of 
study are easier to carry out than others. To begin with, ‘environmental’ and ‘exposure’ 
studies are the most simple to carry out since they consist of the measuring of dioxins in 
samples taken from the environment (for example in the soil, animal fat, eggs) or from 
humans (blood or maternal milk). As I have stated above, however, these studies are rather 
expensive for the budget of the local NGOs. Furthermore, in France only a few laboratories 
are able to make these measurements; it may be thus not easy to find them out. ‘Sanitary risk 
evaluation studies’ are more complicated to carry out because they are a combination of, 
among others, ‘environmental’ and ‘exposure’ studies, and the interpretation of the results 
require highly skilled scientists. Only research institutions or State agencies are able carry out 
such studies. ‘Epidemiological studies’ are the most complicated studies to carry out because 
a large number of conditions must be met, among others: some registers of cancer must be 
available (not in all hospital are such registers kept), no other sources of dioxins than 
incineration plants (such as a chemical industry) must be next to the studied population, the 
diet of the studied population must be monitored (since the main exposure is due to 
foodstuffs), numerous individuals must accept to participate to a research which is 
constraining and time consuming for them. Such studies are likely to be carried out only by 
teams of researchers or state agencies because they require a lot of human, technical and 
economical resources. ‘Bibliographical studies’ are probably the easiest source of information 
for the local NGOs, but they are often rather general and they do not provide precise answers. 
Measurement of the Emissions of Pollutants 
 The directive 2000/76/ec of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
incineration of waste imposes the carrying out of the following measurements of air pollutants 
at the incineration and co-incineration plant: 
- continuous measurements of the following substances: NOx, provided that emission limit 
values are set, CO, total dust, TOC, HCl, HF, SO2; (compulsory for all the facilities only 
from 2005) 
- at least two measurements per year of heavy metals, dioxins and furans; one measurement 
at least every three months shall however be carried out for the first 12 months of 
operation. 
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 A (not legally imposed) system of semi-continuously measurement of the emissions of 
dioxins also exists. This system (COPER-DIOX® type) consists of cartridges of resin which 
collect dioxins at the mouth of the chimney. Every three/four weeks, the cartridge is taken out 
and the dioxins are identified and measured in a laboratory. Furthermore, collectors in form of 
cones opened towards the sky, gather the fall out. They are disseminated in a range of a few 
kilometres around the incineration plant. Regularly, the content of these cones is collected and 
analysed in a laboratory. 
 Obviously, these measurements concern incineration plants which are running. 
Consequently, these measurements play a role mainly in the decision-making processes for 
the setting up of new incineration plants in which an old generation incineration plant used to 
run. For example, the local NGOs may put forward the argument that the old incineration 
plant did not respect the norms of emission of pollutants in order to undermine the position of 
the public authority. However, the measurement of the emission of pollutant can be an issue 
also for the new incineration plant projects: during the third stage of the decision-making 
processes, once the incineration plant is under construction and will open without any doubt, 
the local NGOs may ask for the setting up of more constraining monitoring systems, such as 
the COPER-DIOX® type system. 
Dioxins, Incineration Plants, and Scientific Expertises: The Big Uncertainty 
Controversies around incineration plant projects stem from the scientific uncertainties 
about the effects on health of dioxins emitted by the incineration of wastes. On one hand, the 
adverse effects of dioxins on health are acknowledged by the scientific community. The most 
known effects are about the development of cancers.132 The most informative epidemiological 
studies concern the workers of pesticide facilities, and the residents of Seveso2 who were 
accidentally exposed to a specific dioxin (the 2,3,7,8 TCDD). Following the results of these 
studies, in 1997, the International Agency of Research on Cancer (IARC) of the World Health 
Organisation classified this molecule as carcinogenic substance for man.133 Concerning the 
population of Seveso, a recent study has shown that the risk of developing a non-Hodgkin’s 
                                                 
132 Effects on the reproduction and development are the object of conflicting results. No clear evidence exists 
today. Spontaneous abortions, congenital malformations, changing of the  ratio of  sex at birth, diminution of 
fertility, diminution of the weight at birth, lateness of sexual maturation and of the neurobehavioural 
development, have been evoked (see Institut National de la Santé Et de la Recherche Médicale, 2002) 
133 International Agency for Research on Cancer, 1997 
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lymphoma has been multiplied by 2.8 for the residents of the most exposed area.134 However, 
the rate of exposure for this population was from 100 to 1000 times higher than for the 
general population.  
On the other hand, there are still uncertainties as to the health effects of incineration plants. 
As a matter of fact, there are few studies, and they have been realised recently, after 2001. I 
note that the decision-making processes studied in this research started at the beginning of the 
90’s and finished between 2003 and 2005. Thus, no study was available during the greatest 
part of the decision-making processes. The only available epidemiological studies were 
published in 2000 and 2003.135 These studies confirm a correlation between the fact of living 
next to an incineration plant with high dioxin emission levels and the risk to develop non-
Hodgkin lymphoma. But these studies concern an old generation of incineration plant, and the 
supporters of incineration argue that modern incinerator released much less dioxins, and thus 
that there is no longer any risk. 
It was clearly the public concerns which incited the national state agencies to lead some 
epidemiological and exposure studies about dioxins emitted by incineration plants. Indeed, it 
was only in 2003, because “waste incineration [was] still a cause for concern for the general 
public in light of the significant emission of pollutants, specifically dioxins, emitted by certain 
waste incinerators that were recently shut down or brought up to standards” (Institut 
National de Veille Sanitaire, Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, 2003, p. 
199), that two state organisations, the Institut de Veille Sanitaire (National Institute of Public 
Health Surveillance) and the Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments (French 
Food Safety Agency) started a study on the dioxin exposure of people residing in close 
proximity to municipal solid waste incinerators (MSWIs). They studied as well the 
determinants of this exposure, specifically the consumption of local products. That study, the 
first one to use French data on serum concentrations of dioxins and PCBs, has been published 
at the end of 2006.136 It concluded that “on the whole, there is no difference of the levels of 
dioxins and PCBs between the residents living next to incineration plants and the residents 
                                                 
134 Bertazzi PA, Consonni D Bachetti S et al., 2001 
135 Viel JF, Arveux P Baverel J Cahn JY, "Soft–tissue sarcoma and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma clusters around a 
municipal solid waste incinerator with high dioxin emission levels", American Journal of Epidemiology, 2000, p. 
13-19. 
Floret N, Mauny F Challier B Arveux P Cahn JY Viel JF, "Dioxin emissions from a solid waste incinerator and 
risk of non-Hodgkin lymphoma", Epidemiology, Vol. 14, 2003, p. 392-398. 
136 Institut National de Veille Sanitaire, Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, Étude 
d’imprégnation par les dioxines des populations vivant a proximité d’usines d’incinération d’ordures ménagčres. 
Synthčse des résultats, France, 2006. 
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not exposed to known sources of dioxins. On the contrary, the study concerning the 
‘autoconsumers’137 shows the influence of the consumption of local product such as milk 
products, eggs, and animal lipids on the development of cancers. However, this study 
underlines that for the recent MSWIs, there is no real difference among the autoconsumers 
residing next to the MSWI and the control population non exposed” (Institut National de 
Veille Sanitaire, Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, 2006b, p. 16, translated 
by the author). 
Further, there is also an epidemiological study that was published by the Institut de veille 
sanitaire in 2006. This study shows a correlation between the fact of residing under the plume 
of an incineration plant and the increasing of the risk of certain cancers. However, it is 
specified that “since the study concerns a situation [old generation incinerators which ran 
between 1972 and 1985], the results can not be transposed to the situation currently 
generated by incineration plants, which are less pollutant and better controlled than before.” 
(Institut National de Veille Sanitaire, Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, 
2006b, p.9, translated by the author). However, it is also stated that a link has been established 
between the development of cancer and the exposition to the incineration plants’ discharge, 
but that the pollutants responsible have not been identified. In any case the two studies 
exposed above were not realised yet during the decision-making processes studied in this 
research.  
 
To conclude, at the time of the ten decision-making processes (1992-2005), few 
bibliographical and or epidemiological studies concerning dioxins emitted by incineration 
plants were available, and uncertainties were very high at the time of the ten decision-making 
processes. The local NGOs may order environmental or exposure studies by private or public 
laboratories. Within bibliographical studies about dioxins and waste incineration, there is no 
scientific controversy, only scientific uncertainty. The scientific community already asserted 
that dioxins present a sanitary risk: high exposure to these molecules can provoke the 
development of cancer. Adverse health effects of dioxins depend on the quantity of dioxins 
ingested through feeding. But there was no evidence that an incineration plants which runs 
according to the norms actually provoke cancers. The debate concerns the quantity of dioxins 
                                                 
137 “Autoconsomateurs” in the original text, which means: individuals who consume foodstuffs of their own 
production. 
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actually released by the incinerator on one hand, and the quantity actually ingested by the 
residents on the other hand.  
Scientific uncertainty becomes manifest in the controversy between two academics, Prof. 
Belpomme on one hand, and Prof. Narbonne on the other hand.138 Mr. Narbonne is Professor 
of Toxicology at the University of Bordeaux I. He argues that no sanitary risks are entailed by 
new generation incinerator, and consequently, he is against a moratorium on incineration.139 
On the contrary, Mister Belpomme, Professor of Oncology at the European Hospital Georges 
Pompidou (Paris), is opposed to waste incineration, and in the framework of a more general 
argumentation about the environmental causes of cancer, he claims that there are some 
cancers linked to incineration.140 In this context of scientific uncertainties, I look at the 
importance of scientific knowledge for the engaged NGOs. 
 
                                                 
138 According to the theoretical framework developed by Funtowicz and Ravets, the dioxin/incinerator case can 
be qualified as a ‘post-normal science’ situation (see Funtowicz S. and Ravetz J., 1992 for further details about 
this theoretical framework). Indeed, the level of uncertainty can be considered as high – dioxins pose a hazard to 
health, but the actual impact on health of incineration plants is uncertain-; and the stakes as high too – the  
resident’s life is at stake. 
Bryan Wynne developed a theoretical framework which distinghuishes different types of uncertainty situation 
Among the four types defined by Bryan Wynne (uncertainty, risk, indeterminacy, and ignorance), the dioxin-
incinerator case can be label as an ‘uncertainty’ type since the main parameters – heath effects of dioxins, modes 
of exposure – are known, but the odds – the actual exposure of the residents, and the pathologies developed by 
the residents – are very partially known. The “uncertainty” can be reduced by further researches, which does not, 
in principle, pose problems (see Wynne B., 1992 for further details about this theoretical framework).  
139 See the web-site www.lanutrition.fr: http://www.lanutrition.fr/Jean-Fran%C3%A7ois-Narbonne-Moratoire-
sur-l-incin%C3%A9ration-la-grosse-arnaque-a-1948.html, last access date: March 2009. 
140 See the web site of the NGO ARTAC founded by Prof. Belpomme: 
http://www.artac.info/static.php?op=ReponsesDioxines.txt&npds=1, last access date: March 2009  
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Chapter 7  
Public Mobilisation of Scientific Expertise:  
Theoretical Framework 
 This chapter sets up the theoretical framework concerning the mobilisation of scientific 
expertise by the NGOs. It is divided into three sections. The first section details the theoretical 
perspective adopted in this part of the research. The second section proposes a property space 
which enables a classification of the sources of scientific expertise sought by the NGOs. 
Section three introduces the property space of the reasons why the NGOs may not mobilise 
scientific expertise. Finally, section IV deals with the discourses hold by the engaged NGOs 
in order to bring the wider public and the public authority around to their view. 
I. Theoretical Perspective: A variant of the ‘Critical’ Approach of Public 
Understanding of Science 
The aim of this section is to introduce the theoretical background which underpins the 
theoretical frameworks I use in this research. The Public Understanding of Science (P.U.S.) is 
the common labelling of the discipline which studies the way ‘lay people’ manage scientific 
knowledge. The PUS field can be divided into two approaches: the traditional and the critical. 
One way of interpreting these two approaches is to see them as yet another instance of the 
opposition between quantitative and qualitative methodologies (the traditional approach being 
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quantitative and the critical approach qualitative).141 The principal terms of that debate are 
whether the traditional approach, which has been relying on questionnaires, really grasps 
public understanding, and whether the critical approach, which has been studying local 
communities, can really lead to viable generalization. The critical PUS literature suggests that 
the difference between both approaches is not merely technical but also epistemological: each 
approach would entail different tacit representations of what is ‘public’ and of what 
‘understanding’ is. As a consequence, their points of view about the role that the public must 
or can play in the production of scientific expertise and in public decision-making are 
divergent.142 In the first following subsection, I introduce the two approaches of PUS, and 
then I make a criticism of them. In a second sub-section, I specify the theoretical perspective I 
have adopted in this research. 
I.1. Traditional Versus Critical Approach of Public Understanding of Science 
The ‘Traditional’ Approach 
 To date, in the Public Understanding of Science (PUS) field, the traditional approach 
means ‘questionnaire surveys’. These questionnaires mainly aim to measure the scientific 
literacy of the population in term of method and knowledge or the attitude of the public 
toward science; a lot of publications have been made:143 In the scientific literacy 
questionnaires, after the interviewee has answered some demographical and sociological 
questions about himself (age, sex, profession, etc.), he is mostly asked to answer ‘Yes, No, 
Don’t Know’ to propositions such as: 
• “There are bacteria which live in waste water;” or 
                                                 
141 As I have stated in chapter 1, the terms ‘traditional’ and ‘critical approaches were first coined by Mike 
Michael (Michael M., 2002b). ‘Qualitative PUS scholars’ have respectively labelled these two approaches with 
different terms: Survey research/Constructivist social and anthropological research (Wynne B., 1995); 
Questionnaire method/Ethnographic perspective (Irwin A. and Michael M., 2003, p. 58). The term 
‘ethnographic’ mainly refer to the use of a given methods, and is thus too restrictive; ‘Constructivist social and 
anthropological research’ is more complete, but it makes the label too long. Thus, I prefer to use the labels 
‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ since they symbolise the two steps evolution of the PUS field. 
142 For a thorough presentation of the Public Understanding of Science field, see: Wynne B., 1995; Bucchi M., 
2003; and also Michael M., 2002; Bucchi M. and Neresini F., 2008. 
143 Concerning the scientific literacy see for example the following publications: Miller, J. D., 1983; Durant J., 
G. Evans and P. Thomas, 1989; Evans G. and Durant J., 1995; Miller, J. D., 1998; Allum N. C., D. Boy M. W. 
Bauer, 2002; Edmond, Gary and Mercer, David, 1997Caillot, Michel and Nguyen-Xuan, Anh, 1995Millar, 
Robin, 1994Zhang, Zhongliang and Zhang, Jiansheng, 1993Durant, J, Evans, G, and Thomas, G, 1992.  
Concerning the attitude of the public toward science, see for example the following publications: Gutteling, Jan 
M., 2002.Evans, Geoffrey and Durant, John, 1995Filacek, Adolf and Krizova-Fr²dova, Eva, 1994Gaskell, 
George, Wright, Daniel, and O'Muircheartaigh, Colm, 1993Peters, H P, 1992 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Chapter 7 
Public Mobilisation of Scientific Expertise: Theoretical Framework 
 
- 165 - 
• “More than half of human genes are identical to those of a chimpanzee.”  
(Gaskell, 2002) 
 In the conclusions to these pieces of research, the lack of scientific literacy has been 
considered rather worrying in an era where ‘scientific literacy’ is viewed as a positive and 
important property, ensuring greater practical competence in everyday life, enhancing 
employability, and ability to become involved in democratic life. This last point is considered 
to be the most important at a time when governments are increasingly taking up the idea of 
public participation and consultation about the direction of new technological developments, 
and many scientists defend the idea that a scientifically literate public is a prerequisite to an 
effective public participation in democratic life concerning technoscientific issues. 
Furthermore, scientists argue that a scientifically educated public will tend to be more 
supportive of science and technology. In other words, it is argued that some opposition to new 
technologies is grounded in ignorance or mis-information, sometimes presumed to be the 
result of biased media reporting. Thus, it is argued that information campaigns to inform the 
public about the ‘facts’ and methods of science will be effective in cultivating greater public 
confidence in science and technology. This view of the public has been labelled ‘deficit 
model’ (Wynne B., 1991), and has been supported by studies showing a correlation between 
support for science and the level of scientific literacy (see for ex. Evans G. and Durant J., 
1995, and Allum N. C., D. Boy M. W. Bauer, 2002Allum N. C., D. Boy M. W. Bauer, 2002). 
The ‘Critical’ Approach 
 As its label indicates, the critical approach has been built in opposition to the traditional 
approach. The traditional approach with its questionnaires and its conclusions about the 
‘deficit model’ have been criticised by critical PUS scholars such as Alan Irwin and Brian 
Wynne (see Wynne B., 1991; Irwin A. and Wynne B., 1996). Brian Wynne argues that the 
results of the questionnaires do not mean that scientific knowledge causes support for science; 
the causal relation might just be the reverse. Supporting science – for example in the belief 
that it will bring progress – may make people more interested in matters of science, and 
encourage them to seek more information about it. Yet active opponents of science could have 
the same attitude. These scholars developed their criticism upon what they consider as three 
normative assumptions entailed by the traditional approach (see Irwin A. and Michael M., 
2003 and also Wynne B., 1995).  
 Firstly, they argue that only scientific knowledge has been considered and that the aim is to 
confront lay person’s incorrect knowledge with scientifically-certified knowledge. According 
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to them, the questionnaires made by the traditional approach scholars only measure whether 
persons are right wrong or ignorant according to standard scientific knowledge. The critical 
approach scholars criticises this reduction and argue that people may possess highly relevant 
and useful knowledge, even if they do not meet scientific standards.  
 Their second point is that in the traditional approach people are considered only as a 
repository of knowledge; and that the manner in which questionnaires are constructed 
removes the interviewee from his social and cultural context. According to the critical 
scholars, in the traditional approach questionnaires, questions related to health or 
environmental risks, ethics and consumer choice are not addressed in the manner they are 
usually presented in the everyday life, but in an abstract and de-contextualised fashion. 
Finally, they argue that the reasons for the rejection of certain scientific knowledge are not 
explored.144  
 Thirdly, the critical scholars argue that questionnaires do not take into account the moral 
and reflexive dimension of people. They claim that the traditional approach fails to envisage 
that people are able to construct their responses considering a variety of political, moral, 
ethical, religious concerns, and that people are aware of the extent of their knowledge, of what 
they know and what they do not.  
 In order to overcome the limits of the traditional approach they have identified, the critical 
approach scholars search to examine the influence of social-cultural contexts and social 
relations upon people’s ‘renegotiation’ of the standard scientific knowledge delivered by 
institutions:   
 
“Once we move outside a simple “cognitive deficit” model of the public 
understanding of science, we become increasingly aware of the range and variety of 
possible interactions between people's existing understandings of particular 
situations and those that emanate from science. In order to pursue this, our 
research has attempted to locate issues of the public understanding of science 
within specific practical social contexts.” 
(Wynne B., 1991, p.113) 
                                                 
144 The authors suggest that the reasons of the rejection can be linked to the values or identities of the 
interviewee. For example, a fundamentlist Christian could have no knowledge about the theory of evolution 
simply because he is a creationist, and so he does not want to here anything about evolution. Obviously, the 
exploration of the reasons of such rejections does not, and does not intend to, invalidate the evolutionary model. 
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The ‘critical’ approach assumes that people are able to ‘renegotiate’ scientific knowledge 
delivered by institutions. While according to the lexical definition ‘renegotiate’ means ‘try to 
reach an agreement or compromise by discussion’, for the critical PUS approach 
‘renegotiation of scientific knowledge’ means that the public is able to reflect on the source of 
their knowledge (media or others): they are able to assess the credibility of the source and to 
evaluate the quality of the knowledge they have acquired. In other words, this approach seeks 
to take into account trustworthiness, credibility, and usefulness in the Public Understanding of 
Science, considering aspects such as social identity, practical circumstance or personal 
responsibility, in the framework of detailed, context-specific and local analysis. As Alan Irwin 
and Mike Michael as put it about ‘lay epistemology’: 
“Lay people may not possess knowledge, but have knowledge of how they know: 
they are able to reflect upon why take on board some ‘scientific facts’ but not 
others; they are competent in accounting for why they prefer some sources of 
knowledge (e.g. personal experience) over others; and they can justify why they 
trust some expert authorities and are suspicious of others.” 
(Irwin A. and Michael M., 2003, p. 28)  
 As for the methodology, the critical PUS scholars use qualitative methods to investigate in 
depth the motivations, feelings, and reactions of selected social groups towards a given 
subject or concept: they listen and analyse the way people express themselves through 
discussion groups, (open or semi-structured) interviews, participant observations, or 
document analysis. 
 To conclude, the critical approach of PUS suggests a series of important assumptions for 
technical-scientific public decision-making which are in opposition with the traditional ‘top-
down’ (or expert driven) approach:  
 
? “The multiplicity and diversity of the publics; 
? The knowledgeability and ‘local expertise’ of lay groups; 
? the limitation of scientific-technical knowledge when applied to new settings; 
? the legitimacy of public concerns and questions; 
? the importance of values, ethics and prior experience; 
? the requirement for more open and two-way communication, including the 
communication of scientific uncertainty; 
? the fundamental importance of self-critical and reflexive top-down processes.” 
(Irwin A. and Michael M., 2003Irwin A. and Michael M., 2003, p. 42) 
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Confusion between Methodology and Epistemological Assumptions 
 From the PUS literature analyzed above, it seems that there has been confusion between 
methodologies and epistemological assumptions. As we have seen above, the critical 
approach resorts to qualitative methodology while the traditional approach employs 
quantitative methodology. Now let’s analyse the two main intertwined normative assumptions 
entailed by both approaches. These are the ‘focus’ and the ‘consideration of knowledge’ (they 
are summarised in table 8 below). To start with, the ‘focus’ of the traditional approach is the 
scientific literacy of the public and the public’s attitude toward science; moreover the 
questions are not addressed in the manner they are usually presented in the everyday life, that 
is not in ‘context’, but in an abstract and de-contextualised fashion. In opposition to this view, 
the critical approach focuses on the ‘renegotiation’ of certified scientific knowledge by the 
public. As I have stated above, in the critical approach perspective, ‘renegotiation’ means that 
the public can have an active attitude toward scientific knowledge, that is, that the public can 
select some sources of scientific knowledge and not others, that it has its reasons for trusting 
more certain sources than others, that ignorance can be a self-conscious choice, and that it can 
mobilise other kinds of knowledge. In other words, the critical approach does not consider 
‘not knowing’ only as a lack of scientific literacy; the ‘not knowing’ may be a self-conscious 
choice. Furthermore the critical approach carries out its empirical research in the ‘context’ in 
which the public may face scientific knowledge. Contexts are, for example: volunteers who 
have kept a small plastic Radon detector in their home in the frame of a Radon survey 
(Michael M., 1996a), or sheep farmers facing pollution by radioactive elements (Wynne, B, 
1992c). Concerning the ‘consideration of knowledge’, the critical PUS scholars have 
criticised the ‘positivist’ view of scientific knowledge embedded in the questionnaires and 
then they have taken an opposite position which can be qualified ‘relativist’ with regard to 
scientific knowledge. Firstly, they consider as equal scientific knowledge and “all sorts of 
highly relevant and useful knowledge, even if such knowledge doesn’t meet the exacting 
standards of scientific inquiry” (Irwin A. and Michael M., 2003) that people possess. 
Secondly, they assume that all people have the ability to be reflexive regarding the acquisition 
of their scientific knowledge. In this sense, the critical approach can be said to have a 
‘positivist view of lay people’.  
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Table 8. Epistemological assumptions of the critical and traditional P.U.S. approaches 
 
 
Critical P.U.S. (qualitative, 
interpretative) 
Traditional P.U.S. 
(quantitative, questionnaires) 
Focus Scientific knowledge in its 
social every-day ‘context’ / 
‘renegotiation’ of scientific 
knowledge 
Knowledge of certified science  
Consideration of knowledge All types of knowledge 
(scientific and lay) are 
considered as useful 
Scientific knowledge is 
superior.  Other kinds of 
knowledge are left out of 
consideration. 
 
 I share the position of the few scholars who claim that that confusion has been made 
between methodological and normative assumption (Nisbet, Matthew C. and Goidel, Robert 
K., 2007/10/1Bauer, Martin W., Allum, Nick, and Miller, Steve, 2007/1/1; Sturgis, Patrick 
and Allum, Nick, 2004/1/1; Kallerud, Egil and Ramberg, Inge, 2002/7/1). As the above table 
shows, the ‘critical’ and ‘traditional’ approaches have been respectively linked to a series of 
epistemological assumptions about the focus and consideration of knowledge. There has been 
a fallacious essentialist divide between the two approaches. As Sturgis and Allum put it “de 
facto orthodoxy […] has connected the deficit model and contextualist perspectives with 
quantitative and qualitative research methods respectively” (Sturgis P. and Allum N., 2004, 
p. 55). The scholars quoted at the beginning of this paragraph have attempted to address this 
fallacious essentialist divide: they resorted to the traditional approach methodologies (i.e. 
questionnaires) but with a critical approach concerning their focus (study of the public in local 
contexts). 
I.2. A Variant of the Critical Approach 
 In this research, I do not attempt to address the critical-traditional divide. However the 
approach I use in this research can be considered as a variant of the critical approach. Indeed, 
I adopt the ‘consideration of knowledge’, and ‘focus’ of the critical approach, but with some 
differences. To start with, concerning the ‘consideration of knowledge’, my position is less 
“relativist” than the one of the critical approach. I recognise the validity of other kind of 
knowledge, such as social or local knowledge, and I share the point of view of Alan Irwin 
about public groups: 
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“Public groups can be expected to bring more than a blank sheet of paper to 
environmental debate: memories of previous incidents, moral judgments and forms 
of local knowledge can all play a part in local understanding of environmental 
issues and in the very constitution of these ‘issues’.” 
(Irwin A., 2001) 
But I consider scientific knowledge and scientific experimental methods as superior to the 
other kinds of knowledge in order to understand the natural world. Whenever relevant 
comparisons are made, science tends to be more reliable than other kinds of knowledge. I do 
not claim at all that the scientific knowledge can alone manage the technical-scientific 
problems linked to society, but I claim that scientific expertise should remain a foundation 
stone of technical-scientific public decision-makings. In fact, in this research, I concentrate 
on scientific expertise; this is only for the last research question that I analyse other kinds of 
arguments than ‘scientific expertise’.  
 This research rather falls in the critical PUS approach. The ‘focus’ of this research is 
similat to the one of the critical approach, that is, the ‘renegotiation’ of scientific knowledge 
in ‘context’. For the three research questions, the ‘context’ is the decision-making processes 
for the setting up of incineration plant facilities, and the public in this context is the NGOs; I 
have not selected the public in a random way as usually done in the traditional approach. It is 
now important to state what ‘renegotiation’ consists of for the three research questions. In 
fact, my approach is a variant of the critical approach because it has a more dynamic view of 
the attitude of the public (here the NGOs) toward scientific knowledge: the critical approach 
still deals with the ‘understanding’ of science by the public, which implies still a passive view 
of the public; while I think that it is interesting to study the way the public seek scientific 
expertise. Concerning the research question number 4, I set up a typology of the sources of 
scientific expertise that the NGOs selected. I look at the ‘renegotiation’ of scientific expertise 
in the sense that I analyse the active behaviour local NGOs may have toward scientific 
expertise: the research of scientific expertise is at the core of this question. For research 
question number 5, I study the ‘renegotiation’ of scientific knowledge in the sense that I 
explore the reasons that the NGOs invoke to explain the fact that they did not seek for 
scientific expertise. In the 10 decision-making processes, some local NGOs probably sought 
scientific expertise; when they did, they selected certain sources and did not consider some 
others, moreover some NGOs might themselves carry out some scientific investigation, or 
more probably some NGOs ordered a third party such as private or public laboratories to carry 
out some scientific study. Finally, in the last research question about the importance of 
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scientific expertise in the discourses of the NGOs, the ‘focus’ is clearly the renegotiation of 
scientific knowledge since I analyse the way the NGOs use scientific knowledge in the 
discourses they address to the wider public and the public authorities.  
 Finally, the methodology I use is the one of the critical approach, that is, qualitative: semi-
structured interviews with the engaged NGOs, and analysis of the documents published by the 
NGOs. However, as I have stated above, one could have resorted to questionnaires (the 
methodology of the traditional approach) to answer the same research questions. The reason 
why I resort to qualitative methodologies is that I had little clue about the answers of the 
NGOs before the beginning of the research. So I could not set up a structured questionnaire. 
In further researches concerning the mobilisation of scientific expertise by NGOs in similar 
contexts, knowing the possible answers of the interviewees, I would certainly resort to 
questionnaires. As I have stated above, I believe that the essential divide traditional approach-
quantitative methodologies versus critical approach-qualitative methodologies is fallacious. 
  
 In the approach I held in this research, I make eight assumptions which mostly, but not 
entirely, overlap with the critical approach assumptions: 
? the necessity to base technical-scientific decision-making on scientific knowledge, 
since it has a special access to the truth to the natural world;145 
? the importance of values, ethics and prior experience in technical-scientific 
expertise;146 
? the limitations of scientific-technical knowledge when applied to new settings;147 
? the multiplicity and diversity of publics; public as a general entity is a useless concept: 
? the legitimacy of public concerns and questions; 
? the relevance of social and local knowledge to complete scientific-technical expertise; 
? the scientific and technical knowledgeability of lay groups. 
 
As a conclusion, my approach is a variant of the critical approach. Here there are many 
commonalties with the critical approach. However, there are two main differences. First, I 
concentrate on scientific expertise (I deal little with some other types of knowledge). But 
                                                 
145 By ‘truth’, I mean that natural sciences have a special ability to understand and predict the ‘behaviour’ of 
material. 
146 See chapter 1, for further details on this issue 
147 See chapter 1, for further details on this issue 
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above all I consider that the public (here the local NGOs) can have a more active attitude 
toward scientific knowledge than the mere ‘understanding’: they may seek determined 
scientific expertise, and they may even order to a third party or realise themselves some 
scientific expertises.  
The label ‘Public Understanding of Science’ has been coined by the traditional approach, 
and reflects a series of choices made by this approach concerning the non-contextualisation of 
the research (the terms ‘public’ and ‘science’), and the passive view of the public 
(‘understanding’). This research is a Public Understanding of Science study in a determined 
context: the mobilisation of scientific expertise about dioxins by the local NGOs engaged in 
ten decision-making processes for the setting-up of incineration plants. So this research can be 
label as a ‘NGOs Mobilisation of Scientific Expertise’ study, which is more specific than 
‘Public Understanding of Science’ study.  
II. Sources of Scientific Expertise: a Property Space 
It is useful to begin this sub-section with the definition of two key terms: ‘scientific 
expertise’ and ‘expert’. A piece of expertise is produced by an expert. I adopt the definition of 
‘expert’ given by the Collins English dictionary: “An expert is a person who is very 
knowledgeable about or skilful in a particular area.” (Oxford English Dictionary). In this 
research, the term ‘scientific’ refers to the natural science disciplines, such as physics, 
chemistry, or biology.  In this research I do not deal with other kinds of expertise such as 
social scientific or economic scientific expertise. The term ‘scientific expertise’ means the 
analysis of a specific natural phenomenon or technological object using physical, chemical or 
biological knowledge. ‘Scientific expertise’ is different from fundamental research: it does 
not aim at determining general laws about the way the ‘natural world’ works. ‘Scientific 
expertise’ employs scientific concepts, which are recognized as true and certified by the 
scientific academic society, in order to solve problems concerning real, determinate and 
concrete cases. In other words, ‘scientific expertise’ is an application of scientific fundamental 
knowledge in a particular context. Consequently, a ‘scientific expert’ is a person who has 
special skills in natural sciences (biology, physics or chemistry) and/or in engineering.  
I have hesitated between using the terms ‘scientific knowledge’ and ‘scientific expertise’. 
The matter is that ‘scientific knowledge’ may appear very broad, covering all the knowledge 
produced by science, while the term ‘scientific expertise’ may appear too specific. Since the 
point of departure of this research is the Science Study literature concerning the use of 
scientific expertise in the public decision-making processes, I have finally opted for ‘scientific 
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expertise’. To conclude the definitional issue, in this research, ‘scientific expertise’ refers to 
the scientific knowledge which deals with the impact of the pollutants released by incineration 
plants on the environment and on health.  
 As we have seen in chapter 1, many Science Studies have analysed the problems entailed 
in the use of scientific expertise by public decision-makers. And the conclusion of these 
analyses has been the need to extend the domain of technical decision-making beyond the 
technically qualified ‘elite’, so as to enhance the quality of expertise. While the traditional 
PUS has studied the attitude toward science and the scientific literacy of the public, the 
critical PUS studies have dealt with the relationship between the public and the experts, such 
as sheep breeders and radioactivity experts (See Wynne B., 1989, Wynne B., 1995, Irwin A. 
and Wynne B., 1996), or have entered the black box of scientific ignorance (See Michael M., 
1996). Critical PUS scholars have attempted to shed new lights on lay knowledge, illustrating 
the relevance of this kind of knowledge. But I have found no Science Study about the sources 
of scientific expertise of the public (i.e. the NGOs in this research), and I have found no 
typology of these sources of scientific expertise.  
 To make the link with part II, I remind the reader that the point of departure of this 
research is that public involvement is envisaged as a solution to the problems of traditional 
expertise.148 It should also be borne in mind that according to the model based on the concept 
of flow of information used in Part II, public involvement aims at maximising the quantity of 
relevant information between the public authority and the maximum quantity of relevant 
public, and that the aim is not to give the public the final decision. The contribution of the 
public in the decision-making processes is therefore intended as the bringing in of extra 
knowledge to solve the problems of traditional scientific expertise. 
 I distinguish two types of knowledge that may be brought by the public: local-social 
knowledge, and technical-scientific knowledge. By ‘local knowledge’ I mean the knowledge 
held by local inhabitants about specificities (economical, social, geographical, and so forth) 
concerning the area where the incinerator has been planned. For example, the local knowledge 
may be about a specific local economic activity, such as a renowned wine culture, which may 
commercially suffer from the incinerator’s vicinity. By ‘technical-scientific knowledge’, I 
                                                 
148 As I have stated in chapter 1, section I, the problem of scientific expertise in public decision-making 
processes fall into three categories: suspicion of non-competency (unadapted knowledge-problem of framing, 
uncertainty, confusion between fact and value), suspicion of partiality (confusion between knowledge and 
personal interest), and consequently suspicion of excess of power (the experts have the power to define the very 
term of debates). 
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mean scientific expertises the public may bring. Of course, this distinction is rough, and it 
would be interesting to make a refined classification of the types of knowledge the public may 
bring, and to analyse the way they answer to the problems posed by the traditional expertise, 
and under which circumstances. But this is not the focus of this research. The aim of this 
paragraph is to show that I am aware that the public may bring other kinds of knowledge than 
scientific expertise, but in this research, I focus on the scientific expertise mobilised by the 
NGOs. I aim at developing a typology of the sources of scientific expertise mobilised by the 
NGOs. 
 A recent article by Collins and Evans (Collins H.M. and Evans R., 2002) has been the first, 
and so far the only, attempt to establish a typology of scientific expertise. Concerning the 
sources of expertise, Collins and Evans distinguish two types of expertise based the training 
of the experts; these are the ‘experienced-based’ and ‘certified’ expertise. The term 
‘experience-based’ expert refers to “[…] members of the public who have special technical 
[or scientific] expertise in virtue of experience that is not recognized by degrees or other 
certificates […]” (Collins H.M. and Evans R., 2002, p. 238). Individuals who have special 
technical expertise recognized by degrees or other certificates are ‘certified’ experts.149 We 
have two dimensions here: 1) the presence or absence of superior knowledge in some domain; 
that knowledge could be acquired through specialised training or through experience, and 2) 
certification. Certification is important as it allows the users of expertise to select experts 
without first checking in depth their credentials, which is often a difficult process. This 
distinction is useful, but not enough to build-up a pertinent property space of the sources of 
scientific expertise. 
 The main flaw is that this classification is based on the competences embodied in the 
members of the public; it does not take into account the faculty of the public to mobilise a 
third party to carry-out an expertise. It is thus necessary to make a distinction between the 
‘internal’ and the ‘external’ expertise. ‘Internal expertise’ consists of the competences 
embedded in the public (here the local NGOs); some members of the public have specific 
                                                 
149 However, this dinstinction is not a key issue for these authors: as soon as they made this distinction they 
efface it arguing that experience-based experts are just plain experts, that the important point is that both types of 
experts have special skills not spread thought-out the population, but are found in small specialist groups. In fact, 
the reason why these authors define the term ‘experience based expert’ is that they do not want to use what they 
call the oxymoron notion of the ‘lay expert’ used in the literature of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. 
Indeed, they claim that “[…] ‘layman’ includes the sentiment ‘someone who is not an expert’, and this makes it 
all too easy to over-interpret the term ‘lay expertise’. If those who are not experts can have expertise, that special 
reference does expertise have? It might seem that anyone can be an expert” (Collins H.M. and Evans R., 2002, p. 
238). 
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skills or competences, which can be ‘experience-based’ or ‘certified’. Consequently ‘internal 
experts’ are members of the concerned public. ‘External expertise’ is the expertise mobilised 
by the public but produced by a private or a public laboratory, a state agency, a (certified) 
scientist, an experience-based expert, or by another NGO.  Thus, ‘external experts’ are not 
members of the concerned public. I therefore derive a property space of the sources of 
scientific expertise of the NGOs. The main dimension is the ‘qualification’ of the expert 
(‘certified’ or ‘experience based’) while the second dimension is the group the expert belongs 
to (‘internal’ or ‘external’ to the NGO). However, it is unlikely that an external experience-
based expertise is a private or public laboratory or a state agency: such expertise is likely to be 
solely NGO affiliated. This means that ‘experience-based’ and ‘certified’ expertise are 
mutually exclusive. Experience and experience based are two distinct issues. Of course, a 
certified expert can have more or less experience in its domain of expertise. The main point is 
that he has competencies recognized by degrees or other certificates; whereas an ‘experience-
based’ expert has competencies which stem from his experiences, but without being 
recognized by degrees or other certificates. 
 
 The property space is summarised in table 9 below.  In chapter 8, this property space will 
be refined in the light of the empirical study, and a typology will be developed (see chapter 8, 
section III). For this empirical study, the methodology employed is qualitative: the data are 
collected through three semi-open questions, and then the sources are listed and distributed in 
the property-space. The details about the methodology can be found in section III of chapter 
8. 
Table 9. Sources of scientific expertise: a property space 
Internal External  
 Private 
Laboratory 
Public Laboratory 
(research 
institution/researcher) 
State Agency Other NGO 
Certified      
Experience 
Based 
     
 
III. Reasons for Not Mobilising Scientific Expertise 
 The NGOs that did not mobilise scientific expertise can be divided into two categories: 
those that did not seek expertise and those that failed to obtain the sought expertise. 
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 The reasons declared by the NGOs for failing to obtain the sought-after scientific expertise 
will be developed in the following chapter in an inductive way, while the analysis of the 
reasons for not seeking expertise is based on a typology developed by the critical PUS scholar 
Mike Michael (Michael M., 1996). As I have stated in the previous section, in the traditional 
Public Understanding of Science approach, ignorance is considered as a mere lack of certified 
scientific knowledge, a void, while the critical approach believes that the ‘not-knowing’ can 
be a self-conscious choice which should be explored; and in this research I have adopted a 
variant of the critical PUS approach in which I consider the public as potentially active toward 
scientific knowledge: not only can ignorance be self-conscious, but the public may seek 
scientific expertise. In other words, we should distinguish here between two situations: state 
and activity. Ignorance is a state of an actor who lacks knowledge (or holds false beliefs) 
about some matter. This should be distinguished from the activity of seeking or not seeking 
knowledge. As a state, ignorance is fully compatible with the activity of seeking knowledge. 
In fact it may be the very motive for seeking knowledge. In this research I focus on the 
activity of the local NGOs, and I envisage the not seeking of scientific expertise as potentially 
highly significant, and that the interviewees are allowed to elaborate the reasons of this non 
mobilisation. By the way, in this research I do not try to evaluate the actual scientific literacy 
of the NGOs concerning dioxins, I study the extent to which the NGOs turned toward 
scientific expertise. If they did not mobilise scientific expertise, I search for the reasons they 
invoke (If they did, I look at the sources of scientific expertise they selected; see section III of 
this chapter). 
     Mike Michael has studied the discourse about ignorance of techno-science and its risks, 
and he has built up a typology of the causes of (scientific) ignorance invoked by the 
laypersons (Michael M., 1996). He has analysed semi-structured interviews with volunteers 
who have kept a small plastic Radon detector in their home in the framework of a Radon 
survey carried out by a Local Council Environmental Health office, then he has built a 
typology of the discourses about ignorance. Mike Michael distinguishes three types of causes 
of scientific ignorance invoked in the discourses of the interviewees: ‘mental constitution’, 
‘division of labour’, and ‘deliberate choice’. In ‘mental constitution’, there is an 
acknowledgement of ‘ignorance’ as ‘not-knowing’.  But it is not considered as a lack of 
education but this is a constitutional incapacity which is invoked. These respondents declared 
that they have a ‘non-scientific mind’. The underpinning of such a discourse is a relation of 
subservience and dependence of lay persons toward science. The ‘division of labour’ view 
consists of the reparation of competencies among members of the society: the lay person does 
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his job and the scientists do another. In this view, the layperson is not dominated by science. 
Interviewees argued that ‘it is not their job’: ignorance is neither positive nor negative, lay 
person and science coexist and co-operate. In the ‘deliberate choice’ discourse, respondents 
declared that they do not know and that they are not interested in knowing about radiation. 
Here scientific knowledge (about radiation) is considered as not essential to the primary issues 
at stake (the economic and political aspects of nuclear power). 
 In the Science Study literature, I have found no other research which deals with the causes 
of scientific ignorance declared by members of the public. This typology is at the basis of my 
empirical research, but in the light of the analysis of the empirical data I gather, I test its 
validity in a new context (the NGOs in the decision-making processes for the setting-up of 
incineration plants), then I refine it (see chapter 8, section II). Already, one can see that the 
most curious thing about Michael’s typology is that it does not include ‘lack of training’ or   
‘education’. Obviously, such a response was not made by the members of the ‘public’ studied 
by Michael. Furthermore, there are of course other quite obvious reasons for ignorance the 
interviewees may invoke, such as the inability to access scientific information, or the costs of 
knowledge acquisition. We will see if these reasons are put forward by the NGOs in the ten 
decision-making processes for the setting up of incineration plants, or if they invoke other 
reasons. 
 From now onward, I will not employ the terminology used by Mike Michael (‘ignorance’, 
‘discourses about ignorance’ and ‘social construction of ignorance’), which lack of precision, 
and which can lead to the misunderstanding of what I intend to do in this research. Instead of 
‘ignorance’, I will talk about ‘no mobilisation of scientific expertise’. And instead of 
‘discourses about ignorance’, I will talk about the ‘reasons for not seeking scientific 
expertise’. 
 
 To develop my typology, the methodology employed is qualitative: the data are collected 
through three semi-open questions; then the texts of the answers are analysed in order to 
identify whether the NGOs mobilised ‘scientific expertise’ or not; at last, the reasons given by 
the NGOs for not mobilising ‘scientific expertise’ are identified. The details about the 
methodology can be found in section II of chapter 8. 
IV. Scientific Expertise in the Discourses of the NGOs 
 Once the NGOs have set up their position concerning dioxins and incineration plants, they 
try to bring the wider public (and the public authorities) round to their views. To reach such a 
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goal, they are likely to try to build up their position through a series of selected arguments. 
This section provides a theoretical framework to answer the sixth research question: “Is 
scientific knowledge a key argument in the discourses of the public; what are the other types 
of arguments that the public employs to strengthen their position?” I have found no research 
about this aspect in the Public Understanding of Science literature. Consequently, the 
theoretical framework is novel, and consists of a series of different types of arguments the 
NGOs may use to gain ‘credibility’ and consequently to strengthen their position. This section 
is made of three sub-sections: in the first one the concepts of ‘credibility’ and ‘strengthening 
of position’ are defined while the second explain the concept of ‘cognitive credibility’ of 
science and sub-section IV.3 deals with the concept of ‘moral credibility’. 
IV.1. Credibility and Strengthening of the NGO’s Position 
 ‘Credibility’ is the quality of being trusted or believed in. It can be defined as a form of 
intellectual capital that has to be built up, maintained and replenished. Expertise is a special 
case of credibility. It is based on domain-specific trust that is built over time and often 
institutionalised, i.e. subject to well defined quality controls. However, credibility is 
influenced by a broad range of informal (social, moral, political and cultural) factors. 
‘Credibility’ increases a social actor’s effectiveness as it makes his/her specific claims 
acceptable without costly and uncertain ‘verification’ procedures. Actors, here the local 
NGOs, therefore have a strategic interest in building up their ‘credibility’ and, sometimes, in 
pointing the limitations of the ‘credibility’ of their opponents. This is particularly important 
for ‘new’ agents entering a political-technical domain where expertise is highly 
institutionalized. 
 The local NGOs are in such a situation, they are little known by the public authority, and 
above all by the wider public, and thus, it is thus likely that local NGOs have little initial 
‘credibility’. The initial ‘credibility’ they may have is likely to rest on their socio-political 
position (for example, value congruence, local networks, engagement of well-trusted 
‘personalities’, etc.) or/and on dramatic decrease in the credibility of the ‘establishment’ due 
to some scandals or some other event like that. This form of initial ‘credibility’ may, however, 
prove ephemeral, and has to be bolstered in other ways. Therefore, in order to bring the wider 
public and the public authority round to their view, (the abandonment of the local incineration 
plant project) the local NGOs have to build their ‘credibility’ and to strengthen their position.
  The ‘strengthening of position’ refers to political effectiveness, while the ‘gain of 
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credibility’ to the cognitive social capital. The latter contributes to the former: the local NGOs 
have to gain ‘credibility’ in order to strengthen their position. 
 An important dimension of ‘credibility’ is its social pervasiveness. In other words, the 
question is “credible for whom?”: the general public, members of specific social 
movements/parties, professional experts, public authorities, etc. The credibility of some 
individuals or institutions can be very pervasive, i.e. accepted by virtually entire society. On 
the other extreme it may be limited to a handful of supporters. The strategies of building 
credibility among the general public may be different from those directed towards expert 
groups. In this research, I study the discourses of the NGOs, and these discourses are 
addresses to the public authorities, and to the wider public, that is to the electors of the public 
authority. In this process, the local NGOs do not try to gain ‘credibility’ in the eyes of the 
certified experts. 
IV.2. Cognitive Credibility 
Credibility of Science 
 The concept of ‘credibility’ has been inspired by the concept of ‘boundary-work’ 
developed by Gieryn, or rather by the aim of boundary-work which is to maintain or increase 
the ‘cognitive authority’ of science (see Gieryn T.F., 1995, p. 404-405; Gieryn T. F., 1983; 
Gieryn T.F., 1995; Gieryn T. F., 1999c), and first applied by Sheila Jasanoff (Jasanoff S., 
1987; Jasanoff, S, 1990). According to Thomas Gieryn, boundary-work is used to demarcate 
science from non-science, and it is also employed within science for the ideological 
demarcations of disciplines, specialties, or theoretical orientations.150 
                                                 
150 Gieryn has a constructivist view of ‘the cognitive authority’ of science. He contends that it derives not from 
universal or essential qualities of the scientific method, nor from the special insight these methods may provide. 
Rather, such authority derives significantly from the ways in which science is defined and represented, the 
people and institutions which are included in the boundary-setting process, and the various resources (financial, 
human, etc.) that these representations of science can mobilise. And, still following Gieryn, ‘boundary-work’ is a 
likely stylistic resource for ideologists of a profession or occupation, and he has distinguished three diverse 
boundary-work strategies that scientists use to demarcate science from non-science, and thus to maintain the 
‘cognitive authority’ of science. These are ‘expansion of authority’, ‘monopolization/expulsion’, and ‘protection 
of autonomy’' (Gieryn T. F., 1983, p. 791-792, Gieryn T.F., 1995, p. 424-439). 
 When the goal is expansion of authority or expertise into domains claimed by other professions or 
occupations, boundary-work heightens the contrasts between rivals in ways flattering to the ideologists’ side. 
 When the goal is monopolization of professional authority and resources “each [contender] attaches authority 
and authenticity to claims and practices of the space in which they also locate themselves, while denying it to 
those placed outside.” (Gieryn T.F., 1995, p. 424)  
 When the goal is protection of autonomy over professional activities, boundary-work exempts members from 
responsibility for consequences of their work by putting the blame on scapegoats from outside.  
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 In the present case, science represents institutionalized expertise enjoying arguably the 
highest ‘cognitive authority’, at least in modern Western societies. In other words, science is 
considered to have privileged access to truth for the definition of the natural world. The 
‘cognitive credibility’ of science is broad (it includes a very wide range of specific areas), and 
socially pervasive (it is generally accepted throughout the society). For those reasons, there 
are likely to occur that this significant credibility ‘spill-overs’ into the areas outside the proper 
domain of scientific expertise. This is sometimes called a ‘halo effect’: people tend to be 
trusted beyond their actual area of expertise. This is one reason for the crisis of expertise I am 
talking about. 
 Actors seeking to influence decisions in the areas with a strong institutionalized expertise 
have to develop a strategy towards that expertise. The question is: “To what extent do these 
NGOs mobilise these certified scientific expertises in their discourses in order to gain 
‘credibility’ in the eyes of the wider public and of the public authority?” In other words, the 
local NGOs could try to benefit from the ‘cognitive authority’ of scientific expertise in order 
to increase their ‘credibility’. I suggest that beyond the demonstration of credibility of the 
arguments they use, the NGOs have a medium term strategy of strengthening their position.  
 To confront the ‘cognitive authority’ of science, actors such as the local NGOs could adopt 
four alternative strategies. The first one is ‘mobilisation’: NGOs line up the support of 
science by identifying scientific consensus beliefs or initiating research by scientifically 
qualified institutions to provide certified data. The mobilisation is likely to be selective, 
NGOs likely mobilise only the scientific expertises which support their views. A second 
strategy could be the ‘challenge’: NGOs question the authority of science and propose an 
alternative source of knowledge. NGO could adopt a ‘demarcation’ strategy: they try to limit 
the authority of science by pointing to uncertainties in the state of knowledge and/or to 
conflicting theories/evidence. The containment is more likely to be used when scientific 
expertise may be unfavourable to the NGOs’ position. At last, NGOs could resort to a 
‘complementary’ strategy: they identify complementary forms of expertise which are non-
scientific, such as local knowledge, traditional beliefs, etc. These elements of strategy can be 
of course combined. ‘Demarcation’ argument can be used to justify a selective ‘mobilisation’ 
of scientific expertise in combination with advocacy of some forms of ‘complementary’ 
expertise. 
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Precautionary Principle 
 In case of scientific uncertainty, it may become difficult for the NGOs to rely on science to 
gain cognitive credibility. Indeed, the ‘cognitive authority’ of given scientific expertises is 
likely to be undermined in the eyes of the wider public in case of absence of consensus within 
the scientific community. The local NGOs could adopt a ‘complementary’ strategy resorting 
to the ‘precautionary principle’. As I have already stated in chapter 1, the precautionary 
principle can be briefly formulated as follows: in case of doubt over the potential serious or 
irreversible consequences of a ‘technical-scientific object’ (for example the use of a new 
chemical, the introduction of a GMO in agriculture), protective measures must be taken (for 
example forbidding the use of the chemical, forbidding the use of the GMO open fields) and 
at the same time experts must be asked to search for conclusive scientific evidence of the 
innocuousness of this object.151 
 In this case, NGOs do not try to undermine the authority of science; on the contrary, they 
try to overcome the lack of cognitive credibility of scientific expertise because of 
uncertainties. 
IV.3. Moral Credibility 
 ‘Moral credibility’ means that actors are perceived as acting for the common good, and 
that they do not push for their personal interest as for example lobbies do. Local NGOs could 
resort to three types of arguments: ‘overcoming the NIMBY label’, ‘reference to national or 
international recognised NGOs’, and ‘juridical arguments’. This list is of course not 
exhaustive; these are the arguments which pop up in the light of the literature and of the study 
of the engagement of the NGOs in the 10 decision-making processes. 
 
Overcoming the NIMBY label 
 From the literature, it seems likely that local NGOs have to defend themselves against the 
Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) label. In the case of the setting up of incineration plants, the 
NGOs, because they are local, are likely to be suspected to oppose the incineration plant 
project because the selected site is next to their home. To gain ‘moral credibility’ the local 
NGOs will probably have to overcome this pejorative label which highlights an egoistic 
attitude.  
                                                 
151 See chapter 1 for further details about the precautionary principle. 
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 The general view of the NIMBY response of local populations refers to intense, local 
opposition to proposals for constructing facilities that residents believe will result in a 
negative impact. As C. Davis and J. Lester has analysed, the NIMBY reaction has become 
very common because of the distribution of costs and benefits (Davis C. and Lester J., 1988). 
Nuisances, such as effects on human health, environmental quality, or property values, are 
geographically concentrated while benefits concern a larger and more dispersed population. 
Location and perceived risk can be considered as the independent variables and the NIMBY 
response as the dependent variable. Typical NIMBY infrastructures are, for example, low-
income housing projects, power plants, power lines, airports, prisons, halfway houses, sewage 
treatment plants, highways, dams, oil refineries, rail lines, military installations, junkyards, 
cemeteries, amusement parks, taverns, sex businesses, and, of course, household waste 
incineration plants. NIMBY has quickly become a major social issue, and has given rise to a 
blossoming of evocative acronyms, such as LULU (Locally Unwanted Land Use), NIABY 
(Not In Anybody's Back Yard), NIMTOO/NIMTOF (Not In My Term Of Office), NIMEY 
(Not In My Electoral Year/Yard), NOPE (Not On Planet Earth), NOTE (Not Over There, 
Either), BANANAs (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anyone), NUMBY (Not 
Under My Back Yard), which is used in the case of underground infrastructures, or CAVE 
(Citizens Against Virtually Everything).152 
 
 The literature about NIMBY can be divided into two categories: the analysis of the 
NIMBY phenomenon itself, and the response of the NGOs aimed at overcoming this 
pejorative label. The aim here is not to make an exhaustive review of the literature about 
NIMBY (which is almost impossible considering the proliferation of articles in various 
academic fields, from Science Studies to Urban Planning, through Political Sciences) but to 
introduce the NIMBY phenomenon. 
 In the analysis of the NIMBY phenomenon itself, scholars have explored the reasons of the 
mobilisation of the residents, and have made judgments about the impact of such a 
mobilisation on the decision-making processes. This literature can be levelled in two kinds of 
considerations of the NIMBY reaction. The first one is highly critical, these authors argue that 
essential projects have become impossible to site, restricting or delaying local economic 
                                                 
152 See for ex. Inhaber H., 1992, Trom D., 1999, Heiman M., 1990. The origin of these acronyms is difficult to 
establish. It is unclear whether they were created by scholars, or actors concerned by the NIMBY issue. Most of 
the time, the scholars who use them do not identify their origin. 
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development and technically superior solutions. They often condemn NIMBY actions as 
selfish, irrational, and costly to society (Glaberson W., 1988; Mazmanian D. and Morell D., 
1990). As Michael Craft and Bruce Clary analysed, in this view of a phenomenon recognised 
as NIMBY, five reasons are conventionally attributed to the strong oppositional behaviour: 
 “(1) distrust of the project sponsors; (2) limited information about the sitting 
issue;(3) attitudes toward the project that are local and parochial, and which do 
not consider broader ramifications; (4) an emotional orientation toward the 
conflict; and (5) a high level of concern about project risks.” 
(Kraft M. and Clary B., 1991, p. 302-303) 
 The second kind of analysis of the NIMBY phenomenon is fairly positive and tends to 
invalidate the conventional view of the reasons of the NIMBY reaction. It suggests that the 
public’s position is rational and legitimate and that the participation of the public in the 
decision process leads to better decision-making. These authors argue that citizens may have a 
good grasp of and reasonable concern for health and welfare, which are ignored by technical 
and administrative elites (see for ex.: Fiorino D., 1995; Matheny A. and Williams B., 1985; 
Kraft M. and Clary B., 1991; Hunter S. and Leyden K. M., 1995). From this literature, it 
follows that if, indeed, the public may be strongly opposed to the siting, citizens are 
moderately well informed and able to discuss an array of technical problems. Furthermore, 
these scholars has found that if the “my backyard” is actually present, this parochial outlook is 
not characteristic of the majority of those testifying, and “highly emotive” statements are not 
that spread. With regard to the lack of trust and confidence in the government agency, these 
scholars conclude that it can often be considered as a rational assessment of prior performance 
and credibility of the government agency. 
 
 In order not to be accused of NIMBYism, with its pejorative sense of egoism, militants set 
up strategies to demonstrate that by fighting for their own interests, they are defending the 
common good. In the academic and ‘grey’ literature, it is possible to distinguish three kinds of 
strategy. A first strategy is to try to transform the NIMBY into what I label Local 
Inappropriate Site Use (LISU).153 The militants try to show that the site has special features 
that make it unique and unsuitable for the setting up of the facility. For example, the argument 
can be that the site is a refuge for migratory birds, that it shelters protected species, that it is 
                                                 
153 About LULU and NIMBY, see Popper F. J., 1987 
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next to a residential area, or that it is one of the rare green sites remaining in the city. This 
corresponds to a sectional distribution of activities in space: each zone of geographical space 
has its own function, for example, an industrial facility must be set up in an industrial and not 
in a residential zone.154  
 A second strategy is to transform the NIMBY into a Not-In-Anybody’s-Back-Yard 
(NYABY) position, which is also labelled as NOPE (Not On Planet Earth) by the American 
environmentalists, or again NOTE (Not Over There, Either). The militants try to overcome 
the suspicion of egoism through an attempt of generalisation of the problem (see, for example, 
Gordon C. and Jasper J. M., 1996, Lolive J., 1997).  They do not argue that they are simply 
opposed to the facility next to their home, but that such a type of facility should not be built in 
any place because of its intrinsic dangerousness. Such an argument is typically used for 
facilities which possibly pose a hazard to health, such as household waste incineration plants 
or nuclear power plants. The criticism is not addressed to a facility sited in a given place, but 
to a dangerous technology without further reference to geographical location. 
 A third and far more radical strategy is the BANANA (Build-Absolutely-Nothing- 
Anywhere-Near-Anyone), also labelled CAVE (Citizens Against Virtually Everything). Such 
an argumentation consists of the opposition to every instance of proposed new infrastructures. 
However, rather than a claimed strategy, BANANA is more often used (by the decision-
makers) to criticize the opposition of interest groups to land planning. In other words, it labels 
the opponents as opposed to the (technical) progress.  
Recognised NGOs  
 The local NGOs could make ‘references to recognised national or international NGOs’, 
such as Greenpeace, WWF, CNIID, or France Nature Environnement. These NGOs enjoy 
‘moral credibility’ in the views of the wider public because of their past analysis, positions 
and actions. They enjoy a good reputation in the opinion of the public and are recognised as a 
defender of the common good, especially the NGO Greenpeace (see for example Galinon M.-
                                                 
154 The substance of the LISU concept has been strongly inspired by Dany Trom (Trom D., 1999, p. 38-39). 
However, He limits his concept to a spatial distribution of human activities. Each area has its own function: 
industrial facilities must be set up in industrial zones and residence in residential ones. Furthermore, he labels 
this concept as LULU (Local Unwanted Land Use). The term LULU was first coined by F. Popper in 1981 
(Popper F. J., 1981), and in the sense of Popper, the term LULU is synonymous with NIMBY (see also Inhaber 
H., 1992). In fact, Dany Trom has used the term LULU in the sense that may be found in the grey literature: 
Local Unadapted Land Use (see for example Grelet S., 2007). Inorder to avoid any confusion, I will not use the 
term LULU at all, and I will use the term LISU. 
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P., mémoire P. Chastenet S. Milacic directeurs, 2000). In this case, at various degrees, these 
NGOs stand against household waste incineration generally speaking; they are again the 
setting up of new incineration plants (as I have stated in chapter 3, FNE, however, agree with 
the setting up of new incineration plants under certain conditions). Being national in scope 
and nature, these NGOs can not be accused of Nimbyism. 
Juridical Arguments 
 Local NGOs could resort to a third type of argument, which have a strong ‘moral 
credibility’ in the societies ruled by the laws: the ‘juridical arguments’. Two types of 
‘juridical arguments’ can be distinguished: the regulatory norms, which have a ‘legislative 
authority’, and the sentences, which have a ‘judicial authority’. 
 The ‘sentences’ are the decisions made by court, in the present research about the 
compliance with law of a given incineration plant or incineration plant project. Most of the 
time, these are sentences of civil legal actions undertaken by the local NGOs. These legal 
actions concern procedural aspects of the decision-making, such as the authorisation to build. 
However, some local NGOs have also undertaken criminal actions concerning the possible 
poisoning of the residents by an incinerator.  
  Concerning the ‘regulatory norms’ that the local NGOs could use, a series of European 
directive establish the authorised level of pollutants emissions or the necessary filtering 
equipments.155 These European Directives are: 2000/76/EC of 4 December 2000, 1999/90/EC 
of 22 April 1999, and 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996, 89/369/EEC and 89/429/EEC, and 
75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975. The aim of the directive 2000/76/EC of 4 December 2000 on 
the “incineration of waste” is “to prevent or to limit as far as practicable negative effects on 
the environment, in particular pollution by emissions into air, soil, surface water and 
groundwater, and the resulting risks to human health, from the incineration and co-
incineration of waste” (preamble § 5). This “aim shall be met by means of stringent 
operational conditions and technical requirements, through setting emission limit values for 
waste incineration” (art. 1). Notably, measurements of the following substances, NOx, 
provided that emission limit values are set, CO, total dust, TOC, HCl, HF, and SO2, shall be 
carried continuously (art. 10, § 2a), excepted under certain circumstances. The Directive 
                                                 
155 It should be noted that the ‘credibility’ of the regulatory norms stems from the support of scientific 
arguments. However, I make the hypothesis that the local NGOs actually make reference to the ‘judicial 
authority’ of the regulatory norms. 
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1999/30/EC of 22 April 1999 is related to limiting values for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen 
dioxide and oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter and lead in ambient air. Council Directive 
96/61/EC sets out an integrated approach to pollution prevention and control, and all the 
aspects of an installations environmental performance are considered in an integrated manner. 
The Directive 96/61/EC repeals Council Directives 89/369/EEC and 89/429/EEC on the 
prevention and reduction of air pollution from municipal waste incineration plants.156 Finally, 
directive 75/442/EEC encourages the prevention or reduction of waste production and its 
harmfulness and the recovery of waste by means of recycling. 
 In light of the rule of law principles, it would be difficult for the supporters of incineration 
to deny the ‘judicial authority’ of judges or the ‘legislative authority’ of the legislators. In the 
present case, it is unlikely that the regularity norms about incineration or the sentences 
concerning the non-respect of the procedures are accused of defending personal interests. 
 
 The methodology used to deal with the gain of ‘credibility’ is qualitative. The data consist 
of the documents published by the NGOs and which were addressed to the wider public 
and/or to the public authority. The data analysis method is inspired by the grounded theory 
methodology, and resorts to the software Atlas-ti. More details about the methodology can be 
found in the section IV of chapter 8. 
V. Summary-Conclusion 
 In this chapter, three different theoretical frameworks have been set up to answer to the 
second set of three research questions which intends to evaluate the importance of scientific 
expertise for local NGOs. These three theoretical frameworks fall within the critical Public 
Understanding of Science theoretical perspective.  
 
 The theoretical framework for the research question number 4, which is about the reasons 
declared by the interviewees for not mobilising scientific expertise, consists of a typology 
developed by a critical PUS scholar Mike Michael (Michael M., 1996). This typology, based 
on the semi-structured interviews with members of the public in a local context, identifies 
three types of reason invoked by the interviewee for not mobilising scientific knowledge: 
‘mental constitution’, ‘division of labour’, and ‘deliberate choice’. This typology will be 
                                                 
156 I remind the reader that the cases studied started in the beginning of the 90’s and finished between 2003 and 
2005.  
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confronted with the data collected in the context of this research, and then refined (see chapter 
8, section II). 
 
 In order to deal with the sources of scientific expertise of the NGOs (research question N. 
5), I have developed a property space of these sources. This property space is made up of two 
dimensions: the first dimension concerns the ‘qualification’ of the expert (‘certified’ or 
‘experience-based’) while the second dimension concerns the belonging of the expert 
(‘internal’ or ‘external’) to the NGO. Furthermore, the ‘external’ expert is divided in four 
categories: private laboratories, public laboratories or institutions, stage agencies, and other 
NGOs. Since, there is almost no study about the sources of scientific knowledge mobilised by 
the public, this property space is innovative. It will be refined in the light of the empirical 
study. The result of this refinement will be the setting up of a typology of the sources of 
scientific expertise used by the NGOs in the 10 selected decision-making processes (see 
chapter 8, section III).  
 
 Concerning the final research question, which is about the use of ‘scientific expertise’ in 
the discourses of the NGOs, the theoretical framework is a list of five types of arguments that 
the local NGOs could use to gain ‘credibility’, and consequently to strengthen their position.. 
‘Scientific expertise’, which benefit from the ‘cognitive credibility’ of science, could be a key 
argument in the framework of the technical-scientific decision-making processes studied here. 
At least, I intend to evaluate the importance of ‘scientific expertise’ as an argument to 
convince the wider public and the public authority. To confront the ‘cognitive authority’ of 
science, actors such as the local NGOs could adopt four alternative strategies, which can be 
combined: ‘mobilisation’, which consists of a selection of determined scientific expertise;. 
‘challenge’, NGOs question the authority of science and propose an alternative source of 
knowledge; ‘demarcation’, NGOs try to limit the authority of science by pointing to 
uncertainties in the state of knowledge and/or to conflicting theories/evidence; and 
‘complementary’, NGO identify complementary forms of expertise which are non-scientific. 
 In a complementary strategy, NGOs could resort to four arguments. A first one could be 
the ‘precautionary principle’ in order to overcome the lack of cognitive credibility of science 
in the eyes of the wider public due to the uncertainties around the adverse effects on health of 
incineration plants. The three other arguments allow the NGOs to gain ‘moral credibility’, 
that is, they tend to show that the NGOs act for the common good, and not (only) for personal 
interests. These are: ‘overcoming the NIMBY label’, ‘recognised national or international 
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NGOs’, and ‘juridical arguments’. This list is hypothetical (the NGOs may or may not resort 
to these arguments) and is not exhaustive. As a final point, this theoretical framework is 
novel, and it will be refined or modified in the light of the empirical study. 
 While for the research question concerning the declaration of the NGOs about their 
ignorance the theoretical aim is to test and improve an existing theory, for the two other 
research questions the aim is to build rather than to verify a theory. Thus the respective 
theoretical frameworks I have set up are hypotheses rather than firm theories. The empirical 
study will actively contribute to the building of the two theories.  
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Chapter 8  
Sources of Scientific Expertise of the NGOs 
 It should be borne in mind that among the various pollutants released by incineration 
plants, dioxins and furans are the molecules which worried the most the residents. Indeed, 
while it is acknowledged that dioxins and furans have adverse effects on health, there are 
uncertainties about the link between exposure to dioxins emitted by incineration plants and 
effects on health. In this context, I look at the importance of scientific expertise for the local 
NGOs engaged in the ten decision-making processes. This chapter aims to answer the 
research questions concerning the sources of scientific expertise: “4. To what extent do local 
NGOs seek scientific expertise; what are their sources?”; “5. what are the reasons invoked by 
the local NGOs for not mobilising scientific expertise?” More precisely, it intends to answer 
the following questions: what type of scientific expertise was sought; why was it sought and 
by whom; what were the reasons for not seeking the expertise; have the actors who sought the 
expertise succeeded in obtaining it; and what were the reasons for failing to obtain the sought-
after expertise? 
 
 Let’s start with some definitions about the ‘mobilisation’ of scientific expertise. First, there 
are the NGOs which sought and those which did not seek expertise. Then, among the NGOs 
which sought expertise, there are those which succeeded and those which failed to obtain the 
sought expertise. The NGOs which succeeded in obtaining the sought expertise are designated 
as NGOs which ‘mobilised’ expertise. In the light of the empirical study, it has appeared that 
the NGOs sought expertise in two manners. The first manner is the one already discussed in 
the theoretical chapter: the local NGOs sought the expertise themselves. The second manner 
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has appeared during the empirical study: the local NGOs requested it from their public 
authority. From now and onward, the first manner is labelled ‘direct mobilisation’ of 
scientific expertise and the second one ‘indirect mobilisation’. In this chapter I make a 
classification of these requests, assessing when the public authorities granted them or not. As 
I have already stated in the previous chapter, two categories of NGOs which did not mobilise 
expertise can be distinguished: the NGOs which did not seek expertise and those which failed 
to obtain the sought-after expertise. 
 Again in the light of the empirical study, it seems that there is a correlation between the 
type of NGO (‘ad hoc’-‘existing’) and the mobilisation/no mobilisation of scientific expertise 
by these NGOs. 
 From the empirical study it appears that the definition of scientific expertise I have 
established in the previous chapter must be supplemented. The interviewees make a big 
difference between the scientific expertise concerning their incineration plant and the more 
general scientific expertise. Consequently, I distinguish two further types of scientific 
expertise: ‘general’ and ‘local’. ‘General scientific expertise’ is made up of scientific reports, 
expertises, or discourses held by experts, which are not about the case the local NGOs are 
directly concerned with. ‘General’ expertise covers general scientific background knowledge 
(about dioxins and impact of incineration on the environment and on health), and the pre-
existing expertises carried out in other locations. General expertise does it imply that specified 
scientists or laboratories are requested to deliver reports to the NGOs; NGOs simply read the 
existing reports. ‘General scientific expertise’ can be, for example, an epidemiological study 
about another case published in a scientific journal, a report on the state of knowledge 
concerning dioxins, or a conference about the risks of waste incineration. ‘Local scientific 
expertise’ typically consists of the measuring of dioxins emitted by the incineration plant the 
local NGO deals with. The measuring is typically made in the soil, vegetation and animals 
surrounding the incineration plant and in the blood of the residents. ‘Local scientific 
expertise’ consists of original scientific reports, expertises, or discourses held by experts, 
concerning the incineration plant the local NGOs are directly dealing with. ‘Local’ here 
applies to the geographic location of the ground of analyses and not to the geographical 
location of the laboratory. ‘Local’ does not apply to the type of analysis performed either: 
they can be mere measurements of dioxins in the environment or more complex 
epidemiological studies. However, ‘local scientific expertise’ can also be local 
epidemiological studies. For these two types of scientific expertise the sources are, in 
principle, the same, that is: private laboratory, public laboratory, research institution or 
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researcher, state agency, and NGOs. For most of the local NGOs scientific expertise is 
synonymous with ‘local’ scientific expertise. 
 
 This chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section introduces the methodology. 
In section II an overview of the sources of scientific expertise is stated. Section III deals with 
the ‘general’ expertise sought and section IV with the ‘local’. In section IV, I look at the 
relationship between the type of NGO (‘ad hoc’/’existing’) and the direct mobilisation of 
expertise. Section VI tackles the reasons of the NGOs for not mobilising scientific expertise. 
Finally, section VII is a bit aside from the analysis of the sources of scientific expertise of the 
local NGOs since it deals with the strategy if the NGOs to overcome the NIMBY label. 
Indeed, during the interviews, the NIMBY issue spontaneously popped up. Since this issue 
was important for the local NGOs and since it was already studied in the theoretical 
framework, I have decided to analyse this phenomenon. 
 
I. Methodology 
Selection of the NGOs 
 The NGOs selected are all the (local) NGOs which engaged in the 10 decision-making 
processes, that is, 25 NGOs. However, as I have already stated in chapter 3, it has not been 
possible to carry out the interviews with three NGOs. So, finally, 22 NGOs have been studied. 
Data Collection Methods 
 The data collected are the answers to the topics number 11, 12, 13, of the semi-structured 
questionnaire (see the appendix “Questionnaire for the NGOs”). The questions concerns the 
sources of scientific expertise the NGOs turned toward. I asked for example for question 
N°11: “Did you search for scientific expertise about the impact of incineration on health? Did 
you ask the public authority for the carrying out of scientific expertise concerning the impact 
on health?” The two other questions are similar, but they concern two other domains of 
expertise: question N°12 concerns the impact on the environment, and N°13 the measurement 
of the emissions of pollutants.  
 Since the interviews were semi-open; I had to re-formulate the questions in various ways in 
order to get the sought data. For example, the term “scientific expertise” or even “scientific 
knowledge” sometimes hindered the gathering of the data I sought: some interviewees had in 
mind a very different definition of scientific expertise from the one I have defined for this 
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research, and they often answered me that they did not search for scientific knowledge or 
scientific expertise, even if in fact they did. NGOs tended to consider scientific expertise or 
scientific knowledge only as ‘certified local expertise’, and to exclude ‘certified general 
expertise’, and ‘general’ and ‘local’ ‘experience-based expertise’. So, I had to manage this 
important discrepancy between my definition of ‘scientific expertise’, and those of the 
interviewees, reformulating my question. Among others, a solution was to ask again the 
question but replacing the term “scientific expertise” by the terms “information” or “studies”. 
For example, question N.11 became: “Did you search for information about the impact of 
incineration on health? Did you ask the public authority for the carrying out of studies 
concerning the impact on health?” (see the appendix “questionnaire for the NGOs”). These 
two terms, which are more general and vaguer than “scientific expertise”, enabled me to 
collect the data I was searching for. Of course, using such terms, I have also collected data 
which are not relevant for the present research, that is, data which did not correspond to the 
definition of (‘experience-based’/’certified’) ‘scientific expertise’ I have set up in this 
research.157 The restrictive definition of scientific expertise of the NGOs implies that they 
were interested in certified knowledge concerning (the impact on health and the environment 
of) their local incineration plant. 
 I have made the distinction among the domains of expertise – health, environment, and 
emission of pollutants – on the basis of the initial open interviews, of information concerning 
I found on the web sites of the NGOs (Greenpeace, FNE, CNIID, and local NGOs), and on the 
web sites of various institutions (French Ministers, European Commission, French State 
Agencies). I thought that I would have had more accurate answers if I divided my questions 
according to these four domains. However, the answers were often mixed up: many 
interviewees answered in the same time to questions 11, 12, and 13, when I asked question 
N°11. It has not been, however, a problem for the data treatment. In the cases in which the 
NGOs did not mobilise scientific knowledge, the interviewees spontaneously explained the 
reasons why; I did not have to ask the question: for which reason did not you resorted to 
scientific expertise.  
                                                 
157 It should be remembered that, in this research, ‘scientific expertise’ means: “the analysis of a specific natural 
phenomenon or technological object using physical, chemical or biological knowledge. A ‘scientific expertise’ is 
an application of scientific fundamental knowledge in a particular context”. I remind the reader also that I 
distinguish two types of scientific expertise: ‘experienced-based’ and ‘certified’. See chapter 7, section II for 
further details. 
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When available, the data gathered through the interviews have been verified and 
completed by the documents and web sites the NGOs published, (see the appendix “Sources 
of Data”).   
Data Analysis Method 
 The analysis of the mobilisation of scientific expertise is based on the property space of the 
sources of scientific expertise that I developed in the previous chapter (sub-section II.2). The 
individual sources of scientific expertise of the NGOs have been listed and then distributed in 
this property space. Each type of sources is commented on the text, and the relative 
importance of the sources are assessed and discussed. 
 The analysis of the trust of the NGOs in the sources of scientific expertise is analysed on 
the basis the sources the NGOs actually selected: NGOs mobilise scientific expertise they 
trust.  
 The analysis of the reasons of the NGOs for not mobilising for scientific expertise is based 
on the declaration of the interviewees: either they declared that the NGO did not mobilised 
scientific expertise, or they made the list of the scientific expertise they mobilised. When a 
NGO declared that it did not mobilise scientific expertise, I have tried to identify the reasons 
why it did not seek scientific expertise. The development of the typology is supported by a 
series of quotations from the answer to the questions N°11, 12, 13, and 14 (see the appendix 
“Questionnaire for the NGOs”). I have directly translated these quotations from French to 
English.   
 I have attributed a number (from 1 to 22) to each of the 22 NGOs. Since the NGO ‘Nord 
Nature’, the only NGO engaged in the case of Arras (case N°4), did not answer to these 
questions, the case has been removed from this analysis of the sources of scientific expertise 
of the NGOs. 
II. Mobilisation of Scientific Expertise: an Overview 
 As tables 10 and 11 below show, most of the NGOs sought scientific expertise: only three 
out of the twenty-two NGOs did not seek scientific expertise, while nineteen did. The NGOs 
equally sought local and general expertise: almost the same number of NGOs sought local 
expertise (14) and general expertise (12). All the NGOs which sought ‘general’ expertise did 
it directly. Conversely, the NGOs mainly sought ‘local’ expertise in an indirect way: fourteen 
requested to their public authority for the carrying out of scientific expertise, while only four 
NGOs directly sought expertise. 
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Table 10. Mobilisation of scientific expertise by the NGOs 
Seeking of scientific expertise 
General expertise Local expertise 
NGOs 
No 
seeking 
of 
scientific 
expertise 
Direct 
mobilisation 
Direct 
mobilisation 
Request  to the public 
authority 
1. VPIG 
 X   
2. Autun Morvan Ecologie 
 X   
3. Collectif Inciner’àtort 
 X   
4. AREN 
 X X X 
5. Collectif Halt Incin’ 
 X   
6. Thiviers la Vie 
 X   
7. CRITOM 
 X X X 
8. Ecologie Pour Le Havre 
   X 
9. SOS Estuaire 
   X 
10. Comité du quartier des Neiges 
   X 
11. Compiègne Ecologie 
X    
12. Alerte aux Déchets 
 X X X 
13. Coordination Environementale 
des Pyrénées Orientales    X 
14. La Hune 
 X  X 
15. Charles Flahaut 
X    
16. Guichainville Environnement 
   X 
17. La Sauvegarde de 
l’Environnement    X 
18. ASMSN 
X    
19. Association des Médecins de 
Maincy  X  X 
20. Un autre regard pour Maincy 
   X 
21. AVIE 
 X X X 
22. AIPPNE 
 X  X 
Total 3 12 4 14 
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Table 11. Mobilisation of scientific expertise by the NGOs: frequency table 
 No seeking for 
Scientific 
Expertise 
Seeking for Scientific Expertise 
3 
 
19 
 
- General Expertise Local Expertise 
- 
 
12 
 
14 
- Direct Mobilisation 
Request to the 
public authority 
Direct 
Mobilisation 
Request to the 
public authority 
Number of 
NGOs 
- 
 
12 
 
0 4 14 
 
III. Seeking General Scientific Expertise 
 Among the 12 NGOs which mobilised general scientific knowledge, three (N°2, N°14, and 
N°19) were not able to remember precisely the sources they used; they were just able to 
distinguish between ‘local’ and ‘general’ expertise. In other words, nine NGOs were able to 
specify the sources they resorted to.  From table 12 below, it appears that these nine NGOs 
resorted to two out of the four types of sources of scientific expertise defined by the property 
space: ‘certified external’ and ‘experienced-based external’. No NGO tried to produce 
‘general’ expertise internally. It is likely that the local NGOs simply do not have the internal 
capacities to produce such expertise: epidemiological studies or measuring of dioxins are 
difficult and complex to produce; they require very costly equipment and highly specialised 
competencies.  However, the NGOs did not resort to these two types to the same extent. The 
sources of scientific knowledge of the twelve NGOs are detailed in the text and synthesised in 
table 12 below. 
Certified External Expertise 
 Eight of the 22 interviewed NGOs (NGOs N°1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 21) declared that they 
resorted to some scientific expertise produced by certified external expert. Among the 
‘certified external’ sources, it has been more difficult to obtain clear and detailed information 
about the bibliographical studies than about the other types of sources. Most of the 
interviewees were not able to precisely quote the sources they used. The reason invoked by 
the interviewees was either that they do not remember anymore because the facts occurred a 
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long time ago, or that this is another member of the association who deals with the scientific 
issues. In some cases, the interviewee searched back in his document the sources they referred 
to. The NGOs mainly resorted to bibliographical scientific references, but conferences made 
by scientists were mentioned too. 
The interviewees were able to quote precisely (i.e. at least two of the three following 
elements: title, author, year) only three bibliographical sources. The first one, the most quoted 
(6 times by the NGOs N°1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7), has been produced by a group of French medical 
academics, and is about the French incinerator of the town of Besançon; the leader of this 
group, Professor Viel, is an Epidemiologist. This study is an epidemiological study on soft–
tissue sarcoma and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma clusters around a municipal solid waste 
incinerator with high dioxin emission levels.158 By the way, the national NGO CNIID 
distributed this study among the local NGOs members of its net.159  
Table 12: The sources of ‘general’ scientific expertise of the eleven NGOs 
 The second source quoted is a state research institute, the Institut National de la Santé et de 
la Recherche Médicale, INSERM (National Institute of Health and of Medical Research). 
INSERM is the only French state institute fully dedicated to the research in biology, medicine 
and the health of population. It has published two reports about dioxins: in a report on the 
dioxins in the environment and their dangers for health in 2000, and a report on the risk of 
congenital malformations next to incineration plants in 2002. 160 But these two reports have 
been very little used by the local NGOs: they have been quoted only by N°7 and N°21, 
respectively. With the data I have collected, it is not possible to know the reason why these 
NGOs did not mobilise these expertise: did they consider them as useless or untrustworthy, or 
did they simply ignore their existence? 
                                                 
158 Viel JF, Arveux P Baverel J Cahn JY, "Soft–tissue sarcoma and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma clusters around a 
municipal solid waste incinerator with high dioxin emission levels", American Journal of Epidemiology, 2000, p. 
13-19. 
159 See chapter 3, sub-section III.3 for further details about the local NGOs member of the CNIID’s net. 
160 Institut National de la Santé Et de la Recherche Médicale, Dioxines dans l'environnement : quels risques pour 
la santé ?, INSERM, Paris, 2000.  
Institut National de la Santé Et de la Recherche Médicale, Evaluation du risque de malformations congénitales 
liées a la proximité d’incinérateurs d’ordures ménageres, 2002. 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Chapter 8 
Sources of Scientifc Expertise of the NGOs 
 
- 197 - 
Table 13. Sources of ‘general’ expertise of the eleven NGOs 
 
 The third bibliographical source quoted is a report published by an NGO which the 
members are academics in the medical and biological fields (i.e. certified experts): the Société 
Française de Santé Publique (French Society of Public Health). This report consists of an 
assessment of the knowledge concerning the sanitary impact of waste incineration and was 
published in 1999. It has not been really a reference for the NGOs since it has been quoted 
External  Internal 
Private 
Laboratory 
Public laboratory /research 
institution/researcher 
State 
Agency NGO 
Certified 0 
 
0 8 NGOs 
N°1 : conf. Prof  Belpomme, conf. prof. 
Narbonne; conf. Pluyghers, conf. Reno, study 
Viel 
N.3 : study Viel, conf. Lainé 
N.4 : study Viel 
N.5 : conf. Prof. Mouton, conf. Belpome, Viel 
(M6) 
N.6 : Study Viel, Prof.  Belpomme, other 
sources 
N.7 : Inserm, articles prof. Viel, articles prof. 
Narbonne 
N.12 : a member of Institut Curie, through 
physicians, biologiss, chemists, members. 
(undetermined) 
N.21 : Inserm 2002, SFSPViel 
1 NGO 
 
N.4 : 
DRIRE 
 
1 NGO 
 
N°7:  Study WWF 
“Detox” 
 
Experience 
Based 
0 0 0 0 3 NGOs 
 
N.3: conf. Sarazin 
N.5: conf. Neuhor 
(CNIID), conf. 
Vicaire 
(Greenpeace), 
conf. Dietman, 
conf Sarazin, conf. 
Nicolas; 
CNIID important 
source of 
information 
N°7 : CNIID and 
Greenpeace 
important source 
of information 
N.X (X from 1 to 22), identifies the twenty two interviewed NGOs by a number 
NGOs N.2, N.14, and N°19  mobilised some general scientific knowledge but were not able to remember the sources  
Conf. is for ‘conferences’. Most of them organised by the NGOs themselves 
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only by one NGO, the NGO N°21. With the data in my hand, however, I have no idea about 
the reasons why such a source has so seldom been used. 
 A series of vague references to diverse studies have been made by some NGOs. One NGO 
talked about a “Belgium study concerning dioxins in blood next to an incineration plant” and 
about “an American study”, N°7 about a paper by Professor Narbonne, and another one about 
a paper published by Prof. Belpomme. 
 In four different cases, four local NGOs (N°1, 3, 5, and 6), declared that they obtained 
some information on the environmental or sanitary impact of incineration through conferences 
(three out of these four NGOs organised themselves the conferences). The contributors of 
these conferences were certified medical academics: Professor Belpomme, Oncologist (2 
conferences); Professor Narbonne, Toxicologist (1); Prof. Mouton, Toxicologist (1); Jean 
Reno, academic (1), Dr Pluyghers, Belgium Oncologist (1), and Dr Lainé  (1).161 
 To finish, only one NGO declared that it used a report on the annual emissions of 
pollutants of running incinerator written by DRIRE (the Direction Régionale de l’Industrie de 
la Recherche et de l’Environnement) and initially produced to calculate the pollution tax.162  
No NGO quoted the study carried out by the Institut National de Veille Sanitaire about the 
exposure of the residents living next to household waste incinerators (Institut National de 
Veille Sanitaire, Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, 2003), nor the report 
made of 65 questions about dioxins and incinerator (Institut National de Veille Sanitaire, 
Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, 2005). The conclusions drawn from 
these studies and reports are mainly in favour of the NGOs’position. In short, these studies 
conclude that waste incineration might be dangerous for health and that further studies are 
necessary to be able to draw straight conclusions. It is likely that these studies and reports 
were published too late to be really used by the local NGOs: between 2003 and 2005, some of 
the studied decision-making processes were already finished, and the other ones were at their 
‘realisation’ stage, everything was already decided and the NGOs were little active. The other 
studies carried out by the two states agency which deal with this issue, INVS and AFFSA 
could not be quoted since they were published after the end of the studied decision-making 
                                                 
161 The number in brackets is the number of NGOs concerned, which correspond also to the number of 
conferences since, for each NGO, the external contributor came only one time. 
162 Let us note here that DRIRE is not a state agency but a regional technical department at disposal of the state 
services. However, due to its ‘state nature’ and because it has been quoted only one time, I did not create an ad-
hoc category for DRIRE and I have included it in the ‘state agency’ category. 
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processes (Institut National de Veille Sanitaire, 2006a; Institut National de Veille Sanitaire, 
Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, 2006b). 
Experience-based External Expertise 
 Only four NGOs (N°3, 5, 7, 22) resorted to ‘experience-based external’ expertises, which 
were ‘general’ expertises. Through the conferences they organised, three local NGOs (N.3, 
N.5, and N.7) resorted to members of other NGOs as experienced-based expert. Moreover, 
even if they did not formalise it, the interviewed NGOs made the difference between certified 
experts and experience based experts, as NGO N.5 put it “we organised public meeting with 
members of NGOs who are not experts but who have some competencies” (interview N°5 
Collectif Halt Incin'). Furthermore, from all but one interview (N°5), it is unclear whether the 
interventions of these members of association were principally about sanitary issue or about 
technical issues. When I asked the question about the link incineration-health or incineration-
environment (Q.12, and Q. 13), the names of the members of NGOs popped up, but then, the 
interviewees were not able to specify the content of the interventions the contributors. 
However, they were able to quote the names of these contributors: P.E. Neuhor, president of 
the national NGO, CNIID, Y. Vicaire, responsible “toxicity” in the French national branch of 
Greenpeace, and M. Sarazin, petrochemist engineer, vice-president of a local NGO named 
APEL. Moreover the national NGO CNIID was quoted six times as distributor of existing 
scientific expertises, notably of the epidemiological study realised by professor Viel. In this 
role of distributor the local NGOs EUGENE and the national Générations Futures have been 
respectively mentioned one time.  
Concerning the resort to certified expertise produced or ordered by other NGOs, an 
astonishing fact is that a ‘certified’ scientific report, made by the Greenpeace Research 
Laboratories, which is based at University of Exeter (UK), “State of Knowledge of the 
Impacts of Waste Incinerators on Human Health” initially written in English and then 
translated into French in 2001, has not been even mentioned by any of the interviewee.163 
Only one NGO mentioned “a document realised by WWF about blood analysis” (interview 
N°7, CRITOM). In fact, this is likely to be the “DETOX campaign”, realised between 2003 
and 2006 by WWF. This campaign consisted in measuring out 101 chemicals, among which 
                                                 
163 English version: Michelle Allsopp, Pat Costner and Paul Johnston Greenpeace Research Laboratories 
University of Lexter UK, 2001; French version: Michelle Allsopp, Pat Costner and Paul Johnston Greenpeace, 
2001. 
Let’s note that any reference to the status of academics of the authors has disappeared in the French version. 
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PCBs, in the blood of 47 European citizens. This campaign was not specifically about 
incineration, but about more generally about chemical contamination.164 Thus national or 
local NGOs were not sources of scientific expertise for the local NGOs. However, six local 
NGOs (N°2, 5, 7, 11, 16, and 22) declared that Greenpeace, and above all CNIID played an 
important role as media to gain some certified scientific expertise. 
Summary-Conclusion 
 The nine NGOs which mobilised general scientific expertise about the impact of 
incineration on the environment or health, and which were able to quote their sources, mainly 
turned toward ‘certified external’ scientific sources. These ‘certified external’ expertises were 
largely produced by public institutions or researchers linked to public institutions. The 
epidemiological study carried out by Professor Viel is the most popular, likely because it was 
the only French epidemiological study concerning incineration plants at that time, and 
because it has been spread through the national net Coordination du CNIID. As for the state 
agencies, INVS and AFSSA, they were not quoted. However, this absence is very likely due to 
the fact that the publications of these agencies were quite late (2003, 2005, 2006, and 2006), 
that is, around or after the end of the studied decision-making processes (end between 2003, 
and 2005). From this research, it is thus not possible to draw any conclusion about the trust of 
the NGOs toward these agencies.  
 Surprisingly, national or international NGOs were not a preferred source of scientific 
expertise at all for the local NGOs, whether the expertise was ‘experience-based’ or 
‘certified’. Furthermore the NGOs which resorted to ‘experience-based’ scientific expertise 
also resorted to certified expertises produced by public entities. To a certain extent, the NGOs 
CNIID and Greenpeace were media through which local NGOs received some (certified) 
scientific expertise.  
 As for the absence of production of ‘internal’ scientific expertise, it is likely due to the 
lack of competencies within the NGOs. 
  
 To conclude, in almost each decision-making process, at least one NGO sought ‘external 
general certified scientific expertise’, produced by public institutions or by officially 
                                                 
164 See the WWF web sites (last access 12th May 2008):  
http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/where_we_work/europe/what_we_do/epo/initiatives/chemicals/detox_campai
gn/index.cfm  
http://www.wwf.fr/campagnes/detox  
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accredited laboratories. As many science studies scholar claim, this means that public (here 
local NGOs) engagement is likely to contribute to solving the problem of traditional expertise 
in public decision-making processes (see chapter 1). More particularly, the participation of the 
local NGOs is likely to solve the problem of the inadequacy of traditional scientific expertise, 
that is, the problem of the framing of the issue under discussion, as claimed by Jasanoff 
(1995, 2003) and Goodwin (1994).165 Indeed, the local NGOs searched for information about 
an issue very little considered by the local decision-makers and their experts: the sanitary 
risks and the environmental pollution entailed by waste incineration. A participation of the 
local NGOs from the first stage, that is, from the outset of the decision-making processes, 
would have probably contributed to a wider framing of the issue. This result supports the 
position of Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons (2001), who argue that the plurality of expertise 
brought by the public contributes to the production of a more ‘social robust knowledge’.166  
 The fact that the NGOs sought expertise which is ‘certified’ means that the NGOs rather 
trust the official system of production of scientific expertise. A hypothesis, corroborated by 
the declarations of a few interviewees, is that the NGOs wanted to rely on scientific expertises 
which could not be questioned by the public authorities. In terms of ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn 
T. F., 1983; Gieryn T.F., 1995, the aim of the NGOs was probably to avoid that the public 
authorities resort to a strategy similar to the ‘expulsion’ strategy, that is, that the public 
authorities try to bring discredit the expertises mobilised by the NGOs, qualifying these 
expertises as ‘deviant’, ‘amateurish’, or ‘pseudo-science’.167  
                                                 
165 See chapter 1 for more details 
166 See chapter 1 
167 See chapter 7 section IV.2 for further details about the boundary work. 
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IV. Seeking Local Scientific Expertise 
 As I have already stated, only a few NGOs directly mobilised local expertises while many 
requested to their public authority for sponsoring local expertises. 
IV.1. Direct Mobilisation 
 As table 13 below shows, three NGOs directly mobilised ‘certified external expertise’, 
while only one tried to produce an ‘internal certified’ and one an ‘internal experience-based’ 
expertise. 
Certified Internal Expertise 
 Only in one case did a member of an NGO (N°19), composed of physicians, try to set up 
an epidemiological study, but the attempt failed because of the lack of support of the local 
physicians, and above all because of the absence of register of cancers. It is reasonable to 
make the hypothesis that the local NGOs have not produced any epidemiological or 
environmental studies because of a lack of internal competencies and of technical means.  
Certified External Expertise 
 To get ‘local’ expertise, the three NGOs N°7, 12, and 21 had recourse to private and public 
laboratories. In the three cases, the NGOs asked for the measuring of dioxins produced by an 
old incinerator, pre-existing to the new incineration plant project. First, NGO N°12 resorted to 
the private laboratory named Analytica in order to measure out the quantity of dioxins in the 
soil and in eggs around the site of an old generation incinerator. The NGO tried to ensure the 
legitimacy and the legal value of the analysis through a constat d’huissier made by a huissier 
de justice.168 However, the interviewee was not able to disclose whether the laboratory was 
accredited or not for such analyses. As we will see later in this section, the accreditation of the 
laboratories is a key issue for the NGOs which ordered some analyses. The official 
accreditation gives a legitimacy to the analyses since the accreditation of the laboratories is 
delivered by an official organisation, the French Committee of Accreditation (Comité 
Français d’Accréditation: COFRAC).169 The analysis revealed soil pollution by dioxins, but 
                                                 
168 In France, a Huissier de Justice is a member of the legal profession whose responsibility includes, among 
others, formally bearing witness to events or situations (constat d'huissier). 
169 COFRAC was created in 1994. An accreditation is a proof of technical competences. The accreditation of a 
testing laboratory is made on the basis of the pertinent standard in the NF EN 45000 series and a certification of 
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they were emitted by a chemical industry, and not by the old incinerator. As for the eggs, no 
pollution was showed. So the results had not been put under discussion by the public 
authority. 
 
Table 14. Mobilisation of ‘local’ expertise by the NGOs 
 
 Second, NGO N°7 sponsored the measuring of dioxins in the fat of one cow. But the 
public authority rejected the validity of the analysis arguing that, even if the veterinary was 
accredited by the Direction des Services Vétérinaires (Veterinary Services), he was not 
accredited for the carrying out of fat-taking procedure. Furthermore, the public authority 
argued that the public laboratory, the Institut Pasteur of Lille was not accredited for such 
analysis. According to the interviewee, the difficulty was that “no laboratory in France was 
accredited at that time to do this analyse because the accreditation to do these measuring out 
of dioxins in the food did not exist.” (Interview N°7, CRITOM)   
 Third, following a donation, NGO N.21 ordered the analysis of 10 blood sample to 
quantify dioxins. This NGO searched for months an accredited laboratory in order to produce 
a non questionable analysis. Finally, after having searched in various European countries, the 
NGO found the Belgium accredited laboratory CART (Centre d’Analyse des Résidus en 
                                                                                                                                                        
its quality management system on the basis of the ISO 9001:2000 (see the web-site of COFRAC for more details: 
http://www.cofrac.fr/en/cofrac/Distinction.htm).  
External  Internal 
Private 
Laboratory 
Public laboratory /research 
institution/researcher 
State 
Agency NGO 
Certified 1 NGO 
 
N.19 : 
epidemilogical 
study attempt 
1 NGO 
 
N.12 : 
Analitica + 
Huissier 
2 NGOs 
 
N.7 : D.S.V. + Institut Pasteur 
 
N°21 : huissier + CART  
0 0 
Experience 
Based 
1 NGO  
 
N.22: emission 
flow calculation 
0 0 0 0 
N.X (X from 1 to 22), identifies the twenty two interviewed NGOs by a number. 
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Traces de l’Université de Liège). The takings have been certified by a huissier de justice. 
Finally, the results, which show an over exposure of the residents, have been validated by the 
Institut National de Veille Sanitaire. Following these analyses, NGO N°21 has undertaken a 
legal action for poisoning. To overcome the problem of cost, in the framework of this legal 
procedure, the NGO asked to the magistrate the realisation of an epidemiological study. 
Finally air and eggs analyses, using dioxins as indicator, have been ordered by the judicial 
authority. At the time of the interviews the results of these analyses were not known. 
Experience-based Internal Expertise 
Only one NGO (N°22) declared that it resorted to experience-based internal expertise. 
The expertise was ‘local’, and it consisted of calculations about the flow of emission of 
pollutants released by the chimney of the local incineration plant. 
Summary-Conclusion 
To conclude, the main sources of the five NGOs which mobilised ‘local’ expertise were 
‘externally certified’, and more precisely accredited laboratories. As it is explained in the 
following sub-section, the reason why only few NGOs resorted to laboratories is the cost of 
the analyses that the local NGOs can not afford. Another explanation for this little recourse to 
laboratories could have been that the NGOs wanted to ensure the recognition of the results by 
the public authority. But no NGO mentioned such a reason. Furthermore, as we have seen in 
order to ensure the recognition of the results by the public authority and/or by the law, the 
three NGOs who sponsored themselves ‘local’ scientific studies searched for accredited 
laboratories for the analysis, and the witnessing of a huissier de justice or of an accredited 
veterinary for the taking. 
 The analysis of the research of local expertise is in favour of a probable constructive role 
of the public in top-down participation mechanisms. As I have already stated in chapter 3, the 
local NGOs were informed about the project at the beginning of the second stage. 
Consequently, Local scientific expertise has been sought during the second stage, the 
‘specification’ stage, or during the third stage. They concerned the old generation incineration 
plant, or the new incineration plant project. But, in principle, local expertises could be used 
from the beginning of the decision-making process in order to evaluate the state of the 
environmental pollution. Such an evaluation would be important especially when an old 
incineration used to run. In the framework of participation initiaves sponsored at the outset of 
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the decision-making processes, the mobilisation of ‘local’ expertise by the local NGOs would 
have probably contributed to a wider framing of the incineration waste issue. 
IV.2. Expertise Requested to the Public Authorities 
 Most of the local NGOs (15 out of 22 in seven out of nine decision-making processes) 
requested to the public authority (the Préfet or the mixed-syndicate) for the carrying out of 
expertise. The requests concerned ‘local’ expertises both about the local old and new 
incineration plants. Since the public authorities have not the internal competencies to carry 
out such expertises, they turned to external laboratories. 
The reason why many NGOs requested their public authorities to carry out ‘local’ 
expertise while very few of them themselves ordered ‘local’ analyses to private or public 
laboratories is the cost. As I have explained in the introduction to part III, epidemiological or 
exposure studies are complicated and costly to carry out. Furthermore, even the simplest 
analysis, the measuring of dioxins, is expensive for a local NGO. The cost of such a 
measuring caries from 500€ to 1500€ according to the medium, which is too expensive for the 
budget of the local NGOs. As a matter of fact, while in the questions 11, 12, 13, and 14 about 
the sources of scientific knowledge I did not ask anything about the cost of the analyses, 
eleven out of the twenty two interviewed NGOs (see table 14 below) spontaneously talked 
about this issue: these NGOs clearly stated that they did not sponsor ‘local’ expertise because 
the cost was too high for their budget.  
 The requests covered the entire range of the types of studies which enable the evaluation of 
the sanitary impact of an incineration plant that I have exposed in the introduction of Part III: 
epidemiological studies, exposure studies, and sanitary risk evaluation studies, to evaluate the 
incinerator impact on health; environmental studies to assess the pollution of the environment; 
and the measurement of the emissions of pollutants.170 As I have already stated, many 
requests were not granted, so there is no source of scientific expertise for most of the requests. 
This is the reason why I deal with these request in a separate sub-section from the sources of 
scientific expertise of the NGOs. When the requests were granted, however, the types of 
sources of scientific expertise used in the previous section apply.  
                                                 
170 for further details about these types of studies, see in the section I of this chapter: “The Studies Which Can Be 
Set Up To Measure The Sanitary Impact Of A Household Waste Incinerator”  
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Christophe Voineau  
Controversies, Public Engagement, and Scientific Expertise in Technical-Scientific Decision-Making Processes 
 
- 206 - 
Table 15. The problem of cost for the mobilisation of ‘local’ scientific expertise and the requests made to 
the public authorities  
NGOs (designated by a 
number) 
declaration about 
the problem of 
expertise cost 
Mobilisation of 
‘local’ scientific 
knowledge 
Request of ‘local’ scientific 
expertise to the public 
authority 
1. VPIG 
   
2. Autun Morvan Ecologie 
   
3. Collectif Inciner’àtort 
  X 
4. AREN 
X X X 
5. Collectif Halt Incin’ 
   
6. Thiviers la Vie 
   
7. CRITOM 
 X X 
8. Ecologie Pour Le Havre 
X  X 
9. SOS Estuaire 
  X 
10. Comité du quartier des Neiges 
X  X 
11. Compiègne Ecologie 
   
12. Alerte aux Déchets 
 X X 
13. Coordination Environementale 
des Pyrénées Orientales X  X 
14. La Hune 
X  X 
15. Charles Flahaut 
   
16. Guichainville Environnement 
X  X 
17. La Sauvegarde de 
l’Environnement X  X 
18. ASMSN 
   
19. Association des Médecins de 
Maincy X  X 
20. Un autre regard pour Maincy 
X  X 
21. AVIE 
X X X 
22. AIPPNE 
X  X 
Total 11 4 15 
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 Even if some requests were made during the second stage, most of them were made mostly 
during the third stage, the ‘realisation’ stage, when the opening of the new incineration plant 
became ineluctable.  In other words, the NGOs made these requests once the opening of a new 
incineration plant became inevitable. As a result, these requests could not have an impact on 
the building-non building of the incineration plant. However, they have had an impact on the 
monitoring of the released of pollutants in the environment. When they could not prevent the 
building of a local incineration plant, the local NGOs tried to increase the monitoring of the 
release of pollutants. An existing pollution due to the old incineration plant could have an 
impact on the monitoring of the new one. This suggests mistrust in the operators and the 
authorities charged with the monitoring of the operators. Strictly speaking, these expertises 
are not part of the decision making process (to build or not to build) but of the societal control 
of the technologies-in-use. In substance, the local NGOs wanted some guarantees through 
further monitoring of the emission of dioxins, of the environmental pollution, and of the 
impacts on health. The requests are detailed below, and synthesised in table 15, also below. I 
do not analyse here in detail the refusals of the requests and their motivations in this sub-
section; this is the subject of section I.5 below “reasons for not mobilising scientific 
expertise”. 
Epidemiological Studies 
 Six NGOs requested the carrying out of an epidemiological study of the population 
surrounding their incineration plant, respectively. In other words, the local NGOs wanted the 
carrying out of an expertise in their backyard. Four NGOs (N.8, 12, 20, and 22), in three 
decision-making processes, requested to the public authority (Préfet or mixed-syndicate) the 
realisation of an epidemiological study to evaluate the impact on health of the old incineration 
plant. These NGOs were afraid of the effects on health of long tern exposure to dioxins. NGO 
21 did not ask the local public authority, but made the request directly to a judge in the 
framework of a legal action against the mixed-syndicate, while NGO 19 asked to the DDAAS 
(Direction Départmentale des Affaires Sanitaires et Sociales, Départementale Service of the 
Sanitary and Social Affairs). All these requests have been rejected. 
Exposure Studies 
 The requests for exposure studies consisted of the measuring out of dioxins in blood, 
and/or in maternal milk around the local incineration plant site. While the requests for blood 
tests aimed to evaluate the impact of the old incineration plant, the request for maternal milk 
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concerned the new incineration plant. Here again, these local NGOs sought ‘local’ exposure 
studies. None of the requests has been granted. 
Sanitary Risk Evaluation 
 Only one NGO asked for a sanitary risk evaluation study, which mainly consists of an 
exposure studies which the results are analysed in the light of the Reference Doses and/or 
Reference Concentrations. In the case of Angers, in the framework of the Local commission 
for information and monitoring, on the basis of the law on air,171 the NGO AREN made a 
request to the préfet for the carrying out of a sanitary impact study concerning the old existing 
incineration plant.  
 The request was granted and the study was carried out by certified experts belonging to 
regional services of the state agency INVS. These experts were designated by the DDAAS.172 
The NGO AREN fully trusts the results of this study carried out by certified experts. 
Environmental Studies 
 Environmental studies were the type of study the most requested: 11 NGOs requested such 
studies. Conversely to the epidemiological and exposure studies, most of these requests were 
granted (seven out of 11). The environmental studies consisted of four types of studies: the  
measuring out of dioxins in various mediums, the lichen biomonitoring technique, the impact 
study, and the establishment of the ‘state zero’. These four types of studies are detailed below. 
 To start with, eight NGOs (N°4, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17 and 21) requested the measuring out 
of dioxins in some of the mediums possibly contaminated, that is, soils, vegetation, air, cow’s 
milk, and eggs. These demands concerned either the old incineration plant, the NGOs wanted 
to know the extent to which the old incinerator had contaminated the environment, or the new 
incineration plant, the NGOs wanted further monitoring of the releases of dioxins and other 
pollutants in the environment. Four demands concerned single analysis (NGOs N.4, 7, 16, 21) 
while four other requests (NGO 12, 13, 14, 16) concerned the setting up of regular analyses 
made on several mediums (soil, and/or air, and/or vegetation) in order to continuously assess 
the pollution of the environment. NGO N.16 made an original request: the setting up of a 
vegetable garden and a regular assessment of the contamination of the vegetables by dioxins; 
                                                 
171 Loi No 96-1236 du 30 décembre 1996 sur l'air et l'utilisation rationnelle de l'énergie 
172 (Glorennec P., Zmirou D. and Peigner P., 2001) :Glorennec P., Zmirou D., Peigner P, Cellule Inter Régionale 
d’Epidémiologie Ouest, « Impact sanitaire passé et actuel de l’Usine d’Incinération des Ordures Ménagères 
d’Angers. Rapport », Rennes, 2001. 
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Table 16. The requests of scientific expertises made to the public authorities 
Types of studies 
Health Effects 
NGOs 
(designated by a 
number) 
Epidemiological 
Study 
Exposure 
Studies  
Sanitary  
Risk 
Evaluatio
n 
Environmental 
Studies 
Measurement 
of the Emission 
of pollutants 
1. VPIG      
2. Autun Morvan 
Ecologie 
     
3. Collectif 
Inciner’àtort 
    Ref. 
(Impact study) 
 
4. AREN   Grant 
 
Ref. (dioxins in soil) Ref.  
(Communication 
of the 
continuous 
measurement) 
5. Collectif Halt 
Incin’ 
     
6. Thiviers la Vie      
7. CRITOM  Ref. 
(Blood 
test)  
 Grant. (Dioxins in 
soil and cow’s milk, 
after 2 years); Ref. 
(heavy metal)  
Grant. 
(continuous 
assessment) 
8. Ecologie Pour Le 
Havre 
Ref.  
(multiplicity of 
sources) 
    
9. SOS Estuaire      
10. Comité du 
quartier des 
Neiges 
 Ref. 
(Blood  
tests,  cost) 
 Grant. (lichens)  
11. Compiègne 
Ecologie 
     
12. Alerte aux 
Déchets 
Ref. ( 
multiplicity of 
sources, no 
cancer register) 
  Grant. (regular in soil, 
vegetation and air) 
 
13. Coordination 
Environementale 
des Pyrénées 
Orientales 
   Grant (dioxins in soil, 
vegetation, and air; 
yearly then every two 
year) 
 
14. La Hune    Grant, (dioxins in soil 
and vegetation) 
Ref. (comm.. 
conti.  meas.) 
15. Charles Flahaut      
16. Guichainville 
Environnement 
 Ref. 
(maternal 
milk)  
 Ref. (dioxins in 
vegetables and cow’s 
milk,) 
N.A. (lichens) 
Ref. (con.t 
dioxins) 
17. La Sauvegarde 
de 
l’Environnement 
   Grant. (air) 
Ref. (state zero) 
Grant. 
(communication 
cont. meas.) 
18. ASMSN      
19. Association des 
Médecins de 
Maincy 
Ref. (no cancer  
register) 
    
20. Un autre regard 
pour Maincy 
Ref. Ref. 
(blood 
tests) 
 Ref. (impact study) Grant. (Owen 
cones) 
21. AVIE 
Ref. (through 
legal action) 
  Grant. (dioxins in air 
and cow’s milk; 
through admin. 
Court.) 
 
22. AIPPNE 
Ref. 
Ref. (cancer 
register) 
   Grant. (Owen 
cones) 
Ref.: Refused by the public authority; Grant.: Granted by the public authority; N.A.: No Answer 
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the request was not granted. This NGO also requested some cow’s milk tests, also refused. 
However, in the same decision-making process, following the request of farmers, the mixed-
syndicate granted a regular assessment of the dioxin contamination of cow’s milk, soil, and 
rainwater. As well as for the epidemiological study, the NGO 21 made the request to a judge 
in the framework of a legal action against the mixed-syndicate. 
 Six out of the seven requests were granted (N°7, 12, 13, 14, 17 and 21) and two rejected 
(N°4 and 16). When granted, only two NGOs had the possibility of participating in the 
selection of the laboratory. The laboratories selected were officially accredited (N°7: 
laboratory CARSO, N°12: laboratory APAV, N°13 and N°14: laboratory Laboratoire de 
Rouen, N°17 and N°21: unknown), in other words the expertise produced was ‘certified’. 
 
Second, two NGOs were concerned with the ‘lichens biomonitoring’ technique. This is a 
technique which allows the monitoring of air quality through the measuring out, notably of 
dioxins. Lichens are use as bio-indicators because they are one of the rare vegetal which 
accumulates dioxins. NGO (N°10) requested a regular environment pollution assessment. The 
public authority granted this request proposing the recourse to the lichens biomonitoring 
methods over a period of three consecutive years. These analyses concerned the site of an old 
incinerator plant which used to run. In another case, the NGO N°16 requested the setting up 
of the ‘lichens method’, at the date of the interview no answer was given yet by the public 
authority. On a side note, in the case of Lasse, the mixed syndicate recourses to the lichens 
biomonitoring, following the request of further controls from a group of “mushrooms 
gatherers” (this group is not among the NGOs studied in this research).  
 
 Third, even if the impact study is compulsory by law (Art. L 122-1, Code de 
l’environnement), two NGOs requested it to their respective public authority. An impact study 
consists of the assessment of the possible impacts of a facility on the environment. Then, the 
project must take into account this study to limit the environmental impact of the facility. The 
request made by NGO N°3 was not refused in principle, but the grouping of communes 
argued that it was too early in the decision-making process to carry out such a study, and 
finally the incinerator project has been given up. NGO N.20 declared that it requested an 
impact study which has been refused, even if such a study is compulsory by law. Moreover, in 
the same case, NGO N.19 declared that it asked the suspension of the project because of the 
absence of this compulsory impact study. However, the project went on and the decision-
making process ended with the opening of the incineration plant. 
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 At last, in another case NGO N°17 asked for the assessment of the ‘zero state’, that is the 
assessment of the current pollution of the environment before the incineration plant started to 
run. This request was not granted. 
Measuring of the emission of pollutants   
 Surprisingly, extra measurings of the emissions of pollutants were requested by few NGOs, 
namely six: N°4, 14, 16, 17, 20, and 22. These requests concerned the new incineration 
plants; once the opening of a new incineration plant was inevitable, these local NGOs wanted 
further monitoring of the emission of pollutants. To start with, three NGOs (N°4, 14, and 17) 
simply asked for the communication of the continuous measurement made by the 
operator/mixed-syndicate of a series of molecules, such as HCl, NOx, SO2 (dioxins were not 
measured).173 The request was refused in two cases and granted in one case. Concerning the 
trust in these measurements NGO N°17 did not say that it does not trust, but not that it does 
either: “we don’t trust the numbers 100%” (interview N°17 La Sauvegarde de 
l’Environnement). As for the two other NGOs, NGO N°4 answered that the mixed-syndicate 
considered that there was no legal obligation to communicate the results of such analysis, and 
NGO N°14 complained about the lack of transpARENcy of the mixed-syndicate.  
Two NGOs (N°20 and N°22) requested a continuous monitoring of the emission of 
dioxins. The mixed-syndicate granted the request through the setting of ‘cones Owens’. The 
‘cones Owens’ are recipients distributed within a range of a few kilometres around the 
incineration plant. They gather the dusts falling out from the incinerator chimneys. 
Periodically, the dioxins present in the dust are measured. NGO N°22 did not make any 
comment about the trustworthiness of these analyses, while NGO N°20 complained about the 
fact that it did not participate to the choice of the sites where to install the recipients, and 
argued that “[he is] not sure that the choices actually made were judicious” (interview N.°20 
Un autre regard pour Maincy). In other words, this NGO underlined the lack of “deciding 
together”(Callon M., Lascoumes P. Barthe Y., 2001). Furthermore, this same NGO argued 
that it would have preferred that the choice of the laboratory was done by AFSSA, INVS, or by 
                                                 
173 Such continuous measurements are compulsory as from 28 December 2005 for all existing plants, and as from 
28 December 2002 for all new plants (European Parliament And The Council Of Ministers, 28.12.2000, 
EC/2000/76, art. 20). Some mixed syndicates anticipated this obligation. However, if some mixed syndicate such 
as SMITOM (Vaux-le-Pénil) spontaneously communicated the results without prior requests from the local 
NGOs, some others (Angers, Calce, Guichainville) did not. 
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the Préfet and not by the mixed-syndicate, in order to ensure the independency of the 
laboratory.  
At last, NGO N°16 made the request for a continuous measurement of the emission of 
dioxins at the mouth of the chimney, but it was not granted by the grouping of communes 
which invoked a “technical impossibility”. It should be noted that two mixed-syndicates 
(SIVERT, Lasse; SMITOM, Vaux-le-Pénil) have set up systems of semi-continuous 
measurement of the dioxins emission (Coper-diox™ type).174 SIVERT set up such a system 
following the requests of some local farmers for further pollutants emission monitoring.     
Trust in the results of the measurings of the emissions of pollutants 
 In the eight cases in which the requests were granted (N°7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 21), the 
declarations of the NGOs concerning the trust in the results of these analyses were not always 
clear. For two NGOs (N°17 and N°21) it is not possible to draw any conclusion since they did 
not mention the name of the laboratory, and did not make any comment about their trust in the 
analysis.  
 For two other NGOs (N°7 and N°10), the answers were ambiguous. While it declared that 
there is a “relative trust, and a non-questioning of the results and conclusion drawn by 
INERIS” (interview N°7, CRITOM), CRITOM also argued that the analysis were carried out 
too late after the shutting down of the old incinerator, and thus that “after two years, they [the 
mixed-syndicate] were sure that they would have found nothing”. NGO Comité du quartier 
des Neiges simply answered that they accepted the proposal of the public authority which 
selected and paid for the lichens biomonitoring.  
 Three NGOs (Alerte aux Déchets, la Hune and Guichainville Environnement) trusted the 
results because the selected laboratories (respectively APAV, a “laboratory from Rouen”, and 
Carso and Air Normandie) were accredited. NGO La Hune put it in a strong way: “until proof 
to the contrary, one can not allow himself to contest accredited laboratories” (interview 
N°14, La Hune).  
 At last, two NGOs (Coordination Environementale des Pyrénées Orientales and La Hune), 
which requested further assessments, trusted the results because they participated to the 
choice of the laboratory and of the sites where to take the samples. As Callon, Lascoumes, 
                                                 
174 See “Measurement Of The Emissions Of Pollutant” in the section I of this chapter for further details. 
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and Barthes put it, in this case the trust stems from the “deciding together” (Callon M., 
Lascoumes P. Barthe Y., 2001).  
 It is difficult to draw some strong conclusions concerning the trust in these expertises.  
However it seems that the NGOs rather trust the results. At least, no NGO declared that it 
distrusts the results of the analyses that they requested to the grouping of communes, and four 
out of the eight NGOs strongly stated they trust the results, putting forward the fact that the 
laboratories were accredited, and/or the fact that they participated to the organisation of the 
analyses. The fact that the laboratory is private or public seems to be totally unimportant: no 
NGO talked about this aspect. 
Summary-Conclusion 
 The request made by the local NGOs to the public authority for the carrying out of 
scientific expertise is a very spread phenomenon among the NGOs: 14 out of 22 NGOs made 
such requests. And in all the decision-making processes which ended by the opening of a new 
incineration plant, at least one local NGO requested to the public authority to carry out 
specific scientific expertises. It is likely that the NGOs which did not request scientific 
expertise adopted a ‘division of labour’ strategy among them: the local NGOs of a given case 
worked closely together, so they knew that another one asked for expertise to the public 
authority.  
 All the requests concerned ‘local’ scientific expertise; the local NGOs wanted studies 
concerning their incineration plant project. No NGO asked for ‘general’ expertises; even 
concerning the epidemiological studies, the NGOs wanted above all that the research take into 
consideration the residents who are around their incineration plant site. The NGOs wanted 
some contextualised scientific studies; they wanted scientific expertise in their backyard. 
These requests for ‘local’ expertise show that the engagement of the local NGOs against 
waste incineration generally speaking is in fact a mobilisation against their local incineration 
plant project. 
 The requests concerned mostly the impact of dioxins on health and on the environment. 
The other requests were about other molecules emitted by the incineration plants. This is not 
surprising since, as we have seen in chapter 3, the opposition to the incineration plant projects 
of the NGOs is due to worries about the dioxins. Around 38% of the requests concerned the 
impact on health (11 requests: 6 epidemiological studies, 4 exposure studies, 1 sanitary risk 
evaluation), another 38 % concerned the impact on the environment (11 environmental 
Studies), and the 24 % remaining concerned the measurement of the emissions of pollutants. 
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While most of the requested environmental studies were granted, almost all the requests for 
studies concerning health effects were refused, and half of the extra-measurements of the 
emissions of pollutants were granted. When the requests were granted, the expertises were 
carried out by officially accredited laboratories, that is, they are ‘certified’ experts. To justify 
their refusal concerning the studies about the health effects, the public authorities invoked 
some technical arguments, such as the multiplicity of sources of dioxins, or the absence of 
cancer register. Indeed causal research on the impact of waste incineration on health, such as 
epidemiological studies, is very costly and requires very high technical competences. It is 
likely that local authorities cannot afford it or are not in a position to manage it. On the other 
hand, exposure studies, such as the measuring of dioxins in blood, are neither complicated nor 
costly to carry out (for the budget of a grouping of communes). But the execution of studies 
whose results could be questioned would only lead to increase in the public anxiety, which the 
authorities want to avoid. Therefore it is not surprising that they refused these requests. It 
would have been good to discuss the reasons for acceptance/refusal by the public authorities 
in greater detail. But in this research I have gathered only the views of the NGOs. In further 
research, it would be good to ask the authorities themselves about the reasons for not granting 
this kind of request. 
 The nature and the number of the requests made to the public authority confirms that the 
local NGOs counted on scientific expertise to answer their worries about the impact of 
household waste incineration on health, and on the environment.  
 As in the case of Lasse (only case in which top-down participation was organised before 
the ‘realisation’ stage), it is likely that the granting of the requests for further monitoring 
diminishes the degree of controversy. 
 I have been surprised by the fact that the interviewed NGOs rather trust the results of the 
analyses made or ordered by their grouping of communes. Concerning the environmental 
studies, the NGOs seem to be little bothered by the fact that the laboratories were chosen and 
paid by the public authority, and they do not question the reliability of the analyses. Only a 
very few NGOs stated that their participation to the selection of the laboratory or to the 
selection of the sites where taking the samples is an important element to trust the results. It 
seems that the key element of the trust is the fact that the laboratory has an official 
accreditation. In other words, certification is a key element for the trustworthiness of a source 
of scientific expertise. Another element which favours the trust in the result is the “deciding 
together” (Callon M., Lascoumes P. Barthe Y., 2001), that is the participation of the NGOs to 
the elaboration of the measuring, such as the choice of the site where to take the samples. 
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 At last, the requests for the carrying out of these studies have raised the problem of the 
budget of the Local Commission for Information and Monitoring. According to the law, the 
setting up of a budget is possible but not compulsory. In absence of a budget, the realisation 
of sanitary studies is cautioned to the acceptance of the mixed syndicate or of the operator to 
pay. And a priori, extra monitorings of the emissions of pollutants are not in their interest. 
V. Seeking Scientific Expertise and Type of NGO 
 As I have shown in chapter 3, two types of NGOs can be distinguished: ‘ad hoc’ and 
‘existing’. 11 ‘ad hoc’ and 11 ‘existing’ NGOs engaged in the 10 decision-making processes. 
Relating the types of the NGOs to the research of scientific expertise of the 22 NGOs, it 
emerges that the ‘ad hoc’ NGOs directly mobilised more scientific knowledge than the 
‘existing’ ones (see tables 16 and 17 below). In this analysis I only consider the scientific 
expertise directly mobilised by the local NGOs and not the expertise requested to the public 
authorities. Indeed, the local NGOs typically requested extra-monitoring of emissions and 
their environmental and health effects (rather than analyses of the causal relationships). This 
type of request often has a subtext: we do not trust the system as it is. A request for ever more 
data of this kind is unlikely to make them more supportive of incinerators. Furthermore, most 
of the results of these monitoring activities had yet to be obtained: it could not assess their 
effects at the time of the study. 
 The fact that the ‘ad hoc’ NGOs sought more scientific expertise than the ‘existing’ NGOs 
is supported by four elements. To start with, as table 16 and 17 below shows, the most 
speaking element is that only three out of eleven ‘existing’ NGOs resorted to ‘general 
scientific knowledge’, while almost all the ‘ad hoc’ NGOs (nine out of eleven) did. Secondly, 
the four NGOs which paid for local scientific expertise are ‘ad hoc’ NGOs; none of the 
‘existing’ NGOs directly mobilised ‘local’ expertise. Thirdly, most of the ‘existing’ NGOs, 
that is nine out of 11, did not directly mobilise scientific expertise at all, but only made some 
requests to their public authority, whereas only two out of the eleven ‘ad hoc’ NGOs did so. 
Finally, these two ‘ad hoc’ NGOs invoked the cost of carrying out expertise to explain their 
non-direct mobilisation of scientific expertise, whereas among the nine ‘existing’ NGOs, five 
invoked the ‘division of labour’, and only four the cost (see sub-section I.5 below). It should 
be remembered that while the ‘division of labour’ is really a choice made by the NGOs, the 
absence of mobilisation of expertise due to cost is not a choice at all. Through the ‘division of 
labour’ the ‘existing’ NGOS relied on the ‘ad hoc’ NGOs for the mobilisation of scientific 
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expertise. Moreover, the ‘ad hoc’ were more active than the ‘existing’ NGOs, they organised 
more initiatives against the incinerator project, than the ‘existing’ NGOs.  
 In brief, the main difference comes from the fact that ‘ad hoc’ NGOs are more than twice 
as likely to seek ‘general’ expertise, i.e. educate themselves by reading technical and 
scientific literature. This could depend on the fact that they have less background knowledge 
to start with, or for some other reasons. Both types of NGOs emphasize the importance of 
local expertise (with the existing ones seeking such expertise slightly more often than the 
local ones).  Here the difference is that the ‘ad hoc’ ones sponsor some of these expertises 
directly, while existing ones only make requests to the authorities. 
 It seems that there is a negative correlation between the propensity to seek (certified) 
expertise and the opposition to waste incineration plants. The more the NGOs sought 
(certified) scientific expertise the more they opposed the incinerator project or vice versa, the 
more opposed the NGOs are to incinerators the stronger their effort to mobilize scientific 
arguments as well as to engage in other actions strengthening their position. In fact, in this 
research, the ‘ad hoc’ NGOs were created to stand against a local incineration plant. I remind 
that the main motivation for the engagement of the local NGOs is that they were worried 
about the impact of waste incineration on health. Then, they sought scientific expertise in 
order to get an insight into the dioxin-health issue and the existing scientific expertise, which 
tends to show that incineration is possibly dangerous for health, reinforced the opposition of 
the local NGOs to the incineration plant projects. In order to better support this claim, it 
would be necessary to actually demonstrate that the activity of the ad hoc NGOs is more 
important that the one of the existing NGOs, that is, that ‘ad hoc’ NGOs actually sponsored 
more bottom-up initiatives than ‘existing’ NGOs. 
  
Table 17. Direct mobilisation of scientific knowledge and types of NGOs: frequency table 
 
No seeking of 
scientific expertise 
Direct  
mobilisation of 
general scientific 
knowledge 
Direct  
mobilisation of 
‘local’ scientific 
knowledge 
Request ‘local’ 
scientific expertise 
to the public 
authority 
‘Ad hoc’ NGO 0 9 4 7 
‘Existing’ NGO 3 3 0 7 
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Table 18. Direct mobilisation of scientific knowledge and types of NGOs 
NGOs 
 
No seeking of 
scientific 
expertise 
Direct  
mobilisation of 
general 
scientific 
knowledge 
Direct  
mobilisation of 
‘local’ 
scientific 
knowledge 
Request ‘local’ 
scientific 
expertise to 
the public 
authority Type of NGO 
1. VPIG  X   Ad-Hoc 
2. Autun Morvan 
Ecologie  X   
Exist. 
3. Collectif Inciner’àtort  X   Ad-Hoc 
4. AREN  X X X Ad-Hoc 
5. Collectif Halt Incin’  X   Ad-Hoc 
6. Thiviers la Vie  X   Ad-Hoc 
7. CRITOM  X X X Ad-Hoc 
8. Ecologie Pour Le 
Havre    X 
Exist. 
9. SOS Estuaire    X Exist. 
10. Comité du quartier 
des Neiges    X 
Ad-Hoc 
11. Compiègne Ecologie X    Exist. 
12. Alerte aux Déchets  X X X Ad-Hoc 
13. Coordination 
Environementale des 
Pyrénées Orientales 
   X Ad-Hoc 
14. La Hune  X  X Exist. 
15. Charles Flahaut X    Exist. 
16. Guichainville 
Environnement    X 
Exist. 
17. La Sauvegarde de 
l’Environnement    X 
Exist. 
18. ASMSN X    Exist. 
19. Association des 
Médecins de Maincy  X  X 
Ad-Hoc 
20. Un autre regard pour 
Maincy    X 
Exist. 
21. AVIE  X X X Ad-Hoc 
22. AIPPNE  X  X Exist. 
* the ‘ad hoc’ NGOs are highlighted in grey while the ‘existing’ are in white 
 
 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Christophe Voineau  
Controversies, Public Engagement, and Scientific Expertise in Technical-Scientific Decision-Making Processes 
 
- 218 - 
VI. Reasons for not Mobilising Scientific Expertise 
 As I have stated in the theoretical framework, The NGOs which did not mobilise scientific 
expertise can be placed into two categories: those which did not seek expertise and those 
which failed to obtain the sought expertise. Only three NGOs did not seek scientific expertise 
while eleven others failed to obtain all or part of the sought expertise.  
Reasons for Not Seeking Scientific Expertise 
  As table 18 below shows, only three NGOs (N°11, 15, and 18) did not seek scientific 
expertise. The reasons they invoked only partially matches the typology developed by Mike 
Michael, which is made of three types: ‘division of labour’, ‘deliberate choice’, and ‘mental 
constitution’ (See chapter 7, section III for further details about his typology). In fact I have 
had to partially modify the definition of these types. Two NGOs adopted a ‘division of 
labour’ and one a ‘deliberate choice’ view.  
 NGO N° 15 argued for a ‘division of labour’ between them and the health experts. To the 
question about the production or use of scientific expertise on the impact of dioxins on health, 
this NGO answered: “Everyone has its own domain. Health is the role of the people who deal 
with it.” (interview N° 15, Charles Flahaut). Also ASMSN (NGO N°18) adopted a ‘division of 
labour’ view. However the repartition of competencies is not envisaged not between the 
experts and NGOs, as in the original definition sets up by Mike Michael, but among the local 
engaged NGOs themselves. In other words the position of these NGOs is that they did not 
need to mobilise scientific knowledge since other NGOs did it; “you should see with the other 
NGOs, our NGO is more interested in the clinker management” (Interview N°18, ASMSN)  
  Only NGO N°11 held a ‘deliberate choice’ position. It did not claim, however, that it is not 
interested by scientific expertise but that “the information received through CNIID and NGO 
Alerte aux Déchets [were] enough” (interview N°11, Compiègne Ecologie) 
 No NGO invoked a failing ‘mental constitution’ to justify the fact that they did not resort 
to scientific expertise. Only one NGO declared that it remained superficial with regard to 
scientific knowledge because of a lack of internal competences to deal with them: “We use 
above all [scientific] information. We did not enter in depth. One must be connoiseur, 
technician.” (Interview N°1, VPIG) It is not surprising that no NGO invoked the ‘mental 
constitution’ since this view is linked rather to individuals; it is more difficult to apply this 
concept to a legal entity or group of persons (Mike Michael built up his typology on the basis 
of interviews with individuals, while I study NGOs, that is, groups of people). 
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Table 19. Reasons for not mobilising scientific expertise  
NGOs 
No Seeking 
Scientific 
Expertise 
Justification for 
non or partial 
seeking of 
expertise 
Declaration of a 
problem of cost 
of expertise 
Request of 
‘local’ 
scientific 
expertise to 
the public 
authorities 
Total or partial 
rejection of the 
requests 
1. VPIG      
2. Autun Morvan Ecologie      
3. Collectif Inciner’àtort    X X 
4. AREN   X X X 
5. Collectif Halt Incin’      
6. Thiviers la Vie      
7. CRITOM    X X 
8. Ecologie Pour Le Havre   X X X 
9. SOS Estuaire  Division of labour  X  
10. Comité du quartier des 
Neiges   X X X 
11. Compiègne Ecologie X Deliberate choice    
12. Alerte aux Déchets    X X 
13. Coordination 
Environementale des 
Pyrénées Orientales 
   X X  
14. La Hune   X X X 
15. Charles Flahaut X Division of labour    
16. Guichainville 
Environnement   X X X 
17. La Sauvegarde de 
l’Environnement   X X X 
18. ASMSN X Division of labour    
19. Association des 
Médecins de Maincy  
Division of 
labour X X X 
20. Un autre regard pour 
Maincy  
Division of 
labour X X X 
21. AVIE   X X X 
22. AIPPNE   X X X 
Total 3 - 11 15 13 
 ‘Ad hoc’ NGOs are highlighted in grey while ‘existing’ are in white 
 
 Three NGOs which did mobilised expertise or which made some requests to their public 
authority for expertise invoked a division of labour between the NGOs to justify the fact that 
they did not seek certain types of expertises (NGOs N°9, 19 and 20). Concerning the carrying 
out of blood analysis of the residents, NGO N°20 mentioned that the ‘division of labour’ 
among NGOs is a strategy to overcome material limits due to the nature of the NGO: “This is 
[NGO 21] which has dealt with this issue. We are a small local NGO. We have neither the 
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time nor the means to do everything. There is a distribution of the tasks among the NGOs. The 
aim of our NGO was to say: ‘beware! It is not so simple’. We did not need to be as precise as 
[NGO 22]” (interview N°20, Un autre regard pour Maincy). Let’s note that the ‘division of 
labour’ and the cost of expertise are closely related factors. Still about the same blood 
analyses, NGO Association des Médecins de Maincy declared that “expertises have already 
been realised by NGO AVIE […]”. To the questions about the mobilisation of scientific 
expertise, NGO SOS Estuaire answered: “for these matters [i.e. scientific expertise], you 
should ask to the NGO [N°8]” (interview N°9, SOS Estuaire). 
 I could have developed a fifth type of the reasons for not seeking scientific expertise, 
namely ‘lack of time’. However, I have finally not included this type because it was not well 
grounded. Only one NGO (VPIG) invoked a lack of time: “[the NGO has] not gone deeper 
into scientific expertise because of a lack of time” (interview N°1, VPIG). Moreover, this 
NGO mobilised some scientific expertise.  
  Relating the reasons to the type of NGO (see table 19 below), it emerges that the division 
of knowledge and sufficient knowledge (‘deliberate choice’/’division of labour’) are indicated 
almost solely by the existing NGOs, while the problem of costs is mentioned roughly equally 
often by both types of NGOs. It could be that existing NGOs are more sophisticated in their 
strategies of mobilising knowledge, or merely that they rely on others (other NGOs and public 
authorities) to get scientific expertise. 
 
Table 20. Type of NGO and reasons for not mobilising scientific expertise: frequency table 
 
Division of 
knowledge Problem of cost 
‘Ad hoc’ 1 5 
‘Existing’ 5 6 
 
Reasons for failing to obtain the sought expertise 
 No NGO invoked the impossibility of mobilising general scientific expertise. From the 
interviews, it seems that they obtained all the general expertises they sought. On the contrary, 
as I have shown in the previous section, many NGOs (11) could not afford the cost of ‘local’ 
expertise and consequently requested to their public authority for their carrying out. 
Consequently, the NGOs which failed to obtain the sought expertise are those which the 
requests were not granted by the public authority. In other words, the reasons for the failure to 
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obtain the sought-after expertise are thus the conjunction of the cost of the expertises and the 
refusal of the public authorities. 
 Only one NGO (N°16) which sought expertise finally did not succeed in getting any: it did 
not mobilise expertise and all its requests were refused. However, as table 19 above shows, all 
the NGOs which requested some expertise faced some refusals. In the facts, about half of the 
requests made to the public authorities were not granted (see table 15 in sub-section I.3 
above). Most of the refusals were partial, that is, the public authorities granted a part of the 
requests and rejected the other one, respectively. The rate of granting/refusal mainly depends 
on the type of expertise requested. As I have exposed in sub-section I.3 above, the requests 
covered the entire range of types of expertise that can be made to evaluate the impact of 
incineration on health (epidemiological studies, exposure studies, sanitary risk evaluation), or 
the environment (environmental studies, measurement of the emission of pollutants). 
 To start with, the six requests for epidemiological studies were rejected (see table 15 in 
section I.3 above). Three NGOs declared that the public authorities justified their refusals 
with technical arguments: in two cases it was impossible to realise epidemiological studies 
because of the lack of cancers registers (N°12 and 19), and in two other cases the multiple 
sources of dioxins prevented from evaluating the impact of the dioxins produced only by the 
incinerator (N°8 and 12). The three other NGOs (N.20, 21, 22) did not talk about the reasons 
invoked for the refusal. However, since these NGOs are all three linked to the same decision-
making process as NGO 19, the reason is likely the same: the absence of cancer register. 
Moreover, NGO 22 also requested the setting up of a cancer register for future studies, but 
this request was rejected too. 
  None of the three requests for blood tests (NGOs N°7, 10, 20) and for maternal milk test 
(NGO 16) was granted by the public authorities either. The reasons of these refusals have not 
been exposed by the NGOs or by the public authorities. Since the cost is not that high for the 
budget of the public authorities, it is likely that the local public authorities did not want to 
take the risk to uncover that some residents were contaminated by dioxins. Consequently, it is 
also likely that the material impossibility to carry out epidemiological studies was not really a 
problem for the public authorities…   
 The refusals concerning environmental studies and the measurement of the emission of 
pollutants do not depend on the type of expertise requested but rather on the public 
authority/decision-making process. These requests were granted by certain public authorities 
and not by others. In fact, only seven out of the eighteen requests concerning environmental 
studies and the emission of pollutants were rejected, and six of these rejections concerned two 
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decision-making processes (one highly and one slightly controversial). Moreover, these two 
grouping of communes rejected all the requests made by the NGOs. In the light of the data I 
have, it is difficult to interpret these refusals from these two public authorities. They occurred 
in one highly and one slightly controversial decision-making processes.  
 Let us note here, however, that in the highly controversial decision-making process quoted 
above, the grouping of communes finally abandoned the incineration plant project (most of 
the requests concerned the old incineration plant which was still running at the time of the 
decision-making process), whereas in the highly and moderately decision-making processes 
which ended by the opening of the incineration plant, the groupings of communes granted 
most of the requests. It is thus likely that the public authorities granted the requests in order to 
make the new incineration plant more acceptable.  
VII. Overcoming the NIMBY Label 
 As stated in the previous chapter, in order to gain moral credibility, an obstacle the local 
NGOs have to overcome is the NIMBY label. The analysis of the overcoming of the NIMBY 
label is based on the interviews with the twenty two engaged NGOs. This analysis is not an 
analysis of the discourse that the NGOs made to convince the wider public or the decision-
makers, which is the subject of the section III of this chapter. But while the overcoming of the 
NIMBY label is one of the arguments I talked about in the development of the theoretical 
framework concerning the discourses of the NGOs, the nimby issue spontaneously popped up 
in many of the interviews with the NGOs. Consequently, I have considered that it was an 
issue of importance that I should deal with. To the questions number 2 “for which reasons has 
your NGO been created?” and number 6 “what is your positioning with regard to the 
incineration plant?”, 14 out of the 22 interviewed NGOs spontaneously talked about the 
NIMBY issue, in a more or less explicit way, even quoting sometimes the concept of NIMBY 
itself. Three NGOs were not initially opposed to the incineration plant project, so the NIMBY 
label was not an issue for them, and it has not been possible to draw some conclusion after the 
declaration of three NGOs. Only one NGO did not try to overcome the NIMBY label and 
stated that the aim of the NGO was to “alert against the [local] incineration plant project” 
(interview N°7, CRITOM). The positioning of the NGOs with regard to the NIMBY label is 
summarised in the tables 20 and 21 below. Among the three strategies to overcome the 
NIMBY label, the most used is the Not In Anybody Backyard (NIABY). Indeed, most of the 
NGOs (i.e. 8) which dealt with the NIMBY issue attempted to generalize their position 
concerning the incineration plant project: they explained that they are against the incineration 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Chapter 8 
Sources of Scientifc Expertise of the NGOs 
 
- 223 - 
of waste generally speaking not only against their local incineration plant project. For 
example, they declared that “they are opposed to the principle of incineration” (interview 
N°2, Autun Morvan Ecologie), that “incineration is not a good method for the waste 
treatment” (interview N°13, Coordination Environementale des Pyrénées Orientales), or that 
they are “against thermical waste treatment in the département and opposed to the sending of 
the wastes elsewhere for incineration” (interview N°5, Collectif Halt Incin’). Five NGOs 
resorted to the LISU (Local Inappropriate Site Use) argument. One NGO declared that 
incineration is not appropriate to a rural department (interview N°6, Thiviers la Vie), while 
two other where opposed to the setting up of a new incineration plant on the same site of the 
old one because of the existing pollution (interviews N°19 Association des Médecins de 
Maincy, et N°20 Un autre regard pour Maincy), at last one NGO argued that “there is no 
evidence that the site selected is the less bad in the circonscription” (interview N°20, Un 
autre regard pour Maincy). One NGO made a reference to the LISU argument but in a 
positive way, since it is “not against an incineration plant if it is situated on an appropriate 
site” (interview N°10, Comité du quartier des Neiges). However, this NGO had an interest in 
the setting up of a new incineration plant. Indeed, this NGO is composed of the residents next 
to an old incineration plant which has been closed following the setting up of a new one in the 
middle of a big industrial zone, and far away from their housing.  
 No NGO resorted to the BANANA (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anyone) 
strategy. Obviously, this radical position has little chance to increase the moral credibility of 
the local NGOs in the eyes of the wider public: it is necessary to build up new facilities in 
order to treat household wastes.  
 Three NGOs did not contest the choice of the site but the choice of the waste treatment 
technology. In other words, they argued (in a more or less explicit way) that they did not 
oppose the setting up of a waste treatment facility on the selected site, but they did not want 
the incineration technology. They wanted an alternative waste treatment technique. In other 
words, beyond the NIABY or LISU arguments, the local NGOs set up a fourth type of 
strategy, the proposition of alternatives, I label this argument Local Alternative Land Use 
(LALU). As a matter of fact, from the question N°14 “have you mobilised technical 
knowledge concerning incineration or the alternatives for the waste treatment?”, it follows 
that most of the NGOs searched for some information about the alternative waste treatment 
techniques and that they supported some of these. As table 20 below shows, fourteen NGOs 
in nine out of the 10 studied cases searched for information about alternative techniques: 
thermolysis, pyrolisis, methanisation, and mechanical biological sorting. Six NGOs have not 
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searched for information, however only in one case none of the NGOs dealt with the 
alternative techniques. It should be highlighted that at the local level the NGOs worked 
together in a large extent and that they were a distribution of the tasks between them. To 
conclude, the LALU strategy can be qualified as “positive” since it offers alternatives to the 
incineration plant project, whereas the NIABY, LISU, or BANANA strategy are “negative” 
since they are limited to the opposition to the initial project set up by the decision-makers.  
 From table 21 below, it emerges that there is no correlation between the type of the NGO 
and the strategy to overcome the NIMBY label. 
 To finish, this section on the NIMBY issue clearly indicates that technological alternatives 
were an issue for most of the NGOs. Consequently, it would be interesting to analyse the 
setting up of incineration plant, not only in the light of the PUS literature, but to also of the 
public technological choice perspective litterature. 
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Table 21. Frequency of use of the strategies to overcome the NIMBY label and type of NGO 
 
 
Table 22: strategies of the 22 NGOs to overcome the NIMBY label  
NGOs (designated by a 
number) Positioning with regard to the incineration plant 
Strategy to 
overcome the 
NIMBY label 
Research of 
Alternative 
Technologies 
1. VPIG 
Against incineration 
Opposition also after the given up 
NIABY 
Methanisation 
Visit of sites 
2. Autun Morvan 
Ecologie - -  
A member made afile 
about the alternatives 
3. Collectif 
Inciner’àtort 
Against principle of incineration. No opposition to the choice 
of the site but to the technology. 
NIABY 
LALU 
Visits of sites. 
Mechanical biological 
sorting 
4. AREN Against incineration plant also in the other site NIABY ? 
5. Collectif Halt Incin’ Against waste thernical treatment in the department and not sent wastes elsewhere for incineration  NIABY 
Contact with local 
decision-makers from 
other places 
6. Thiviers la Vie Against incineration in a rural département LISU 
Visit of sites 
Mechanical biological 
sorting 
7. CRITOM Warn about the incineration plant project. Increasing selective sorting  
NIMBY 
LALU 
Bio-masse, 
methanisation and 
others 
8. Ecologie Pour Le 
Havre Against incineration. In favour of methanisation 
NIABY 
LALU 
Methanisation 
9. SOS Estuaire Against incineration generally speaking NIABY 
Methanisation 
See EPLH 
10. Comité du quartier 
des Neiges 
Not against an incineration plant if it is situated on an 
appropriate site LISU 
Asked for increasing 
of the selective 
sorting 
11. Compiègne 
Ecologie Opposition to the incineration plant wherever they are NIABY 
No 
12. Alerte aux Déchets Have information about the project. Study alternative to incineration for the waste treatment LALU 
Yes visit of sites. 
Internet 
13. Coordination 
Environementale 
des Pyrénées 
Orientales 
Incineration is not a good method for the waste treatment NIABY 
No, this is not the role 
of the NGOs 
14. La Hune Incineration as a transitory solution 
Initially, 
incineration was 
not Problematic 
No, because the NGO 
has little means 
15. Charles Flahaut Necessity to treat the wastes. Incineration was the less bad solution No Problematic 
No 
Strategy 
Type  
of NGO 
NIMBY NIABY LALU LISU BANANA 
‘Ad hoc’ 1 5 3 3 0 
‘Existing’ 0 3 2 2 0 
Total 1 8 5 5 0 
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NGOs (designated by a 
number) Positioning with regard to the incineration plant 
Strategy to 
overcome the 
NIMBY label 
Research of 
Alternative 
Technologies 
16. Guichainville 
Environnement 
Opposition to the incineration plant because there are 
alternative solutions less dangerous for the heatlth LALU 
Thermolyisis, 
mechanical biological 
sorting, individual 
composting 
17. La Sauvegarde de 
l’Environnement Opposition to incineration because of  the health effects - 
Pyrolisis, mechanical 
biological sorting 
18. ASMSN Initially, incineration was not a matter. This was considered as a progress by comparison to the landfills 
Initially, 
incineration was 
not Problematic 
Vaguely 
19. Association des 
Médecins de 
Maincy 
Wondering about the opportunity to set up a new 
incineration plant on the same site because of the existing 
pollution 
LISU 
No 
20. Un autre regard 
pour Maincy 
Against the siting of the incineration plant which is at the 
geographical center and not at the barycentre of the 
population. No demonstration the site was the less bad of the 
circonscription 
LISU 
No 
21. AVIE The aim of the NGO is to obtain compensations for the victims of the old incineration plant - 
No because the NGO 
has been created 
lately 
22. AIPPNE Opposition to the incineration plant because of the pollution due to the old incineration plant LISU 
Through CNIID. 
Maximising selective 
sorting is the best 
solution 
‘Ad hoc’ NGOs are highlighted in grey, ‘existing’ are in white 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 The analysis of the sources of scientific expertise of the NGOs supports the idea that local 
NGOs are likely to make constructive contributions to local technical-scientific decision-
making processes. The sponsoring of top-down participation initiatives from the outset of the 
decision-making processes would have very probably improved the quality of the expertise 
delivered to the local public authorities. Taking again the concept developed by Nowotny, 
Scott, and Gibbons (2001), this means that the local NGOs are likely to contribute to the 
‘social robustness’ of scientific expertise thanks to the plurality they bring.175 
 To begin with, local NGOs are likely to bring alternative worthwhile scientific expertise in 
local decision-making processes. Even though they are unable to produce their own expertise 
because of the lack of internal competencie, they are capable to seek and mobilise ‘local’ and 
‘general’ ‘external certified scientific expertises’. Almost all the NGOs sought, and most of 
them brought some, scientific expertises. Furthermore, almost no NGO made the ‘deliberately 
choice’ of not seeking scientific expertise. Some NGOs failed to mobilise the sought (‘local’) 
                                                 
175 See chapter 1 
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expertise, but it was not a deliberate choice; the reasons for these failures are the conjunction 
of economic impossibilities of the NGOs and of refusals of the public authorities to order and 
pay for the expertises. In order to make possibe an efficient participation of the public to the 
decision-making process, it would be necessary to provide the participation mechanisms, such 
as the Local Commission for Information and Monitoring, with a budget dedicated to the 
carrying out of extra scientific expertises. Many Science Studies scholars argue for the 
incorporation of ‘non-standard’ knowledge in order to improve the governance of risk 
(Wynne B., 1992; Fischer F., 1999; Weale A., 2001; Callon M., Lascoumes P. Barthe Y., 
2001; Jasanoff S., 2003; Grundmann R. and Stehr N., 2003; Dietrich H., Schibeci R., 
2003/10/1).176 I do not question the probable valuable contribution of ‘non-standard’ 
knowledge. But in this study, I have focused on ‘standard knowledge’, and the analysis shows 
that the public (here the local NGOs) are likely to contribute to the decision-making bringing 
valid alternative ‘standard knowledge’. The fact that the expertise brought by the local NGOs 
was valid is supported by the fact that, to a very large extent, the scientific expertises were 
‘certified’: the local NGOs mainly sought ‘general’ expertises produced by recognized public 
institutions or researchers, and ‘local’ expertises produced by officially accredited 
laboratories. They resorted to a very minor extent to ‘experienced-based’ expertise.  
 Secondly, generally speaking, in technical-scientific decision-making processes, debates 
are likely to be easier when the participants agree on what counts as scientific expertise, and 
what does not. In the cases studied here, it seems that the ‘certification’ of scientific expertise 
is likely to prevent the NGOs and public authority from making ‘boundary works’, that is, 
from disputing what counts as scientific expertise and what does not (Gieryn T.F., 1995; 
Gieryn T. F., 1999c)177. Indeed, from the interviews of the local NGOs, it appears that the 
local NGOs sought mainly for ‘certified’ scientific expertise very likely in order not to be 
contested by the public authority. In fact, the public authorities did not question the validity of 
the results of the ‘local’ expertises ordered by some local NGOs to officially accredited 
laboratories (in future researches, it would be interesting to verify whether the public 
authority recognise the scientific character of the general ‘certified’ expertises mobilised by 
the local NGOs). Moreover, the local NGOs trusted the expertises ordered by the public 
authorities; the main reason for this trustworthiness is that the laboratories were officially 
accredited. Therefore, the recourse to ‘certified’ expertise, and especially to officially 
                                                 
176 See chapter 1 
177 See chapter 1 
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accredited laboratories, is likely to avoid or at lleast to limit attempts of making ‘boundary 
works’ in order to discredit the opponents. This does not mean, however, that the involved 
parties would necessarily agree on the content of the expertises. They may mobilise 
contrasting expertises, and they may confront on the interpretation of the results. For example, 
the interpretation of the epidemiological study carried by INVS (2003) is likely to depend on 
the point of view of the reader. In substance, in the conclusion of this study, it is argued that 
the old generation incineration plants were actually dangerous but that these results do not 
allow the evaluation of the dangerousness of the new generation incineration plants. 
As pointed out by some Science Studies scholars, scientific expertises inevitably 
incorporate popular conceptions and personal values (Jasanoff, S, 1990; Nowotny H., 2003; 
Jasanoff S. and Lynch M., 1998; Funtowicz S. and Ravetz J., 1992), and very few researchers 
are not affected by their personal interest and financial dependence when acting as experts 
(Jasanoff, 1990).178 However, this research suggests that these drawbacks listed by Science 
Studies scholars were not a problem for the local NGOs. Indeed, this research shows that 
NGOs trust ‘certified’ expertises, especially the local ones carried out by officially accredited 
laboratories, not minding who ordered them. This suggests that the matter of the local NGOs 
is not the sources of expertise of the local public authority (in a given domain), but the 
selection of the relevant domains. In other words, the main problem for the studied local 
NGOs was the framing of the issue under discussion. In fact, the local NGOs attempted to 
widen the framing of the waste incineration issue including sanitary and environmental 
concerns. Indeed, the sought ‘general’ and ‘local’ expertises and the expertises requested to 
the public authorities concerned mainly the impact of incineration on health and on the 
environnement. According to the NGOs, these two issues were almost not considered by the 
local decision-makers. This result supports the position hold by numerous scholars who claim 
that public involvement have the potential to widen expertise in order to answer the 
complexities of the social and the political world (Wynne B., 1992; Fischer F., 1999; Weale 
A., 2001; Callon M., Lascoumes P. Barthe Y., 2001; Nowotny H., Scott P. Gibbons M., 2001; 
Nowotny H., 2003; Jasanoff S., 2003; Grundmann R. and Stehr N., 2003; Dietrich H., 
Schibeci R., 2003/10/1).179 
 At last, the local NGOs strongly emphasized ‘local’ expertise; they largely prefer it to the 
‘general’ ones. They wanted expertise made in their backyard. The expertises contextualised 
                                                 
178 See chapter 1 
179 See chapter 1 
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in their own cases seem to be more convincing to the local NGOs. But above all, ‘local’ 
expertises are more likely to be politically effective, simply because the local population is 
probably more concerned by the local incineration plant project: in their daily life, they face 
or will face their local incineration plant and its possible effects on health, not the other 
incineration plants running in France. Moreover, the emphasis on the local monitoring of the 
plants is likely to (i) create a degree of control over the operations of the technology-in-use, 
and (ii) create the possibility of re-opening the debate in the future. For material reasons, it 
was not always possible to carry out the ‘local’ expertises wanted by the local NGOs. it is 
often possible to carry out ‘local’ environmental expertises whereas it is much more difficult 
to realise ‘local’ epidemiological studies. Environmental studies are easy to realise: samples 
are taken and then sent to a (officially accredited) laboratory. As we have seen the local 
NGOs and the local public authorities may be in position to order and pay for such expertises. 
These ‘local’ environmental expertises are likely to increase the knowledge of the actual state 
of the local environmental pollution, and thus to positively contribute to the decision-making; 
in other words it increases the quality of the overall expertise delivered to the local decision-
makers.  
On the contrary, the carrying out of ‘local’ epidemiological studies is often impossible 
since they often require the selection of multiple incineration plants to monitor a series of 
parameters. Significant epidemiological studies are more likely to be produced at the national 
level, by the State agencies INVS or AFSSA. As we have seen, these agencies produced some 
national epidemiological studies, but which were produced rather late. The setting up of 
national participation mechanisms could be a solution to make these agencies more reactive in 
front of the needs for further expertises of local NGOs or local decision-makers. These 
mechanisms should involve, notably, the state agencies, the concerned national NGOs (with 
their net of local NGOs), and the associations of local public authorities such as Association 
des Maires de France. In these participation mechanisms, it should be given the possibility to 
the local public authorities and the local NGOs to directly request the carrying out of 
expertises to the State agencies. 
 Another aspect of the local dimension is the importance of the NIMBY issue for the local 
NGOs. As a matter of fact it spontaneously popped up in the interviews. The NGOs did not 
have a NIMBY attitude: they did not say “build the incineration where you want but not next 
to our home”. On the contrary, the NGOs perceive the NIMBY label as an obstacle that they 
had to overcome. In fact, they resorted to various strategies to overcome the NIMBY label, 
they resorted mainly to the NIABY (Not In Anybody Backyard) and LISU (Local Unadapted 
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Site Use) and to a minor extent to the LASU (Local Alternative Site Use) strategies. No 
NGOs resorted to the BANANA (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anyone) 
strategy. This is not surprising since ‘BANANA’ is a negative label which highlights an 
extreme and untenable position: the refusing of any change. It is likely that the aim of the 
NGOs was to gain ‘moral credibility’ in the eyes of the wider public. The discourses of the 
NGOs may lack of sincerity, but this is not the important point. The main point is that the 
NGOs’ attempts to avoid the NIMBY pitfall led them to the research of alternative 
technologies to incineration. This research confirms theories proposing fairly positive view of 
the NIMBY phenomenon. This research shows that citizens may have a good grasp of and 
reasonable concern for health and welfare, which are ignored by technical and administrative 
elites (Fiorino D., 1995; Matheny A. and Williams B., 1985; Kraft M. and Clary B., 1991; 
Hunter S. and Leyden K. M., 1995).180 
 
 From a theoretical point of view, the property space of the sources of scientific expertises 
developed in the theoretical framework (chapter 8) works quite well for the studied local 
NGOs. In the light of the empirical study, I have distinguished the ‘general’ and ‘local’ 
expertise: the ‘general’ expertise consists of existing studies, while the ‘local’ consists of 
original analyses, such as the measurement of dioxins in the soil, cow’s milk, or eggs, which 
are made around the incineration plants the local NGOs are directly concerned with.  
 Concerning the reasons of the NGOs for not mobilising scientific expertise; the typology 
developed by Mike Mikael (1996) – ‘mental constitution’, ‘deliberate choice’, and ‘division 
of labour’ – fits only very partially the present research. First, no NGO invoked the ‘mental 
constitution’ to explain why they did not seek scientific expertise, which is not surprising 
since this reason is much more likely to be invoked by natural persons than by legal entities 
such as the local NGOs. Second, I have had to modify the type ‘division of labour’ since the 
NGOs talked about a division of labour among the local NGOs and not between the NGOs 
and the experts as defined by Mike Mikael. Only the type ‘deliberate choice’ fits well in this 
research.  
 As for the NIMBY issue, I have identified a strategy that I did not find in the literature: the 
‘Local Alternative Site Use’ (LASU). In the ‘Local Alternative Site Use’, this is not the 
choice of the site which is questioned but the choice of the waste treatment technology. The 
                                                 
180 See chapter 7 
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NGOs argue that alternative waste treatment technology should be used. Of course, this 
strategy can be used only when there are alternatives. This argument may be intertwined with 
the LISU argument, that is, some NGOs claim that the site is not adapted for the proposed 
activity, and they propose another destination for the site. 
 To finish, from a theoretical perspective point of view, this analysis of the sources of 
scientific expertise of the local NGOs supports the position held by the ‘critical’ PUS 
scholars, that is, that the public is able to reflect on the source of their knowledge, that they 
are able to assess the credibility of the source and to evaluate the quality of the knowledge 
they have acquired (Irwin A. and Wynne B., 1996; Irwin A. and Michael M., 2003).181  
                                                 
181 See chapter 7 
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Chapter 9  
Scientific Expertise in the Discourses of the Local 
NGOs 
 As we have seen, sanitary risks are at the core of the concerns of residents, and the main 
reason for their engagement. Moreover, in the previous chapter, we have seen that the 
engaged NGOs searched for scientific expertise in order to have an insight into the dioxin-
incineration-health effects issue and to monitor the pollution emitted by the incineration 
plants. This chapter intends to answer to the research question n°6: “Is scientific expertise a 
key argument in the discourses of the NGOs; what are the other types of arguments NGOs 
employ in their discourses to convince the wider public and the public authorities?” The aim 
of this chapter is to analyse the strategy of the NGOs to confront scientific expertise 
(mobilisation, challenge, demarcation, complementary) and to evaluate whether they try to 
gain ‘cognitive’ or ‘moral’ credibility’.  
 The first section introduces the methodology used, while section II deals with the discourse 
of the NGO AREN, and section III with the discourse of the NGO Collectif Inciner’àtort.  
I. Methodology 
I.1. Selecting the Cases 
 For reasons of time, I could not analyse the discourses of the 22 NGOs which engaged in 
the eleven decision-making processes. Consequently, this analysis is based on the discourses 
of two ad hoc NGOs, AREN and Collectif Inciner’àtort, which strongly engaged in the 
decision-making process of Angers. 
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 These two NGOs have been selected two reasons. First, for these two NGOs the question 
of the health impact of the incinerator was acute. Consequently, as I have stated in the 
previous chapter, for these two NGOs, scientific expertises have been an important source of 
information to get an insight into the incineration-dioxins-health effects issue. In other words, 
they knew a series of ‘certified’ expertises. It would have not been possible to make any 
analysis of the use of scientific expertise in the discourses of NGOs which did not seek and 
find many scientific expertises. Second, these two NGOs are two extreme cases. Indeed, the 
decision-making process of Angers has been selected because it was the most controversial 
decision-making process. As we have seen in chapter 4 and 6, a high degree of controversy 
means that the NGOs strongly engaged in the decision-making process. In fact, as I have 
shown in chapter 6, AREN and Collectif Incine’àtort are the two NGOs which sponsored the 
highest numerous of bottom-up communication initiatives, among which many newsletters 
and press releases. Thus, there are some materials to be studied; it would have been difficult 
to make an analysis of the discourses of NGOs which published very few documents.  
 Therefore, these two NGOs are more likely than the others to have used a great deal of 
scientific expertise, and to have built the most complex discourses in order to support their 
opposition to the incineration plant project. The analysis being based on two cases, the aim of 
this section is more to illustrate novel concepts rather than to build a complete theory. 
Besides, if the analysis shows that these two extreme NGOs did not use that much scientific 
expertise in their discourses, it is likely that the other NGOs did not either. On the contrary, if 
scientific expertise was central in the discourses, it would be interesting to analyse other 
NGOs in order to evaluate in details the variations of the use of scientific expertise in their 
discourses and their reasoning. 
I.2. Data Collection and Analysis Method 
 The analysis relies on the documents published by the two NGOs. The documents were 
aimed at the wider public or to the public authority. The data analysis method is inspired by 
the grounded theory methodology182 and the analysis has been conducted with the help of the 
software Atlas-ti.183 
                                                 
182 The grounded theory methodology was originally set up by Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser. Their first 
book, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research (Strauss A. and Glaser B., 1967) 
was published in 1967. Then they separately wrote a series of articles and monographs, the most relevant are: 
Glaser B., 1978; Glaser B., 1992; Strauss A. L., 1987. Then Anselm Strauss published in collaboration with 
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 The Analysis starts with the ‘coding’ which consists of a line-by-line analysis: I highlight 
some words, sentences, or even entire paragraphs and attributes a code to these highlighted 
parts called ‘quotation’. The code is a more or less conceptual name or label of a 
phenomenon. Once one code has been used, the researcher must be aware of it and looking 
for other phenomenon which could also be label with the same code. The coding was not 
inductive since I have set up a list of five codes in the theoretical framework: , ‘scientific 
expertise’, ‘precautionary principle’, ‘overcoming the Nimby label’, ‘juridical arguments’, 
and ‘recognised national or international NGOs’. This list stems from the interviews made 
with the NGOs and from the initiatives sponsored by the NGOs. To begin with, ‘scientific 
expertise’ is the main object of the studies. The ‘precautionary principle’ and the ‘Nimby 
label’ popped up in the interviews while the possible recourse to ‘juridical arguments’ stems 
from the fact that numerous local NGOs undertook legal actions against incineration plant 
projects. Finally, I thought about national NGOs because they can be a solution to overcome 
the Nimby label and as I have shown in chapter 3, three national NGOs (Greenpeace, FNE, 
and CNIID) are engaged against the incineration of waste. However, I have kept an open 
mind in order to favour the emergence of new codes which fit the theoretical framework of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Juliet Corbin (Strauss A. and Corbin J., 1990; Strauss A. and Corbin J., 1997; Strauss A. and Corbin J., 1998; 
Strauss A. and Corbin J., 1999. 
 In the 60’s, at the time when Strauss and Glaser set up the grounded theory, mainstream American Sociology 
had become Durkeimian. Ethnography and the Chicago school were considered as anecdotal or journalistic. In 
Sociology, there was a paradigm about the need to product scientific theory using quantitative methods, 
following the model of natural sciences. Ethnography was considered only as a possible developer of interesting 
questions to be answered using quantitative methods. While the 2nd Chicago school, through notably Herbert 
Blumer, defended ethnography and the right to be unscientific by criticizing the epistemological assumptions of 
quantitative researches, Glaser and Strauss considered that the study of human being in the interpretative 
researches should be scientific. This means that grounded theory should seek to produce theoretical propositions 
which are testable and verifiable, and which could be used to predict future events. Furthermore the theories 
should be produced by a clear set of replicable procedures. During this ‘modernist phase’ of qualitative research 
(see Denzin N. K. and Lincoln Y. S., 2003, p.16), a series of other researchers, such as Bogdan and Taylor 
(Bogdan R. and taylor S., 1975), Circourel (Cicourel A. J., 1964) or Lofland (Lofland J., 1971), also attempted to 
formalize qualitative methods. 
183 Atlas-ti has been developed on the basis of the logic of grounded theory. It does make any analysis by itself; it 
is a tool which facilitates the management of the data. Each step of the coding process can be realised with the 
software. In a first stage, the researcher codes what is called the ‘primary documents’: texts, images, and also 
audio and video records. The parts of the documents which are coded are the ‘quotations’. Then, if necessary, the 
researcher may group the codes in ‘families’ and starts to built categories. Finally, the ‘network manager’, a 
graphic interface, allows the elaboration of the relations between categories. 
 An advantage of this software is that it makes the management of a large amount of primary documents 
easier, and it is also easier to find back the quotations which have lead to the building of the concepts. ATLASti 
is a powerful organizer for the grounded theorists. However, Atlas-ti has a drawback, which is the small surface 
of the computer screen, and consequently of the ‘network manager’, which is the tool used to established the 
relationships between concepts and codes. Thus this makes more difficult to have a general overview of all the 
codes and concepts, and the way they are related; that is of the emerging theory. A researcher who deals with a 
small number of primary documents may be more at ease with a pen and some paper cards. 
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the strategies of mobilisation of scientific expertise. Then, I evaluate the grounding of each 
code, that is, the relative importance of each type of argument through the number of 
quotations for each code. 
 In fact, the main common point with the grounded methodology is that I resort to the 
coding for the analysis of the data. The two main differences are, first that I do not make an 
‘open coding’ and the analysis is only partially inductive; I set up a list of possible codes 
(which come from part II) before starting the analysis of the documents. Second, since I 
studied the discourse of only two NGOs, I cannot build a theory as the Grounded Theory 
does, reaching a theoretical saturation point.184 Indeed, from the perspective of the Grounded 
Theory methodology the more the sampling (theoretical or not) is systematic and widespread, 
the more conditions and variations will be discovered, and thus the greater will be the 
explanatory power of the theory produced. Having just two cases, however, does not preclude 
the construction of the grounded theory or at least the formulation of an initial version of such 
a theory. However its validity/credibility is likely to be limited. The theory speaks for the 
population from which it has been derived; it could, however, be applied to other similar 
cases. 
 To conclude, I resort to coding and Atlas-ti because they provide a clear set of procedures 
for the analysis. The procedures are explicit and hence the results more open to external 
assessment. 
II. AREN 
 The analysis of the discourse of the NGO AREN (Angers Roseraie Environnement) is 
based on 15 documents published by the NGO between April 2003 and 2005, that is, roughly 
during the ‘specifications’ stage (May 2003-December 2005). These documents are press 
releases, minutes of the speech of the NGO during public meetings sponsored by the grouping 
of communes, and letters and open letters addressed to the public authority (see the detailed 
list in the appendix “Sources of Data”). Each document is roughly of A4 page length. The 
NGO published some newsletters, but they were for an internal use only: they were sent to its 
members and not to the wider public or to the public authority. It was through press releases 
that AREN informed the wider public about its positionings and or initiatives. 
                                                 
184 The theoretical saturation is “the point in category development at which no new properties, dimensions, or 
relationships emerge during analysis” (Strauss A. and Corbin J., 1998, p. 143). When theoretical saturation is 
reached, the refining stage is over, the researcher can move to the integration of the theory. 
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 AREN did not resort to the same strategies Collectif Inciner’àtort. The NGO used mainly 
and extensively the following types of argument: ‘juridical arguments’ ‘overcoming the 
NIMBY label’, and ‘scientific expertise’. 
Scientific Expertise 
 AREN resorted much more to ‘Scientific expertise’ than Collectif Inciner’àtort to gain 
‘credibility’. It clearly tried to gain ‘cognitive credibility’ by adopting a ‘mobilisation’ 
strategy to confront scientific expertise. AREN quoted 16 times ‘scientific expertise’. Taking 
again the types of scientific expertise developed in the section III.1 of this chapter, the NGO 
makes reference to ‘certified scientific expertise’ (16 quotations), these are: DRIRE (5 
quotations), Ministry of Health and INVS (4 quotations), INSERM (2 quotations), INVS (2 
quotations), Professor Viel (2 quotations), and professor Belpomme (1 quotation). The 
expertises of DRIRE are reports concerning the quantities of emission of pollutants by the 
incinerator plant of Angers. The other expertises are about the sanitary impact of incineration: 
the Ministry of Health ordered to INVS the realisation of a sanitary impact study around the 
incinerator of Angers, two studies about the hazards posed by dioxins published by INSERM 
in 2000 and 2002, two epidemiological studies carried out by Professor Viel in 2000 and 
2003, and a popular book written by Professor Belpomme. More information about these 
expertises can be found in sub-section III.1 of this chapter. In the text, AREN designates the 
scientific expertises by the name of the author or of the organisation and/or the date of 
publication; the content of these expertises are summarised in a brief way. For example, in the 
press release dated 28 December 2003, AREN states: “A sanitary study carried out in 2001 by 
the ministry of health, on the demand of our NGO, states that 95.000 inhabitants in Angers, 
Sainte-Gemmes-sur-Loire et Les-Ponts-de-Cé, are exposed to this pollution and that the risks 
for health are not inconsiderable.” 185  
Juridical Arguments 
 Besides the ‘mobilisation’ strategy, AREN adopted a ‘complementary’ strategy and tried to 
gain ‘moral credibility’ through the mobilisation of ‘juridical arguments’. In fact, these are 
                                                 
185 AREN, “Cadre de vie, santé environnement”, press release,  28 December 2003 (ATLAS-ti Primary 
Document P 1)  
Translated by the author – orgininal version: « Une étude sanitaire réalisée en 2001 par l’Etat, ministère de la 
santé, à la demande de notre association, indique que 95.000 habitants à Angers, Ste-Gemmes-sur-Loire et Les-
Ponts-de-Cé sont exposés à cette pollution et que des risques pour la santé ne sont pas négligeables.» 
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the most used types of argument used by AREN: in the 15 documents AREN recoursed 46 
times to ‘juridical arguments’. I have found the two types of ‘juridical arguments’, but the 
NGO resorted more to ‘regulatory norms’ (34 quotations) than to ‘sentences’ (12 quotations). 
All these juridical arguments concern, not the new incineration plant project, but the old 
generation incineration plant which is still running in the area of La Roseraie. 
 In order to gain credibility, AREN makes references to four ‘sentences’ unfavourable to 
incineration. The two sentences which were passed by the tribunal administratif 
(administrative court) of Nantes in 2002 are the most quoted (8 quotations). The court 
sentenced the grouping of communes of Angers and some municipalities for the non respect of 
the urbanism laws. The legal actions were undertaken by AREN. The third sentence was 
pronounced by the Magistrate’s court of Angers for the non-respect of the norms of emission 
of pollutants (2 quotations). The fourth sentence, which is quoted twice, was passed by the 
European Court of Justice against France for the non-implementation of the European 
Directive 2000/76/EC on the incineration of waste (this directive notably sets up more 
constraining norms for the emission of pollutants). The sentences are designated by the date 
of their pronouncement, for example in the press release of the 21st of March 2003, AREN 
states: “[…] the administrative court of Nantes well sentenced on 19th of December 2002, 
quashing the two modifications of the urbanism plan and the planning permission for the 
building of an extension and for the conformation to the standards, decisions taken by the 
elected decision-makers in 1997 and 1998”.186 
 The ‘regulatory norm’ arguments consist of references mainly to the non-respect by the 
incineration plant of the norms of emission of pollutants (18 quotations), to the non-respect of 
the urbanism law (11 quotations), but also of references to the non-respect of the norms about 
the classified facilities (3 quotations) and to the legitimacy to participate to the public debate 
(2 times). The norm of emission of pollutants which is by far the most invoked is the 
European directive 2000/76/EC on the incineration of waste (14 quotations). The NGO, 
however, does not quote directly; it makes reference to its date of enforcement, for example in 
the press release dated 22nd April 2003: “on the 1st of January 2006, this incinerator will have 
to stop running, because it will not comply with the new norms to be enforced on 28th 
                                                 
186 AREN, “Usine d’incinération de la roseraie: imprévoyance ou mauvais calcul ? », press release, 21 March 
2003 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 4) 
Translated by the author – orgininal version : « comme l’a si bien jugé le tribunal administratif de Nantes le 19 
décembre 2002, en annulant les deux modifications du plan d’occupation des sols et les deux permis de 
construire des travaux d’extension et de mise aux normes, décisions prises par les élus locaux en 1997 et 1998. »       
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December 2005”.187 The other 4 references are ministry orders about rates of emissions of 
pollutants. The recourse to the urbanism law consists of three references to the rules of 
urbanism generally speaking, and to the urbanism plan set up by the grouping of communes 
(eight quotations). The reference to the urbanism plan, which forsees an alternative site, is 
quite detailed, for example: “the urbanism plan approved on the 1st of July 1996, forsees a site 
in the East of the urban area, at the border between Saint Barthélémy-d’Anjou and Saint 
Sylvain-d’Anjou”188 On the contrary, the references to the urbanism law are vague, for 
example in the open letter dated 23 May 2003, the NGO claims that “the urbanism law and 
the regulations concerning the classified facilities will not allow its [the new incinerator] 
realisation”.189 The three references to the classified facilities law are also vague and are 
quoted together with the reference to the urbanism law. At last in the 2 reference concerning 
the legitimacy of AREN to participate to the public debate, the NGO quotes the law about the 
Local Commission for Information and Monitoring, for example: “L’AREN […] affirms 
again that it plays its role and is within its right when it expresses itself within the Local 
Committee for Information and Monitoring […]. We remind that the Local Committees for 
Information and Monitoring [were] created by the law of the 30th December 1988”.190 
Overcoming the NIMBY label 
 For AREN ‘overcoming the NIMBY label’ was an important issue; I have found this 
argument 16 times in its discourses – the same number as ‘scientific exepertise’. In this 
‘complementary’ strategy to gain ‘moral credibility’ avoiding the egoistic label ‘NIMBY’, 
AREN recoursed to four arguments: ‘LUSU’ (8 times), ‘Alternative Site’ (6 times), 
                                                 
187 AREN, “Usine d’incinération, pourquoi ne pas dire la vérité aux Angevins?”, press release, 22 April 2003 
(ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 3). 
Translated by the author – orgininal version : «le 1er janvier 2006, cet incinérateur devra cesser de fonc-tionner, 
car il ne satisfera pas aux nouvelles normes exigibles au 28 décembre 2005»  
188 AREN, “Usine d’incinération de la roseraie: imprévoyance ou mauvais calcul ? », press release, 21 March 
2003 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 4). 
Translated by the author – orgininal version : « Le schéma directeur approuvé le 1er juillet 1996, prévoit un site à 
l’est de l’agglomération en limite de St Barthélémy-d’Anjou et de St Sylvain-d’Anjou »,  
189 AREN, “Lettre ouverte à Monsieur le president de la commnauté d’agglomération d’Angers”, open letter, 23 
May 2003 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 11). 
Translated by the author – orgininal version: « Le droit de l’urbanisme et la réglementation des installations 
classées ne permettront pas sa [de l’incinérateur] réalisation » 
190 AREN, “Usine d’Incinération, L’AREN, acteur de la démocratie participative locale”, press release, 10 
october 2003 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 14). 
Translated by the author – orgininal version: « L’AREN réaffirme qu’elle est dans son rôle et aussi dans son 
droit, lorsqu’elle s’exprime au sein de la CLIS (Commission d’information et de surveillance), […]. Faut-il 
rappeler que les CLIS [sont] issues de la loi du 30-12-1988 » 
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‘Generalisation’ (1 time), and ‘juridical argument’ (1 time). Let’s start with the 
‘generalisation’. The NGO resorted to the ‘generalisation’ claiming that “AREN […] does not 
try to protect the backyard of the neighbouring residents, it goes further, it aims at protecting 
the health of the residents of the whole urban area, because everybody knows that dioxins do 
not stop at the boulevard d’Arbrissel.”191 The ‘juridical argument’ consists of arguing that the 
existing urbanism plan should be implemented: “the residents do not practise NIMBY, that is, 
Not In My Back Yard, when they ask for the implementation of regulation documents of the 
urbanism plan”.192  
 When it recourses to the two intertwined arguments ‘LUSU’ (Local Unadapted Site Use) 
and ‘Alternative Site’, the NGO does not explicitly defend itself against the NIMBY label. 
AREN simply develops these two arguments; without quoting the term NIMBY. Eight times it 
claims that the site of La Roseraie, which hosts the existing old generation incineration plant, 
is not adapted to a new incineration plant because the site is at “the junction of a highly dense 
residential area and of a market gardening area, as the administrative court underlined, and 
on an exiguous piece of land which does not offer enough space for the future”,193 that it is 
claimed that the setting up of a new incineration plant would be a Local Unadapted Site Use. 
Concerning the ‘Alternative site’ argument, six times the NGO claims that an alternative site 
which has not the drawbacks of La Roseraie was available. For example, in a minute of the 
speech of the NGO at a public meeting sponsored by the public authority, the NGO states that 
“the new site of replacement is foreseen in the urbanism plan of the urban area of Angers 
which was approved on the 1 July 1996, selected following a multi-criteria study […], and an 
agreement among fifty municipalities […]. […] This is the business park of Saint Barthélémy-
Anjou / Saint Sylvain- d’Anjou, which is well served by infrastructure transport and far away 
                                                 
191AREN, “Usine d’Incinération, L’AREN, acteur de la démocratie participative locale”, press release, 10 
october 2003 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 14). 
Translated by the author – orgininal version:  « L’AREN en disant des vérités au sein de la CLIS n’essaie pas de 
protéger une soi-disant « arrière-cour » de riverains, elle vise bien au delà, la santé des angevins, car tout le 
monde sait bien que les dioxines ne s’arrêtent pas à la verticale du boulevard d’Arbrissel ! » 
192 AREN, “Usine d’incinération, pourquoi ne pas dire la vérité aux Angevins?”, press release, 22 April 2003 
(ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 3). 
Translated by the author– orgininal version: « De la part des habitants, ce n’est pas vouloir pratiquer le « 
NIMBY », c’est-à-dire «  pas dans mon arrière cour », que de demander l’application des documents de 
planification règlementaires. » 
193 AREN, “Usine d’incinération, pourquoi ne pas dire la vérité aux Angevins?”, press release, 22 April 2003 
(ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 3). 
Translated by the author – orgininal version : « à la jonction d’une zone dense d’habitations et d’une zone 
maraîchère, comme l’a si bien souligné le tribunal administratif, et sur un terrain exigu qui ne réserve pas 
l’avenir. » 
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from residential areas.”194 Thus, the NGO tried to overcome the NIMBY label arguing that 
another site which better suits the hosting of an incineration plant was available. However, as 
we saw in the previous sub-section, the residents neighbouring the site of Saint Barthélémy 
d’Anjou did not consider the issue in the same way… Furthermore, the ‘alternative site’ 
argument is in contradiction with the aim of ‘generalisation’.  
Summary-Conclusion 
 AREN adopted a ‘mobilisation’ strategy to gain ‘cognitive’ credibility but above all it tried 
to gain ‘moral’ credibility: with 46 references to ‘juridical arguments’ and 16 to ‘overcoming 
the Nimby label’ the attempt to gain ‘moral credibility’ was much more important than the 
attempt to gain ‘cognitive credibility’ with 16 ‘mobilisation’ of scientific expertise.  
  The NGO refers only to ‘external certified scientific expertise’; it does not quote any 
internal source or experience-based sources. The references to ‘scientific expertise’ are quite 
precise concerning the sources but rather vague concerning the content. The ‘juridical 
arguments’, ‘regulatory norms’ and ‘sentences’, mainly refer to the non-respect of the 
urbanism laws, and to the non-respect of the norms of emission of pollutant set up by the 
European Directive 2000/76/EC about the incineration of waste, respectively. At last AREN 
also tried to ‘overcome the Nimby label’. 
III. Collectif Inciner’à tort 
 The raison d’être of Collectif Inciner’àtort is its opposition to the local project of setting up 
an incinerator next to the city of Angers, and to waste incineration more generally speaking. 
The analysis of the discourse of this NGO relies on eight newsletters it published between 
May 2005 (number 1) and January 2006 (number 8). These newsletters were thus published 
during the second stage, the ‘specifications’ stage. Even if the grouping of communes Angers 
Loire Métropole officially abandoned the incineration plant project in December 2005, the 
NGO continued to publish newsletters until March 2008. These newsletters were distributed 
                                                 
194 AREN, “Mémo Réunion assos 7 avril 2004”, minute of the NGO’s speech at a public meeting sponsored by 
the public authority, 7 April 2004 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 12). 
Translated by the author – original version: « Le site nouveau de remplacement est prévu au schéma directeur de 
la région angevine, approuvé le 1er juillet 1996, retenu après analyse multi-critères […], et accord  des cinquante 
communes , […]. […]. Il s’agit de la zone d’activités de St Barthélémy-Anjou / St Sylvain- d’Anjou, en 
particulier du fait de sa bonne desserte et de son éloignement des quartiers d’ habitation. » 
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to some residents and personally addressed to each of the elected local decision-makers of the 
grouping of communes. 
  The cornerstone of the argumentation of the NGO is that it claims to be an alternative 
informer for the residents and for the decision-makers. It claims this role four times in its 
newsletters (newsletters N°1, 2, 4 and 8). For example, in its first newsletter, Collectif 
Inciner’àtort states that “the grouping of communes focus its communication on incineration, 
without any debate. In order to fill in this gap, we propose to bring other information, so that 
the elected decision-makers could make their decision fully informed”195 the NGO does not 
denounce the decision-makers, it does not claim that they are bad or corrupted; it points out a 
structural problem concerning the sources of expertise of the decision-makers. Collectif 
Inciner’àtort clearly states that it does not mistrust the local decision-makers, but believe that 
their sources of information were not diversified, that the decision-makers only heard one 
discourse without any contradictory advices. The NGO also argues that the choice of 
incineration resulted from habits and laziness of the technical department: “They are the 
technical departments in charge of the dossier which have to provide them [the decision-
makers] with the elements of the decisions when they make their choice. But they can not take 
again ready made solutions anymore. Many solutions take again existing technologies 
because of routine, laziness, or sometimes by complicity.”196  And it argues that to make their 
decision, “the duty of the elected decision-makers is to require optimum expertises.”197 The 
perception of the NGO is that the possible adverse health effects of waste incineration, and 
the advantage of the alternatives, were simply not debated by the decision-makers. The NGO 
claims its competencies twice, for example in the newsletter N°2: “the novelty is that the 
citizens have the possibility, notably thanks to the internet, to attain a degree of competencies 
and engineering equal [to the elected decision-makers].”198 It also claims its moderation in 
                                                 
195 Translated by the author – original version: « La communauté d’Agglo organise toute sa communication  sur 
l’incinération, sans avis contradictoires. C’est pour combler ce vide que nous nous proposons de vous apporter 
d’autres éléments d’information afin que les élus prennent leur décision en complète connaissance de cause. », 
La Lettre d’Information N°1, Collectif Inciner’à tort, May 2005 
196 Translated by the author – original version: « Ce sont les « services » en charge des dossiers qui doivent leur 
apporter les éléments de décisions au moment de faire des choix. Mais ils ne peuvent plus désormais se 
complaire dans la facilité. Bien des solutions proposées reconduisent l’existant par routine, par paresse, ou par 
complicité parfois. », La Lettre d’Information N°2, Collectif Inciner’à tort, May 2005 
197 Translated by the author – original version : « le devoir des élus c’est d’exiger une expertise optimale », La 
Lettre d’Information N°2, Collectif Inciner’à tort, May 2005 
198 Translated by the author – original version : « La nouveauté, c’est que les citoyens ont la possibilité, grâce à 
internet entre autre, d’atteindre un niveau de compétence et d’ingéniérie au moins égal », La Lettre 
d’Information N°2, Collectif Inciner’à tort, May 2005 
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the form: “constructive attitude and dialog, presentation of objective elements, reflection and 
proposals.”199 To conclude, the NGO introduce itself as a source of alternative expertise in 
order to enlighten the decision-makers, who are then free to make their own decision. 
Collectif Inciner’àtort seems to agree that scientific expertise have the power to decide the 
very terms of deliberation (see chapter 1, sub-section I.1 for further details about the “very 
term of deliberation”). 
 In order to gain ‘credibility’, Collectif Inciner’àtort resorted to the arguments I developed 
in the theoretical framework: ‘overcoming the NIMBY label’, ‘scientific expertise’, 
‘precautionary principle’, and ‘juridical arguments’. But it also used an argument I did not 
develop in the theoretical framework: ‘internal technical expertise’.  
 
Scientific Expertise 
 To confront scientific expertise, the NGO adopted a strategy which is more similar to 
‘mobilisation’ than to ‘challenge’ or ‘demarcate’ scientific expertise. However, in the event it 
did not really mobilise scientific expertise in its discourses: it talks about scientific expertise 
or expert only four times, and the references to scientific expertises are rather vague. It never 
quotes any scientific study to support their position, notably, they do not quote a study they 
know, the epidemiological studies carried out by professor Viel. Therefore, the NGO resorted 
to another strategy that I label ‘superficial’.  
 The first reference concerns the incineration plants of Bourgoin-Jallieu for which the 
veterinary services advised against the cultivation of cucurbitaceae and the consumption of 
local eggs (newsletter N°5). In the second reference, the NGO makes one reference to 
epidemiological studies, but without quoting precisely any source, it just talks about 
“Epidemiological studies concerning diseases developed by the residents neighbouring waste 
incinerators gives clearer and clearer results: increasing of the number of cancers, 
malformations at birth, fertility decreasing”.200 The third reference is about a conference 
organised by the NGO, and in which 300 persons came to hear “the professor [Lesné] who 
                                                 
199 Translated by the author – original version : « esprit constructif et dialogue, présentation d’éléments objectifs, 
réflexion et propositions de citoyens responsables préoccupés par le nécessaire respect de l’Homme et de la 
nature, aujourd’hui et demain. », La Lettre d’Information N°4, Collectif Inciner’à tort, Sept. 2005. 
200 Translated by the author – original version : « […] les études épidémiologiques sur les maladies que subissent 
les voisins  d’incinérateurs de déchets donnent des résultats de plus en plus clairs : augmentation du nombre de 
cancers, malformations à la naissance, baisse de fertilité, … », La Lettre d’Information N°5, Collectif Inciner’à 
tort, Sept. 2005. 
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listed all the pollutants which invade our atmosphere, and who uttered his shout of alarm”201. 
Only the name of the professor is specified; there is no information concerning his actual 
competencies. Finally, the NGO talked about the local practitioners who asked the public 
authority to give up the project, invoking the precautionary principle. 
 This lack of quotation of scientific expertises, however, does not mean that the NGO does 
not talk about the pollution due to waste incineration and its effects on health. On the 
contrary, still following a ‘superficial’ strategy they talk about the problems entailed by 
dioxins twelve times in the newsletters N°1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, but they do not support their claim 
by any precise quotation of scientific expertises. For example, In the first newsletter, the NGO 
takes position against Professor Narbonne, a pro-incineration expert I already talked about in 
the section I of this chapter: “No, professor Narbonne, the risks linked to incineration are not 
globally under control. […]. Chimneys of incineration plants emit thousands of molecules 
which have not been studied yet”202. In the newsletter N°3, concerning health hazards, it 
claims that “the link between exposure and its disastrous consequences is being confirming by 
the development of specific cancers”203, and in the newsletter N°5 it states concerning the 
environmental pollution that “dioxins and lead are the eggs and in the vegetables which grow 
next to the chimney of the incinerator”.204 
 
Precautionary Principle 
 In the meantime, the NGO is aware of the scientific uncertainties; in the newsletter N°5 it 
mentions this issue twice: “considering sanitary uncertainties and the climate of anxiety the 
incinerators create for the population, we are against any new setting up in the département 
                                                 
201 Translated by the author – original version : « le professeur décliner tous les polluants qui envahissent notre 
atmosphère et pousser son cri d’alarme», La Lettre d’Information N°3, Collectif Inciner’à tort, June 2005. 
202 Translated by the author – original version : «NON, Mr NARBONNE, les risques liés à l’incinération ne sont 
pas globalement maîtrisés. […]. Il sort des cheminées des incinérateurs des milliers de molécules qui n’ont pas 
encore été étudiées. », La Lettre d’Information N°1, Collectif Inciner’à tort, May. 2005. 
203 Translated by the author – original version : « Le lien entre l’exposition et ses conséquences désastreuses se 
confirme de plus en plus avec  le développement de cancers bien précis.», La Lettre d’Information N°5, Collectif 
Inciner’à tort, Sept. 2005. 
204 Translated by the author – original version : « la dioxine et le plomb sont dans les œufs et les légumes qui 
poussent à l’ombre des cheminées de l’incinérateur.», La Lettre d’Information N°5, Collectif Inciner’à tort, Sept. 
2005. 
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[…]”205; and “when it [the link between exposure and disastrous consequences] will be 
clearly established, it will be too late to say: if we knew…!”206  
 As a consequence of this awARENess, Collectif Inciner’àtort adopted a ‘complementary’ 
strategy and it (briefly) invokes, three times, the precautionary principle: in the newsletter 
N°5, it states that “the physicians of Saint-Barthélemy invoke the precautionary principle and 
ask the grouping of communes to renounce the incineration plant project”207; at the beginning 
of the newsletter N°5, the NGO claims “today the precautionary principle must prevail”; and 
it concludes the newsletter N°6 with “And if the precautionary principle was simply 
applied?”208 The question which pops up now is whether the precautionary principle is 
invoked because of the actual and documented scientific uncertainties or because it is likely to 
reinforce the supposed anxiety of the wider public? 
 
Internal Technical Expertise 
 The NGO adopted a ‘complementary’ strategy and tried to gain ‘cognitive authority’ 
resorting to a large extent to an argument I did not develop in the theoretical framework: an 
‘internal technical expertise’. In fact, Collectif Inciner’àtort dedicated most of its newsletters 
to ‘technical expertises’ about alternative technologies for the waste treatment.  
 The ‘technical expertise’ consists of reports made by the members of the NGO. Excepted 
in the newsletter N°1209, these reports were written following the visits of existing waste 
treatment facilities which use alternative technologies. This technical expertise has been 
gained by resorting to internal competencies: some members of the NGO who have technical 
competencies (mostly engineers) went to visit 10 waste treatment facilities which use 
alternative technologies throughout France, they then wrote down a report of their visit which 
                                                 
205 Translated by the author – original version : « Compte tenu des incertitudes sanitaires et du climat 
d’inquiétude que les incinérateurs créent dans les populations, nous sommes contre toute nouvelle création dans 
le département.», La Lettre d’Information N°5, Collectif Inciner’à tort, Sept. 2005. 
206 Translated by the author – original version : « Quand il sera clairement établi,[ le lien entre l’exposition et 
ses conséquences désastreuses] il sera bien temps de dire : si on avait su !», La Lettre d’Information N°5, 
Collectif Inciner’à tort, Sept. 2005. 
207 Translated by the author – original version : « Les médecins de St-Barthélemy invoquent l’application du 
principe de précaution et demandent à l’agglo de renoncer au projet d’incinérateur», La Lettre d’Information 
N°5, Collectif Inciner’à tort, Sept. 2005. 
208 Translated by the author – original version : « Et si l’on appliquait tout simplement le principe de 
précaution ? », La Lettre d’Information N°6, Collectif Inciner’à tort, Oct. 2005. 
209 In this newsletter, the reports concerning the selective sorting in the region Alsace and in the town of Segré 
are not based of visits; they were written down, however, by some members of the NGO. 
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was published in the newsletters.210 Roughly speaking, the reports are made of four elements: 
a short description of the process; quantitative data concerning the visited facility such as the 
capacity of treatment or the number of employees; the cost of the facility and of the treatment 
(per ton of waste treated); and the main advantages (more or less explicitly by comparison 
with incineration). These reports can be labelled as ‘technical internal experience-based 
expertises’.  
 The NGO refers 11 times to ‘technical expertise’; roughly, there is one report per 
newsletter. But the number of times is not enough to show that these ‘internal technical 
expertises’ are central to the argumentation of the NGO. Indeed, each expertise is quite long 
by comparison with the other types of arguments. Indeed, the ten newsletters consist of two 
pages A4 format. By and large, the pages are divided into frames: a main central frame which 
occupies around three quarters of the surface, and a series of two-five secondary small frames. 
And the central frames are dedicated to the ‘internal technical expertises’, while the lateral 
ones contain other kind of arguments or information such as the initiatives sponsored by the 
NGO (in the appendix see the newsletter N°1 as an example of the composition of the 
newsletters). There is, however, one exception: the newsletter N°5, in which the main frame is 
dedicated to the pollution by existing incineration plants (as a matter of fact most of the 
arguments developed in the theoretical framework are used in this newsletter N°5).211 
 Finally, the NGO clearly claims the seriousness of its technical expertise, arguing that it 
stems from grounded analyses of the alternatives to incineration, notably through visits of 
existing waste treatment facilities: “Collectif Incin’àtort does not assert without knowing. It 
gets information: visits of the landfill site of Champteussé-sur-Baconne, of the mechanical 
biological sorting site of Launay Lantic […], and of the incineration plant of Lasse”.212 These 
                                                 
210 Small groups made of members of the NGO went to visit the ten following sites: incineration plant of Lasse 
(newsletter N°1), mechanical biological treatment site of Launay lantic (newsletter N°2), methanisation facility 
of Amiens (newsletter N°3), landfill of Champteussé-sur-Baconne (newsletter N°4), selective sorting system of 
Lille (newsletter N°4), site of collective composting of Saint-Philibert de Bouaine (newsletter N°5), thermolysis 
incineration plant of Arras (newsletter N°7), plasma torch of Cenon (newsletter N°7), the mechanical biological 
and methanisation facilities of VARENnes-Jarcy (newsletter N°8). 
211 The newsletter n. 6 is also a bit different: one page is dedicated to an argumentation against incineration while 
the other page is made of a table which summarize the advantages and drawbacks of the alternative technologies.  
212Collectif Inciner’à tort, « La Lettre d’Information N°1 », May 2005. 
Translated by the author – original version: « Le Collectif n’affirme pas sans savoir. Il s’informe :  visites du 
centre d’enfouis-sement de Champteussé-sur-Baconne, du centre de tri mécano-biologique de Launay Lantic, en 
Côtes d’Armor et  de l’usine d’incinération de Lasse », La Lettre d’Information N°1, Collectif Inciner’à tort, 
May 2005. 
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forms of ‘local’ technical expertise are likely to be serious since they have been conducted by 
individuals who have certified technical and scientific qualifications.  
 
Overcoming the NIMBY label 
 Neither the NIMBY, nor the LULU, or NIABY (Local Unwanted Land Use) arguments 
have been used by Collectif Inciner’àtort. In fact, the NGO did not try to gain ‘moral 
credibility’ through an explicit argumentation trying to overcome the NIMBY label.  
However, it did in an implicit way. Indeed, the NGO implicitly adopted a LALU (Local 
Alternative Land Use) strategy. In the newsletter N°4, it implicitly argues that the selected site 
would be adapted for the hosting of an alternative technology: “[methanisation] seems to be 
very well appropriate to our city”.213 Moreover it stated that it is engaged in order to “favour 
the realisation of alternative solutions to incineration”.214 As we will see below, the NGO 
centered its argumentation on the visiting of facilities which use alternative technologies. 
 The NGO, however, used on one occasion the term ‘NIMBY’, but it was to criticize the 
attitude of the elected decision-makers. In the newsletter N°2 it talks about a possible 
‘reversed NIMBY’ attitude of certain decision-makers because on the occasion of a 
conference organised by the public authority on the sanitary risk of dioxins produced by 
incinerators: only the decision-makers of the municipalities directly neighbouring the site 
participated to this conference; the decision-makers of the municipalities which were more 
distant from the site did not participate. Using the term ‘reversed NIMBY’, the NGO wants to 
underline also that the decision-makers are more interested by what happens next to them by 
what happens far away from their district. 
 
Juridical Arguments  
 Collectif Inciner’àtort does not resort to ‘sentences’ in order to gain ‘moral credibility’. As 
a matter of fact, it did not undertake legal actions against the grouping of communes. The 
NGO resorted four times to the ‘regulatory norms’ argument (mainly in the newsletter N°5), 
but not always to gain ‘moral credibility’. In fact, Collectif Inciner’àtort does not trust the 
established norms and adopted a strategy which is analogous to the ‘demarcation’ strategy 
                                                 
213 Translated by the author – original version : « Le dispositif adopté nous paraît particulièrement bien adapté à 
notre agglomération. », La Lettre d’Information N°3, Collectif Inciner’à tort, June. 2005 
214 Translated by the author – original version : « pour la mise en œuvre de solutions alternatives à 
l’incinération », La Lettre d’Information N°4, Collectif Inciner’à tort, Sept. 2005 
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defined for scientific expertise, putting forward the fact that the norms are fickle: “the 
continuous evolution of the norms is the proof [that the risks of incineration are not globally 
under control], […].”215 According to the NGO, the norms do not guarantee the absence of 
sanitary risks: “those who currently decide to build incinerators, even complying with the 
norms, take the risk to be one day under accusation of poisoning”216. For the NGO, the 
(European) norms simply define a right to pollute (twice: newsletter N°1, and 5), and “are 
only a compromise between technical possibilities of the measurements and economical 
constrains”.217  
 However, in the newsletter N°5, in a paragraph Collectif Inciner’àtort makes two 
references to the norms in order to gain ‘moral credibility’. It argues that a pollution was 
made by two incineration plants which exceeded the norms: the incinerator of “Gien-Arrabloy 
released during five months in 2004 dioxins rates 6 800 times superior to the authorised 
norm, entailing a pollution by dioxins of the eggs of the neighbouring farmings”, and 
concerning the incinerator of Bourgoin-Jallieu, “analyses indicated dioxins rate two times 
superior to the European norm for the eggs”.218 
 
Summary-Conclusion  
 NGO Collectif Inciner’àtort tried to gain ‘credibility’ by adopting a combination of a 
reduced ‘mobilisation’ of scientific expertise and a very substantial set of ‘complementary’ 
arguments.  It is likely that Collectif Inciner’àtort thought that the ‘scientific expertise’ 
arguments would have had little impact on the wider public and on the public authorities 
because of the uncertainties concerning the impact of dioxins on health. Indeed, Collectif 
Inciner’àtort tried to gain ‘cognitive authority’, but it mobilised only a few times and a very 
vague way ‘scientific expertise’ (4 times) while it complemented its discourses with some 
                                                 
215 Translated by the author – original version : « Les normes en évolution constantes en sont la preuve [que les 
risques liés à l’incinération ne sont globalement pas maitrisés]», La Lettre d’Information N°1, Collectif Inciner’à 
tort, May. 2005. 
216 Translated by the author – original version : « Ceux qui décident actuellement de construire des incinérateurs, 
même aux normes, prennent le risque de se voir un jour accusés d’empoisonnement.», La Lettre d’Information 
N°5, Collectif Inciner’à tort, Sept. 2005. 
217 Translated by the author – original version : « normes européennes, qui ne sont qu’un compromis entre la 
faisabilité technique de la mesure et les impératifs économiques», La Lettre d’Information N°5, Collectif 
Inciner’à tort, Sept. 2005. 
218 Translated by the author – original version: «Gien-Arrabloy […] a rejeté pendant 5 mois en 2004 et au début 
2005 des taux de dioxine 6 800 fois supérieur à la norme autorisée»; «analyses effectuées en juin 2005 
présentant des taux de dioxine 2 fois supérieurs à la norme européenne dans les œufs», La Lettre d’Information 
N°5, Collectif Inciner’à tort, Sept. 2005. 
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references to the ‘precautionary principle’ (3 times) and above all to ‘internal technical 
expertise’. 
 In fact, to gain ‘cognitive credibility’, Collectif Inciner’àtort extensively resorts to a type 
of argument I did not develop in the theoretical framework: ‘internal technical expertise’, 
which consist of reports made by small groups of members of the NGO following visits to 
waste treatment facilities which use alternative waste treatment technologies. The aim of the 
NGO was to provide the wider public and above all the public authority with an alternative 
expertise discussing the advantages and drawbacks of the alternatives to incineration. The 
NGO resorted eleven times to this form of expertise. But the number of quotations alone does 
not enable the evaluation of the importance of the ‘internal technical expertise’ since these 
eleven times occupy almost all the place in the tenth newsletter of the NGO.  
 Collectif Inciner’àtort did not try that much to gain ‘moral credibility’: it resorted in a brief 
way to ‘juridical arguments’ (5 times) concerning the norms of emission, and implicitly tried 
to ‘overcome the Nimby label’ through a Local Alternative Land Use (LALU) strategy. 
   
IV. Conclusion 
 From the analysis of the discourses of two local NGOs, it appears that scientific expertise 
was not the main argument for gaining ‘credibility’, and that they resorted to other types of 
arguments to bring the wider public and the public authorities round to their view. This means 
that even though sanitary risks were their main concern for these two NGOs, they considered 
that ‘scientific expertise’ was not the best argument to convince the wider public and the 
public authority. It is probable that the NGOs did not mobilise ‘scientific expertise’ that much 
in their discourses because they were aware that scientific uncertainties were high. And 
therefore, they may think that they could not gain much ‘cognitive credibility’ in the eyes of 
the wider public and of the public authorities because of these uncertainties. More generally, 
the nature of the uncertainties is likely to influence the strategy of NGOs: in case of 
uncertainties in favour of NGOs, these latter are likely to adopt a combination of 
‘mobilisation’ and ‘complementary’ strategies, whereas if the uncertainties are not in favour 
of NGOs, they are more likely to adopt a combination of ‘demarcation’ and ‘complementary’ 
strategy. 
 From a theoretical point of view, the concept of ‘strategies of mobilisation’ of scientific 
expertise (mobilisation, challenge, demarcation, amd complementary) seems to work to 
analyse the attempts of the NGOs to gain ‘cognitive credibility’. The ‘strategies of 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Christophe Voineau  
Controversies, Public Engagement, and Scientific Expertise in Technical-Scientific Decision-Making Processes 
 
- 250 - 
mobilisation’ presents some similiraties with the ‘boundary-works’ developed by Gyerin 
(Gieryn T. F., 1983; Gieryn T.F., 1995; Gieryn T. F., 1999c).219 The aim is the same: 
strengthening its own position while weakening, if possible, the position of the opponents. 
The main difference is that ‘boundary-works’ are made by the members of the scientific 
community, while the ‘strategies of mobilisation’ applies to the stake holders engaged in 
decision-making processes. More generally, the ‘strategies of mobilisation’ can be applied to 
any situation in which scientific expertise is mobilised by “lay people”, that is, by individuals 
or groups who are not members of the scientific community which produce the expertises. 
 
 The analysis of the arguments used by the two NGOs enables the drawing up of two 
distinct profiles. The argumentation of NGO AREN characterises its ‘opposition’ to the 
project, trying to ‘gain moral credibility’, while Collectif Inciner’àtort resorted to an 
argumentation made of ‘propositions’, trying mainly to gain ‘cognitive credibility’. 
 AREN, the NGO which engaged first in the decision-making process, developed an 
argumentation of ‘opposition’: it merely aimed at the abandonment of the incineration plant 
project sited next to the homes of its members; it was in substance a NIMBY attitude. Indeed, 
the argumentation of AREN combined: ‘mobilisation’ of scientific expertise, ‘juridical 
arguments’, and ‘overcoming the NIMBY’. The ‘mobilisation’ of expertise aimed to highlight 
the possible sanitary dangers of incineration, while the ‘juridical arguments’ were linked to 
legal actions engaged by the NGO against the public authority which did not respect some 
procedures in previous decision-making processes. In order to overcome the NIMBY label, 
AREN combined the LUSU (Local Unadapted Site Use) and ‘alternative site’ arguments. This 
was a more subtle and argumented way to say ‘Not In My BackYard’. This last point is 
supported by the fact that AREN became less active after the shifting of site a few kilometres 
away.  
 Collectif Inciner’àtort, the NGO which engaged after the shifting of site, had a more 
constructive discourse than AREN. Its discourse was made of ‘propositions’, trying in the 
meantime to gain ‘cognitive credibility’. The discourse combined the following arguements: a 
‘superficial’ mobilisation of expertise; a substantial ‘internal technical expertise’; and to 
overcome the NIMBY label, it resorted to the LALU (Local Alternative Site Use) argument. 
The sanitary risks were the main motivation of the initial engagement of the NGO against the 
                                                 
219 See chapter 7 
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incineration plant project. Moreover, it sought and found the epidemiological studies which 
argue that incineration may be risky. However, it resorted only to a ‘superficial’ mobilisation 
of scientific expertise. This shows that the NGO did not count that much on the sanitary and 
environmental risks to gain ‘credibility’.220 The NGO focused on the alternatives technologies 
to incineration. In fact, they really did not hold a NIMBY position. They adopted a LALU 
(Local Alternative Land Use) argumentation: they did not question the choice of the site, but 
the choice of the waste treatment technology. To support this position, they tried to gain 
‘cognitive credibility’ by producing their own ‘internal technical expertise’ about the 
alternative waste treatement technologies.  
 This analysis of the discourses of the NGOs supports the idea that the public (here the local 
NGOs) are likely to make a constructive contribution to technical-scientific decision-making 
processes through the plurality they bring and the widening of the framing of the issue under 
discussion (Nowotny H., 2003). It also confirms that the NIMBY is likely to be fairly positive 
and that the public may have a good grasp of and reasonable concern for health and welfare, 
which are ignored by technical and administrative elites (see for ex.: Fiorino D., 1995; 
Matheny A. and Williams B., 1985; Kraft M. and Clary B., 1991; Hunter S. and Leyden K. 
M., 1995). However, there are, at least in this research, two distinct degrees of contribution. 
The first one, ‘opposition’, is the less rich as it only highlights important drawbacks of the 
solution selected by the decision-makers. The second one, the ‘propositions’, is richer: it 
provides the decision-makers with alternative solutions. Further research is necessary, 
however, to assess whether these two degrees of contribution are just linked to the studied 
decision-making process or whether they are well grounded.  
 From a theoretical perspective point of view, this analysis of the discourses of the NGOs 
supports the view of the ‘critical’ PUS scholars, that is, that the public is able to reflect on the 
source of their knowledge (media or others): they are able to evaluate the quality of the 
knowledge they have acquired (Irwin A. and Wynne B., 1996; Irwin A. and Michael M., 
2003).221  
  
 To finish, from a methodological point of view, it has appeared during the analysis that the 
number of quotations may be not enough to evaluate the grounding of the respective codes. 
                                                 
220 See chapter 3 
221 See chapter 7 
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Indeed, a quotation may cover only one sentence or an entire page. The length of a quotation 
must be thus taken into account.  
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CONCLUSION 
 Many Science Studies scholars agree that there is a crisis of tradional expertise and that 
public participation is a solution to solve this crisis, thanks to the plurality the public brings 
(Wynne B., 1992; Fischer F., 1999; Weale A., 2001; Callon M., Lascoumes P. Barthe Y., 
2001; Nowotny H., Scott P. Gibbons M., 2001; Nowotny H., 2003; Jasanoff S., 2003; 
Grundmann R. and Stehr N., 2003; Dietrich H., Schibeci R., 2003/10/1).222 However, while 
these scholars focus mainly on ‘non-standard’ knowledge, this research shows that the public 
can be able to bring valid alternative ‘standard knowledge’, that is, alternative ‘certified’ 
scientific expertises. Moreover, both analyses of the public engagement and of the 
mobilisation of scientific expertise by the local NGOs show that, in the eyes of the local 
NGOs, the problem of the expertise provided to the local public authorities is the framing of 
the issue under discussion (see Jasanoff S., 2003). The local NGOs put under discussion the 
fact that the sanitary and environmental risks entailed by incineration were not taken into 
account by the local public authorities and their experts. The local NGOs did not question that 
much the other possible drawbacks of traditional scientific expertises highlighted by Science 
Studies scholars: confusion between facts and values (Jasanoff, S, 1990, p. 229; see also 
Nowotny H., 2003; Jasanoff S. and Lynch M., 1998; Funtowicz S. and Ravetz J., 1992), and 
confusion between knowledge and personal interests (Jasanoff, 1990).223 In fact, the local 
NGOs rather trust ‘certified’ expertises, no matter who ordered them.  
 
                                                 
222 See Chapter 1 
223 See Chapter 1 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Christophe Voineau  
Controversies, Public Engagement, and Scientific Expertise in Technical-Scientific Decision-Making Processes 
 
- 254 - 
 In part II, I have tried to assess the actual public involvement and its impact on the 
outcome and degree of controversy of local decision-making processes. Whereas at the 
national level public participation from the outset of decision-making processes is guaranteed 
by the Commission Nationale de Débat Public, there is no similar obligation at the local level. 
The legal framework which rules public involvement gives at a lot of freedom to the local 
decision-makers and little constraints. And as a matter of fact, there was very little political 
will to engage the public; almost no decision-maker went further than the few legal 
constraints: top-down public engagement was late and consisted mainly in communication, 
and there was very little consultation and participation. Only two out of the ten studied 
groupings of communes started to sponsor (non-compulsory) participation and consultation 
initiatives toward the beginning of the second stage. 
 Most of these decision-making processes were controversial: in all the cases, some local 
NGOs stood against the incinerator project sponsoring many bottom-up engagement 
initiatives. Above all, they were not satisfied with the framing of the issue: according to them 
the local public authorities did not consider the environmental and sanitary risks entailed by 
the incineration of wastes. The relative absence of public participation strongly suggests that 
the local public authorities studied in this research do not perceive public participation as a 
solution to diminish the degree of controversy. In other words, the solution proposed by many 
Science Studies scholars to solve the problem of traditional expertise, and more particularly to 
widen the framing of the issue under discussion, was not applied at all by the studied local 
public authorities. Moreover, in the typology of the engagement mechanisms developed in 
this research, I have found no trace of the highly particpative mechanisms studied in the 
(Anglo-Saxon) Science Studies literature and listed by Rowe and Frewer (2005). I have 
identified, however, new types of participation mechanisms (sponsored late in the decision-
making processes) which had not been identified by Rowe and Frewer. This suggests that 
exchanges between the French and Anglo-Saxon experiences are likely to enrich the range of 
mechanisms possibily useful to solve the problem of traditional scientific expertise on the one 
hand, and to diminish the degree of controversy of decision-making processes on the other 
hand.   
 Because of this lack of top-down public engagement, I cannot draw a straight conclusion 
about the impact of top-down public engagement on the outcome and above all on the degree 
of controversy of the decision-making processes. In other words, it has not been possible to 
actually verify whether the public participation recommended by the Science Studies scholars 
has actually, in terms of degree of controversy, a positive impact on the decision-making 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Conclusion 
 
 
- 255 - 
processes. I can only draw two hypotheses.  First, top-down participation is sponsored when 
there are still issues to be decided is likely to diminish the degree of controversy, as happened 
in the only case in which some top-down participation initiatives were sponsored. Second, 
consultation might be less effective at diminishing the degree of controversy than 
participation: the only case in which consultation initiatives were sponsored, the decision-
making process remained highly controversial until the abandonment of the incineration plant 
project. It is likely that the consultation came too late, and that the local NGOs no longer 
trusted the public authority.  
 
 From a theoretical point of view, the property space of the public engagement mechanisms, 
derived from those developed by Rowe and Frewer (2005), has allowed the carrying out of a 
detailed analysis of the public engagement along the decision-making processes. In particular, 
the concept of flow of information and the distinction of seven classes of public engagement 
(no engagement, bottom-up and top-down communication, consultation, and participation) 
have been useful to classify the mechanisms. The further distinction of sub-types of 
mechanisms through the definition of eight key characteritics has not been central for the 
present empirical research. It enables, however, a classification of the mechanisms according 
to explicit criteria. But the high number of criteria (8) does not allow the development of a 
synthetic property space, which is consequently a bit heavy and complicated to manage. 
 The distinction of the three key chronological stages of the decision-making processes has 
made possible a chronological analysis of the public engagement. The definition of the stages 
for the ten studied decision-making processes has not been easy because the decision-making 
processes did not develop exactly in the same way. But finally, I have succeeded in defining 
the three stages and thus to make comparable the ten cases. More generally, it may be difficult 
to apply the same stages to other kind of local decision-making processes, more or less 
important are likely to be necessary. In order to adapt the definition of the key chronological 
stages to other kind of decision-making processes one must just keep in mind that what 
delimits each stage is the importance of the issues under discussion, and that along the 
decision-making processes, the degree of manoeuvre diminishes. 
 Finally, the degree of controversy of a decision-making process is difficult to define 
because it is relative: a decision-making process is more or less controversial by comparison 
with other decision-making processes. I have attempted to make more reliable the evaluation 
of the degree of controversy through the combination of four indicators (presence/absence of 
ad hoc NGOs; high/low level of bottom-up communication; high/low level of protest 
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initiatives; and presence/absence of legal actions). The use of the mean as a reference for 
distinguishing the low and high level could be applied here because the dispersions of the 
values are high. In case of low dispersion, another technique of evaluation of the degree of 
controversy should be used. To finish, it would be interesting to confront the definition of 
degree of controversy with new grounds in order to evaluate the extent to which this 
definition could work as such in new contexts or if it would be necessary to refine or modify 
it. 
 
 In the literature, the studies, such as the typology developed by Rowe and Frewer (2005), 
or the evaluation of mechanism made by Renn and al. (1995), focus on the single 
mechanisms. In this research, I have first developed a typology, that is, I have also dealt with 
the single mechanisms. In a second step, considering that the point time when an initiative is 
sponsored is fundamental, I have attempted to deal with all the mechanisms used during the 
entire decision-making processes, but the evaluation was mainly quantitative. A more global 
evaluation of the engagement mechanisms is necessary: rather than evaluating the 
mechanisms separately, it is necessary to study the efficiency of systems of public 
engagement mechanisms, that is, of plans of public engagement which combine engagement 
initiatives at the various stages of the decision-making processes. To make such an analysis, 
the ‘key chronological stages’ combined with the ‘significant characteristics’ are likely to be 
helpful.  
 It is likely that an efficient plan of public engagement should combine the three classes of 
mechanisms (information, consultation, participation). Such a plan should start with large 
degree of publicity for the project, traditional information mechanisms such as newsletters 
and press releases are likely to work well. In the meantime, it should conduct an evaluation of 
the impact of the project on the public opinion in order to evaluate the public willingness to 
engage in the decision-making process. If there is no public willingness, information 
initiatives are likely to be sufficient; there would probably be few participants to consultation 
or participation initiatives. In case of public willingness to engage, the sponsoring of 
participation or consultation initiatives should be considered. Moreover, it is likely that an 
engagement plan should flexible in order to adapt to the evolution, which may be unexpected, 
of the decision-making process and more precisely of the reactions of the public. Such plans 
could be used as hypotheses to be tested through new empirical research. In order to 
implement and assess the efficiency of such plans, collaborations with consultancy firms 
dealing with participation or with grouping of communes could be considered. 
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 Moreover, the legal framework, has evolved in the last years and tends toward more public 
engagement from the outset of the decision-making processes, notably thanks to the 
convention of Aarhus which the objective is to “[…]guarantee the rights of access to 
information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental 
matters[…].” (article 1).  With this convention, and notably with article 6, the participation of 
the public is really guaranteed. However, this article 6 seems not to be fully implemented in 
French law: there is a discrepancy between the two décrets: while Décret n° 2002-1187 du 12 
septembre 2002 Journal Officiel du 21 septembre 2002 has enforced the convention in French 
Law as such, and thus guarantee public engagement, Décret n° 2006-578 du 22 mai 2006 
concerning the information and participation of the public with regard to environmental 
matters only partially updates the Aarhus convention in the French environmental Code, and 
does not guarantee the participation of the public from the outset of decision-making 
processes. The latter décret only extends the decision-making processes in which a public 
enquiry must be carried-out.224 And as I have already stated, public enquiries come late in the 
decision-making processes. Thus, the Code de l’environnement only partially takes into 
account the Aarhus convention. It would thus be interesting to study the public engagement in 
environmental decision-making processes which started from 2003 onward in order to 
evaluate the extent to which the Aarhus convention is actually implemented in local decision-
making processes, and therefore to evaluate if there is more public participation and/or 
consultation from the outset of the decision-making processes. In other words, is the legal 
framework used by the local decision-makers the one of Décret n° 2002-1187, that is the 
Aarhus convention, or the one of Décret n° 2006-578, that is, the French environmental Code. 
                                                 
224 Substantially, this Décret only provides for a generalisation of the public enquiries to “[…] the decisions of 
authorisation, approval or execution of environmental planning or facilities for which an impact study or a 
impact note, and for which the State or a Public entity is the developer. […]”.224 The developer must make 
available the impact study or impact note to the public who must have the possibility to write down its 
observations on registers. Then “[…] 3° The developer makes the synthesis of these observations and make it 
available to the public according processes that he determines.[…]”224 (Emphasis added). 
 In fact, only the National Public Debate Commission fulfils the Aarhus convention provisions concerning 
public engagement. But the National Public Debate Commission only deals with a limited number of 
environmental matters since it is charged with the development of town and country planning or infrastructure 
projects of national interest of the state. This Commission does not deal with local projects such as the setting-up 
of waste treatment facilities. Moreover, concerning article 6, the report on the implementation of the Aarhus 
Convention in French law only focuses on the National Public Debate Commission arguing that the French 
legislation fully takes into account the Aarhus convention, and it does not talk about the local environmental 
decision-making processes such as the setting up of incineration plants (See United Nations, Economic 
Commission for Europe, Aarhus Convention Implementation Report submitted by France, 13 April 2005, UN 
doc. ECE/MP.PP/2005/18/Add.8, at 
http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2005/pp/ece/ece.mp.pp.2005.18.add.8.e.pdf). 
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 The very practical question of the implementation of public engagement initiatives and of 
their costs should be dealt with. If local public entities cannot afford the organisation of public 
engagement mechanisms or if they have not the internal competencies to organise them, 
theoretical discussions, such as those made by the Science Studies scholars, lose their interest. 
The problem of the competences could be solved, for example, by the setting up of a national 
public entity which could provide ad hoc advice and practical procedures of public 
engagement to the local public authorities. Another solution could be to resort to private 
consulting companies specialised in the sponsoring of communication-consultation-
participation initiatives. 
 As an aside, since participation is likely to spread in the future, it would be interesting to 
set up a database of the decision-making processes which resorts to top-down consultation or 
participation mechanisms. Such a database would notably facilitate the evaluation of the 
impact of these classes of mechanisms on the degree of controversy of the decision-making 
processes.   
 
 Better grounded conclusions can be drawn about the impact of the bottom-up public 
engagement on the decision-making processes. In the three decision-making processes in 
which the incineration plant project has been abandoned, the level of bottom-up 
communication was very high during the ‘specifications’ stage (the second stage), and it was 
much higher than the level of top-down communication. In the other cases, those which ended 
with the opening of an incineration plant, the level of bottom-up communication was low. So, 
a high level of bottom-up communication during the ‘specifications’ stage (the second stage), 
superior to the level of top-down communication is likely to lead to the abandonment of the 
incineration plant project. Therefore, beyond the fact that public participation is likely to 
improve the quality of the expertise, in front of resolute local NGOs, the public authority has 
an interest in making the public participate. Further research is necessary in order to know 
whether a high level of bottom-up communication is sufficient to lead to the abandonment of 
an incineration plant project, or whether it is necessary that the bottom-up is superior to the 
top-down communication, or whether both conditions are necessary.  
 
 Part III, which deals with the mobilisation of scientific expertise by the public, supports the 
position of the Science Studies scholars who argue that the public (here the local NGOs) is 
likely to make a constructive contribution to the decision-making processes (Wynne B., 1992; 
Fischer F., 1999; Weale A., 2001; Callon M., Lascoumes P. Barthe Y., 2001; Nowotny H., 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Conclusion 
 
 
- 259 - 
Scott P. Gibbons M., 2001; Nowotny H., 2003; Jasanoff S., 2003; Grundmann R. and Stehr 
N., 2003; Dietrich H., Schibeci R., 2003/10/1), and that citizens may have a good grasp of and 
reasonable concern for health and welfare, which are ignored by technical and administrative 
elites (Fiorino D., 1995; Matheny A. and Williams B., 1985; Kraft M. and Clary B., 1991; 
Hunter S. and Leyden K. M., 1995).225 Therefore, the results of this research support a fairly 
positive view of the impact of (top-down and bottom-up) public engagement on the overall 
expertise provided to the local public authorities, and consequently on the outcome of 
technical-scientific decision-making processes. As Domique Pestre puts it: “criticisms, 
refusals and oppositions to sciences, to technologies and to their direct and indirect effects 
have not only been massive in the past, butthey have always been essential for the 
development of safer technological systems.[…] Today – this is a matter of principle to be 
considered specifically for each situation – these people and contestations should (probably) 
be carefully listened to.” (Pestre D., 2007, p. 8) 
 To start with, highlighting the sanitary and environmental riskd entailed by the incineration 
of household wastes, the NGOs widened the framing of the issue under discussion. The main 
motivation of the NGOs to engage in the decision-making processes was the environmental 
and sanitary risks entailed by the incineration of wastes. According to the NGOs, these risks 
were not considered by the local public authority. Secondly, searched for evidence to support 
there worries, the local NGOs brought valuable alternative scientific expertise in the debates. 
Indeed, almost all the NGOs sought scientific expertise in order to get an insight into the 
impact of waste incineration on health and the environment in a first step, and to monitor the 
pollution in a second step.  
 The local NGOs were not able to produce their own expertise but they were able to 
mobilise ‘external’ scientific expertises. They obtained it in two ways: directly, seeking and 
selecting themselves the sources, and/or indirectly, asking to their public authority to order 
and pay for the sought expertise. The NGOs which mobilised indirectly scientific expertise 
did so because of its high costs they could not afford. Almost all the local NGOs succeeded in 
obtaining all or at least part of their sought expertise. Moreover, very few NGOs declared that 
they did not seek scientific expertise at all, and three that they renounce to seek certain 
expertises. Almost all the NGOs invoked the ‘division of labour’ between the engaged NGOs. 
Therefore, this important recourse of the local NGOs to scientific expertise shows that local 
                                                 
225 See chapter 7 
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NGOs are likely to make valuable contributions to local public decision-makings, bringing a 
plurality in the expertises as Nowotny H., Scott P. Gibbons M (2001) claim. Certification is a 
key characteristic of the scientific expertise mobilised by the local NGOs.  As a matter of fact, 
when they directly mobilised scientific expertise, the local NGOs selected to a very large 
extent ‘external certified’ sources: public institutions or officially accredited laboratories. 
They almost never mobilised ‘internal’ expertise, probably due to the lack of internal 
competences, or ‘external experience-based’ expertise, most likely because they find that the 
latter is reliable. The fact that the scientific expertise mobilised by the local NGOs were 
mainly ‘certified’ supports the claim that the public is likely to bring valid expertises to the 
decision-making processes. 
 Concerning the expertise indirectly mobilised, the NGOs rather trust the results of the 
expertises ordered and paid by their public authority because they were carried out by 
officially accredited, that is certified, laboratories. This suggests that both the public 
authorities and the local NGOs agree on what counts as reliable scientific expertise. This 
agreement is likely to prevent the NGOs and public authority from making ‘boundary works’, 
that is, from disputing what counts as scientific expertise and what does not (Gieryn T.F., 
1995; Gieryn T. F., 1999c).226 This does not mean that the parties agree on the content of the 
expertise but that a there is a shared basis on which the debates can develop. This agreement 
is likely to facilitate the debates which would be organised in the framework of participation 
mechanisms. 
 The results of the analysis of the discourses of two NGOs suggest that local NGOs may 
make (at least) two types of contribution to the decision-making. The first one, ‘opposition’, 
is the less rich than the second one, ‘propositions’. In the ‘opposition’ contribution, the public 
highlights important drawbacks of the solution selected by the decision-makers bringing 
scientific expertise to support its opposition. In the ‘propositions’ contribution, the public 
provides the decision-makers with alternative solutions supported by economical-technical 
expertises. Further researches are necessary, however, to assess whether these two types of 
contribution are just linked to the studied decision-making process or whether they are well 
grounded types.  
 For none of the two studied ad hoc NGOs scientific expertise was the key argument to 
convince the wider public and the public authorities. One NGO tried to gain ‘cognitive 
                                                 
226 See chapter 1 
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authority’ resorting to a combination of ‘superficial’ and ‘complementary’ strategy. The 
‘complementary’ strategy consisted of resorting massively to ‘internal technical expertise’ 
about the alternative technologies to incineration. The other NGO also tried to gain ‘cognitive 
authority’, and to do so, it resorted to a ‘mobilisation’ strategy. But this was not the core of its 
strategy. In fact, it tried to gain rather ‘moral credibility’, resorting to ‘juridical arguments’, 
than ‘cognitive credibility’. Since the scientific expertise was in favour of the position of the 
local NGOs, not surprisingly, the two NGOs did resort to the ‘challenge’ or ‘demarcation’ 
strategy. From a meta-theoretical point of view, this analysis supports the critical PUS 
scholars’ position who claim that the public is able to reflect on the source of their knowledge 
(media or others), that is, that they are able to evaluate the quality of the knowledge they have 
acquired (Irwin A. and Wynne B., 1996; Irwin A. and Michael M., 2003).227 
 
 From a theoretical point of view, The novel property space of the sources of scientific 
expertise I have developed, and which defines four types of scientific expertise (internal 
certified, internal experience-based, external certified, and external experience-based) works 
quite well in this research and has allowed me to identify the type of sources of scientific 
expertise the local NGOs selected. This property space can be probably used as such to 
analyse the sources of scientific expertise of the public in various contexts. 
 The typology set up by Mike Mikael (1996) concerning the reasons for not seeking 
scientific expertise (‘division of labour’, ‘mental constitution’, and ‘deliberate choice’) does 
not fit well this research. The ‘mental constitution’ reason was not invoked by the interviewed 
NGOs, and I have had to modify the ‘division of labour’ type since the local NGOs 
considered the division of labour more among the NGOs than between them and experts. 
Only the ‘deliberate choice’ could be used as such, without any modifications. 
 At last, the gain of ‘cognitive credibility’ and ‘moral credibility’ seem to be grounded 
concepts and allow the analysis of the strategies the local NGOs resorted to in order to bring 
the wider public and the public authorities round to their views. Within the strategy of 
gaining ‘cognitive credibility’, the four ‘strategies of mobilisation of scientific expertise’ 
(‘mobilisation’, ‘challenge’, ‘demarcation’, and ‘complementary’) has allowed me to analyse 
the use of scientific expertise in the discourses of the local NGOs. In the light of the empirical 
study, I have added, however, a fifth strategy: the ‘superficial’ strategy. This strategy consists 
                                                 
227 See chapter 7 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Christophe Voineau  
Controversies, Public Engagement, and Scientific Expertise in Technical-Scientific Decision-Making Processes 
 
- 262 - 
of making reference to results of expertise, but which are vague and without quoting any 
sources. In other words, this is a superficial version of ‘mobilisation’. In order to build up a 
well grounded theory, the theoretical framework developed here should be confronted with 
new grounds, with other types of technical-scientific controversies which involve NGOs.   
 The ‘strategies of mobilisation’ presents some similiraties with the ‘boundary-works’ 
developed by Gyerin (Gieryn T. F., 1983; Gieryn T.F., 1995; Gieryn T. F., 1999c).228 The aim 
is the same: strengthening its own position while weakening, if possible, the position of the 
opponents. The main difference is that ‘boundary-works’ are made by the members of the 
scientific community, while the ‘strategies of mobilisation’ applies here to the stake holders 
engaged in decision-making processes. More generally, the ‘strategies of mobilisation’ can be 
applied to any situation in which scientific expertise is mobilised by “lay people”, that is, by 
individuals or groups who are not members of the scientific community which produce the 
expertises. 
 
 To finish, it should be remembered that the analysis relies on the declarations of the NGOs 
gathered through semi-structured interviews. In other words, the analysis is based on the 
declaration of the interviewees. The interviewees may have forgotten some sources, and not 
all the NGOs were able to precisely quote their sources. It is, however, reasonable to make the 
hypothesis that the sources which spontaneously popped up in the interviews were the most 
important in the eyes of the interviewee. And thus, it is possible to suggest that even though 
the image of the sources is a bit blurred, it remains representative. Now that the sources of 
scientific expertise of the NGOs have been identified, a more accurate image could be 
obtained through a questionnaire, asking for each source if the NGO used it or not, and why. 
 Concerning, the validity of the results of this research, I have tried to provide with details 
the characteristics of the 10 selected decision-making processes and of the studied NGOs. I 
leave it to the reader the possible extension of the results to other decision-making processes 
or situations. The extension of the results of this research should be done case by case using 
the characteristics evoked above in order to evaluate the similarity of the cases.  
                                                 
228 See chapter 7 
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THE TEN DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
 This appendix introduces each of the ten decision-making processes selected for this 
research. The cases are introduced one by one indicating their main features, that is, the public 
entity in charge of the waste treatment, the engaged NGOs, the key dates of the decision-
making process, the running of an existing incineration plant, the type of site (urban or rural), 
and the outcome of the decision-making process. These key features are summarised in table 
22 below. The specificities of each decision-making process are also stated. In brief, the aim 
is to enter into the thickness of the reality of the cases. This appendix has been written down 
using some of the main concepts developed in this research: the three chronological stages 
(‘framing’, ‘specifications’, ‘realisation’), and the types of NGO (‘existing’, ‘ad-hoc’). 
 As I have already stated, a number has been assigned to each case. The criterion of 
assignment is chronological. The case which ended most recently is the number one and the 
oldest is the number eleven. These numbers are used for the entire research. Due to the 
impossibility of realising the interviews, the case number 7 “Nîmes” has been finally removed 
from the study. Consequently, this case is not introduced, and the numeration goes directly 
from VI to VII. 
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Table 23. The main features of the eleven decision-making processes 
N° Case Name of the public entity 
in charge of the project 
Ending 
Date 
Starting 
Date 
Duration 
Of the 
Decision-
making 
process 
(in Year) 
Opening 
of an 
incineration 
plant 
Replacement of 
an old 
incinerator 
Number of 
NGOs 
Which 
mobilised 
1 Gueugnon 
SMEVOM du Charolais-
Brionnais et Autunois 
2005 1998 7   2 
2 Angers Angers Loire Métropole 2005 2003 2  X 2 
3 Thiviers SMD3 2004 1995 9   2 
4 Arras SMAV 2004 
1995- 
1996 
9 
X 
(thermolysis 
facility) 
X 1 
5 Lasse SIVERT 2004 1995 9 X X 1 
6 Le Havre SEVEDE 2004 1998 6 X X 3 
7 Nîmes SITOM Sud Gard 2004 1996 8 X  2 
8 
Villers-Saint-
Paul 
SMVO 2004 1993 9 X X 2 
9 Calce SYDETOM 66 2003 1992 9 X  4 
10 
Guichainville 
(Evreux) 
SETOM 2003 1994 9 X  3 
11 Vaux-le-Pénil SMITOM 2003 1992 9 X X 5 
     
Average: 8 
years 
  Average: 2,5 
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I. Gueugnon 
 Gueugnon is a small town with less than 9000 residents in east-central France. In May 
1998, the beginning of the ‘framing’ stage was marked by the creation of the mixed syndicate 
‘SMEVOM (Syndicat Mixte d’Elimination et de Valorisation des Ordures Ménagères) du 
Charolais-Brionnais et Autunois’. This entity was put in charge of a study to find a solution to 
the problem of household waste treatment. No old incineration plant had to be replaced in 
Gueugnon. Very quickly, about a month after the creation of the mixed syndicate, incineration 
was selected as the solution for the wastes that were not sorted. In March 1999, SMEVOM put 
the private company GIRUS in charge of a feasibility study. In the meantime, under the 
presidency of the Préfet, the département plan for the disposal of household and similar waste 
made compulsory the recourse to incineration. The results of the pre-study on incineration 
were communicated to SMEVOM in January 2002. At that date, the site was already selected, 
in the town centre, next to a steelworks facility. The reason behind this choice is that the 
mixed syndicate wanted to sell the steam produced through the waste incineration to this 
industrial facility. In November 2002, only few months after the incineration plant project was 
publicized, the local NGO VPIG (Vigilance Projet Incinérateur Gueugnon), which was 
opposed to the incineration plant project, was created by a group of residents. This NGO was 
very active, and organised a lot of bottom-up communication initiatives. Another NGO, Autun 
Morvan Ecologie also stood against the project. However, it did not undertake many actions; 
it mainly sent information to its members. In fact, this existing environmental NGO follows 
the incinerator project through VPIG. As Autun Morvan Ecologie stated, the site was rather 
far from the town of Autun, and thus it did not feel very concern by the issue. Both NGOs are 
members of Coordination du CNIID.  
 The second stage of the decision-making process, the ‘specifications’ stage, started in 
January 2004 with the transformation of the status of SMEVOM from study to realisation 
syndicate. Since it was necessary to modify the local urban plan (Plan Local d’Urbanism) to 
site the incineration plant, a public inquiry was realised in June-August of the same year. But 
the commissaires enqueteurs draw unfavourable conclusions. In September, the département 
plan for the disposal of household and similar waste was modified to give the possibility to 
recourses to alternative waste treatment techniques. After the local elections in March 2004, 
the majority of the Conseil Général changed. Then, the new Conseil Général, who was 
opposed to the incineration plant project, took the competence of waste treatment in January 
2005. In March, the SMEVOM gave up the incineration plant project because the new Conseil 
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Général refused to contribute to it financially. A new decision-making process for the 
establishment of a totally new département plan for the disposal of household and similar 
waste began in 2006. All the options are opened again, and both local NGOs VPIG and Autun 
Morvan Ecologie have been involved from the outset through participation in all the meetings 
of the decision-makers. The meetings take place every two months. At the date of the 
interviews, 4 among 12 waste treatment scenarios were selected. The NGO Autun Morvan 
Ecologie also participated to the establishment of the previous département plan, but its 
participation was reduced to the two plenary sessions, which took place twice a year. 
 
 In this research, I study the period 1998-2005; from the creation of the mixed syndicate in 
May 1998 to the given up of the incineration plant project in March 2005. The first round of 
this decision-making process lasted seven years. I have not studied the second round, which 
started after March 2005. The main reason for this choice is that at the date of the interviews it 
was not over yet, and I as I stated in chapter 2, I have studied exclusively completed decision-
making processes. 
 
II. Angers 
 Angers is a 157 000 residents city situated in the western part of France. It is the chef town 
of the département of Maine-et-Loire. The entity in charge of the waste treatment is the 
grouping of communes Angers Loire Métropole. The community of communes Angers Loire 
Métropole is composed of 31 municipalities and 270 000 residents. 
 A first incineration plant was built in 1974 on a site situated in an outlying and at that time 
new area called La Roseraie. In 1998, following the exposure in the media of the existence of 
pollution caused by dioxins emitted by the incineration plant of Gilly-sur-Isère (in the South 
East of France), some residents of La Roseraie set-up a NGO called Association Roseraie 
Environnement, AREN. Since its creation this NGO was strongly opposed to the existing 
incineration plant. It has not been possible to identify the dates of the ‘framing’ stage. It is 
only possible to state that the ‘framing’ stage was before May 2003.  
 Indeed, May 2003 was the start date of the ‘specifications’ stage; when the grouping of 
communes Angers Loire Métropole set up a first committee, a comité de pilotage, to thinks 
about the construction of a new incineration plant to replace the ‘old’ existing incineration 
plant. Two solutions were under discussion: the renewal of the existing plant or the building 
of a new one on another site. In May 2004, on the basis of the comité de pilotage’s thoughts, 
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Angers Loire Métropole decided to transfer the waste incinerator to a neighbouring small 
municipality, Saint-Barthélemy-d’Anjou. The site is at the border between the city and the 
country side, in a lightly urbanized industrial area. Immediately, an existing NGO the 
Association de Défense de la Zone Industrielle, ADZI, (Association for the Defence of the 
Industrial Zone) took a strong stand against the construction of the incineration plant. In 
September 2004, a second comité de pilotage, the charge of which was the completion of the 
incineration plant, was set up by Angers Loire Métropole. In December 2004, an informal 
new NGO, ‘Collectif Inciner’à tort’ (Association Incineration Is Wrong) was especially 
created, by the members of ADZI, other NGOs, and residents. The aim of this NGO is to fight 
against the plan of the particular incinerator of Saint Barthélemy d’Anjou and more generally 
against incineration as a solution to the problem of household waste. The ‘specifications’ 
stage ended in December 2005, when the grouping of communes dropped incineration in 
favour of an alternative technique, the mechanical-biological sorting.    
 
With regard to the mobilisation of the NGOs, two sub-stages can be identified: before 
and after the choice of the site. While the NGO AREN was active during the phase of the 
choice of the site, Collectif inciner’à tort was active once the site of Saint-Barthélémy was 
done. AREN was strongly opposed to the existing incinerator and its renewal whereas 
Collectif Inciner’à tort stands against the incineration plant project and against the principle 
of incineration generally speaking. Both NGOs are members of Coordination du CNIID. A 
third local NGO, an ‘existing’ one, La Sauvegarde de l’Anjou, which has been set up long 
before the new incineration plant project, was not opposed to incineration, and did not care a 
great deal about the new incineration plant project. As a matter of fact, this NGO did not 
answer my requests to interview them. This NGO did not undertake any action against the 
project. Both NGOs AREN and La Sauvegarde de l’Anjou participate to the Comité Local 
d’Information et de Surveillance (Local commission for information and monitoring) of the 
existing incineration plant which is currently running. 
 
 In this research, I have studied the period January 2003-December 2005: from the creation 
of the first comité de pilotage until the giving up of the incineration plant project. I have not 
studied the second ‘specifications’ stage which concerns the mechanical-biological sorting 
facility which was not ended at the dates of the interviews. Moreover, this decision-making 
process lasted only two years, and is thus by far the shortest. 
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III. Thiviers 
 Thiviers is a small town situated in the rural department of Dordogne, in the south west of 
France with a few more than 3000 inhabitants. 
 The ‘framing’ stage started with the setting up of the département plan for the disposal of 
household and similar waste, under the presidency of the Préfet. In May 1995, the 
département plan foresaw the construction of a household incineration plant which was to be 
next to a railway line. Moreover, the incineration plant was to produce electricity and was 
thus called Energetical Valorisation Unit (Unité de Valorisation Energétique).  
 It was thus in December 1995 that the ‘specifications’ began, with the creation of the 
mixed syndicate Syndicat Départemental des Déchets de la Dordogne (SMD3)  by the Préfet.  
SMD3 was put in charge to implement the département plan. In the event, SMD3 started to 
work in 1997. During the same year, the Conseil Général voted in favour of the incineration 
plant. The selection of the site was made in 1999 in collaboration with the French railway 
company Société Nationale de Chemins de Fer (SNCF). At the end of the same year, five 
existing NGOs created the informal ad-hoc local NGO Collectif Halt’incin. Six months later, 
in July 2000, following the hype made by Collectif Halt’incin, some residents of Thiviers 
created the NGO Thiviers la Vie. Collectif Halt’incin is member of coordination du CNIID 
whereas Thiviers la Vie is completely independent. In 2001, the selection of the site of 
Thiviers was made official. The reasons for this choice were the presence of a freight railway 
station, the proximity of an Electricité De France (EDF) facility to which to sell the electricity 
produced by the incineration plant, and a neighbouring quarry which could use the clinker. 
Local elections took place in 2004. Following these elections, the new Conseil Général voted 
against the incineration plant project set up by the Préfet and SMD3. In the meantime, the 
competence of the département plan for the disposal of household and similar waste was 
transferred from the Préfet to the Conseil Général. These two events marked the end of the 
‘specifications’ and of the decision-making process with regard to this research.  
 
 With the designing of a new département plan sponsored by the Conseil Général, a new 
decision-making process started. This second round of the decision-making process includes 
all the options for the waste treatment technique. In this second round, the Conseil Général 
involved the NGOs: they partipated to all the meetings of the decision-makers (i.e. 20-25 
meetings, three hours each). At the date of the interviews, this new decision-making process 
was ongoing; for this I have focused only on the first round of the decision-making process 
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which lasted nine years: from the setting up of the SMD3 in December 1995 until the given-
up of the incineration plant project in June 2005. Finally, no old generation incineration plant 
used to run at Thiviers. 
IV. Arras 
 Arras is the chef-lieu of the département of Pas-de-Calais, in the north of France. Arras is 
a small city with slightly fewer than 50,000 inhabitants. The case of Arras is particular since 
the technology used is not the classical incineration but the thermolysis. The thermolisor of 
Arras is actually the only one running in France. Despite its particularity, I have selected this 
case because it is considered as an incineration plant by the national NGOs Greenpeace and 
CNIID (see the web-site ‘www.france-incineration.org’).  
 In 1995, the grouping of communes around the city of Arras started to study a solution for 
replacing an old generation incineration plant through the creation of the entity Trie Artois 
Service. The existing incinerator sited at Tilloy-les-Mofflaines had to be closed by the end of 
2000 because it did not respect the new norms of emission of pollutants. From the very 
beginning, the decision-makers eliminated the classical incineration technique because 
problems with dioxins started to break out and they though that it would have been difficult to 
make accepted a classical incineration plant by the population. The framing was short: the 
choice of the thermolysis technique was made during 1995. The ‘specifications’ stage was 
longer: it started in 1996 and ended in October 2001. The establishment of the specifications 
of the thermolysis project took two years, and in April 1998, an invitation to tender was 
published. The company Thide Environnment won the tender in August 2000. The public 
enquiry took place in January 2001, and the ‘specifications’ stage ended in October 2001 with 
the starting of the building of the facility. In March 2002, Trie Artois Service was transformed 
in the mixed syndicate called Syndicate Mixte Artois Valorisation (SMAV) who was put in 
charge of the waste gathering and treatment. Finally, the thermolysor opened at the end of 
2003. SMAV groups together four existing grouping of communes, among which the Urban 
Community of Arras, which represents 133,000 residents. From the framing until the opening 
of the facility, the decision-making process lasted nine years. 
 
 No NGO stood against the thermolysor project. Only one existing environmental NGO, 
Arras Nord Nature, member of the National NGO France Nature Environnement, followed 
the issue since it was member of the Local Committee of Information and Monitoring of the 
existing incineration plant and is member of the committee of the new thermolysor. 
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According to SMAV, the residents were little interested in the thermolysor project, and during 
the meeting information about the selective sorting and the waste treatment, very few 
questions were asked about the thermolysor. 
V. Lasse 
 Lasse is a small village with a population of less than 247. It is situated in a rural zone, in 
the département of Maine-et-Loire in the west of France. The ‘framing’ stage started in July 
1995: a group of small communes set up a mixed syndicate to study a solution for the 
treatment of the household wastes: the Syndicat Mixte d’Etude et de Programmation du 
Traitement des Déchets Ménagers et Assimilés (SMEPTDMA). In November 1998 the 
technique of incineration was chosen.  
 The second stage ‘specifications’ started in may 1999 with the creation of another mixed 
syndicate put in charge of the realisation and the running of the incineration plant. This mixed 
syndicate has been called SIVERT (Syndicat Intercommunal de Valorisation et de Recyclage 
Thermique). SIVERT did not select a site at the outset of the decision-making process in order 
“to avoid the NIMBY phenomenon”. A small household incineration plant used to run until 
the end of the 1990’s at Lasse. The final site, still in the municipality of Lasse is in the middle 
of the countryside. As soon as the municipality of Lasse was chosen for the siing of the 
facility, in summer-autumn 1999, some residents created the ad-hoc NGO CRITOM (Comité 
de Réflexion sur l’Incinération des Ordures Ménagères) and invited SIVERT to a public 
meeting it. CRITOM is member of Coordination du CNIID. Very quickly, in December 1999, 
SIVERT asked Préfet for the setting-up of a local commission for information and monitoring 
in order to have a place where to meet the NGOs. The operator ONYX-Véolia was selected in 
December 2000. The public inquiry took place during the autumn 2001.  
 The end of the ‘specifications’ stage and the beginning of the ‘realisation’ stage took place 
in March 2002. After a ten year decision-making process, the incineration plant opened at the 
end of 2004. 
 
 An existing environmental NGO, La Sauvegarde de l’Anjou, also participates in the local 
commission for information and monitoring for the new incineration plant. As in the case of 
Angers, this NGO did not stand against the incineration plant project. During the decision-
making process, SIVERT also met the farmers and some mushroom gatherers. The results of 
these meeting have been the improvement of the emission monitoring system, and the setting 
up of a compensation fund for the farmers in case of pollution by the dioxins. 
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VI. Le Havre  
 Le Havre is a 190,000 population city in the the département of Seine-Maritime in the 
region Haute-Normandie.  By the end of 2000, the city of Le Havre had to replace two 
incineration plants which did not comply with the new norms of emission of pollutants. The 
‘framing’ stage started toward the end of 1998 it asked to the company Groupe Merlin to 
study a solution for the waste treatment. The chosen site was in the middle of a huge 
industrial zone, at Saint-Jean-de Folleville, far from any housing. Moreover, this industrial 
zone already hosted pollutant facilities such as a refinery. The ‘framing’ stage was short: less 
than one year after the setting up of a mixed syndicate, SEVEDE (Syndicat d’Elimination et 
de Valorisation Energétique des Déchets de l’Estuaire) was put in charge of the 
implementation the decision to set-up an incineration plant, which marked the beginning of 
the ‘specifications’ stage in September 1999. The invitation to tender for the construction, and 
then the selection of the building company, were made between February and December 
2000.  
 SEVEDE was very confident in its project since the building of the facility started in 
January 2002, before the granting of the authorisation to run by the Préfet. No real opposition 
broke out during the Public Enquiry which was realised in May-June 2002. In July-August 
2002, the company Novergie was selected to operate the incineration plant and the Préfet 
grant its authorisation in September. At the end of 2003, the first trial of the new incineration 
plant was realised. The decision-making process ended with the official opening which took 
place in June 2004. This six years decision-making process is the shortest among the ones that 
ended by the opening of an incineration plant. In all but one other decision-making processes, 
the building started after the granting of the authorisation to operate. Since the division of the 
decision-making process into stages is based on the number and importance of the issues 
under discussion, I have decided to end the ‘specifications’ with the beginning of the building. 
 
 No ad-hoc NGO was created on the occasion of this decision-making process. The three 
NGOs which engaged in the decision-making process are ‘existing’ NGOs. Comité du 
quartier des Neiges is an NGO composed of some residents of one of the two existing 
incineration plant. It was created in 1995 to fight against the pollution produced by the 
neighbouring incineration plant. The members of this NGO were not opposed to the new 
incineration plant project. In fact, Comité du quartier des Neiges is not against the 
incineration technique if the facility is set up in an appropriate site. The two other NGOs, SOS 
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Estuaire and Ecologie Pour Le Havre, are environmental and local. These two NGOs are 
tightly linked: both are members of the national NGO France Nature Environnement, and the 
later is member of the former. SOS Estuaire was created in 1988, on the occasion of the 
building of the Normandie bridge across the Seine estuary, while Ecologie Pour Le Havre 
was set up in 1981. Ecologie Pour Le Havre deals with the environment, the industrial 
pollution, and the renewable energy. Initially these two NGOs mobilised against the old 
incineration plant which did not respect the norms of pollution. In the facts, this is Ecologie 
Pour Le Havre which actually engaged in the decision-making process, with the support of 
SOS Estuaire. Both NGOs were opposed to the incineration plant project, and in favour of an 
alternative technique, the methanisation.  
VII. Villers-Saint-Paul  
 Viller-Saint-Paul is a small town with a population slightly more than 6,000. It is in the 
département of Oise, less than 100 kilometers north of Paris. The ‘framing’ stage started 
sometime during the second semester 1993: an informal group of mayors asked to a private 
urban research consultancy to study a solution for the waste treatment in order to replace an 
old existing incineration plant. At that date, incineration was already a special solution. At the 
end of 1994, the main lines of the project were defined, and the département plan for the 
disposal of household and similar waste integrated the setting up of an incineration plant in 
the western part of the département. An existing environmental NGO member of the 
Coordination du CNIID, Compiègne Ecologie, mobilised during the public enquiry for the 
département plan because it was against the setting up of an incineration plant in the western 
part of the département. But its engagement did not go much further since the town of 
Compiègne is “far from the site of Villers-Saint-Paul” (interview N°11, Compiègne 
Ecologie). In fact, Compiègne Ecologie declared that it was satisfied with the mobilisation of 
another NGO, Alerte aux Déchets.  
 In May 1999, the creation of the mixed syndicate SMVO (Syndicat Mixte de la Vallée de 
l’Oise) marked the beginning of the ‘specifications’ stage. February 1999-February 2000 was 
the period of the invitation to tender for the construction. This is during this period, quite late 
after the incineration plant project was made public, that the ‘ad-hoc NGO’ Alerte aux 
Déchets was created by some residents. The initial aim of the NGO was to obtain information 
about the incineration plant project and to study the alternatives. Alerte aux Déchets was also 
worried because “the existing incineration plant, at Nogent-sur-Oise, was very polluting, and 
neither the local elected decision-makers nor the Préfet wanted to close it”. The strong 
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bottom-up engagement of this NGO (the case was ‘highly controversial’) came late, during 
the ‘realisation’ stage, and thus the decision-making process went on. The invitation to tender 
for the running of the incineration plant took place between September 2000 and September 
2001. In September 2001 the public inquiry was conducted. The second stage of the decision-
making process ended little after with the granting of the authorisation to run in December 
2001.  
 The ‘realisation’ stage started in March 2002, and finally, the incineration plant officially 
started to run in April 2004, nine years after the beginning of the decision-making process.  
VIII. Calce 
 Calce is a small village with a population of less than 247. It is in the département of 
Pyrénées-Orientales (66), in the very south of France. The ‘framing’ started in October 1992 
when the president of the Conseil Général asked for a study for the setting of an household 
waste treatment facility. The private study Groupe Merlin recommended the setting up of 
three incineration plants. However, in 1994, under the presidency of the Préfet, the 
département plan for the disposal of household and similar waste foresaw only one 
incineration plant. In July of the same year, the mixed syndicate SYDETOD (Syndicat 
Départemental pour l’Etude en vue de la réalisation d'un dispositif de Transport et de 
Traitement des Ordures ménagères et autres Déchets) was set up and put in charge of a study 
to try to find a solution for the transport and the treatment of the households and similar 
wastes.  
 In November 1996, the beginning of the ‘specifications stage’ was marked by the creation 
of a new mixed syndicate, SYDETOM66 (Syndicat Départemental de Transport, de 
Traitement et de valorisation des Ordures Ménagères et autres déchets assimilés) which was 
put in charge of the realisation and of the management of the facility. Then, for more than two 
years, until March 1999, SYDETOM66 searched for a site and encountered a lot of refusals. 
At least four municipalities refused the siting of the incineration plant on their territory. The 
town council of Saint–Hippolyte initially accepted. Then in front of the opposition of the 
population, a referendum was organised by the municipality, and the hosting of the 
incineration plant was finally rejected. At Rivesaltes, an appellation d’origine contrôlée wine 
zone, the town council, partially composed of viticulturists, refused because it was afraid of 
the contamination by dioxins. The mayor of Peyrestrotes gave up in front of the opposition of 
the local NGO Vivre à Peyrestrotes. At Vivès, in front of the opposition of the residents, the 
town council voted against the project. Finally, the town council of Calce offered to host the 
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facility. In March 1999, SYDETOM66 selected Calce and started the invitations to tender for 
the building and the running of the facility. During the autumn 2000, the operator and the 
builder were chosen. Toward the end of 2000, the public enquiry was made. Over the same 
period, a first meeting of the local commission for information and monitoring took place. 
Calce is one of the rare case in which the local committee for information was set-up, during 
the second stage, before the ‘realisation’ started.  
 And this is in January 2001 that the ‘realisation’ stage started. Finally, the incineration 
plant opened in July 2003, after a nine year-long decision-making process. 
  
 In the study of this case, I have focused on the NGOs which mobilised around the 
incinerator project in Calce. I have not studied the long route made by SYDETOM66 across 
the département to find a site. Four NGOs, one ad-hoc and three existing, engaged in the 
decision-making process, that is, participated to the local committees for information and 
monitoring: Coordination Environnementale des Pyrénées-Orientales, La Hune, Charles 
Flahaut, and Frene66. Coordination Environnementale des Pyrénées-Orientales is an ad-hoc 
NGO, member of the Coordination of CNIID. It was created in May 1998 while SYDETOM66 
was searching for a site. This NGO gathers together seven existing NGOs among which Vivre 
à Peyrestortes, some individuals, and one company. Some elected decision-makers are also 
members of this NGO. From its creation, Coordination Environnementale des Pyrénées-
Orientales has been against waste incineration. In this decision-making process, this is the 
NGO which was the most active through the organisation ‘bottom-up initiatives’ to stand 
against the project. La Hune is an environmental ‘existing’ NGO. The aim of this NGO, 
created in 1994, is to inform the elected and private local decision-makers about the 
environment and the evolution of the legislation concerning the environment. Formally, La 
Hune is independent, but it has tight links with France Nature Environnement. Initially, when 
it engaged in the decision-making process in 1996, La Hune was not opposed to the 
SYDETOM66’s project. At that time, this NGO considered incineration as the only available 
technique to make the transition between the disposal to landfills and a full selective sorting. 
Furthermore, it thought that one modern incinerator was better than the five old existing ones 
which used to run. But this position has changed along the decision-making process. Today 
the NGO is against waste incineration because of heath hazard of the dioxins, and above all, it 
thinks that it is impossible to have a transpARENt functioning of incineration plants. Both 
NGOs Coordination Environnementale des Pyrénées-Orientales and La Hune work together 
from the beginning of their engagement. But the La Hune did not participate in the 
Voineau, Christophe (2010), Controversies, public engagement and scientific expertise in technical-scientific decision-making 
processes : the setting up of household waste incinerators in France 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93385
Appendix 
The Ten Decision-Making Processes 
 
- 277 - 
organisation of the ‘bottom-up initiatives’; its actions consisted mainly in participating in the 
local committees for information and monitoring. Coordination Environnementale des 
Pyrénées-Orientales and La Hune have no relation at all with the NGO Charles Flahaut. 
Charles Flahaut is an old independent environmental NGO created in 1944. Its initial aim 
was the reforestation of the département. Today, it is a multi-purpose NGO for the knowledge 
and the protection of the nature. It was not opposed to the incineration plant project, and 
thinks that it was the “less bad solution”. At last, Frene66 is an environmental ‘existing’ 
NGO as regards the incineration plant project. Frene66 groups together 25-30 local NGOs 
and is member of France Nature Environnement. Due to my inability to gain interview, no 
more information about this NGO could be gathered. However, it seems that it was not very 
active concerning the incineration plant project. To finish with the groups which mobilised 
around the incineration plant project, SYDETOM66 met the chamber of agriculture in 2003 
because the viticulturists were worried about the pollution due to dioxins. Following these 
meetings, some extra monitoring measures were realised, and a compensation fund was set 
up. 
  
 With regard to the ‘top-down public engagement’, the municipal elections in 2001 were a 
turning point. The president of the SYDETOM66, who was in favour of the participation of 
the NGOs and thus who anticipated the creation of a local commission for information and 
monitoring during the second stage of the decision-making process, was not elected again. 
The new president was not in favour of the NGOs participation. From this moment, the NGOs 
encountered difficulties within the committee:  they should ask the meetings to be done and 
they had difficulties to obtain information. 
IX. Guichainville 
 Guichainville is a small town with 2,500 inhabitants. It is in the département of Eure in the 
region of Haute-Normandie, in the north-west part of France. The starting point of the 
‘framing’ stage is the creation of the study mixed syndicate SETOM (Syndicat mixte pour 
l’Etude et le Traitement des Ordures Ménagères). Between March and July 1994, the research 
study Groupe Merlin was put in charge of finding a waste treatment solution . The ‘existing’ 
environmental NGO Guichainville Environnement started to stand against the incineration 
plant project quite early, between 1992 and 1994. This NGO engaged on the occasion of 
setting up of the département plan for the disposal of household and similar waste, which 
forsaw three incineration plants. Guichainville Environnement was created in 1992. The initial 
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aim of this NGO was to stand against the transformation of the main road which goes through 
the village into an express way. Among the twenty-seven studied NGOs, Guichainville 
Environnement is the only one which is member of both national nets Coordination du CNIID 
and France Nature Environnement. It is also member of the regional NGO Haute-Normandie 
Nature Environnement. 
 The decision-making process entered in the second stage in December 1994 with the 
transformation of SETOM from a study to a realisation mixed syndicate. Then, Groupe Merlin 
was nominated as project manager for the study, implementation, and monitoring of the 
operating of the waste gathering and treatment plans. In 1994-1995 the municipality of 
Guichainville was selected to host the incineration plant; the final decision was made official 
in March 1997. The invitation to tender for the building started in August 1997 and ended in 
1999. Then, in 2000, the public inquiry took place, and the commissaires enquêteur gave a 
favourable opinion to the project. And this is quite late, on the occasion of this public enquiry 
that the existing local environmental NGO La Sauvegarde de l’Environnement engaged in the 
decision-making process. La Sauvegarde de l’Environnement was set up in 1978 to stand 
against the setting up of a chemical facility in the village. This NGO is member of Haute-
Normandie Nature Environnement, which is itself affiliated to France Nature Environnement. 
However, this NGO did not mobilise significantly: its action consisted in giving information 
to, and in supporting, Guichainville Environnement. In the event it was the latter which 
organised and coordinated the ‘bottom-up initiatives’ to stand against the project. 
 As soon as the Préfet granted the authorisation to operate (March 2001), building started 
(April 2001). The operator Novergie was selected quite late in the decision-making process, in 
January 2003. The ‘realisation’ stage, and thus the decision-making process, ended in January 
2004 with the official inauguration of the incineration plant. The first meeting of the local 
commission for information and monitoring took place before the opening of the facility, 
during the ‘realisation’ stage, in October 2002. From then the frequency of the meetings was 
one per year. 
X. Vaux-le-Pénil 
 Vaux-le-Pénil is a small town with a 10,000 population situated around forty kilometres in 
the south-east of Paris, in the département of Seine-et-Marne. The ‘framing’ started with the 
creation of the SMECOSOM, a mixed syndicate put in charge of the study of a solution for the 
household waste treatment to replace the existing incineration plant. The setting up of an 
incineration plant was decided upon. In November 1996, the creation of SMITOM, a mixed 
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syndicate put in charge of the realisation of the project, marked the beginning of the second 
stage. The siting of the facility just next to the existing incineration plant was decided in June 
1997. In September 1997, the SMITOM’s project was integrated in the département plan for 
the disposal of household and similar waste. The invitation to tender for the building took 
place between January 1998 and October 1999. Groupe Merlin was selected as project 
manager in February 1998. Véolia-Onyx was selected in January 2000 to operate the 
incineration plant. In May 2000, SMITOM asked to the Préfet for the anticipated creation of a 
local commission for information and monitoring because it wanted to answer to the worries 
of the population. The ‘specifications’ stage ended in September 2000 with the starting of the 
building. The public enquiry took place very late in the decision-making process, in February 
2001, whereas the building was already started. The Préfet granted the authorisation to 
operate in April. The first meeting of the local commission for information and monitoring 
took place by the middle of 2001. Then the meetings took place once a year. Finally, the 
incineration plant was brought into service in December 2003. 
 As for the mobilisation of the NGOs, the case of Vaux-le-Pénil is very special. While in the 
other cases one ad-hoc NGO grouped together the interested individuals and some existing 
NGOs, and as a result two NGOs were mobilised, one ad-hoc and one existing, five NGOs 
mobilised in the case of Vaux-le-Pénil. These NGOs were AIPPNE  (Association 
Intercommunale pour la Protection et la Promotion de la Nature et de l'Environnement), Un 
autre regard pour Maincy, AVIE  (Association de défense des Victimes de l'Incinération des 
Déchets), Un autre regard pour Maincy, Association des Médecins de Maincy, and ASMSN 
(Association Seine-et-Marnaise pour la Sauvegarde de la Nature). Three were ‘existing’, and 
two were ‘ad-hoc’ NGOs. ASMSN was created in 1972 by a group of researchers from the 
CNRS (Centre National de Recherche Scientifique). Its aim is to contribute to the protection 
of the environment and of the living environment by any means. This NGO, which is 
affiliated to France Nature Environnement, was not initially opposed to the incineration plant 
project. Incineration was not a matter to them because they considered incineration as a 
progress by comparison to landfills. In this decision-making process, the NGO was more 
concerned with the protected site of Vaux-le-Vicomte, where there is a castle. AIPPNE was 
set up in the 1980’s. The aim of the NGO is to defend the environment and the town’s 
heritage. AIPPNE is in touch with, but not member of, Coordination du CNIID, and it is a 
member of ASMSN. The third ‘existing’ NGO, Un autre regard pour Maincy, was set up in 
1996 by a group of ten-fifteen residents. The foundors of this NGO wanted to make the 
functioning of the town hall more democratic. Un autre regard pour Maincy is not linked to 
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any national NGO net. It engaged against the incineration plant project in 1998, invoking the 
principle precaution about dioxins. Association des Médecins de Maincy is an ad-hoc NGO. It 
was created in 2000, and gathers together eleven physicians who lived in Maincy. These 
physicians were worried by the pollution emitted by the existing incineration plant and 
wondered about the opportunity to set up a new incinerator on the same site, adding pollution 
again. The aim of the NGO was to bring advices and scientific expertise to the residents, and 
to warn the public authority about the dangers of household incineration for the population. 
This NGO was independent. At last, the aims of AVIE, an ‘ad-hoc’ NGO created in 2003, are: 
to obtain a compensation for the victims of incineration, to prevent the setting up of another 
incineration plant on the same site, and to obtain a sanitary monitoring of the residents.      
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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 
 
 The chronological tables are the tool I used to gather the data during the interviews with 
the groupings of communes. For each case, there is one table per year. For example for an 
eight years decision-making process, eight tables are necessary. In the first column, the 
possible mechanisms of public participation are listed (there is one line for each ‘type’ of 
participation initiative). In the first row, time is divided in years (1,2,3,….of the decision-
making process). In the second row, the key moment of the decision-making process are 
noted. This key moment will then define (for the analysis) the significant stages of the 
decision-making process with regard to public participation. In the other cells (the coordinates 
of each cell are ‘a point in time’, and ‘a participation mechanism’), the number of actually 
organised mechanisms, and some specificities about it, is indicated. Moreover, in two cases, 
the public authorities only accepted to be ‘interviewed’ via (e-)mail. Consequently, the  
instructions for the filling of the table have been written down (in French). They can be found 
below just after the model of the chronological table. The chronological tables of each of the 
eleven case, resulting from the 15 interviews realised with the public authorities, are available 
in annexe 3 (entitled ‘chronological tables: the eleven decision-making processes’) 
. 
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Année 1:  Cas: 
Mois Janv. Fév. Mars  Avr. Mai  Juin Juil. Aout Sept. Oct. Nov. Déc. 
Dates importantes du projet: voir la liste ci-après             
Information/inclusion du public, des associations, des 
groupes d’intérêt économique, autre: 
            
Lettre d’information, journal du syndicat, etc. (nom du 
journal, date de chaque édition et/ou nombre de numéro 
sur une période, sujet des articles/des numéros) 
            
Réunion publiques/colloques 
Date,lieu et/ou nombre sur une période. 
Participants (public, élus locaux, associations, groupe 
d’intérêt économique, ex : chambre d’agriculture, un 
invité spécial animant la réunion, etc…) 
Thème(s) de la réunion  
            
Communiqués de presse (date et/ou nombre sur une 
période, sujet) 
            
Autre (ex : courrier aux associations,  site web, etc.)             
‘Participation’ du public/des associations             
Présence passive/Participation active aux réunions de 
l’entité publique porteuse du projet (nom des 
associations, des groupes d’intérêt économiques) 
            
Manifestations lors de réunions de l’entité publique 
porteuse du projet 
            
Réunions spécifiques de l’entité publique avec les 
associations ou groupes d’intérêt économique (dates,  
et/ou nombre sur une période, sujets abordées). Inclure 
les CLIS ici. 
            
Visite de sites existants. Nom des sites, type de 
traitement, participants, ex. élus locaux, associations, 
riverains, etc., à défaut nombre) 
            
Sondage/référendum             
Autre (à préciser)             
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Comment remplir le tableau chronologique ? 
 
Une page par année depuis le tout début du projet jusqu’à l’ouverture de l’U.V.E et la 
première CLIS qui s’en suit ; ou jusqu’à son abandon définitif, et éventuellement jusqu’à 
l’ouverture  d’une unité de traitement utilisant un autre procédé et la première CLIS qui s’en 
suit. 
 
1. Les différentes lignes (voir exemple) 
 
Dates importantes du projet 
Les ‘Dates importantes du projet’ ont pour but d’avoir un récit chronologique avec les faits 
importants qui ont marqué les différentes étapes. La liste des dates ci-dessous est celle des 
informations minimales que je souhaite avoir et qui sont présentes dans tous les processus de 
décision. C’est une liste standard, n’hésitez donc pas à ajouter des faits qui vous paraissent 
importants pour votre projet.  
Date importante du processus (s’il y a lieu):  
? Création/Nom de l’entité publique porteuse du projet (c.a.d. du syndicat d’étude, 
Communauté de Commune, etc.) 
? Transformation en syndicat de réalisation 
? Appel d’offre exploitation et construction 
? Sélection de l’exploitant 
? Sélection du constructeur 
? Si possible dépôt demande permis de construire 
? dépôt demande autorisation d’exploiter 
? Enquête publique 
? Si possible Permis de construire accordé 
? Autorisation d’exploiter accordée 
? Début des travaux 
? Ouverture/mise en route officielle de l’unité 
? Création de la CLIS  
? Abandon du projet d’incinérateur / Démarrage d’un autre projet  
? Autre (à préciser) 
 
Autres informations souhaitées : 
? Nom du Maitre d’œuvre ou de l’aide Maitre d’œuvre : 
? Nom du constructeur : 
? Nom de l’exploitant : 
 
Cette première ligne est importante car elle détermine les différents périodes projets et 
‘structure’ les réponses des lignes suivantes. 
 
Pour la précision des dates, le mois me suffit.  
 
Fréquence/nombre des réunions de l’entité publique porteuse du projet : 
Selon les phases du projet, la fréquence des réunions a pu changer. Dans chaque case, qui 
correspond à 1 mois, indiquer par exemple ‘1 réunion entre les élus du syndicat, sujet : aspect 
économique’ ; ou pour une période indiquer par exemple de février à juin 1999, 1 réunion par 
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mois entre les élus du syndicat, sujet : économique et environnemental ; ou encore de février 
à juin 1999, 5 réunions, sujet : économique et environnemental. 
 
 
 
Informations du public, des associations, groupes d’intérêt économique, autre  : 
Selon les phases, la manière d’informer a pu changer. Là aussi il possible de remplir par mois 
ou par période.  
 
‘Participation’ du public/des associations : 
Selon les phases, l’éventuelle participation du public a pu changer. Là aussi il possible de 
remplir par mois ou par période.  
 
2. Note générale sur le remplissage 
 
Quand il n’y a pas d’évènement pour un mois ou une période, laisser les cases blanches. 
Si une ligne est sans objet pour votre cas durant toute la période du projet, écrire « sans 
objet » dans la case du premier mois de la première année  
Si vous n’avez pas le mois précis, indiquer la période approximative la plus restreinte 
possible. Par exemple, ‘entre décembre 1998 et janvier 1999, dépôt de la demande 
d’autorisation à exploiter.  
Enfin, sentez-vous libre d’ajouter d’autres informations qui vous semblent importante (ex. 
projet en vue de remplacement d’un incinérateur ne répondant pas aux nouvelles normes). 
Sentez-vous libre d’ajouter des informations en marge du tableau. 
 
3. Note technique sur le remplissage ; à propos de Word: 
 
Pour une remplir les cases pour une période donnée, vous avez (au moins) trois possibilités. 
De la plus simple à la plus compliquée : 
1. Dans la case correspondant au premier mois de la période écrire, par exemple, du 
mois de février au mois de juin … 
2. Fusionner les cellules : sélectionner les mois de la période. Cliquer bouton droit de la 
souris. Sélectionner ‘fusionner les cellule’. Puis écrire, par exemple, du mois de 
février au mois de juin … 
3. Faire apparaître la barre d’outils ‘dessin’ et utiliser les ‘cadres textes’. Puis écrire, par 
exemple, du mois de février au mois de juin … 
Le problème est que le ‘cadre texte’ n’est pas ‘attaché’ au tableau. A la fin du 
remplissage, il est possible qu’un cadre texte que vous avez disposé ne soit plus sur la 
bonne ligne, il faut alors le repositionner.    
 
Dans tous les cas, ne vous préoccupez pas pour la mise en forme, l’important est que les 
informations soient présentes. 
Si vous préférez, vous pouvez me fournir les informations sur un papier libre, sans remplir le 
tableau. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE NGOS 
 
Association 
 
1. Quelle est la date de création de votre association ? 
 
2. Pour quelles raisons a-t-elle été créée, quel était son but initial ? 
 
3. Etes vous affilié à une association nationale et/ou internationale ? 
 
4. Si, oui la ou lesquelles ? 
 
5. voir ci-dessous 
 
6. Quelle est votre position vis-à-vis de l’incinérateur.  
Quelle est la date d’engagement de l’association. Pour quelles raisons vous êtes vous mobilisés autour 
de ce projet d’incinérateur? 
 
7. Y a t il des évènements passés qui ont contribué à votre mobilisation ?  
Le cas de Gilly-sur-Isère a-t-il été un évènement important pour votre mobilisation ? 
 
 
Information et participation éventuelle du public dans le processus de décision 
 
 
5. Comment l’entité publique porteuse du projet a-t-elle informé et éventuellement inclus le public et plus 
particulièrement votre association ? (types d’action, dates) 
 
8. Par conséquent, quels ont été vos modes d’actions ? (types d’action, dates) 
 
9. Etes-vous satisfait de la manière dont l’entité publique porteuse du projet vous a informé ou inclus dans 
le processus de décision?  
 
10. Qualifieriez-vous vos relations avec l’entité publique porteuse du projet de consensuelles, constructives, 
controversés, conflictuelles, autre ? 
 
10bis. Quelle est la composition de la CLIS ? 
 
Mobilisation de la connaissance technique et scientifique 
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11. Avez-vous mobilisé par vous-même ou demandé à NOM DE L’AUTHORITE PUBLIQUE des 
expertises scientifiques sur le lien incinération-santé ? (expertise faites faire par vous-mêmes ou pré-
existante, concernant d’autres cas d’incinérateur)  
Si non : pour quelles raisons ?  
Si oui : Quelles ont été vos sources ? (ou nom des laboratoires/confiance?) 
 
12. Avez-vous mobilisé par vous même ou demandé à NOM DE L’AUTHORITE PUBLIQUE des 
expertises scientifiques sur le lien incinération-environnement ? (expertise faites faire par vous-mêmes 
ou pré-existante, concernant d’autres cas d’incinérateur)  
Si non : pour quelles raisons ?  
Si oui : Quelles ont été vos sources ? (ou nom des laboratoires/confiance?) 
 
13. Avez-vous mobilisé ou demandé à NOM DE L’AUTHORITE PUBLIQUE des expertises scientifiques 
concernant la mesure des émissions de molécules polluantes ?  
Si non : pour quelles raisons ?  
Si oui : Quelles ont été vos sources ? (ou nom des laboratoires/confiance?) 
  
 
14. Avez-vous mobilisé des connaissances techniques concernant l’incinération ou des alternatives 
techniques pour le traitement des déchets ?  
Si non : pour quelles raisons ?  
Si oui : Quelles ont été vos sources ? (ou nom des laboratoires/confiance?) 
 
 
15. L’entité publique porteuse du projet a-t-elle apporté des expertises sur le lien incinératin-santé ?  
 
(Si oui) Qu’en pensez-vous ?  
 
15bis. L’entité publique porteuse du projet a-t-elle apporté des expertises sur le lien incinératin-santé ?  
 
(Si oui) Qu’en pensez-vous ?  
 
16. Avez-vous confiance dans les mesures concernant les mesures d’émission de molécules polluantes 
faites par l’entité publique porteuse du projet ou l’exploitant? 
 
17. Que pensez-vous de l’expertise technique apportée par l’entité publique porteuse du projet  concernant 
les alternatives à l’incinération pour le traitement des déchets? 
 
Pensez-vous que concernant la technologie concernant l’incinération l’entité publique porteuse du projet 
à utilisé la meilleur technologie existante ? 
 
Autre 
18. Quelles sont les autres associations qui se sont mobilisées ? 
 Auriez-vous les coordonnées d’autres personnes pouvant répondre à mes questions ? 
 
19. Seriez-vous près à me faire parvenir des documents que vous avez édités et à répondre à d’éventuelles 
questions ultérieures ?  
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TEMPLATE OF THETABLE OF THE NUMBER OF EACH TYPE OF 
MECHANISMS IN EACH KEY CHRONOLOGICAL STAGE 
 
 For each case, a table has been filled, counting the number of iniatives sponsored in each 
stage. This table is a combination of the typology of the mechanisms with the three 
chronological stages (see below). 
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Stages ‘Framing’ ‘Specifications’ ‘realisation’ 
After 
Opening Total
Sub-stages 
(possibly)      
Case: 
 
Dates      
Mechanism Classes229 
Mechanisms 
present in this 
research230 
     
Top-down 
communication 
type 1* 
(traditional 
publicity)  
Information 
broadcasts 
(‘Publicity’ via 
newsletters/ 
Journal, 
press releases, 
radio 
broadcasts, 
letters to 
associations) 
     
Top-down 
communication 
type 2* 
 
Public Meeting 
(Eventually with 
question-and-
answer session) 
District councils 
     
Top-down 
communication 
type 3* 
Public authority 
(non interactive) 
web site 
 
Exhibition 
     
Top-down 
Communication 
Top-down 
communication 
type 5 
Formal / 
Informal 
Meetings with 
NGOs or  
groups of 
economical 
interests 
 
Visits of existing 
facilities with  
NGOs or groups 
of economical 
interests 
 
Compulsory 
Local 
commission for 
information and 
monitoring 
     
 Top-down 
communication 
type 6 
Phone 
Communication  
with NGOs or  
groups of 
economical 
interests 
     
 Total       
                                                 
229 NOTE: asterisks (*) mark the top-down types that have been initially listed in the typology set up by Rowe G. 
and Frewer L.J.  2005. 
230 The term “association” refers to NGOs, groups of interests, or other organizations. 
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Stages ‘Framing’ ‘Specifications’ ‘realisation’ 
After 
Opening Total
Sub-stages 
(possibly)      
Case: 
 
Dates      
Mechanism Classes229 
Mechanisms 
present in this 
research230 
     
Top-down 
consultation 
type 1* 
Opinion Survey 
Local referenda      
Top-down 
consultation 
type 2* 
Consultative 
Committee      
Top-down 
consultation 
type 4 
Consultation 
meeting with  
representatives 
of associations 
     
Top-down 
Consultation 
Top-down 
consultation 
type 5 
Consultation 
public meeting      
 Total       
Top-down 
participation 
type 1*  
Action Planning 
Workshop 
(commission 
départementale 
pour le plan 
d’élimination des 
déchets des 
ordures 
ménagères)
231
 
     
Top-down 
participation 
type 3 
Non compulsory 
and Compulsory 
Local 
commission for 
information and 
monitoring 
     
Top-down 
participation 
type 4 
Registre 
d’enquête 
(Enquiry 
Register) 
(Compulsory 
Public Enquiry) 
     
Top-down 
participation 
type 5 
Interview with 
commissaires 
enquêteurs 
(compulsory 
public enquiry) 
     
Top-down 
Participation 
Total       
No Engagement No Mechanism No Initiative      
                                                 
231 Départemental commission for the disposal of household and similar waste plan 
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Stages ‘Framing’ ‘Specifications’ ‘realisation’ 
After 
Opening Total
Sub-stages 
(possibly)      
Case: 
 
Dates      
Mechanism Classes229 
Mechanisms 
present in this 
research230 
     
Bottom-up 
consultation 
type 1 
Association 
meeting with 
policy-makers 
 
     
Bottom-up 
Consultation 
Bottom-up 
consultation  
type  2 
Request of 
Documents      
 Total       
Bottom-up 
communication 
type 1 
(traditional 
public protest) 
Demonstration 
 
Petition  
 
Protest letter 
sent  to policy-
makers 
     
Bottom-up 
communication 
type 2 
Opposition 
association 
press release  
 
Opposition Open 
Letters 
     
Bottom-up 
communication 
type 3 
Association 
Information 
broadcast 
(‘Publicity’ via 
newsletters/ 
Journal, 
newspaper, 
open Letters, 
press release, 
radio broadcast) 
     
Bottom-up 
communication 
type 4 
Association 
exhibition 
 
Association web 
site 
     
Bottom-up 
communication 
type 5 
Association 
conferences 
 
Association 
public meeting 
     
Bottom-up 
Communication 
 
 
Bottom-up 
communication 
type 6 
Association 
newsletter, 
reports,  or 
expertises, sent 
to policy-makers 
     
 Total       
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Stages ‘Framing’ ‘Specifications’ ‘realisation’ 
After 
Opening Total
Sub-stages 
(possibly)      
Case: 
 
Dates      
Mechanism Classes229 
Mechanisms 
present in this 
research230 
     
Bottom-up  
Participation 
Bottom-up 
participation 
type 1 
Not  present in 
this research. 
For information, 
existing 
exercices: 
 
Community 
based research 
 
Patient 
association 
     
 Total       
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PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT MECHANISMS CLASSIFIED 
ACCORDING TO THE STATE OF THEIR EIGHT 
SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS 
 Table 25 below lists the mechanisms sponsored by the public authority and by the public in 
the ten decision-making processes and states their structural variability, so that each 
mechanism is fully defined through the values of its eight significant characteristics. The class 
of the mechanisms (top-down communication, top-down consultation, etc.) is also indicated. 
However, this table is not the typology itself, but a working document. 
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Table 24: Public  engagement mechanisms classified according to the values of their eight key characteristics  
Characteristics233 
Engagement 
Class 
Type of 
Mechanism232 
Selection 
Method: 
Controlled-
Uncontrolled 
Elicitation 
Facilitation: 
Yes-No 
Response 
Mode: 
Open-
Closed 
Information 
Input: 
Set-Flexible 
Medium of 
information 
transfer: 
FTF-Non FTF 
Facilitation of 
aggregation: 
Structured-
Unstructured 
Addressee of 
information: 
Public authority-
Larger  public 
Argument: 
Yes-No 
Information broadcasts 
(‘Publicity via newsletters/ 
Journal, 
press releases, radio 
broadcasts, 
letters to associations) 
Controlled NA NA Set Non FTF NA NA NA 
District councils 
(compulsory for big 
municipalities) 
Uncontrolled NA NA Flexible FTF NA NA NA 
Public Meeting (Eventually 
with question-and-answer 
session) 
Uncontrolled NA NA Flexible FTF NA NA NA 
Public authority web site Uncontrolled NA NA Set Non FTF NA NA NA 
Public authority exhibition Uncontrolled NA NA Set Non FTF NA NA NA 
Formal / Informal Meetings 
with representatives of 
associations 
Controlled NA NA Flexible FTF NA NA NA 
Visits of existing facilities 
with  associations Controlled NA NA Flexible FTF NA NA NA 
Compulsory Local 
Committee for Information 
and Monitoring 
Controlled NA NA Flexible FTF NA NA NA 
Top-down 
Communication 
Phone Communication  
with associations Controlled 
NA NA Flexible Non FTF NA NA NA 
                                                 
232 Associations is a generic term which indifferently names NGOs, groups of interests, or other organizations. 
233 NOTE :  FTF = Face-To-Face ; NA = Non Answer, where the  key charateristic is not relevant for the type of engagement 
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Characteristics233 
Engagement 
Class 
Type of 
Mechanism232 
Selection 
Method: 
Controlled-
Uncontrolled 
Elicitation 
Facilitation: 
Yes-No 
Response 
Mode: 
Open-
Closed 
Information 
Input: 
Set-Flexible 
Medium of 
information 
transfer: 
FTF-Non FTF 
Facilitation of 
aggregation: 
Structured-
Unstructured 
Addressee of 
information: 
Public authority-
Larger  public 
Argument: 
Yes-No 
Opinion Survey 
 Controlled No Closed NA Non FTF Structured NA 
NA 
Local referenda Controlled No Closed NA Non FTF Structured NA NA 
Consultative Committee Controlled No Open NA Non FTF Unstructured NA NA 
Local public services 
consultative commission 
(compulsory) 
Controlled No Open NA Non FTF Unstructured NA  
Consultation meeting with  
representatives of 
associations 
Controlled No Open NA Non FTF  Unstructured NA NA 
Top-down 
Consultation 
Consultation public 
meeting Uncontrolled No Open NA FTF Unstructured NA NA 
Action Planning Workshop 
(Départemental 
commission for the 
disposal of household and 
similar waste plan) 
Controlled Yes Open Flexible FTF Unstructured NA NA 
Non compulsory and 
(sometimes) compulsory 
Local commission for 
information and monitoring 
Controlled No Open Flexible FTF Unstructured NA NA 
Registre d’enquête 
(Enquiry Register) 
(Compulsory Public 
Enquiry) 
Uncontrolled Yes Open Set Non FTF Unstructured NA NA 
Top-down 
Participation 
 
Interview with 
commissaires enquêteurs 
(compulsory public 
enquiry) 
Uncontrolled Yes Open Set FTF Unstructured NA NA 
No Mechanism NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA No Engagement 
Legal actions NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
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Characteristics233 
Engagement 
Class 
Type of 
Mechanism232 
Selection 
Method: 
Controlled-
Uncontrolled 
Elicitation 
Facilitation: 
Yes-No 
Response 
Mode: 
Open-
Closed 
Information 
Input: 
Set-Flexible 
Medium of 
information 
transfer: 
FTF-Non FTF 
Facilitation of 
aggregation: 
Structured-
Unstructured 
Addressee of 
information: 
Public authority-
Larger  public 
Argument: 
Yes-No 
Association meeting with 
policy-makers NA No Open NA FTF Unstructured NA 
NA Bottom-up 
Consultation 
 
Request of Documents NA No Open NA Non FTF Unstructured NA NA 
Demonstration Controlled NA NA Set FTF NA Public authority No 
Petition Controlled NA NA Set FTF NA Public authority No 
Protest letter sent  to 
policy-makers Controlled NA NA Set FTF NA Public authority No 
Association press release Controlled NA NA Set Non FTF NA Larger Public Yes 
Open Letters to policy-
makers Controlled NA NA Set Non FTF NA Larger Public No 
Association information 
broadcast 
(‘Publicity’ via newsletters/ 
Journal, 
newspaper) 
Controlled NA NA Set Non FTF NA Larger Public Yes 
Association exhibition Uncontrolled NA NA Set Non FTF NA Larger Public Yes 
Association web site Uncontrolled NA NA Set Non FTF NA Larger Public Yes 
Association public meeting Uncontrolled NA NA Flexible FTF NA Larger Public Yes 
Association conferences Uncontrolled NA NA Flexible FTF NA Larger Public Yes 
Bottom-up 
Communication 
Association newsletter, 
reports,  or expertises, sent 
to policy-makers 
Controlled NA NA Set Non FTF NA Public authority Yes 
Not  present in this 
research. For illustration, 
some mechanisms listed 
by Rowe and Frewer: 
        
Community based 
research Controlled Yes Open Flexible FTF Unstructured Public authority Yes  
Bottom-up  
Participation 
Patient association Controlled Yes Open Flexible FTF Unstructured Public authority Yes 
C
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ACTUAL PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT:  
CHARTS BY CLASS OF MECHANISMS 
 This appendix contains the charts of chronological study of the public engagement along 
the decision-making processes. There is one chart for each of the seven types of public 
engagement mechanisms: top-down communication, top-down consultation, top-down 
participation, legal actions (no engagement), bottom-up communication, bottom-up 
consultation, and bottom-up participation. The Y-axis represents the number of initiatives 
while the X-axis is made of the three key stages of the decision-making processes (‘framing’, 
‘specifications’, and ‘realisation’). There are ten curves on each chart: one for each decision-
making process. At last, the tables situated under the charts are the data tables: the numbers 
are the numbers of initiatives. 
 The three cases (1. Gueugnon, 2. Angers, 3. Thiviers) in which the incineration plant 
project were finally given up ended during the second stage. Consequently, there is no third 
stage for these three cases. Moreover, there is no curve for the case 7. Nîmes since it has been 
finally removed from the research due to a lack of data. 
 In order to draw these charts, it has been necessary to set up first the tables of the relative 
data. These tables combine the typology of the public engagement mechanisms and the three 
key chronological stages. For each of the 10 decision-making processes, a first table is set up: 
in the two first columns are indicated the class and the type of the mechanisms while the key 
chronological stages are in the first row. In each cell, that is, for each type of mechanism and 
for each chronological stage, the number of initiatives actually organised has been counted. I 
have not included these tables in the dissertation; but I have included a second kind of table, 
more synthetic. This second kind of table is composed of the seven classes of mechanisms 
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and of the three chronological stages. In each cell, that is, for each class of mechanisms and 
for each stage, the number of initiatives actually organised is indicated. The synthetic tables 
can be found under each chart, respectively.  
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ACTUAL PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT:  
CHARTS BY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 This appendix contains the charts of the chronological study of the public engagement 
along the decision-making processes. There is one chart for each of the 10 cases. The Y-axis 
represents the number of initiatives while the X-axis is made of the three key stages of the 
decision-making processes (‘framing’, ‘specifications’, and ‘realisation’). On each chart, 
there is one curve for each of the seven types of public engagement mechanisms (top-down 
communication, top-down consultation, top-down participation, legal actions [no 
engagement], bottom-up communication, bottom-up consultation, and bottom-up 
participation). The tables situated under the charts are the data tables: the numbers are the 
numbers of initiatives. 
 The three cases (1. Gueugnon, 2. Angers, 3. Thiviers) in which the incineration plant 
project has finally been given up ended during the second stage. Thus, there is no third stage 
for these three cases. Moreover, there is no chart for the case 7. Nîmes since it has been finally 
removed from the research due to a lack of data. 
 In order to draw these charts, it has been necessary to set up first the tables of the relative 
data. These tables combine the typology of the public engagement mechanisms and the three 
key chronological stages. For each of the ten decision-making processes, a first table is set up: 
in the two first columns are indicated the class and the type of the mechanisms while the key 
chronological stages are in the first row. In each cell, that is, for each type of mechanism and 
for each chronological stage, the number of initiatives actually organised has been counted. I 
have not included these tables in the dissertation; but I have included a second kind of table, 
more synthetic. This second kind of table is composed of the seven classes of mechanisms 
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and of the three chronological stages. In each cell, that is, for each class of mechanisms and 
for each stage, the number of initiatives actually organised is indicated. The synthetic tables 
can be found under each chart, respectively.  
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COLLECTIF INCINER’ÀTORT: NEWSLETTER N°1 
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SOURCES OF DATA 
 
In the first section, this annexe lists, for each case, all the interviewees, documents and 
web site edited by the public authorities and by the NGOs. In the second one, the secondary 
literature can be found. 
 
I. Interviews and Documents 
Case1. Gueugnon 
 
Interviews: 
 
Public authority: 
? Grouping of communes : mixed syndicate SMEVOM du Charolais-Brionnais et Autunois 
 
NGOs: 
? VPIG 
? Autun Morvan Ecologie 
 
 
Documents: 
 
Grouping of communes:  
 
? Web-site : www.smevom.fr last access 19/08/2007; http://www.ville-
gueugnon.fr/ville/delib.htm last access 19/08/2007 
? Minute of the town council of Gueugnon 03/05/2002 
? Minute of the town council of Gueugnon 28/11/2002 
? Minute of the town council of Gueugnon 20/12/2002 
? Minute of the town council of Gueugnon 30/01/2003 
? Minute of the town council of Gueugnon 19/12//2003 
? Minute of the town council of Gueugnon 25/03/2004 
? Minute of the town council of Gueugnon 08/07/2004 
? Minute of the town council of Gueugnon  23/09/2004 
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? Minute of the town council of Gueugnon 18/11/2004 
? Minute of the town council of Gueugnon 24/03/2005 
? Minute of the town council of Gueugnon 25/00/2006 
 
  
NGOs: - 
 
Other: 
? Le Journal de Saône et Loire 03/04/2005 
? Le Journal de Saône et Loire29/03//2005 
 
Case 2. Angers 
Interviews: 
 
Public authority  
? Grouping of communes:  Urba community Angers Loire Métropole 
 
 
NGOs: 
? Angers Roseraie Environement (AREN) 
? Collectif Incinér’a’tort: 2 interviewees  
? Sauvegarde de l’Anjou: No answer 
 
  
 
Documents: 
 
Grouping of communes (Angers Loire Métropole):  
 
? Newsletters of ‘Angers Loire Métropole’: 
o  power point presentations used on meetings  
o web-site: 
http://www.angersloiremetropole.fr/domaines_intervention/environnement/dechets.ht
m  
http://www.angersloiremetropole.fr/telechargement/telechargement_environn
ement.htm 
o Minutes of the “comités de pilotages” in charge of the waste treatment project 
 
NGOs: 
  
? AREN: 
o  “Emissions aériennes d’oxydes d’azote”, observations de l’AREN à la CLIS, 13 
September 2005 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 16) 
o “Usine d’Incinération, La requalification: un expedient à hauts risques”, press release, 
12 January 2004 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 15) 
o “Usine d’Incinération, L’AREN, acteur de la démocratie participative locale”, press 
release, 10 october 2003 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 14) 
o “Mémo réunion publique 20 avril 2004”, minute of the NGO’s speech at a public 
meeting sponsored by the public authority, 20 April 2004 (ATLAS-ti Primary 
Document P 13) 
o “Mémo Réunion assos 7 avril 2004”, minute of the NGO’s speech at a public meeting 
sponsored by the public authority, 7 April 2004 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 12) 
o “Lettre ouverte à Monsieur le president de la commnauté d’agglomération d’Angers”, 
open letter, 23 May 2003 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 11) 
o “à Monsieur le Président du conseil de développement du Pays et de l’agglomération 
d’Angers”, letter to the conseil de développement, 29 March 2004 (ATLAS-ti 
Primary Document P 10) 
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o “Incinération des Déchets, l’AREN sort de son silence”, press release, 15 April 2005 
(ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 9) 
o “Usine d’Incinération, pour l’AREN : la raison l’a finalement emporté !”, press 
release, 12 May 2004 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 8) 
o “Feuille de route pour les élus de l’agglo d’Angers”, minute of the NGO’s speech at a 
public meeting sponsored by the public authority, 27 May 2005 (ATLAS-ti Primary 
Document P 7) 
o “Usine d’incinération de la roseraie, tribunal administrative: l’AREN obtient gain de 
cause dans un long contentieux d’urbanisme”, press release, 2 January 2002 (ATLAS-
ti Primary Document P 5) 
o “Usine d’incinération de la roseraie: imprévoyance ou mauvais calcul ? », press 
release, 21 March 2003 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 4) 
o “Usine d’incinération, pourquoi ne pas dire la vérité aux Angevins?”, press release, 
22 April 2003 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 3) 
o “Usine d’incinération de la roseraie, fonctionnera-t-elle après le 28 décembre 2005 ? 
demande l’AREN”, press release, 23 June 2003 (ATLAS-ti Primary Document P 2) 
o “Cadre de vie, santé environnement”, press release,  28 December 2003 (ATLAS-ti 
Primary Document P 1) 
 
? Collectif Incinér’a’tort 
o  Newsletters from number 1 (May 2005) to 9 (January 2006) 
o  web-site: http://www.incineratort.com  
? Sauvegarde de l’Anjou 
Web site: http://perso.orange.fr/sauvegarde.anjou/ 
 
Case 3. Thiviers 
 
Interviews: 
 
Public authority: 
? Grouping of communes: mixed syndicate SMD3 
 
NGOs: 
? Thiviers-la-Vie 
? Collectif Halt’Incin 
 
Documents: 
 
Grouping of communes:  
? Web-site : http://perso.orange.fr/geotrie/  
  
NGOs: 
 
Thiviers-la-Vie : 
? Web-site : http://www.thiviers.fr/thivierslavie/actualites.html  
 
Collectif Halt’incin: Lettre de Halt’incin N°1 to N°31 
Other: 
 
Web site: http://www.incinerateur-bergeracois-danger.ouvaton.org 
 
Case 4. Arras 
 
Interviews: 
 
Public authority: 
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? Grouping of communes: mixed syndicate SMAV  
 
 
NGOs:  
? Nord Nature : no interview 
 
Documents: 
 
Grouping of communes: 
 
Communauté Urbaine d’Arras: http://www.cu-arras.fr/index2.php?rub=missions&page=8  
 
NGOs: 
 
Web site: www.nord-nature.org/ 
 
 
Case 5. Lasse 
 
Interviews: 
 
Public authority: 
 
? Grouping of communes: mixed syndicate SIVERT 
? Municipality of Lasse 
 
 
NGOs: 
 
? CRITOM 
? Sauvegarde de l’Anjou: No answer 
 
  
Documents: 
 
Grouping of communes:  
? Press articles 
? Web-site: http://www.sivert.fr  
 
 
NGOs: 
  
? CRITOM: leaflets, press articles  
? Sauvegarde de l’Anjou 
Web site: http://perso.orange.fr/sauvegarde.anjou/ 
 
 
Case 6. Le Havre (St-Jean-De-Folleville) 
 
Interviews: 
 
Public authority:  
 
? Grouping of communes: mixed syndicate SEVEDE 
 
NGOs:  
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? Comité du quartier des Neiges 
? SOS Estuaire 
? Ecologie Pour Le Havre 
 
Documents: 
 
Grouping of communes:  
 
? Web site : www.sevede.fr  
 
 
NGOs: 
Web sites : http://sos.estuaire.free.fr/ ; http://eplh.free.fr/ 
 
 
Case 7. Nîmes 
 
Interviews: 
 
Public authority: 
 
? Grouping of communes: mixed syndicate SITOM SUD GARD 
 
NGOs: 
 No interview 
 
Documents: 
 
Grouping of communes:  
 
? Web site : www.sitom-sud-gard.com  
 
NGOs: 
 
Web site : http://reseau-ecoforum2.chez-alice.fr/ICIROM/IciRom.htm 
 
 
Case 8. Villers-Saint-Paul 
 
Interviews: 
 
Public authority:  
? Grouping of communes: mixed syndicate SMVO  
 
 
NGOs: 
? Alerte aux Déchets 
? Compiègne écologie 
 
Documents: 
 
Grouping of communes:  
 
? Web-site : www.smvo.fr  
 
NGOs: 
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Web site: www.alerteauxdéchets.org 
 
 
Case 9. Calce 
 
Interviews: 
 
Public authority: 
 
? Grouping of communes: mixed syndicate SYDETOM66 
NGOs: 
 
? Coordination Environnementale de Traitement des Déchets des Pyrénées orientales 
? La Hune  
 
Documents: 
 
Grouping of communes:  
 
 Web site : http://www.sydetom66.com  
 
NGOs: 
 
 
Case 10. Evreux-Guichainville 
 
Interviews: 
 
Public authority: 
 
?  Grouping of communes: mixed syndicate SETOM 
 
NGOs: 
? Association Seine et Marnaise pour la Sauvegarde de la Nature : President Ms Gilloire  
 
Documents: 
 
Grouping of communes:  
 
? Web site : www.lombric.com  
NGOs: 
 
ASNSM : Association Seine et Marnaise pour la Sauvegarde de la Nature 
 
Web site : www.asnsm.org 
 
 
Case 11. Vaux-le-Pénil 
 
Interviews: 
 
Public authority:  
?  Grouping of communes: mixed syndicate SMITOM 
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NGOs: 
? ASMSN: Association Seine-et-Marnaise pour la Sauvegarde de la Nature 
? Association des Médecins de Maincy 
? Un autre regard pour Maincy 
? AVIE: Association de défense des Victimes de l'Incinération des Déchets 
? AIPPNE: Association Intercommunale pour la Protection et la Promotion de la Nature et de 
l'Environnement 
 
Documents: 
 
Grouping of communes:  
 
? Web site : www.lombric.com  
NGOs: 
 
ASNSM : Association Seine et Marnaise pour la Sauvegarde de la Nature 
 
Web site : www.asnsm.org 
 
II. Secondary Litterature 
 
Organisations 
 
ADEME, www.ademe.fr 
Ministère de l’Ecologie et du Développement durable, MEDD : www.environnement.gouv.fr 
IFEN, Institut français de l’environnement, Données de l’Environnement, www.ifen.fr 
FEDEREC, Fédération Française de la Récupération pour la gestion industrielle de l’environnement et du 
recyclage, www.federec.com 
FNADE, Fédération Nationale de la Dépollution et de l’Environnement, www.fnade.com 
INERIS, Institut National de l’Environnement Industriel et des Risques, www.ineris.fr 
ECO-EMBALLAGES, www.ecoemballages.fr 
ADELPHE, www.adelphe-recyclage.com 
AMF, Association des Maires de France, www.amf.asso.fr 
AMORCE, Association de collectivités et de professionnels, www.amorce.asso.fr 
Greenpeace France: www.greenpeace.fr  
WWF France: www.wwf.fr  
CNIID: www.cniid.org  
COFRAC http://www.cofrac.fr/Cofrac_en.htm 
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Internet Web Sites 
Droit français : www.legifrance.gouv.fr, http://admi.net, www.senat.fr, http://aida.ineris.fr, 
www.recup.net/legislation.html, 
Portail européen de l’environnement, http://www.enviro2b.com/france 
Veille environnement, http://www.terrabilis.com/ 
Actualités déchets : www.dechetscom.com, www.environmentdaily.com 
Information & service environnement, www.pro-environnement.com 
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